Mexico's Drug War

Controversy Reemerges Over US Drones in Mexico

On February 22nd, the details of the arrest of Mexican drug kingpin Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzmán were slow to emerge. The notorious leader of the Sinaloa Federation, the largest and most powerful drug cartel in Mexico, had been on the run from authorities for 13 years.
Word was that he was paying his bodyguards and corrupt police at last $1 million per month to keep his whereabouts secret, and for a long time it worked.

However over the weekend, his luck ran out. Guzmán grew tired of being holed up in his mountain sanctuary and started becoming more lax in his security protocols. Mexican authorities were hot on his tail in the city of Culiacán, but he managed to escape through a series of tunnels under various buildings. Then he fled to the resort area of Mazatlán, where he was captured in a hotel room without a shot being fired, seemingly unaware that the Mexican marines were upon him.

So how did the Mexican military finally find him after all this time? Multiple media reports said the operation was in the works for several weeks, and that the DEA intercepted phone calls from a satellite phone Guzmán used during this time. Unconfirmed reports indicate the number of that satellite phone was derived from the arrest of the son of El Chapo’s partner, Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada. US officials have also confirmed that American drones were used for surveillance operations in Culiacán: “The US surveillance drone was used for two weeks between mid-January and mid-February to back up a massive operation in the northwestern city of Culiacán, a US government official told AFP on condition of anonymity.”

The key statement in this story—and also the one most likely to stir up controversy—is this: “[The drone] had been deployed in Culiacán to corroborate other intelligence and that Mexico’s military had authorized its use.” As soon as this information was published, Twitter erupted with claims that the use of U.S. drones in Mexico violated that nation’s constitution, and it was also a violation of Mexico’s sovereignty. It turns out that both of these statements are doubtful.

To read the rest of my article on Breitbart Texas, please CLICK HERE!

Cartel Kingpin Arrest Signals the End of an Era for Mexican Drug War

The arrest on Saturday morning of the Sinaloa cartel’s front man, Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzmán, was not just a victory for the Mexican government. It foretold the end of the mafia-esque era of “old school” drug cartels that characterized several decades in the history of Mexican drug trafficking. The future narco landscape is now littered with roughly 80 smaller gangs and mini cartels that are fighting to the death for their share of the multi-billion dollar illegal drug business.

Cartels like the Sinaloa Federation formerly run by El Chapo were a family business in the 1980s and 1990s. All of them go back to one main drug trafficking organization in Mexico known as the Guadalajara cartel. It was split up into a few pieces in 1987, and its remnants still exist today as the Tijuana, Juárez, and Sinaloa cartels. The Gulf cartel in the northeast corner of Mexico developed independently at around the same time frame, but is a shadow of its former self, much like the Tijuana and Juárez cartels.

The two bulwarks remaining today are Guzmán’s organization and Los Zetas, a group that started out as a private army for the Gulf cartel, but then went independent in 2010 as drug traffickers and bloodthirsty killers willing to target innocent people in their greedy quest for profits. But even Los Zetas, as large and powerful as they are, have started to show some major cracks, and the Sinaloa Federation has been hit particularly hard by the Mexican government in recent weeks. 

To read the rest of my article on Breitbart Texas, please CLICK HERE!

Mainstream Media Has Failed to Cover Cartels, Border Security

Our southwest border with Mexico is completely unlike any other part of the United States. It is also a place that needs to be personally experienced in order to fully understand the complexities and nuances of life next to another country. But Mexico is not just any country; it is our third largest trading partner, and our two nations share a cultural bond that goes back over a hundred years. This cross-border relationship hasn’t always been pretty, and at some points in history, it has been downright ugly. However, US and Mexican citizens have always found a way to exchange ideas, trade goods, and friendships.

After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, our relationship with Mexico became much more
complicated. Some of us became concerned about terrorists entering the United States to do us harm by crossing the border from Mexico. Drug cartels—which had existed rather quietly for decades—were now cutting off people’s heads and massacring hundreds of innocent migrants, all in the pursuit of enormous drug profits. These cartels operate fluidly on both sides of the border and engage in violent activity throughout the United States.

However, they behave very differently here than they do in Mexico, and much of their illicit—and often violent—activity goes unnoticed by most of America. Reports of cartel-initiate
d murders, home invasions, kidnappings, and assaults on US law enforcement are usually relegated to local media outlets. These outlets often don’t have the time or ability to follow up on these stories months later, which is when cartel connections are frequently made. As a result, the rest of the country gets an inaccurate picture of what the security situation is like along various parts of our southwest border. Not all of its 2,000-mile expanse is a war zone, but it’s not all peace, love, and happiness either.

After serving for eight years in the US Air Force as an officer and special agent, I worked for four years as a senior intelligence analyst for the State of California. I researched and wrote extensively about cartel organizations, drug trafficking, weapons trafficking, human smuggling, and other illicit activities in which cartels were engaged. Since 2009, I have worked independently as a consultant and writer, and my focus on these issues has continued, although my audience has changed. My passion for informing concerned Americans about Mexico’s drug war and border security issues has manifested itself during this time in two books and numerous print, academic, and online pieces for a wide variety of media outlets.

Now I have the opportunity to share my experience and analysis of these issues through Breitbart Texas. In the eight years I have spent researching and writing about the drug war and border security, I have yet to come across a media company with such a strong desire to focus a significant portion of its attention on these issues. I have said repeatedly in my books, writings, and media interviews that I don’t believe our national leaders view the violence in Mexico as a threat to our national security, nor do they view border security as a high enough priority. I hope that my contributions to Breitbart Texas help more Americans understand how these issues affect not only border residents, but our citizens in every corner of this country.

I believe one of my strongest assets is my ability to present important information about the drug war and the border in a non-partisan fashion and fully supported by concrete facts—something every analyst strives to do. My mission as a contributing editor for Breitbart Texas will rest on these principles, and I am dedicated to providing readers with information and analysis they can bank on when it comes to these issues.

LINK TO ORIGINAL ARTICLE

"Mexico vigilantes in turf war with drug cartel."

Here is an excerpt from this Associated Press article in The Guardian:

"Hundreds of vigilantes in Mexico were involved in a gun battle with a drug cartel over the weekend in a fight to control territory. Members of so-called self-defence groups entered Nueva Italia in Michoacán state in an effort to liberate towns from the control of the Knights Templar cartel. Opponents and critics say the vigilantes are backed by a rival cartel, something the groups deny. Hundreds of vigilantes drove into Nueva Italia late on Sunday morning in a caravan of large trucks, surrounded the city hall and disarmed local police... An Associated Press journalist witnessed citizens initially welcoming them. But shooting broke out almost immediately in and around the centre square... Fighting between vigilantes and alleged cartel members has racked Michoacán for almost a year. President Enrique Peña Nieto's government has sent thousands of federal police officers and soldiers to the state, but the situation has worsened... The federal government has said the civilian vigilante groups are operating outside the law, armed with high-calibre weapons Mexico allows only for military use. ut government forces have not moved against them and in some cases seem to be working in concert with the vigilantes." Link to Full Article

Analysis: The expansion of the vigilante movement has been going on for several years, and I can recall an incident in a very rural town going back to 2009. In that case, a local girl had been kidnapped, and the townspeople--after apprehending the kidnappers--tied the five men to trees and beat them senseless. They even managed to stave off police from entering the town. On the flip side of that, after an enforcer group for the Sinaloa Federation dumped 35 bodies in Veracruz and claiming the dead were members of Los Zetas, they called themselves the "Mata Zetas" and said their mission was to rid Mexico of the bloodthirsty killers. It was all a sham, and other groups with that name have emerged before under less than honorable circumstances.

But the violence often associated with vigilantism in Mexico has never been more extreme than what has been observed in the state of Michoacán in the last year, and particularly in the last few weeks. It led the Mexican government to send in the military to secure the major port of Lázaro Cárdenas and stand down the entire local police force. Rumors and accusations are swirling that the Knights Templar and/or rival cartels like the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) have infiltrated the vigilantes--or militias, as some media outlets are calling them--and that local police and governments are supporting militia activity.

It's interesting to note that, while there are many differences, there are also some similarities between these vigilante groups and the autodefensas that were active in Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s. Known as the AUC, they started out as private armies working for drug lords to protect their territories and operations from terrorist groups like the FARC and ELN. They went into areas where the FARC operated and uprooted the communities that they thought provided logistical, personnel, and moral support to the guerrillas. Some estimates claim as many as 2.5 million people in Colombia were displaced by the AUC, which eventually became engaged in the drug trade as well. The autodefensas in Mexico are different in the sense that they're generally made up of non-criminal local citizens who are tired of the cartel violence and feel they need to do the job the government can't or won't do.

However, the similarty lies in the fact that sizeable factions of the government, military, and police inevitably end up supporting vigilante activity. They are all fighting against the same enemy, and for every vigilante holding a gun and placing himself in harm's way, that's one less police officer or soldier that needs to risk that confrontation. The rule of law that Mexico is working so hard to reinstate is obviously being snubbed, but that may be okay in the eyes of people who feel that any cartel or militia members who get arrested are never going to see the inside of a courtroom anyway. Government officials probably think it's sufficient to speak out vocally against vigilante groups that operate outside the law, but then in practice, be content to look the other way and allow those groups to do the dirty work.

The main problem with this attitude is that the Mexican government can't rely on these often untrained and disorganized groups to contain the violence. It's not just the Knights Templar operating in Michoacán; you have the remnants of La Familia Michoacana, as well as elements of the CJNG. When you mix three cartels, plus government/police forces, plus militia groups, violence is going to get out of control and people are going to lose track of who's killing whom. That poses a big public relations problem for President Enrique Peña Nieto; not only does he have to somehow quell violence being initiated by at least three or four different groups, but he has to find a way to convince local officials that the rule of law needs to stand. That would involve arresting militia leaders and members--an option that would likely be highly unpopular.

I'm curious to see what tack EPN will take to try to deal with the security situation in Michoacán. But even if he manages to quell the violence there, odds are the militia movement will emerge elsewhere, and possibly on a larger scale if similar groups see the Michoacán groups achieve any level of success. Ultimately, the entire situation demonstrates that the Mexican government has lost control of parts of Mexico to TCOs, and the strategies they have developed and are following continue to fail in the face of unending corruption.

New eLearn Courses About Mexico's Drug War

I'm very excited to announce that I've expanded my consulting business to include very brief online courses about various issues stemming from Mexico's drug war! Three courses are live right now:

A History of Mexican Drug Cartels

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

An Overview of Drug Trafficking in Mexico

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Mexican Marijuana Grows in the United States

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Over the next few days, I'll be going live with a few more courses. I invite you to visit the eLearn page on my consulting business website to see the full library of what I'll be offering, and check back often to see what's gone live!

 

Official website and book trailer for "Border Insecurity" are up!

I'm very proud to announce that both the official website and trailer for my forthcoming book, Border Insecurity: Why Big Money, Fences, and Drones Aren't Making Us Safer, are up! 

You can visit the wesbite here: Border Insecurity  Feel free to explore reviews as I accumulate them, images from the book, and events as they get scheduled!

And after many hours of hard work, I'm very excited to present the official trailer...

 

BOOK REVIEW: "Midnight in Mexico," by Alfredo Corchado

I bought this book a few months ago when it first came out, but since I've been working furiously on my own manuscript, I haven't had time for any recreational reading until a few days ago. Since it came out, I've been reading many glowing reviews, so my anticipation of cracking the book - or Kindle, as it were - open was growing. I read the book over just two days, and to say the least, I wasn't disappointed. Here's the book description from Amazon.com:

"In the last six years, more than eighty thousand people have been killed in the Mexican drug war, and drug trafficking there is a multibillion-dollar business. In a country where the powerful are rarely scrutinized, noted Mexican American journalist Alfredo Corchado refuses to shrink from reporting on government corruption, murders in Juarez, or the ruthless drug cartels of Mexico. A paramilitary group spun off from the Gulf cartel, the Zetas, controls key drug routes in the north of the country. In 2007, Corchado received a tip that he could be their next target—and he had twenty four hours to find out if the threat was true.

"Rather than leave his country, Corchado went out into the Mexican countryside to trace investigate the threat. As he frantically contacted his sources, Corchado suspected the threat was his punishment for returning to Mexico against his mother’s wishes. His parents had fled north after the death of their young daughter, and raised their children in California where they labored as migrant workers. Corchado returned to Mexico as a journalist in 1994, convinced that Mexico would one day foster political accountability and leave behind the pervasive corruption that has plagued its people for decades.

"But in this land of extremes, the gap of inequality—and injustice—remains wide. Even after the 2000 election that put Mexico’s opposition party in power for the first time, the opportunities of democracy did not materialize. The powerful PRI had worked with the cartels, taking a piece of their profit in exchange for a more peaceful, and more controlled, drug trade. But the party’s long-awaited defeat created a vacuum of power in Mexico City, and in the cartel-controlled states that border the United States. The cartels went to war with one another in the mid-2000s, during the war to regain control of the country instituted by President Felipe Calderón, and only the violence flourished. The work Corchado lives for could have killed him, but he wasn't ready to leave Mexico—not then, maybe never. Midnight in Mexico is the story of one man’s quest to report the truth of his country—as he raced to save his own life."

As I mentioned in my last book review for The Fight to Save Juárez, it's awesome to read a book (at least partly) about Mexico's drug war that is truly personal and shows the human side of things. Midnight isn't written in a linear/chronological fashion, but I don't think that takes away from the substance of the book - Corchado's internal battles over the future of Mexico and how he deals with death threats made repeatedly by cartels he writes about. I don't know Corchado personally, but I've been reading his articles for years, and I consider his love of over 20 years, Angela Kocherga (who appears frequently throughout the book), to be a friend. In other words, I felt a personal connection to his story, and a great respect for the risks he has taken as a journalist to at least try to get to the truth of matters - an almost impossible task in Mexico.

The writing is superb. He mentions in his acknowledgements something about getting help with his dry reporter's writing, but there's nothing about Midnight I found even close to that description. The passages about his childhood I found less interesting than his secret meetings with an unnamed US investigator who held the key to finding the identity of his potential killer, or reading about his conversations with people at the highest levels of both the US and Mexican governments like I was there in the room when they happened; but that's a personal preference.

There's a little bit of drug war history interspersed throughout the narrative, but it's just to give context and doesn't slow down the narrative. You don't need to be an expert on happenings in Mexico to appreciate the first-hand, gritty look at murders in Ciudad Juárez and politics in Mexico City from the ground up. Midnight is truly a gripping read that you're going to have a hard time putting down, and Corchado's writing will make you feel like you were there with him and his colleagues the night he found out he was a hunted man. I highly recommend Midnight in Mexico for your next read.

BOOK REVIEW: "The Fight to Save Juárez: Life in the Heart of Mexico's Drug War," by Ricardo Ainslie

I was very lucky to have been asked to do a peer review of this manuscript during the publishing process, as I got to read this admirable work before almost anyone else. I get asked to do a lot of reviews of books dealing with Mexico's drug war, and while I love expanding my knowledge of the subject, sometimes the material gets a bit repetitive. That's just the nature of our business; there are certain facts and issues you have to hit in case your readers are wholly unfamiliar with the topic. However, what I loved the most about The Fight is the fact that Ainslie manages to work drug war facts and history into a gripping narrative, rather than the norm, which is the other way around.

The Fight tells the story (among others) of the descent of Ciudad Juárez into a violent narco hell during the tenure of former Mayor José Reyes Ferriz roughly between 2007-2010). While the narrative is primarily from Ferriz's perspective, Ainslie also delves into the lives of a cartel member's mistress, a human rights activist, a photojournalist, and others. He describes in heart-wrenching details events like the Villas del Salvarcar massacre, where gang members on a cartel payroll ambushed a party and killed several innocent teenagers and young adults in a case of mistaken identity. You can feel Ferriz's anxiety in dealing with corrupt police officials and trying to find someone willing, able and courageous enough to take a leadership role that often equates to suicide.

To say that Ainslie had an in-the-trenches perspective while researching this book is an understatement. He had first-hand access to the Mayor, members of for President Felipe Calderón's cabinet, and citizens on the street whose stories tend to be far more fascinating than anything you can find in fiction. Far too often we learn about Ciudad Juárez through news reports telling all about body counts and cartel perpetrators, which completely dehumanizes the city and its all-too-human population. The Fight takes the reader into the heart of life as a Juárez resident, and not just someone looking in from the safety behind bulletproof glass. The research is impeccable and the narrative is rich and gripping. If you want to learn more about the struggle to return Juárez to some semblance of normalcy from the perspective of real people rather than headlines, then I highly recommend you pick up a copy of The Fight to Save Juárez.

"Mario 'X-20' Ramirez Treviño, Mexico's Gulf Cartel leader, in custody, law enforcement sources say."

Here are the basics of the arrest from a CBS News report:

"A top drug cartel figure wanted by the U.S. government since 2008 was arrested Saturday in Mexico, CBS News reports. Two law enforcement sources told CBS News that Mario Ramirez- Trevino, also known as Mario Pelon, was captured Saturday morning by Mexican authorities. Ramirez-Trevino is the head of Mexico's Gulf Cartel. The arrest took place at Ramirez-Trevino's house in northern Mexico between Rio Bravo and Reynosa near Mexico's border with Texas. Ramirez-Trevino, 51, was charged in a 2008 federal indictment on multiple drug violations. The State Department had been offering a reward of up to $5 million for information leading to his arrest or conviction." Link to Full Article

Analysis: The exact details of the arrest are coming from several different sources, so I'll try ot sum them up first. Mexico's Proceso magazine reported he was caught by elements of both the army and navy at a military checkpoint in Rio Bravo, Tamaulipas state. He was in possession of several weapons and there were at least ten helicopters involved in the operation. SEGOB confirmed his arrest this afternoon.

Ramirez didn't have the top job in the CDG for very long, although there were some high hopes for TCO reunification after his ascension into the top spot. He was very close with Jaime "El Hummer" Duran, one of the founding members of Los Zetas, and was the number two guy in charge of the Reynosa plaza for some time. After Los Zetas split off from the CDG, Ramirez stayed put. Although the analyses I've read conflict on this account, it appears that he aligned with Los Metros after the CDG internal split occurred in late 2010/early 2011. His boss was Samuel "Metro-3" Flores Borrego, who was executed by CDG rivals under the Rojos faction. After Mexican authorities captured the two top CDG leaders, Jorge "El Coss" Costilla Sánchez and Mario "El Gordo" Cárdenas Guillen, in quick succession last year, Ramirez assumed the top spot.

Not much information is publicly available about Ramirez, although BorderlandBeat has a great post on how he rose to power. As always with the arrest of a TCO leader, people want to know what will happen next - specifically, if the parts of Mexico where the TCO is dominant will experience more violence. Unfortunately, the areas of NE Tamaulipas where Ramirez was captured are already having issues with violence because of internal conflicts and battles with Los Zetas. The CDG was already in a delicate position of trying to reunify two factions that had been trying to kill each other for over two years. I don't think Ramirez was in charge long enough to heal those wounds, and from some reports I've read, the split was bad enough that relatively new ally the Sinaloa Federation was backing off a bit from it's support so as to avoid getting involved in the drama.

The CDG's structure has become much more fluid in the last several years, and the internal splits didn't help matters any. As troubled as they are, the TCO has had some solid victories in Veracruz and stayed relevant enough in parts of the Gulf Coast - certainly in their home base of Matamoros where they control the flow of drugs into south Texas. But some of these victories have been gained through the influence of outside factors, namely the support of the Federation and the arrests of major Zetas players combined with that TCO's own internal problems. Los Zetas are still reeling a bit from the arrest of leader Miguel "Z-40" Treviño Morales, so it's unclear if new top dog Omar/Alejandro Treviño is in a position to consolidate quickly and take advantage of the power vacuum, however temporary it might be.

Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzmán is in a trickier spot. Despite his TCO's size and power, he's feeling the effects of assaults by Los Zetas and La Familia Michoacana. Does he keep supporting the CDG and maintain their alliance to fight Los Zetas, or does he cut loose a ship that's possibly sinking and make his own move into Tamaulipas? It's a tempting thought for sure, seeing both Los Zetas and the CDG in compromised positions. And just like I posted after Z-40 was arrested, it's going to take a few days to see who steps up to fill Ramirez's spot (I prediction I can't make at this point) and a few weeks to see how much worse things can really get in NE Tamaulipas, Monterrey, and other parts of NE Mexico where the CDG has a presence. I'm very much looking forward to reading other analyses of the potential impact of his capture, and I'll be sure to update this post with other points of view as I review them.

"Other kingpin in DEA killing may be freed."

Here is an excerpt from the Associated Press article in the Arizona Daily Star:

"Defense attorneys believe freedom is imminent for a second member of the trio of Mexican drug kingpins responsible for the 1985 slaying of a Drug Enforcement Administration agent (Kiki Camarena, pictured), one of the capo's attorneys said Saturday. In the U.S., outrage grew over this week's surprise decision to overturn Mexican drug lord Rafael Caro Quintero's conviction in the notorious killing. Caro Quintero walked free Friday after a federal court overturned his 40-year sentence in agent Enrique "Kiki" Camarena's kidnapping, torture and murder. The three-judge appeals court in the western state of Jalisco ordered Caro Quintero's immediate release on procedural grounds after 28 years behind bars, saying he should have originally been prosecuted in state instead of federal court. Also imprisoned in the Camarena case are Ernesto Fonseca Carrillo and Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo, two of the founding fathers of modern Mexican drug trafficking, whose cartel based in the northwestern state of Sinaloa later split into some of Mexico's largest drug organizations. Fonseca Carrillo's attorney, Jose Luis Guizar, said his team had filed an appeal based on the same procedural grounds used by Caro Quintero, and expected him to be freed within 15 days by a different court in Jalisco." Link to Full Article

Analysis: For those of you who aren't too familiar with the history of drug trafficking in Mexico, Caro Quintero, Fonseca Carrillo and Félix Gallardo form the narco "holy trinity" that ran the Guadalajara cartel in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1985, Caro Quintero was arrested in Costa Rica and extradited to Mexico, and Fonseca Carrillo was apprehended in Puerto Vallarta by the Mexican army. Félix Gallardo stayed out of the reach of authorities the longest, arrested in 1989 in Mexico but continued running trafficking operations by cell phone until he was transferred to the maximum security prison in Altiplano in the 1990s.

Their involvement in Kiki Camarena's murder wasn't a casual affair. Camarena was working undercover against the cartel for several years. In 1985, he identified a large marijuana growing operation at the cartel's Rancho Bufalo and pressured the Mexican government to stop it. The ranch was raided and the operation came to an end - resulting in Quintero and Carrillo's arrest shortly thereafter - but it wasn't long before the three capos realized Camarena was the infiltrator who game their operation away. Their henchmen kidnapped Camarena in broad daylight while he was on his way to meet his wife for lunch. He was tortured extensively before being killed and buried in a shallow Mexican grave.

The impact of Camarena's disappearance on US-Mexico relations was severe. US Customs brought cross-border traffic to a virtual halt as they searched every vehicle entering the US for signs of Camarena's whereabouts. The pressure on the Mexican government to find him and hold the three Guadalajara cartel leaders accountable was enormous, and a task that then-President (and PRI member) Miguel de la Madrid probably wasn't too enthusiastic about. But despite the fact the three capos were captured and later incarcerated, the cartel lived on. Félix Gallardo knew his time as a free man was limited, and he split up the Guadalajara cartel into some of the TCOs we know now - the Arellano Félix Organization, the Sinaloa cartel and the Carrillo Fuentes Organization.

To say that DEA personnel in the US are angry about Caro Quintero's release - and the potential release of Fonseca Carrillo, and maybe even Félix Gallardo - is an understatement. While it's admirable that the Mexican government is trying to follow the letter of the law, one has to ask why this is happening now, a full 28 years after they were imprisoned, and not back then. The US wants Caro Quintero extradited so he can face criminal charges here, but his whereabouts are already unknown. Releasing Carrillo and Gallardo will be another huge slap in the face to the US government, which has frustratingly remained relatively silent after ICE Special Agent Jaime Zapata was killed by Los Zetas in 2011 and two CIA employees were attacked by dirty federales in late 2012.

The next question becomes, what danger can these men pose after being mostly out of the game for 28 years? Some reports are saying they were still running some operations out of prison, but it's not necessarily the same as physically being in the mix - especially considering their former Guadalajara cartel is in various states of disrepair across the country. Would they join up with Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzmán and his Sinaloa Federation since his organization is the most solid? Or just seek a quiet and anonymous retirement in Yucatán or Los Cabos?

I don't think Caro Quintero's release is upsetting to the US because he poses a potential danger, but because it represents a distortion of justice in a murder case that, even 28 years later, is still an extremely sensitive issue for the DEA and the US government in general. The level of cooperation between our two governments has never been better, but it has been noticeable cooling off since Enrique Peña Nieto took office last December. Intelligence sharing has been restricted from the Mexican side, and now this happens without even a heads up being provided. Mind you, that would have just been a courtesy and not a requirement. The Mexican government can do what it wants, but it's still a snub considering the years-long rhetoric about drug war collaboration.

Bottom line, I wouldn't be surprised if both Fonseca Carrillo and Félix Gallardo are released soon. Maybe they'll get back into the trafficking mix, and maybe they'll just go silently into the night to enjoy their freedom while it lasts. I can't tell from the latest reports if they're going to be indicted under state authority (which I guess is what should have happened in the first place) or if the Mexican government is going to work on extradition orders. But as the article's subtitle states, "US unlikely to pressure Mexico if latest appeal is granted." I think the DEA is going to have to learn to live with the 28 years these men have served as the best justice they're going to get for Camarena's murder.

Zetas Leader Miguel "Z-40" Treviño Morales Captured in Nuevo Laredo

Or so we believe. This news is breaking all over as I type, so this post is subject to updating as more information comes in. A report from the San Antonio Express-News has some more detail than the other early reports, despite the fact that the Dallas Morning News was the first US source I saw cited. From what I'm able to gather from multiple (and sometimes contradictory) US and Mexican sources, Treviño was captured during a shootout with Mexican marines in the border city of Nuevo Laredo. He's wanted in the US on five murder charges and is reportedly behind at least 2,000 killings. Treviño is also "accused of smuggling tons of cocaine and marijuana into the U.S. and laundering tens of millions of dollars here through a number of businesses, including horse racing and real estate." Z-40 has been in charge of Los Zetas since his predecessor, Heriberto "El Lazca" Lazcano was killed in October 2012.

Analysis: So now the question becomes, who will be in charge? And what effect will Treviño's death have on Los Zetas as an organization, as well as their war with the Sinaloa Federation? We were all actually asking these same questions when El Lazca was killed, although the situation was slightly different. Lazcano had handed off most of the TCO's operational aspects to Treviño before he was killed, so he was in a figurehead position for the most part. There were some adjustments at the upper levels because the two men have (had) different leadership styles, but I wasn't made aware of any significant shifts in trafficking patterns or hubs of violence.

In this case, Treviño had a very hands-on operational role; not only as Zetas leader, but head of one of the most lucrative border plazas in Nuevo Laredo, his home base. It's important to remember that Los Zetas aren't organized in a hierarchichal fashion, but work more like a franchise operation. Each cell operates more or less independently, and cell/plaza leaders can determine what criminal activities they'll engage in based on local conditions. There isn't as much direction coming from the top as there is in TCOs like the Sinaloa Federation or the Arellano Félix Organization, so as long as Z-40 is replaced quickly with someone the plaza bosses have confidence in, his capture may only be a speed bump.

Right now I'm looking at his brother and right hand man, Oscár Omar "Z-42" Treviño Morales, who also goes by Alejandro. He's a nasty piece of work in his own right, heavily involved in drug trafficking, kidnapping, and murder, and wanted for US$5 million - the same reward offered for brother Miguel. Back in 2012, Mexican newspaper La Jornada identified him as the #3 man in Los Zetas, and said he was responsible for negotiating the Zetas' supply of Colombian cocaine and precursor chemicals for making methamphetamine. I think Omar/Alejandro would be perfectly capable of taking the Zetas helm, but there may be other plaza bosses who feel the same about themselves. This is where the cell structure is to the disadvantage of the organization as a whole; loyalties in Los Zetas are much more fickle than they are in family-run or "old school" TCOs, although loyalty to a kingpin is never really guaranteed. It's always possible that the bloodbath to fill Z-40's position could begin any day now, although I'm not convinced that's going to be the definitive route for Los Zetas.

One man who is most certainly doing a happy dance is Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzmán, head of the Federation. I'm not sure how well he'll be able to exploit Z-40's capture, since El Lazca's death didn't deal him a huge benefit. However, because Treviño has a much bigger and active role in Los Zetas than El Lazca did when he was killed, there's a better chance El Chapo could see this as the perfect time to strike. Guzmán and Los Zetas have been fighting over Nuevo Laredo since 2004, and the city could now be perceived as ripe for the picking. This is why it's crucial for Omar/Alejandro or someone else to step up and step in as quickly and seamlessly as possible with a strong show of leadership and strength if violence during this transition is to be minimized. Only the body count in the days and weeks ahead will be a real indicator of how smoothly (or not) the Zetas' recovery is going.

"Three Defendants Plead Guilty to Participating in Ambush Murder and Attempted Murder of ICE Agents in Mexico."

Here's an excerpt from the Department of Justice press release:

"Julian Zapata Espinoza, also known as “Piolin,” 32, pleaded guilty today to the murder of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Special Agent Jaime Zapata and the attempted murder of ICE Special Agent Victor Avila in Mexico. The court also unsealed today the guilty pleas of three other defendants on related murder, attempted murder, racketeering, and accessory charges... As set forth in court filings, on February 15, 2011, Espinoza, a commander in Los Zetas Cartel, a heavily armed Mexican narco-trafficking cartel and transnational criminal organization, attempted to hijack Special Agent Zapata’s and Special Agent Avila’s armored government vehicle as the agents were driving on Highway 57 in San Luis Potosi. Two armed Zetas hit squads, or “estacas,” forced the agents off the road, and surrounded their vehicle. Espinoza, the leader of the attack, ordered the agents to exit their vehicle. When the agents refused and attempted to identify themselves as American diplomats from the U.S. Embassy, the hit squad members fired weapons near and into the vehicle, striking both agents. Estaca members continued to fire at the vehicle as the agents attempted to escape by driving away. Special Agent Zapata died as a result of the gunshot wounds he suffered during the attack, and Special Agent Avila was seriously injured... As part of their guilty pleas, Espinoza, Rivera, and Villagran admitted to being members of a Los Zetas hit squad and to participating directly in the February 15, 2011 ambush of the two special agents. The fourth defendant, Flores, acknowledged assisting Zetas members after the February 15 attack. All four defendants face a maximum sentence of life in prison. No sentencing date has been set for the defendants." Link to Full Press Release

Analysis: Part of me wants to be happy and relieved that justice has finally been served, and that these Zetas scum are being held accountable for actions the likely took thinking no one could touch them. Another [cynical] side of me wishes I could get a comprehensive summary of the evidence (hopefully) piled against these men that encouraged them to accept a plea deal. 

According to a Brownsville Herald article from last year that talked about El Piolin's hearing getting pushed back to September 2012, "authorities reported to have turned over thousands of pages of discovery for the trial and that thousands more are being processed." I'd like to think all those pages means that there are ample reports from investigators, forensic specialists, crime scene examiners, etc. However, remember that this investigation was conducted in Mexico by mostly Mexican authorities with some US assistance that happened after the fact.

That being said, El Piolin and company already knew they wouldn't get the death sentence by the mere fact that the Mexican government agreed to extradite them. Mexico is very much against the death sentence, and this is a strict condition for extradition of any criminal indicted in the US. They still face a maximum of life in prison, so the obvious thing they would have to gain from a plea deal is a reduced sentence in exchange for providing actionable intelligence on Zetas operations, most likely in the San Luís Potosí area where these men operated.

Does this mean these are actually the men responsible for pulling the trigger and setting up Agents Zapata and Avila? Maybe, maybe not. El Piolin has said up and down that he thought Zapata and Avila were members of a rival cartel, which is patent bullcrap. Could these men have just been fall guys ordered by Los Zetas to take one for the team? That's possible, too. Will their plea deal and subsequent incarceration bring some closure to the Zapata family, ICE, and DHS? Only they can say.

It's possible I'm just too cynical for my own good, and this really is a good news story. But my spidey sense still tells me that these men were captured too quickly, too easily, and 'fessed up too smoothly. This is definitely one of those [rare] times where I hope I'm wrong.

"Immigration reform’s hidden border-crossing charge."

Here is an excerpt from Mark Johanson's article in the International Business Times:

"If the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has its way, Congress may soon authorize the study of a fee to be collected at all land crossings with Canada and Mexico. The contentious issue was buried deep within the department’s proposed 2014 budget, released last week by DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano. It may have gone relatively unnoticed if U.S. Rep. Brian Higgins, D-N.Y., hadn’t sounded the alarm late Friday... Higgins also suggested that the fee along the 5,530-mile (8,900-kilometer) Canada-U.S. border would unfairly 'subsidize' the more challenging and expensive southwestern border with Mexico. According to Section 544 of the budget proposal, the Commissioner of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection should 'conduct a study assessing the feasibility and cost relating to establishing and collecting a land border crossing fee for both land border pedestrians and passenger vehicles along the northern and southwest borders of the United States.' Currently, travelers aren’t charged fees for crossing the border by car, bus or train... It remains unclear whether the fee would focus on those entering or exiting the U.S., or both. How much each crossing may cost travelers has yet to be determined." Link to Full Article (via Salon.com)

Analysis: As a (very) small business owner, I'll be the first one to tell you that when the cost of doing business goes up - whether that cost comes from more taxes, more expensive supplies, rising travel costs, etc. - those costs almost always get passed on to the customer. In this case, the customers paying the cost of our federal government's little spending spree over the last several years are the roughly 640,000 people crossing our land borders every day. I imagine DHS took one look at those numbers and started doing the math if each of those daily border crossers equaled a dollar bill of income.

The first obvious negative impact that comes to mind is a new fee's effect on cross-border trade. Tens of thousands of people (if not more) cross the border into Mexico and Canada and the other way around to go to work every day, and even more so just to go shopping. Then there are the tens of thousands of trucks that enter the US every day to deliver things like fresh food, flowers, electronic components, trees, clothes...you name it. The fees add up quickly for DHS, but that can mean an expense of several hundred dollars per year for just one person, and thousands of dollars for a company whose employees conduct cross-border business on a regular basis.

I imagine the study will examine things like how much DHS can expect to reasonably charge a border crosser without too much protest, and the practical logistics of taking payment - sensors and stickers (like for toll roads), cash, monthly payment discounts, etc. The main security concern would be if individuals who are super-strapped for cash might look to avoid paying the fee by crossing the border illegally, but I don't really envision that happening en masse, and especially not from people who have to cross on a regular basis. I also can't imagine that DHS would charge more than a few dollars, but DHS never fails to astound in its frequent short-sightedness and lack of common sense.

I'll be curious to see the results of the study in nine months' time, but I have a feeling the negative backlash from the Canadian and Mexican governments will outweigh DHS' need to make a quick buck to help it survive sequestration cuts.

BOOK REVIEW: "The Fence: National Security, Public Safety, and Illegal Immigration along the U.S.-Mexico Border," by Robert Lee Maril

I started reading this book as part of my research for my next book, partly because the content would be useful to cite and partly because it was my biggest competition. I was pleased after finishing it for several reasons: First, it was clear that Dr Maril has had a considerable amount of first-hand experience working with Border Patrol and has culled a significant number of sources along the border; second, the author is even-handed in his critique of DHS and its component agencies, as well as his support for the safety of law enforcement officers, without any obvious bias or political agenda.

The book is titled The Fence, but it covers a wider variety of border-related issues that either directly or indirectly tie in to the border fence or the immigration debate. I was disappointed and not at all surprised to learn about the extent of Border Patrol inertia as an organization. After spending eight years as a female law enforcement agent in the military - not exactly a bastion of forward-thinking progress - I can unequivocally say I had it really good compared to female Border Patrol agents. Any agency that squashes every iota of dissent with retribution and initiative with reprimand is doomed to dysfunction. Fortunately, Maril manages to shine a light on the sacrifices made by Border Patrol agents and other law enforcement officers trying to work within the confines of an archaic system.

Where Maril isn't even-handed - and deservedly so - is in his criticism of DHS for overspending, underplanning, and generally having its head up its behind when it comes to reality on the ground in the borderlands. Just his explanation and illustrations of the ways in which DHS has carelessly handed over hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars to profit-maximizing contractors to build a fence that is completely unnecessary in some places will leave you in awe. And not in a good way.

My only critique is that some narrative sections about certain people he knows and interviews can be tedious, and the details concerning fence contracts, technology, and construction can get too much into the weeds for more casual readers. The book seems to be organized in a chronological fashion for the most part, then digresses, which can mess with the flow a bit.

However, this doesn't take away from the substance of The Fence, and the extensive evidence Maril puts forth to back up his assertions about the lack of true purpose and direction for the fence along several parts of its almost-700-mile length. If you're looking for a book that explores not just the history of border fence constructions and all the problems that have plagued it, along with related enforcement and immigration issues, this is the book for you. I highly recommend it for researchers and casual readers interested in learning more about these border security-related issues.

"Border Violence Spillover: A Growing, but Undefined Problem."

Here is an excerpt from my latest piece for Small Wars Journal:

"In October 2010, the first Mexican cartel-related beheading occurred in the United States. Martin Alejandro Cota-Monroy was killed because he had stolen a 400-lb load of marijuana and lied to his bosses about it, claiming the US authorities had seized the dope. When they demanded the money he owed them, Cota-Monroy begged for time to repay, offering his house as collateral. When the PEI Estatales and Sinaloa Federation discovered he didn’t have the money and didn’t even own the house, they took their payment in flesh by sending in sleepers to befriend him and sever his head while he was in a drunken stupor. This single act of violence—the first drug-related beheading ever known to have occurred in the United States—would significantly change our assessment of border violence “spillover.” Or would it?"

To read the full article at Small Wars Journal, please CLICK HERE!

"Bomb blast injures three; Police believe Brownsville family was targeted."

Here is an excerpt from Mark Reagan and Laura Martinez's article in the Valley Morning Star:

"Investigators say they believe a Brownsville family was intentionally targeted when a bomb exploded inside their home Friday morning and injured three of them. The morning blast at a home on Resaca Vista Drive critically injured a 5-year-old girl and her parents... Police say they have not been able to determine why the bomb was left at the home... Authorities declined to say whether the bombing was cartel related. 'The person or persons who had these devices delivered or delivered them knew what they were doing,' Rodriguez said. 'These were not simple devices... This was intended to cause mass destruction,' the chief added. 'This family or members of this family were targeted.'... The resulting blast blew the front door off the house and shattered the windows. It created a fire and left burn damage... The package contained four pipe-bomb-like devices, Rodriguez said, adding that he was being careful not to speculate because the investigation is ongoing. Only one detonated." Link to Full Article

Analysis: It's still too early to know anything for sure since the investigation is in its preliminary stages. However, I have to agree with the police chief in that this was a targeted hit, and not just some punks out to have a good time with a few pipe bombs. I'm very curious to find out (if the lab results are ever made public) what kind of explosive was used, and whether or not it matches other explosive devices used in attacks in Mexico. I also wonder if the other three devices were intended to detonate, or to send the message of "see how much worse this could have been if we wanted it to be."

I'm going to be a bit stereotypical here, but bear with me. There's a lot of video on the Internet of the house where the explosion occurred. The house where Juárez and Machado live is very nice, as is the entire neighborhood. If you've never been to Brownsville, much of the city is older and run-down. It has a very high Hispanic population, and the average income is relatively low compared to the rest of the country. We have no idea what kind of business Juárez was involved in; he may very well be a perfectly clean businessman with no ties to criminal activity whatsoever. However, the typical Mexican family in Brownsville cannot afford to live in a house like the one that was targeted in this bombing.

I'm not sure yet what to make of the family members not being cooperative with authorities. Maybe they're here illegally and are afraid of being deported, maybe they're involved with criminal activity, and maybe they're simply in shock and extremely concerned about the severe injuries their family members sustained.

I see so many reports of criminal activity happening in south Texas that my gut tells me are TCO-related, but either the news outlets don't follow up or the police don't make the details of the investigation public. This particular incident is extremely disturbing because I'm unaware of a TCO-connected targeted bombing happening anywhere on US soil. Certainly, it's never happened in Brownsville, as the police chief told the media. If this does turn out to be connected to TCO activity, how will it play out in the media? Will the story actually make the national news cycles? I imagine the "big guns" like CNN and FOX News are aware of this story, but holding off until any TCO connection can be confirmed or denied. How will the debate over the existence of border violence spillover be affected, if at all? Will it bring any doubters around to finally believing we have a problem with TCO members carrying out violent attacks within the US?

More to come, so stay tuned for updates in the next several days.

UPDATE 1/15/13: Unfortunately, even several days after the bombing, there isn't much to report. We know that fragments from the part of the package that detonated have been sent to an FBI lab to determine what was inside, and perhaps where it came from. We also now know that the box that contained the pipe bombs was a FedEx package. Still no word on how it arrived on Jesus Juárez's front door.

UPDATE 1/21/13: Looks like Stratfor got it wrong; turns out the package left for Jesus Juárez and Iviz Machada wasn't a FedEx package after all. Technically, the police don't know what kind of package it was because it exploded and left no identifiable parts, but FedEx said that while they were in the neighborhood that day making deliveries, they did not deliver any packages to that house that day. Machado spoke to investigators on the 16th, but this particular news story didn't mention what she said, other than provide demographic information. The bomb fragments are still being analyzed at the FBI lab, and the victims are still in no physical condition to provide detailed statements.

UPDATE 1/31/13: In this news update, Jesus Juárez's father said he was sleeping the morning of January 12th when he and other family members heard a loud noise. His son and granddaughter were on fire and his daughter-in-law were on the floor, and he helped put the flames out. He also said his son was on his way out of the house when he noticed the FedEx package on the doorstep, brought it inside and opened it. Another family member told police her boyfriend left the home the night before and did not see a package when he left.

"Latin America reconsiders pot legalization after ballot wins in US."

Here's some descriptive text about the interview I did for KPCC (the NPR station) in Los Angeles this morning:

"Recent marijuana legalization measures in Washington and Colorado have sparked an international dialogue on drug policy, and how to change it. This is especially true in Latin American countries, where the drug trade has had deadly consequences. So might legalizing marijuana diminish the power of the violent cartels? Here to talk about that is Sylvia Longmire. She's the author of Cartel: The Coming Invasion of Mexico's Drug Wars."

To listen to the interview (about 6 min 38 sec), please CLICK HERE!

"Branding: Just Another Mexican TCO Tool"

Here is an excerpt from my latest Borders & Intelligence column for Homeland Security Today magazine:

"I’m always on the lookout for great television shows, so I was intrigued when I heard about 'Sons of Anarchy,' a drama about an outlaw motorcycle club in a fictional northern California town. Last season, the club got involved with a faux Mexican transnational criminal organization (TCO) called the Galindo cartel, which of course piqued my interest. In one episode, the local sheriff, on behalf of the district attorney, orders 'Juice' to retrieve a sample of cocaine the club planned to ship for the TCO. The sheriff claims that if the cocaine is pure, it will have markers that the crime lab can use to isolate the region of origin. So is this just dramatic TV, or can an uncut cocaine sample provide US law enforcement with that kind of intelligence? ...This method of tracing illegal drug shipments to a specific TCO or geographical region seems to be a long shot. Fortunately, there are other ways US agencies—both along the border and across the United States—can determine where a brick of cocaine, heroin, or a bale of marijuana originated, and/or where it might be destined—and stamps are the primary one."

To read the rest of this article in the digital edition of this month's issue, please CLICK HERE!

"Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto Outlines New Drug War Plan."

Here is an excerpt from Jordan Fabian's article on ABC/Univision:

"Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto said Monday his administration will shift the nation's anti-crime strategy in a break from the U.S.-backed campaign against drug cartels carried out under his predecessor, Felipe Calderón. According to multiple media reports, Peña Nieto laid out a plan before Mexico's National Council on Public Security that he would focus more on reducing crimes against ordinary citizens – such as murder, kidnapping, and extortion -- than pursuing the leaders of violent drug cartels. Peña Nieto and members of his cabinet were also critical of the previous administration's policies, which resulted in a drawn out war against cartels that has left tens of thousands dead. The centerpiece of Peña Nieto's plans is the creation of a 10,000-person national gendarmerie – or paramilitary police force -- designed to patrol far-flung areas where local law enforcement and military forces have failed to eradicate widespread crime. Similar forces are used in European countries like Spain and Italy... While Peña Nieto offered more specifics on the shift than he has since taking office, he did not indicate a timeline for when the force would be established or where or how officers would be recruited. He also reportedly did not say whether he would remove the country's military from the nation's drug war... Other reforms include a review of Mexico's detention policies, which allow certain drug suspects to be held for almost three months without being charged." Link to Full Article

Analysis: There's a lot more detail in a recent Washington Post story about just how much lack of detail EPN has provided almost three weeks into his term. A lot of us drug war observers who have taken a wait-and-see attitude are starting to get tired of waiting, as I'm sure much of Mexico is as well. For example:

"The administration said it would divide Mexico into five regions for the purposes of security planning, allowing them to design tactics specific to problems that vary widely across Mexico. It did not, however, say what those five regions would be."

The gendarmerie EPN is referring to is supposed to reach a size of 40,000 officers from the initial 10,000 recruits, but he didn't mention anything about how he would prevent the plague of plata o plomo, meaning how those officers could avoid the "take the bribe or take the bullet" corruption of police departments past. Will the US have a hand in training these officers? Will they be paid more or offered more benefits than their federal police predecessors? What will they be armed with to protect themselves? Right now, no one knows the answers to these questions...and possibly not EPN himself. And too many critics are spewing that this gendarmerie will be just another attempt at renaming and reforming the police, which has been attempted no less than seven times in the last decade with no positive results.

I do like EPN's strategy of focusing on violence reduction more than capo hunting or setting records for drug seizures. But again, I'm waiting to see specifics for how he's going to do that. State and local police departments in Mexico have been focused on the exact local crimes EPN has been referring to, and they haven't had much luck due to being mostly in the employ of battling TCOs. How can EPN hope to significantly reduce kidnapping rates when the police are either looking the other way when they happen, or are actively involved in the kidnappings themselves?

A little over a week ago, EPN announced he was going to enact sweeping reforms to the education system; specifically, he wanted to take on the Mexican teachers' union to allow promotions based on merit, the elimination of nepotism, and some other issues. I find it interesting that a president from a left-leaning party wants to take on one of the biggest unions in the hemisphere (I'd wager this one is even more powerful than the California version), and I don't know how much success he'll have unless he can convince the legislature to support him.

So far, however, EPN is behaving predictably. We knew he'd want to change up a few things from the way Calderón was steering the ship, but not make any drastic changes out of the gate. He's keeping the military in place for now while exploring his options - the proposed gendarmerie being at the top of his list for their eventual replacement. I'd like to see him offer some radical plans for reducing the TCO recruitment pool by increasing educational, after-school, and work opportunities for tweens and teens. I'd also like to see him be vocal about tackling money laundering and institution building.

I know he's just getting started, and he has six years to work with. However, he's got that dinosaur on his back called the PRI, and he has a lot to prove. Mexicans are growing weary of war and bloodshed, and are more skeptical than ever of any politician who says he or she can make their communities safer or their lives better. I'm happy to give EPN the benefit of the doubt, but that - for me - will always be tinged with a healthy dose of skepticism, no matter who sits in Los Pinos.

Blog Address Change Notice!

Greetings! I just wanted to let my readers know that this blog can now be accessed at http://www.mexicosdrugwar.com, as I just purchased the domain. You can still get here through the original TypePad address as well. If you like the material I post, please pass the link on!

"Why Arresting 'El Chapo' Might Be a Bad Thing."

My apologies for posting this later than I would have liked! Here is an excerpt from my latest piece for Small Wars Journal:

"It sounds crazy, but catching the most notorious and wanted drug trafficker in the world might be a bad thing.

"Joaquin 'El Chapo' Guzmán Loera’s empire spans almost half of Mexico, employs, bribes, and kills thousands of people, and rakes in billions of dollars every year from the insatiable American demand for illegal drugs. He has been ranked for the last three years as one of Forbes magazine’s top 100 most powerful people in the world[1], and the US government is offering a $5 million reward for information leading to his capture.[2]

"Guzmán is also a smart and talented businessman, getting involved in the drug business at a very young age under the tutelage of Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, known as “The Godfather” of Mexican drug trafficking. He was a major player in the original Guadalajara cartel, and was granted his own corridor in Sonora, Mexico when Gallardo divided up his empire in 1987. El Chapo is as “old school” mobster as they come, having built up his transnational criminal organization (TCO), known as the Sinaloa Federation, into one of the richest and most powerful organized crime groups in the Western Hemisphere. So why wouldn’t Mexican and American authorities want him behind bars?"

To read my entire article at SmallWarsJournal.com, please CLICK HERE!

"Silence on Drug War in Races Speaks Volumes."

Here is an excerpt from my opinion piece for FOX News Latino:

"The United States shares a nearly 2,000-mile long border with a country that has witnessed over 100,000 drug-related murders in the last six years alone. Mexican drug cartels are making tens of billions of dollars every year from the trafficking of illegal drugs across our southwest border, along with kidnapping, extortion, fuel theft and piracy. American demand for illegal drugs has not wavered, and the U.S. Department of Justice estimates that 90 percent of marijuana, methamphetamine, heroin and cocaine consumed in the U.S. is supplied by Mexican cartels. Most disturbing of all is the fact they have a presence in almost 1,300 U.S. cities. Neither the drug war in Mexico, nor border security challenges, nor America’s failed drug policies were mentioned once during the three presidential debates. The silence on these critical issues says one thing very loud and clear: none of them will be a top priority for either President Obama or Governor Romney in 2013." 

To read the rest of my opinion piece at FOX News Latino, please CLICK HERE!

Questions Surrounding Claims by Alejandrina Guzmán Salazar of Being El Chapo's Daughter

On Monday morning (Oct. 15), I got an email from a DHS friend of mine giving me a heads up that Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzmán Loera's pregnant daughter had been apprehended at the San Ysidro (California) port of entry with false papers. I went on Twitter and posed the question if anyone had heard anything about it and could confirm through open sources. I went back and forth over the rest of the day and part of today with Tim Johnson from McClatchy, him trying to get CBP and the US Attorney's Officer to answer his questions and me trying to figure out who in the heck this woman really is.

In all my reading, including Malcolm Beith's The Last Narco (the only English-language biography of El Chapo I know of), El Chapo only has two daughters - one by his second wife, named Griselda, and one by his current 23 year-old wife. I don't remember her name, but she would only be a year old or so. Griselda Guadalupe would be old enough to be pregnant (she's about 23), but the name given by the woman at San Ysidro was Alejandrina Gisselle Guzmán Salazar. The name is almost a rearrangement of the name of El Chapo's first wife, who Alejandrina claimed is her mother. There are no open source records online anywhere indicating El Chapo ever had a daughter by that name. Doesn't mean he didn't; it's just interesting.

Monday night doing some more online searching, I found a website of a Mexican government agency that lists all Mexican citizens who have been granted medical licenses by class/year. I found Alejandrina's name on one list, indicating she's a licensed surgeon. That was interesting too, and made me wonder how many women by the exact name of Alejandrina Gisselle Guzmán Salazar there are in Mexico.

As a surgeon, and as a daughter of the most wanted man in the Western Hemisphere, you'd think she'd be able to afford a really good fake visa, but apparently not. This makes me think she has no relationship or communication at all with her father's people, or there's some reason she couldn't get a real visa.

Anyway, these were some of the questions Tim and I have been going over, and he wrote a really great blog post about it. He's given me permission to reprint it here:

10/16/2012

The Drug Lord's Unknown Daughter

Last Friday afternoon at around 3:30 p.m., a visibly pregnant Mexican woman tried to walk into Southern California at the San Ysidro entry point.

She presented a fraudulent non-immigrant visa to the U.S. border agent, and he detected it. So he sent her to a holding area while her fingerprints were run through a system.

It turned out that her real name is Alejandrina Gisselle Guzman Salazar, and she is the daughter of Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, who U.S. officials have described as the most wanted drug trafficker in the world.

According to a criminal complaint, the daughter waived her right to an attorney and began to talk. She told U.S. officials she wanted to give birth to her child in the United States (where the child would automatically get U.S. citizenship).

Guzman Salazar’s mother is María Alejandrina Salazar Hernández, a former wife of the drug lord but one who the U.S. Treasury claims is an integral part of his narcotics and crime empire.

I’ve been trading notes about this case with Sylvia Longmire, author ofCartel: The Coming Invasion of Mexico’s Drug Wars, and she’s pointed out several things. Most importantly, hardly anyone has ever heard of this daughter. Guzman has coupled with a lot of women but those who follow his rise appear not to have known that he had a daughter with Salazar Hernandez.

Even more curiously, the daughter did not keep a low profile. She graduated in 2005 from the Autonomous University of Guadalajara as a surgeon, according to this website. That would put her in high spheres of Guadalajara society.

Here’s another curiosity: If she’s got the $1 billion empire of the Sinaloa Cartel behind her, why did she use a cheap fake visa to cross into California? Surely, the cartel has ways of doing very good fakes.

The money behind her became evident after her arrest. She and her family hired high-powered and expensive San Diego attorneys, Guadalupe Valencia and Jan E. Ronis, both well-known for defending accused drug traffickers.

So how many kids does Chapo Guzman have? Best guess now is at least 10.

It was widely thought before now that Guzman had three sons with his first wife: César, Iván Archivaldo and Jesús Alfredo. Then with second wife Griselda Lopez Perez, Guzman is thought to have had three more sons and a daughter: Edgar, Joaquín, Ovidio and Griselda Guadalupe.

In 2007, Guzman robbed the cradle for his third marriage, wedding 18-year-old Emma Coronel, the niece of fellow Sinaloa trafficker Ignacio Coronel. His bride made news last year when she entered the United States and gave birth to twin girls in an LA County hospital. Since Coronel is a U.S. citizen, border authorities said they had no reason to stop her.

So now it turns out that Guzman had a fourth child with his first wife and she tried to imitate his latest wife by going to give birth in the United States.

I’d bet money that his list of offspring is even longer than we know now. It's also a safe bet that some of those children will try to visit the United States.

Check out Tim Johnson's awesome drug war blog HERE!

Bottom line, if she really is El Chapo's daughter, I doubt they'll be able to get much useful intel out of her regarding her father's business or whereabouts. Her mom and brother were recently added to the Kingpin list, but she sounds like she already has a cushy job and life in Guadalajara. I'm willing to wait to see what comes out of this, but I don't think it's going to be much.

"Mexican Navy Believes It Killed Ruthless Gang Kingpin."

Here's an excerpt from Randal Archibold's article in the New York Times:

"The Mexican Navy said on Monday night that it believed it had killed a man who it thinks may be a founder and the principal leader of the Zetas, one of the most violent criminal gangs to terrorize the country in years. But adding to the confusion, two Mexican newspapers reported the next morning that the corpse had suddenly gone missing. The navy said in a statement that in a battle Sunday afternoon in Coahuila state in northern Mexico between marines and men armed with guns and grenades, two men were killed, one bearing “strong signs” of being Heriberto Lazcano, known as El Lazca and the main leader of the Zetas. The navy said it was conducting forensic tests to positively identify the men, but the prospect of having eliminated one of Mexico’s most wanted criminals led to leaks just before the most-watched evening newscast, which reported the possibility that Mr. Lazcano had been killed... In an odd twist, the two Mexican newspapers reported on Tuesday that the corpse that the authorities believed to be Mr. Lazcano was taken away from a funeral home by armed people or family members. They reported that law enforcement authorities had already taken fingerprints, photographs and other material to aid in the identification, but the loss of the body would surely add to doubts and mystery over the man and the case." Link to Full Article

Analysis: Since I started reviewing all the stories on El Lazca after I woke up and got going this morning, the Mexican navy has confirmed that the man they killed is indeed Lazcano, so my analysis will be based on this confirmation.

First, there should be no question that this is a big victory for the Mexican navy/marines and the Calderón administration. Despite the fact that it seems they more or less lucked out on coming across his location (FOX News Latino said that some locals in Progreso made reports about armed men in the area), I've also seen reports they benefitted from some DEA assistance. If that's true, then I'm happy to see that cross-border intelligence sharing worked here, like it did in Arturo Beltrán Leyva's death in 2009.

That being said, it's going to be a symbolic victory more than anything else. Calderón can say one of the founders and top leaders of Los Zetas was killed on his watch, and this will no doubt be a big morale booster for the military. But we need to take a good look at how El Lazca's death will (or won't) impact operations on the ground.

Rumors of El Lazca's death started well over a year ago in June 2011 when there was a huge firefight in Matamoros. The drug lord was said to have been involved and possibly killed during that firefight, but no solid evidence of his presence ever emerged. We know now he was likely never there, but he essentially disappeared from the radar screen shortly afterwards. Several months later, rumors began that he was terminally ill with some sort of cancer - rumors that, again, were never confirmed. But we do know that Miguel "Z-40" Treviño Morales, the Zetas' #2 man, in effect took control of Los Zetas some time ago. This leadership handover didn't seem like it was the result of any rivalry or intra-TCO dispute.

This ultimately means that El Lazca, while remaining a huge and historic figurehead for Los Zetas, likely had very little actual control over TCO operations in the field. It's even questionable how much real control Treviño has over regional plaza commanders, considering that Los Zetas are set up like a franchise rather than a traditional top-down hierarchy, and Zetas activities are determined by the business environment in each location. The good news is that El Lazca's death probably won't incite any additional violence in the form of a power or territory grab. However, it also means Los Zetas aren't significantly weaker as an organization as a result.

"Mexico nabs ex-Zetas leader 'El Taliban.'"

Here is an excerpt from Dudley Althaus' article in The Houston Chronicle:

"Mexican marines have captured a renegade leader of the Zetas known as El Taliban in the latest blow by the US-backed commando campaign against the violent gang operating south of the Texas border. Ivan Velázquez Caballero, 42, was dragged Wednesday evening from a safe house in a middle class neighborhood in the city of San Luis Potosi. Though accompanied by two bodyguards, Velázquez apparently was seized without a shot being fired... Formerly a senior Zetas lieutenant, Velázquez had broken with the gang's top bosses in recent months, allying himself with remnants of the rival Gulf Cartel and Knights Templar gangs to vie for control of key border cities and smuggling routes... His fall, combined with the Navy's capture this month of two Gulf Cartel leaders, could bolster efforts by Zetas kingpins Miguel Angel Trevíño, known as Z-40, and Heriberto Lazcano to consolidate underworld control along the entire south Texas border... The split between Velázquez and his former Zetas bosses became public in mid-August with the discovery of the bodies of 14 Velázquez gunmen stuffed into a van parked outside San Luis Potosi. Scores also have been killed this month in Nuevo Laredo as the factions battle it out." Link to Full Article

Analysis: The fallout from this arrest can be summed up in three words: What. A. Mess. It's always a good thing when a major TCO kingpin gets arrested - and hopefully extradited - by Mexican authorities, and particularly without a shot being fired in the process. Currently, former CDG kingpin Rafael Cárdenas Vela (nephew of former CDG boss Osiel Cárdenas Guillen) is spilling everything he knows to US authorities during the trial of Juan Roberto Rincon-Rincon, and you'd better believe he'll have something huge to gain from that. I have no doubt Velázquez will be a gold mine of information, probably for both Los Zetas and the CDG.

While that's the good news, the bad news is that his arrest plunges northeast Mexico into even more chaos, if that's even possible. In case you haven't been closely following developments there in the last few months, both Los Zetas and the CDG are undergoing major upheavals. The CDG split into two factions, Los Metros and Los Rojos, over a year ago, and the leaders of both of those factions have recently been arrested. No one really knows who's running the CDG show right now, although some names have been tossed around as likely candidates.

Los Zetas underwent their own split, possibly as far back as April, with one faction falling under Miguel "Z-40" Treviño Morales - who has sort of wrested control of Los Zetas from absent leader Heriberto "El Lazca" Lazcano Lazcano - and the breakaway group falling under Velázquez. Last week, the news was that "El Taliban/Z-50" had forged an alliance with the CDG, Los Zetas' former employer pre-2010, to do battle against Treviño. But the ink was barely dry on that agreement when Velázquez was picked up a couple of days ago. It's not clear if his faction was strong or organized enough to have a set hierarchy, meaning a designated replacement for Velázquez.

Unfortunately, this means there are more questions than answers: Who is in control of the CDG? Have the two factions reunited? What is the status of the Zetas split now that Z-50 is gone? What is the status of the alliance between Z-50's people and the CDG? All of those issues are kind of unknowns right now.

Just to make things more interesting, let's throw the Sinaloa Federation and Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzmán into the mix. I told Agence France Presse in an interview yesterday that I think Guzmán is probably laughing his head off at this whole mess right now because he's the only one who can potentially stand to gain from it. Many of us analysts/observers had theorized that the Federation could sweep in to prop up the CDG after the arrest of Jorge "El Coss" Costilla Sánchez in order to fight off Los Zetas - and gain a bigger piece of the lucrative Matamoros plaza. But El Chapo might have even bigger fish to fry if he perceives a major weakness in Los Zetas subsequent to El Taliban's arrest. The CDG still needs his help, without a doubt, but Guzmán may be calculating if his organization is capable of eliminating both Los Zetas and the CDG from large swaths of Tamaulipas in one fell swoop. This would be a herculean task, of course, but he can't complain about the good timing.

Sadly, most of us know by know that uncertainty and instability in the drug war inevitably lead to increased levels of violence. With not just one, but two power vacuums going on, plus possibly three major TCOs fighting for control of the same area of NE Mexico, things are going to get even uglier than they already are. The only things that could alleviate that are if Los Zetas and the CDG decide who is in charge VERY quickly, and/or if El Chapo can take control, either with or without the CDG's help, of Tamaulipas in short order. Stay tuned...

Is Chicago Becoming America’s Ciudad Juárez?

“At least seven people…have been killed and 24 others wounded in a string of shootings in the US city of Chicago in the past two days.” This was one very stark headline the morning of August 26, 2012. The attacks occurred in different parts of the city, with several in the south and west parts of the city. Shockingly, the statistics and incident details were reminiscent of grisly headlines emerging daily from a foreign city 1,500 miles away—Ciudad Juárez, arguably the deadliest place in the Western Hemisphere.

Juárez has been the epicenter of violence in Mexico’s drug war since 2007, when leaders of two major drug cartels—the Sinaloa Federation’s Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzmán and the Juárez cartel’s Vicente Carrillo Fuentes—failed to see eye-to-eye on a few things and went to war. The annual murder rate skyrocketed, hitting the plateau of 3,622 people killed in 2010 (according to New Mexico State University researcher Molly Molloy) before dropping precipitously to 1,976 in 2011. The trend seems to be continuing into this year, with only 602 murders through August 14.

Chicago, however, is following a different trend. A 2011 report by the Chicago Police Department shows the murder rate held relatively steady between 2004-2011, with a “low” of 433 in 2011 to a high of 513 in 2008. However, this occurred after over a decade of annual murder totals topping 900 during three years in the 1990s. And it looks like 2012 is taking a turn for the worse again. Between the first of the year and August 23, 351 shooting deaths occurred in the city: 37 of those in July, 47 in June, and 51 in May.

The comparison to homicides in Ciudad Juárez this year is stunning—45 were killed there in July, 49 in June, and 74 in May.

Of course, there are several ways in which Chicago and Ciudad Juárez differ that makes the similar numbers sit on footing that isn’t equal. Chicago has a population of roughly 2.7 million people, which is more than twice that of Ciudad Juárez at 1.3 million residents. The geography, industries, and average income levels are very different.

But the two cities might just have more in common than not. Ciudad Juárez is notorious for its corrupt politicians and police officers, with an entire enforcement arm of the Juárez cartel, known as “La Línea,” being comprised almost completely of dirty local cops. Chicago doesn’t exactly have a squeaky clean record in this department, either. In February 2012, University of Illinois at Chicago professor Dick Simpson, who served as alderman of the 44th Ward in Lakeview from 1971 to 1979, found that Chicago is the most corrupt city in the US through using US Department of Justice statistics. 

It should come as no surprise that Chicago has a gang problem. Just over half of this year’s 297 victims so far had gang affiliations. While most of Ciudad Juárez’s violence has been attributed to the war between big cartels, the truth is more subtle. There are more than 500 gangs operating throughout the city’s 800 colonias, or neighborhoods. And the gangs are all doing the same thing, regardless of country or nationality—fighting for turf and drug profits.

According to the US Department of Justice, Mexican cartels dominate most trafficking of wholesale quantities of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana in the Chicago area. DEA Special Agent in Charge Jack Riley told CBS news last month that Mexican cartels have a significant influence on gang violence in Chicago, with three major cartels operating here and “turning parts of this Midwest city into a Mexican border town.”

Chicago’s increasing murder rate isn’t as simple as it seems—something that can just be labeled “typical gang violence” and addressed with more police patrols and neighborhood watches. The roots of the violence run more deeply than some officials might be willing to acknowledge, and stem from another violent part of the hemisphere that is dangerously starting to look more and more similar to “The Windy City.” Residents can only hope that city officials recognize the potential implications of the Chicago-Mexico connection and address them before the murder rate soars even higher.

"Mexican Navy says captures top drug boss 'El Coss.'"

Here is an excerpt from this Reuters article:

"The Mexican Navy said on Wednesday it had captured one of Mexico's most wanted drug bosses, the head of the Gulf Cartel, in what would mark a major victory in President Felipe
Calderon's crackdown on organized crime. The Navy said it would give more details about the arrest of the man it believed to be Jorge Costilla, alias 'El Coss,' when it parades him in front of the media early on Thursday. A government security official said Costilla, 41, was detained in Tampico in northeastern Mexico, where the cartel is active, without putting up a fight. The U.S. State Department has a reward of up to $5 million for his capture. No other details were immediately available. The arrest of the suspected capo comes barely a week after the Mexican Navy captured senior Gulf Cartel member Mario Cardenas, alias 'Fatso,' also in the state of Tamaulipas where Costilla was caught." Link to Full Article

Analysis: Just as an FYI, the identity of the man the Mexican navy arrested last night was confirmed as that of Costilla Sánchez, so we shouldn't be seeing another case of mistaken drug lord identity.

This arrest is a really big deal. It comes hot on the heels of another major CDG arrest, that of Mario Cárdenas Guillen, brother of former CDG heads Osiel and Antonio (aka "Tony Tormenta"), on Sept. 5. The Mexican government has essentially eliminated the leadership of both the Metros and Rojos factions of the CDG, effectively leaving the organization's jugular exposed to Los Zetas. There's very little chance that northern Tamaulipas can escape a dramatic rise in violence right now.

The question is, who will be responsible for that uptick. The first scenario that comes to mind is a huge push by Los Zetas to take over what's left of the CDG and finally take control of the elusive Matamoros plaza. That city was the birthplace of the CDG and had been their stronghold ever since. By taking Matamoros, not only do Los Zetas take control of the drug profits from that plaza, but score an enormous psychological victory over any CDG holdouts.

However, this situation also presents a huge opportunity to the Sinaloa Federation. Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzmán has been fighting Los Zetas on many fronts for years. He may be able to prop up what's left of the CDG in Tamaulipas and take the fight to Los Zetas instead. The Federation and the CDG used to be mortal enemies, but they allied a few years ago, forming "The New Federation" along with the old La Familia, to do joint battle against Los Zetas. If it meant survivial for the CDG, I have no doubt that whatever lieutenants get promoted to take the place of Mario and El Coss would be interested in forming a pact again.

The arrest is still very fresh and few details have emerged; Costilla Sánchez was only just recently paraded before the cameras yet in the traditional Mexican perp walk. We'll see how things play out over the next week or two, but regardless of which path the remnants of the CDG take, it's likely to get uglier in northeast Mexico.

"Suspected Hezbollah Leader Apprehended in Mérida, Mexico."

Here is a Google translated excerpt from Daniel Barquet's story in Milenio:

"An FBI and CIA tip given to the National Migration Institute led to the arrest in Mérida, Yucatan, of Rafiq Mohammed Labboun, the highest ranking member of Hezbollah in the San Francisco Bay Area until he depated the United States in 2002 for Lebanon. The subject came from London and entered Mexico through the airport in Cancun, Quintana Roo, and then traveled to Mérida, where he was captured under the false name of Wilhelm Dick. Also known as Al-Labboun Rafic, Rafic Hajj, Hajj Hajj Rafik or Rafiq, this Lebanese naturalized American (born in 1968) led an Islamic extremist cell on the West Coast of the United States for years, after graduating as a mathematician at the University of California at Berkeley. According to the data by the CIA, was a frequent speaker Labboun religious themes in the Iraqi Community Association (ICA) from downtown San Francisco and preached at the Islamic Center Fatimiyya Hayward, California. According to the U.S. agency, he departed the US 'suddenly' with his wife Tracy Marie Becker (U.S.), who was pregnant, and her two daughters, in 2002...In 2006 he returned to California for religious reasons and export and import trading firm with Costco. On 30 December 2008 he returned again to the United States, where he was charged with implementing plans to defraud various financial institutions of America credit card and checks. In 2010 Judge Ronald M. Rafic M. Whyte sentenced Labboun to 27 months in prison after arrest in federal prison, followed by three years probation. Also ordered to pay $102,000 in restitution to the financial institutions that were defrauded. He departed the US once more until recently, when alerts were issued for him internationally and in Mexico." Link to Original Article (in Spanish)

Analysis: First, a huge "Thank you!" to freelance writer and TV producer Susana Seijas in Mexico for tipping me off to this story. Second, I'm really hoping to nip this story in the bud before some news outlets go crazy with the apprehension of a Hezbollah member in Mexico. I'm just waiting for World Net Daily and The Blaze and FOX News to start going nuts with this, and it's important to understand that, while the apprehension is a really good one and the Mexican authorities should be commended, Laboun's presence in Mérida was incidental and not a big deal.

I don't know why Milenio is referring to him as a "leader," other than the fact that he had some speaking gigs in the San Francisco area. He obviously had a good business going as well, making more than pocket change for the organization back home in Lebanon. However, it should come as a surprise to no one (although it often does) that Hezbollah has had a significant presence in the US for some time. They make tons of money here selling fake designer purses, shoes and cigarettes, and all that money goes "across the pond" so that Hezbollah can use it to buy guns and mortars and RPGs to use against the Israelis. Of course this is disturbing, and it should be.

However, there's no evidence that any of these Hezbollah members are planning to blow anything up here, despite the warnings that "they could easily become operational" if Israel goes to war with Iran. Personally, I think that's an overstatement. Imagine selling fake Louis Vuittons and Nikes in New York City for ten years in Manhattan, and then being told you need to arm up and plan a terrorist operation in the next week. It's not as easy as some pundits make it out to be.

But back to Labboun's story. For all intents and purposes, it seems like he was in the Bay Area for the same reason so many other Hezbollah members are in the US - to make money and not conduct any operations. Right now it appears he was only in Mexico incidentally; perhaps to take a vacation, but maybe to conduct some import/export business before heading back to San Francisco. This is an unanswered question, and might remain that way if details of his presence in Mérida become classified. But I'm not inclined to believe he was there to lead some sort of operational cell in the Yucatan intent on illegally coming across the southwest border with a bomb. That may sound over-the-top, but some people really will say that.

So I'll be waiting to see how/if this makes it into US headlines - maybe not at all; you never know - and somewhat optimistically hoping they get the context right. But if you see it somewhere, hopefully you'll keep this blog post in mind and remember that the sky isn't falling down because of Labboun's apprehension in Mexico.

Details emerging about Mexican Federal Police Attack on US Embassy Vehicle

This morning around 8:00am local, an armored Toyota SUV belonging to the US Embassy in Mexico City was fired upon by both unidentified gunmen and Mexican federal police officers between the 47km and 50km markers of the Mexico-Cuernavaca Highway. Two US government employees, Jesse Hoods Garner and Stan Dove Boss, were in the Toyota and received non-life threatening injuries. They were taken to a local hospital in Cuernavaca, then taken to another hospital in Mexico City. Four members of the Mexican navy, who were riding in the vehicle with them as escorts, received minor injuries.

What happened during those morning hours has been a nightmare to discern, and the process is ongoing. If any of you have been following my Twitter feed today, you know that it has been one contradictory news story after another, from both US and Mexican sources. As of 4:14pm CST, the US Embassy's only official statement has been to say two US government employees were injured in an attack south of Mexico City.

About 20 minutes ago, I got a look at the only (somewhat comprehensive but still confusing) official statement from the Mexican government via their navy department, SEMAR. In a nutshell, the Embassy employees and Mexican sailors were enroute to an army installation in the El Capulín area of Xalatlaco. About 4km from the main highway, a vehicle pulled up either next to them or behind them (unclear) and the passengers showed them their firearms. The driver of the Embassy vehicle tried to maneuver around them and back onto the highway; at this point, the other vehicle's passengers opened fire on the armored Toyota.

At this point, the navy personnel called the local army base to ask for backup. This is where things get fuzzy. The federal police say they were in the area pursuing a report about a stolen vehicle. Three other cars of gunment had joined the first one, and also started firing on the Embassy SUV. The SEMAR release says that soldiers from the base at El Capulín, along with several federal police, showed up after the gunfight ended, but there was no mention (either in the release or in the press) of how it ended. Some reports said all the cars were stopped at a police checkpoint, which is when the federal police started shooting at the Embassy vehicle. There's no official clarity on where in the timeline the police fired their guns; only that it happened at 8:00am local.

As for the gunmen, reports simply say they got away. The SEMAR release says that the police officers involved in the shooting of the Toyota will be investigated.

A few questions I'd like answered: Is it a mere coincidence that only the two Americans got shot and the navy sailors only received minor injuries? I have no idea where in the vehicle everyone was sitting, who was driving, etc., so that may have played a role in that. Did the federal police think the Toyota was the stolen car they were looking for? If so, is it standard procedure to just start firing away? All the people in the Embassy people were unarmed, so the men in the four chase vehicles were doing all the shooting. Why didn't the federal police shoot at the shooters first?

Anyway, please stay tuned. Just like the shooting of ICE agents Avila and Zapata in February 2011 near San Luís Potosí, it's going to take a few days for all the details to shake out. And sadly, like that incident, no one will be held responsible for the attempted murder of two more US government employees in Mexico.

UPDATE Aug 27: Reports over the weekend indicated that it was definitely 12 members of the Federal Police who opened fire on the US Embassy's Toyota. They said it wasn't an ambush, but rather that they were chasing and shooting at who they thought were kidnappers. All 12 have been officially arrested, which means they can be held up to 40 days. News and updates have barely been trickling out of Mexico, with the FP redirecting all inquiries to Los Pinos (Mexico's version of the White House), and Los Pinos isn't talking to anyone yet. The US State Department has also not issued any updated statements, so we still don't know who the two Americans work directly for.

The good news is that the individuals involved are all accounted for, and it's likely someone (if not all of them) will get punished in some way. But what will that punishment be, will it stick, and will it be enough in the eyes of the US State Department? Will any changes occur either in FP procedure or diplomatic protective measures for US officials working in Mexico? More to come...

UPDATE Aug 28: Both The Washington Post and several Mexican news outlets have suggested this, but The New York Times seems to have confirmed that the two Americans in the Toyota are CIA employees. Here's an excerpt from the Times story:

"The two Americans who were wounded when gunmen fired on an American Embassy vehicle last week were Central Intelligence Agency employees sent as part of a multiagency effort to bolster Mexican efforts to fight drug traffickers, officials said on Tuesday. The two operatives, who were hurt on Friday, were participating in a training program that involved the Mexican Navy... an American was driving the vehicle and that during the attack the captain, who was handling logistics and translating for the men, remained in the back seat... The men were wounded, the Navy said, when the rain of bullets managed to tear through the car’s protective armor. It was unclear if the Americans, who officials said were unarmed, were specifically targeted, if the shooting was a case of mistaken identity or if there was some other reason that the vehicle was ambushed... American officials, speaking on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to release information, said no evidence had emerged so far that the Americans were targeted because of their affiliation." Link to Full Article

Here are some interesting excerpts from the Washington Post story:

"The agency link was first reported in the Mexican media. U.S. public records suggest that the name reportedly used by one of the shooting victims was a CIA cover identity associated with a post office box in Dunn Loring, Va... One of the wounded men was attached to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, and the other appeared to be in Mexico on temporary assignment, according to U.S. law enforcement officials and diplomats who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the case is under investigation... But an examination of public records suggests that the name used by one of the men may be fictitious, with similarities to others created by the CIA to provide cover for its officers overseas... Some Mexican law enforcement officials have said that the confrontation was caused by confusion — that the federal police were in the area chasing kidnappers who had seized the head of the National Anthropology Museum. A spokeswoman for the museum said it had no reports indicating that anyone from the institute had been kidnapped." Link to Full Article

So at this point, we can reasonably assume that the two Americans in the Toyota were indeed CIA agents or trainers or employees of some sort. We can also reasonably assume that the federal police who shot them were not exactly out in Tres Marías "To Protect and Serve" Friday morning. The last big question that remains unanswered is whether or not the men were intentionally targeted because they were CIA, or American, or just traveling in a highly desirable hard car. Personally, if I want to steal a car for personal use, I'm not going to shoot it 30 times. However, if I want to kill someone IN the car and I know it's armored, I'm going to try to breach the armor by concentrating all my fire in one spot - which is exactly what the shooters did, and exactly how Garner and Boss (cover names, it seems) got shot. I guarantee you, this is not standard FP protocol for dealing with ANY suspect who is unarmed and not actively posing a threat to officers. Stay tuned...

BOOK REVIEW: "Marijuana Legalization: What Everyone Needs to Know," by Jonathan P. Caulkins, Angela Hawken, Beau Kilmer, and Mark A. R. Kleiman

I'm going to start out by saying if you have any interest whatsoever in the drug legalization debate, then run - don't walk - to your local or online bookstore and get this book.

I kind of knew before I started reading it that I would probably have this reaction. Earlier this year, I read Drugs and Drug Policy: Everything You Need to Know by three of the same authors. It was such an eye-opening book, and one of the reasons I loved it so much is that I was no closer to making up my mind about legalization as I was when I started it. I know that sounds weird, but as an analyst, I pride myself on being on the fence about some issues. That means that I'm still actively taking in information, and that I feel there's more to be learned. Marijuana Legalization was a different experience, in that I already supported the legalization of marijuana before I read it. While my position hasn't changed - and, in fact, was reinforced by much of what I read - I learned quite a bit, and some of it made me doubt my position a little bit.

If you're not familiar with Drugs and Drug Policy, Marijuana Legalization is written in the same easy-to-follow Q&A format. Each chapter has a general theme or tackles a different aspect of the legalization issue; for example, the composition of marijuana and why it gets you high, the risks of using it, how its prohibition works, and some of the pros and cons of legalization, just to name a few. 

But it's the questions that the authors try to answer that are the lightbulb moments throughout the book. There were so many times that I came across questions thinking, Yes!! That's exactly what I want to know!! That being said, there were some instances where I got solid answers, and more instances where I was left frustrated because there weren't any. This isn't the authors' fault. We're dealing with an inherently specuative issue here, and the best that anyone can do - and what the authors do with great skill - is to provide several scenarios that could play out, given the facts they have to work with.

I want to point out some very important points made in several parts of the book that highlight why this is such a hotly debated issue, and kind of why I waffle on my opinions about some aspects of legalization. First of all, it is abundantly clear that the authors are in agreement that alcohol is more addictive and more dangerous than marijuana. Tobacco is as harmful to the body and likely more so, although the most harm it does to others is generally the impact of second-hand smoke. However, the book sheds so much light on why we're socially, culturally, and morally so much more okay with drinking alcohol than we are with getting stoned.

The heaviest users of any intoxicating substance are the ones who will be the most heavily targeted by manufacturers of that substance. Therefore, because any future marijuana manufacturing corporation will want to maximize profits, it will likely make marijuana products with the highest legally possible THC content and market its products to encourage heavy use. The vast majority of alcohol and tobacco profits come from roughly the top 20% of users, so these companies do not have public health as a top corporate priority. Their lobby groups have also been very successful at minimizing the taxes that can be levied on alcohol and tobacco, so the financial windfall some legalization proponents anticipate might never materialize.

Marijuana is categorized by the DEA as a Schedule I narcotic, meaning it has a high potential for abuse and has no medicinal value. However, marijuana has a much lower "capture rate," meaning the proportion of people who get addicted out of the number of people who try it, than alcohol or tobacco. While this is strictly anecdotal, thousands, if not millions, of people claim it helps them with pain, glaucoma, MS symptoms, and chemotherapy-induced nausea. Neither alcohol nor tobacco (or caffeine, for that matter) have any medicinal value. By these facts alone, marijuana should at least be reduced to a Schedule II or III if kept controlled, and alcohol and tobacco should become illegal Schedule I narcotics. Yet, due to societal and cultural mores, this will never happen.

Very few people serve jail time for simple possession or use of marijuana. Those who do are usually incarcerated because the use or possession was incidental to another crime.

No country in the world has truly legalized marijuana, meaning that the entire chain - production, distribution, and use - is completely legal. All those countries you've heard of - Portugal, the Netherlands, etc. - have decriminalized marijuana (and in some cases, other drugs) use, meaning it's treated as a misdemeanor. If we just decriminalzed marijuana here at the federal level, instead of just at the state level, it would have very little positive impact on law enforcement and the justice system. Cops and lawyers would still need to investigate and prosecute growers and dealers.

If marijuana were legalized, there would likely be an initial rise in consumption. However, this is more about the social stigma attached to its use than the fear of breaking the law. I promise you, anyone who really wants to use marijuana later today can do it relatively easily and for minimal cost. The authors used a really great quote by Abraham Lincoln to explain how the use of an intoxicant depends so much on how fashionable it is at the time. Cocaine use in the US has varied over time, spiking in the 1980s when it was cool to use, and everyone who used it didn't think it would kill them. Cigarette use has declined in the last few years because it's less cool to smoke. Restrictions on where you can smoke have helped, but there's no reason that the same rules that apply to smoking and drinking can't be applied to marijuana use. We can legally allow people to use marijuana, but regulate and socially frame it in a way that becomes less fashionable/cool to use it.

Anyway, this is just the start. If you've noticed, some of the issues I've pointed out sound in favor of legalization and some against. That's the beauty of this book; it provides you with the information to help you make up your own mind. But ultimately, even the authors acknowledge that a person's stance on legalization and drug use in general has more to do with that person's values more than marijuana's legal status. We all know that the values of an entire nation of people don't change in one direction or another overnight, and I don't anticipate that policy makers will read this and have some sort of epiphany (although I wish they would). However, YOU, as the average American, can learn a LOT about marijuana use, distribution, enforcement, decriminalization at the state level, and the legalization debate by reading this book. I'll warn you; it may cause your values to shift from "in favor" or "against" into a happy level of indecisiveness, which always fosters a more civil level of debate.

To see more about Marijuana Legalization at Amazon.com, CLICK HERE!

"Bin Laden-like SEAL Team Raid Could Take Down Mexican Drug Kingpin."

Here is an excerpt from Seth Cline's article in US News:

"The Pentagon may send Navy SEALs into Mexico to take out drug kingpin Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman in a raid mirroring the one that took out Osama bin Laden, Proceso magazine reports. Guzman, who presides over an estimated $1 billion drug empire as head of the Sinaloa cartel, has repeatedly escaped capture since breaking out of prison in 2001. His continued elusion of Mexican authorities has apparently frustrated the Pentagon enough that it has discussed a raid targeting El Chapo with Mexican President Felipe Calderon. Calderon approved of the idea, but because the Mexican Army and Navy balked, Washington will wait to propose the idea to Mexico's next president, Enrique Peña Nieto, according to Proceso's interviews with anonymous Mexican and American military sources. According to the sources, the proposed raid would be performed by two small teams of specially-trained SEALs, armed helicopters, and three missile-equipped drones. One SEAL team would be dropped on the ground and the other remaining in the air, with the drones providing backup support and surveillance. No Mexican military or police would assist in the raid.... Representatives for the U.S. Northern Command and the U.S. Special Operations Command declined to comment for this story." Link to Full Article

Analysis: This isn't a critism of Seth Cline's article, as he's basically providing a concise translation of the original Proceso article (which, if you read Spanish, you can find HERE). It IS, however, a criticism of Proceso and their attempt - yet again - to scandalize the perceived intervention of the US military in Mexico's drug war.

Back in November 2010, Proceso reported on a supposed "super spy center" that the US government stood up in Mexico City:

"With the approval of Felipe Calderón’s Administration, the U.S. Government finally got what it always wanted: To set up a super spy center in Mexico City. It was the escalation of the drug war in the country what opened the door to all U.S. intelligence agencies, including the military, to operate out of the Federal District without having to disguise their agents as diplomats. The establishment of the Office of Bi-national Intelligence (OBI) was authorized by Calderon, after negotiations with Washington, which began under the government of his predecessor, Vicente Fox Quesada. The creation of the super spy center was authorized by the director of the Center for Investigation and National Security (CISEN), Guillermo Valdés Castellanos, without taking into account any objections from the Mexican military."

Unfortunately for Proceso, not only were they wrong, but they really pissed off NORAD and US Northern Command. Two days after the article was published, NORTHCOM published its own explanation on its Facebook page:

"We have seen some mileage from a story out of Mexico alleging a 'Binational Intelligence Office' of US Government officials in Mexico. It is unfortunate that other news agencies are starting to pick up this story, because frankly it simply isn’t true. In violation of standard journalistic practice, 'Proceso' magazine never contacted the Embassy to seek confirmation of any part of this patently false story. The following points below are being communicated to media outlets who call us and we wanted to share them with you, our friends, so you can at least be aware of our perspective on this story.

· There is no “Binational Intelligence Office” in Mexico involving USG agencies. 

 

· There is a Merida Initiative Bilateral Implementation Office (BIO).  It was announced by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Mexico’s Secretary of Foreign Relations Patricia Espinosa in March 2009, and it opened August 31 in Mexico City. 

· This office allows for daily exchanges between technical staffers of agencies of both countries with the purpose of fully implementing equipment transfer and training programs under the Merida Initiative. 

· Neither officials from Mexico or the United States working in the Bilateral Implementation Office engage in intelligence or operational activities."

There are a few additional points, but you get the idea. This brings me to the point where I ask you and myself, does this story pass the giggle test? Take a look at the specificity of the operational details that were supposedly leaked by anonymous US and Mexican officials. One guy in the air and one guy on the ground, with a couple of drones and helicopters for backup? You don't need to watch "Act of Valor" to understand that US Navy SEALs do NOT operate this way. Also, tactical details generally aren't developed until a few days - and sometimes hours - before an operation because the target is often on the move, as authorities believe El Chapo generally is.

Moving beyond the operational aspect, I have to ask, Why would the Obama Administration put American lives in harm's way to eliminate a mere criminal? The White House and DHS have made themselves very clear that they consider Mexican TCOs to be criminal organizations that do not pose a national security threat to the United States. While El Chapo is arguably the most wanted man in the Western Hemisphere and runs one of the most powerful criminal organizations in the world, is this the smartest move to reduce drug-related violence in Mexico? If I had a SEAL team and could only take out the leadership of one TCO, I'd hit Heriberto "El Lazca" Lazcano and Miguel "Z-40" Treviño, the top two guys in Los Zetas, not El Chapo. 

Then there's the assumption that the Mexican government asked for this, and either is or will be okay with a covert military incursion into Mexican territory. Has the drug war gotten so bad in the minds of the Calderón administration that they're willing to (at least secretly) admit they've completely lost control and need US military help? Honestly, I don't think they're there, or at least not yet. Of course, if the SEALs were successful in both killing or capturing El Chapo in secret, they could hand him over the Mexican authorities, who could then take credit for the catch. But is there a precedent for this? It would be like killing Osama Bin Laden covertly in Pakistan (like we did), then allowing the Pakistani authorities to take credit for it. Never gonna happen.

Which brings me back to my point - What evidence is there to indicate El Chapo, and the drug war in general, is high enough of a priority to the US government to engage in this kind of activity, given the political, diplomatic, and physical risks? There isn't. And the US government never does anything like this unless there is a clear and defined goal AND benefit to our country. Personally, I believe taking out El Chapo will make things worse in Mexico, not better. It will cause massive destabilization, unless his #2, Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada, Garcia can take control quickly enough, and it will also serve as a huge green light for the salivating Los Zetas to move more aggressively to take over Sinaloa Federation territory. It certainly won't reduce the amount of illegal drugs coming into the US, nor significantly reduce violence in Mexico. So why do it? As a favor to Calderón? The election is over, the PAN lost, and the US government hasn't historically been so motivated to do Mexico such enormous favors.

Bottom line, the story is bunk. Hopefully my explanation above will help readers, and possibly other people intending to pass it on, understand why.

BOOK REVIEW: "Drug War Mexico," by Peter Watt and Roberto Zepeda

A couple of months ago, the publicity folks at ZedBooks emailed me and asked if I'd be interested in reading and writing a review for Drug War Mexico prior to its publication. Well, never one to turn down a free book, and especially one on my subject of choice, I agreed.

The book is available now, and here's the publisher's summary:

"Mexico is a country in crisis.  Capitalizing on weakened public institutions, widespread unemployment, a state of lawlessness, and the strengthening of links between Mexican and Colombian drug cartels, narcotrafficking in the country has flourished during the post-1982 neoliberal era. In fact, it has become Mexico's biggest source of revenue, as well as its most violent, with an astonishing 9,000 drug-related executions in 2009 alone. In response, Mexican president Felipe Calderón, armed with millions of dollars in military aid supplied by the US government, has attempted to launch a "crackdown," ostensibly to combat the power of organized crime. Despite this, human rights violations have increased, as has the murder rate, making Ciudad Juárez on the northern border the most dangerous city on the planet.  Meanwhile, the supply of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine has continued to increase.  And yet, both the Mexican and US governments pour money into a drug war fought by an army with a track record of violating human rights and having close links to the drug cartels. In this insightful and controversial book, Watt and Zepeda throw new light on the situation, contending that the "drug war" in Mexico is in fact the pretext for a bi-national strategy to bolster unpopular neoliberal policies, a weak yet authoritarian government and a radically unfair status quo."

Before I started reading Drug War Mexico, I thought it would be like a lot of other books that have come out in this genre of "narcobooks." Parts of it are, but make no mistake - this is designed to be a textbook for a college class (as its hardcover $116.95 sticker price makes clear). That doesn't mean there aren't several stretches from which the casual reader could benefit, but before dropping even the $24.95 for the paperback version (it doesn't come in eBook), you should know what you're getting yourself into.

The authors are both professors at the University of Sheffield, and certainly know what they're talking about. However, it's very clear that the two have VERY different writing styles, and of course specialize in different things. I had no trouble at all picking out which parts of the book were written by which author: Watt, the historian, has a more casual, readable style that explains sometimes convoluted histories and incidents in a manner that's clear and minimally confusing. Zepeda, the political economist....well, let's just say that wading through several sections of discussions on Mexico's political economy, neoliberalism, NAFTA, etc. made me want to poke my eyeballs with a fork. Needless to say, I skipped a few of these parts to get back to the drug war "meat," which was more Watt's territory.

Despite the book's stuttering nature between fascinating narcohistory and economic drudgery, there's a good bit to be learned. For me, the part of greatest value was contained in the first three chapters, where the history of the relationship between Mexican drug trafficking families and the PRI is explained in detail I've never seen before. It's incredibly interesting, and goes so much more into the relationships and interdependency between those two than other narcobooks I've read, which have mostly glossed over this issue.

I'm sure there's plenty of good information to be gleaned from the political economy sections as well, and especially if you're a student or researcher specifically looking for this kind of information. However, be forewarned that a good chunk of it is biased and accusatory. By now, I'm used to hearing that everything bad in Mexico and Latin America is the fault of the United States. Honestly, some of it is. But I have to draw the line when Zepeda pretty much claims that today's drug war in Mexico is largely a result of NAFTA and a change to neoliberal policies. I get it; increased unemployment and population displacement make for a great operating environment for TCOs. However, drug trafficking and associated violence in Mexico existed before NAFTA, and the increased violence is more a result of evolving TCO tactics and Mexican government strategies to fight them. Blame us for drug demand and drug prohibition; fine. But NAFTA? It was just too much of a stretch for me.

Bottom line, if you ask me if you should read this book, my answer is going to be, "It depends." If you're a casual reader looking for an easy-to-read overview of the drug war, no. If you're a student and want well-researched information on this specific aspect of the drug war (if largely biased, but what isn't these days?), then you should consider it. I do think this book will do better as required reading for college courses rather than a weekend or airplane page-turner.

To view this book's information on Amazon.com, please CLICK HERE!

"The 'Los Zetas' Cartel is Divided"

Here is a translated excerpt from the Mexican news magazine Proceso:

"Mexican Federal Security Sources confirm what some narcobanners hung in northern states suggested since early last month: Los Zetas, the extremely violent group of thugs who became a drug cartel, faces a break in the dome. Its two main leaders, [Miguel] El Z-40 [Treviño Morales] and [Heriberto] El Lazca [Lazcano Lazcano] apparently are engaged in a complicated web of betrayals. Experts predict new and more serious bloodshed in the country... [Several narco] messages, [videos on YouTube] and events such as the dismemberment of 49 bodies that were abandoned early on May 13 in Cadereyta, reveal a new division in one of the most powerful and diversified cartels in the country, which could be a prelude to a new spillage of blood... 'El Z-40 has been betrayed and has been moving against El Lazca's people,' say the officials, who add that Lazcano has been moving between Europe and Central America. He was recently spotted in Costa Rica, where he arrived from Germany... El Z-40, who has been located between Piedras Negras, Coahuila, and Aguascalientes, could make an even more violent cartel if he can remain in control. He has distinguished himself as an impulsive operator, say the sources. News of the Zeta division are not new. Since April last year the Texas firm Stratfor intelligence realized versions in this regard." Link to the Full Translation

Analysis: Trying to dissect the potential repercussions of an internal split within the ranks of Los Zetas is a different animal than the same endeavor with the CDG or the Federation. The reason for this is the inherent difference in organization between Los Zetas and the "old school" cartels where fault lines might be more visible.

For example, there have been two relatively recent splits in more traditionally organized TCOs - the Metros and Rojos factions of the CDG, and the split in La Familia Michoacana that resulted in the creation of the Knights Templar. One similarity is that you have two Zetas leaders - Treviño and Lazcano - with whom the various members and cells can choose to align. But Los Zetas are organized very horizontally, sort of in a franchise fashion, whereas the other major TCOs are organized more vertically with a clearer and stricter chain of command.

If the rumors of the split are confirmed - and it certainly seems to be heading in that direction - this will be the most significant shift in the TCO landscape since the La Familia split, or perhaps the defection of the BLO from the Federation. In the last year, we drug war observers believe Los Zetas gained control of more territory in Mexico than the Federation, which is a considerable amount of real estate. Journalist and author Sam Logan theorized not long ago that Los Zetas may have had a long-term strategy in mind to consolidate control over smuggling routes in a roman cross pattern across Mexico. Any major split would completely disrupt any such strategy.

It might be difficult to determine how the split would impact any international arrangements Los Zetas have with cocaine suppliers in South America, route managers and training camp locations in Central America, and arms suppliers in Central America and the US. Kind of like a major corporation that relies heavily on sales and service, Zetas partners may show more loyalty to their local Zetas cell, rather than one or the other head honcho. And individual cells may continue to operate relatively independently, regardless of the personal disputes between Z-40 and El Lazca.

Certainly, some (or many) members may feel more loyalty towards one man or the other, and will follow orders to the death. However, due to the military-style discipline leaders, trainers, and recruiters try to instill in many new members, some Zetas may feel a little lost, like watching the General and the Colonel fighting, and just wait to see who comes out alive to give the new orders.

Also, we have to remember that Los Zetas - probably more than any other TCO - have branched out into a wide variety of other illicit activities, many of which are dependent on local conditions for income. Conflict at the top of the Zetas food chain may not have any major impact on the extortion of businesses or pirated DVD sales in certain parts of Mexico.

But first things first; we need to wait a bit and see if these rumors pan out, meaning we start seeing an increase in violence in parts of Mexico where Los Zetas have total control - meaning a rival TCO can't be held responsible for the killing, like we saw in Tijuana in 2008-2010. So for now, the watching and waiting continues...

BOOK REVIEW: "The Executioner's Men," by Dr George Grayson and Sam Logan

I was very excited to get started on this book for several different reasons. First, it was written by two colleagues of mine, professor and TCO expert Dr. George Grayson from the College of William & Mary, and journalist and author of This Is For The Mara Salvatrucha, Sam Logan. I've read most of the material written by both authors, so I knew it would contain a lot of good information.

Second, this is the first authoritative book ever written solely about Los Zetas, the most vicious, bloodthirsty, and ambitious TCO in Mexico. Of course, much has been written about Los Zetas over the years, but never this much, and never in this much detail.

It's obvious from the start that Grayson and Logan have done their homework. There's plenty of history about how Los Zetas were first recruited in the late 1990s, and joined the Gulf cartel as Osiel Cárdenas Guillen's private army. The authors cover how Los Zetas are organized, financed, armed, and trained, and these sections contain information that is a researcher's dream. The Executioner's Men also discusses the expansion of Los Zetas into Central America, as well as their operations in the United States - of particular interest and importance to my work.

One of my favorite parts is the chapter on Dual Sovereignty - how Los Zetas (and other TCOs in general) are operating as a state parallel to the Mexican state. The chart (one of many helpful charts and tables) in that chapter that outlines side by side all the state functions that both execute is quite eye-opening.

The book does have some down sides. First, it's not a page-turner; but then again, I don't think it's designed to be. I really hated it when my own book was criticized for things I never intended to do with it, because I believe a book should be reviewed with its purpose in mind. That being said, it's a great source of information for anyone who needs a solid source to cite for research. Unfortunately, that's the result of the book containing an overload of facts, figures, and names - my second dislike.

For anyone who has read Grayson's Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?, this should come as no surprise. I'm familiar enough with both authors' work to know who wrote what sections. Logan's narrative is awesome, and I highly recommend you check out his first work on MS-13; it's really good, and a great inside look at how the world's most dangerous gang operates. I just wish Logan's narrative sections had been interspersed throughout this book more frequently to break up the deluge of narco names and stories of arrests and killings.

Bottom line, if you do any work or research related to Mexico's drug war, this needs to be in your book collection. I read it with my page marker Post-Its because I knew I'd come across information I could use in my writing post haste. It's not light summer reading to take to the beach, but again, remember - it's not designed to be. The Executioner's Men is an immensely valuable source of solid information on Los Zetas, and anyone who seeks to know more about this brutal organization should crack this book open sooner rather than later.

"'Flood' of drugs from Mexico linked to Atlanta area abductions."

Here is an excerpt from Mary Lou Pickel's article in The Atlanta Journal-Constitution:

"A recent increase in drug-related kidnappings in Gwinnett County has put a spotlight on drug violence in Georgia, federal agents say. About nine drug-related kidnappings have occurred in Gwinnett this year. The latest involved a man bound and chained in a basement in Lilburn whom federal agents rescued earlier this month. Mexican drug cartels are moving large amounts of cocaine, methamphetamine and marijuana into the country for distribution up the East Coast, said Rodney Benson, the special agent in charge of the Drug Enforcement Administration in Atlanta. Drug-related kidnappings have increased in the past 90 days, he said. David Nahmias, U.S. attorney for the Northern District of Georgia, said Gwinnett is a center of Mexican drug cartel activity in the area because of easy transportation on I-85 and a large Hispanic population where traffickers can try to blend in... Representatives of Mexican drug cartels in Atlanta are 'clashing with each other,' the DEA's Benson said. Drug traffickers are also getting younger, Gwinnett County Assistant District Attorney Keith Miles said... Miles says the up-tick in kidnappings is not a 'blip.' 'It's just a matter of time before innocent people get caught in the crossfire,' he said." Link to Full Article

Analysis: This story shouldn't come as a surprise to anyone, as Atlanta is a known trafficking hub for Mexican TCOs. What should come as a surprise is that THIS ARTICLE WAS WRITTEN IN JUY 2008! Yep, this headline and complete story would fit right in with news reports coming out today.

Honestly, I don't have much by way of analysis on this story; it really speaks for itself. I highly recommend following the link to the full article and scrolling down to the bottom so you can read some of the kidnapping cases that occurred in the first half of 2008 in Gwinnett. My point for writing this post is to showcase exactly how little we've progressed in acknowledging that Mexico's drug war is here. This kind of stuff has been happening not just in Georgia, but in Alabama, Baltimore, Denver...you name it. US cities nowhere near the border have been experiencing kidnappings and violent drug-related murders for years, but some in charge are happy to pass those incidents off as "the drug business as usual."

And hey, maybe it is. DHS chooses not to keep track of cartel-on-cartel violence here in the US, which totally misses the point of what border violence spillover really is. The El Paso Sheriff's Office has told me that if they investigate a gang-related murder that is somehow connected to the Mexican drug trade, they don't consider that spillover; just "business as usual." I'm pretty sure that DHS wouldn't classify these Gwinnett kidnappings that way either, which makes me wonder how many TCO-related violent incidents are occurring in the United States where agencies - for purely subjective or political reasons - choose to not advertise the link to Mexico. Then you have other agencies, like the DEA and several south Texas departments, who are happy to let Americans know, "Hey! We've got a problem here!"

I just get so angry when I stumble across old news reports like this that read like today's news. It makes me feel like some people at DHS and in the White House are asleep at the wheel. How is it that no progress has been made in the last four years in our cities where Mexican TCOs are operating? It's all about priorities, and it seems obvious to me that the drug war has been nowhere near the top of the national security priority list since it started in earnest several years ago.

"Forensics of Recovered Weapons from Piedras Negras Tactical Engagement Between Los Zetas and GATE."

Here are excerpts from a BorderlandBeat.com blog post and analysis from Small Wars Journal:

"Chaos and panic erupted last night in Piedras Negras, Coahuila, the Mexican city that shares the border with Eagle Pass Texas. Around 8PM twitterers and libre network users began reporting that shootouts were occurring in various sectors of the city in what media sources are calling a 'narco rebellion.' In the aftermath Sergio Sisbeles, a spokesman for security affairs of Coahuila, stated there were 10 known casualties of the attacks with no apparent losses by the narco group, but possibly there may be civilian casualties... Terror gripped the city causing widespread turmoil. The first confrontation broke out on Highway 57 at around 5 PM and the Micare plant and offices. The violence triggered American federal authorities to close the two international bridges in Eagle Pass, Texas... Buses were stopped by the gunmen, passengers robbed and the buses set afire. The armed gunmen are believed to be the Los Zetas cartel known to have control of Piedras Negras and are most likely responsible for the attacks." Link to Full Post

Analysis: While this particular confrontation is notable due to the proximity to Eagle Pass, as well as the disregard for the loss of innocent lives, there's something else I want to discuss. Take a look at the LONG list of items seized after all was said and done:

1. AK-47, 7.62 X 39mm, fixed stock.

2. Grenade launcher, 40mm, rifle mount (mount configuration unknown).

3. Assorted Ammunition, Rifle, .30 caliber or greater, type unknown.

4. Grenade launcher, 40mm, M-79, standard format.

5. Grenade launcher, 40mm, Multiple, 6-round capacity, mfg. unknown.

6. Grenade launcher, 40mm, HK 69A1 “Granatpistole,” retractable butt-stock (Heckler & Koch).

7. 40mm Spin-stabilized Grenades, HE // HEDP:  (2) types present:

      (4) Bearing strong resemblance to the U.S. M433 HEDP (Fragmentation / Shaped-charge).

      (3) Bearing strong resemblance to the S. Korean K200 HE (Fragmentation / High Explosive).

8. Ammunition, Rifle, .30 caliber or greater, type unknown.

9. AK-47, 7.62 x 39mm, unknown origin, folding stock.

10. AK-47, 7.62 x 39mm, military issue, fixed stock.

11. Model 1919A4.30 cal. Browning Machine Gun, belt-fed, (U.S. produced or exact foreign copy).

12. PG-7 Booster charge – for RPG-7 munitions.

13. RPG round – PG-7VM (Romanian) HEAT with a modified fuze or an improvised fuze safety cover; heavily carried.

14. RPG round – PG-7V Anti-tank; consistent with RFAS or Bulgarian mfg.

15. RPG round – PG-7V Anti-tank; consistent with RFAS or Bulgarian mfg.

16. RPG round – PG-7VM (Romanian) HEAT.

17. RPG-7 Launcher, 40mm Russian (RFAS) or Eastern Bloc, heavily carried and recently fired.

18. RPG-7 Launcher, 40mm Russian (RFAS) or Eastern Bloc, heavily carried.

19. M-60 machine gun, 7.62 x 51mm, U.S. issue, produced sometime between 1996 and 1999.

20. Ammunition, Military Ball, linked, 7.62 x 51mm (for the M-60).

21. AK-47, Weapon origin uncertain, however, the folding stock that it is equipped indicates that it is Romanian, Polish, or post 1985 East German.

22. Weapon not identifiable from view angle, but may be a semi-auto shotgun, box magazine fed.

23. AK-47, 7.62 x 39mm, fixed stock.

24. This firearm appears to be a pump-action rifle, .30 cal. or above, model / origin unknown.

25. Limited item view prevents positive identification.

26. Magazines, 7.62 x 39mm, 30-round capacity, loaded.  Magazine count:  108 // Total rounds:  3,240 rnds.

27. (2) Hand-held Transceivers (appear to be VHF).

28. Magazine, Drum, 7.62 x 39mm, AKM, 75-round capacity.

29. Hand Grenades, delay fragmentation, M-26A1 design, country of origin not identifiable; possibly:  South African, South Korean, or U.S.

30. Hand Grenade, appears to be an RFAS RDG-5 with UZRGM Fuze.

31. Unknown container, possibly Deta-sheet (flexible explosive) rolled, or similar foreign compound.

32. Packing container containing at least one PG-7 booster charge – for the PG-7 rounds.

33. Canister, PG-7 booster charge.

34. Canister, PG-7 booster charge.

35. Tactical Vest, hand grenade configuration.

36. Body armor, military.

37. Tactical gear pouches.

38. Tactical duty belt.

39. Tactical Rifle sling, padded.

40. Body Armor, tactical, threat level (Bullet resistance) unknown.

41. This appears to be a ceramic plate/s for body armor shown (Item No. 40).

The good folks at Small Wars Journal made some very important observations about the weapons found in this cache, but we'll get to that in a second. One of the biggest controversies regarding the drug war is southbound weapons trafficking, or just the overall subject of how weapons get into the hands of TCOs. It's a very polarized argument because one side believes almost all weapons come from US sources, and the other side believes almost all weapons come from Central American, internal Mexican, or other sources. I believe the truth lies somewhere in between, but I also don't think anyone can possibly know the proportion of each because of the very nature of the underground, black market business that is weapons trafficking.

This seizure is very interesting because of the mix of firearms. The grenade launcher (#6) obviously didn't come from a US gun shop. Small Wars Journal notes, "[It's] a very high quality 40mm launcher that is produced in Germany and is in service with a number of military and police forces, all of which are overseas.  There is a high likelihood that this weapon was hijacked or interdicted during a shipment of legitimate arms, possibly destined for delivery to the Mexican government." This sounds very plausible, and the folks at SWJ know their stuff. However, it raises the question, Where are these hijackings and interdictions taking place? The Mexican navy and US Coast Guard have a great working relationship, and are surely up to the task of trying to detect this kind of activity. But I haven't seen any reports of authorities breaking up an interdiction of arms shipments by TCOs or their proxies. If some other organization(s) is doing this for them, that would be a great piece of information to have.

The next SWJ note is about the RPGs, which TCOs have been using sparingly, but with a but more frequency lately. Again, we know these are not coming from US gun shops. SWJ says, "The presence of two RPG-7s (Item Nos. 17 & 18) in this cache may have significance based upon their origin.  Components of the Mexican army appear to have fielded small numbers of RPG-7s within the past several years from sources currently unknown.  The RPG-7 has seen very limited use on the southern continent, with the exception of the El Salvador conflict that occurred in Central America in the mid 1980s.  While the dates of manufacture of these weapons are not readily apparent, they appear far too new to be from the El Salvador conflict.  They do however, appear, to be of European (RFAS or former Eastern Bloc) or Middle Eastern origin." Again, it raises the question of how these high-powered weapons got from point A to point B.

This may be an "AHA!!!" moment for the pro-gun lobby, but it's still a source of frustration for people trying to figure out the exact methods by which TCOs acquire their firearms. US agencies have been trying for years to determine who calls the shots, and the exact route by which rifles and pistols wind their way from Arizona and Texas gun stores into Mexican TCO stash houses and assassin hands. Likewise, Mexican and US military agencies have been trying to ascertain relationships between TCOs and international arms dealers, and how military-grade weapons are being shipped from foreign sources.

The whole thing makes me scratch my head because we read stories every now and then about houses and cars being busted in the US containing Mexico-bound weapons, as well as large seizures being made in Mexico like the one above. But where are the stories of the interdicted shipping containers housing hundreds of grenades and rocket launchers headed for TCO hands? Or reports about international arms rings being investigated or busted for arming TCOs? We know that not all weapons in Mexico are coming from the US, but what are Mexican authorities doing to stop the heavy-duty stuff from coming in? Of course, many of these items come from corrupt internal sources like the Mexican military and police, but many others don't. The Mexican government can point the finger all it wants at the US and blame our lax gun laws for arming Mexican TCOs, but it has no such recourse for many of the weapons pictured above.

Bottom line, it should be little source of relief or joy for US gun advocates, or any agency trying to fight the TCOs, to take note of the types of weapons entering Mexico from non-US sources. I agree with BorderlandBeat that the most likely purveyor of these weapons was Los Zetas, and we know they are more willing to confront US law enforcement than probably any other TCO. The fact that they're getting their hands on this stuff worries me big time, because there's no telling if and when they'll use it against our agents, possibly on US soil. This potential threat should far overshadow any argument over where the weapons ultimately come from.

"Militias in Arizona thrive despite lack of authorizing law."

Here is an excerpt from Tim Steller's article in The Arizona Daily Star:

"Lawmakers killed a bill that would have created a state-sanctioned border militia, but that didn't squelch the Minuteman impulse in Arizona... People in the cause remain committed to patrolling spots near the Arizona-Mexico border to stop what they see as an invasion by smugglers or illegal immigrants, said participants, their supporters and their critics. Some may be even more motivated now that their plan for state organization was ended by a legislative maneuver... A longtime Arizona border-militia leader, Jack Foote, worked for a period with the group that wrote the bill and said its demise is motivating sympathizers of the border-militia movement... The bill would have set up a 300-member volunteer force to patrol the border at the governor's request. The group would have been armed but also vetted in an effort to weed out the violent extremists who have been attracted to the Minuteman movement. But critics of that movement, such as Mark Pitcavage of the Anti-Defamation League, said the border-militia idea is extremist in its nature, not just at its outer edges... If the border-militia movement is regenerating, that goes against a trend documented earlier this year by the Southern Poverty Law Center, which tracks groups it considers right-wing extremist. The center reported that the number of border-militia groups had significantly declined, in part because members' passions were being channeled into state legislatures. Now, in Arizona, they've been stymied.But the potential expansion of border-militia activity doesn't necessarily mean violence, members and others said." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I have to admit, I was pretty surprised at first glance that this bill never even made it to a floor vote in the Arizona legislature, considering it's probably the most hard-core border security state in the southwest. Then I thought about it a bit, and started looking at some of the public image hits Arizona has been taking lately, mostly over SB 1070. Even if the bill passed and a private-citizen border force was created that behaved impeccably, the national perception might be that a bunch of trigger-happy cowboys were wandering around the desert, looking for Mex-ee-cans to shoot.

The fact is, these types of patrol groups - call them militias, Minutemen, civil patrols, whatever - have been around for some time, and not just in Arizona. The Texas Minutemen are probably the most well-known, and they've had their own conflicts to deal with. Most members of these groups either just walk or drive the border, or sit next to a camper with binoculars or a camera, making phone calls to the nearest US Border Patrol station if they see something suspicious. A lot of civil border patrollers are former or retired law enforcement or military members, and feel their federal or state government isn't doing enough to prevent illegal immigrants or violent drug smugglers from crossing the border and/or trespassing on their property.

But then there are the bad apples. Border-militia leader and neo-Nazi J.T. Ready killed four people and apparently killed himself May 2 in Gilbert. Per the article, "Ready's rampage - in which he killed his girlfriend, her daughter, the daughter's boyfriend and their baby - was "a domestic violence tragedy" unrelated to his political and border activities, said James Turgal, the FBI special agent in charge who oversees Arizona. The FBI was investigating Ready at the time he died. For years he participated in heavily armed border patrols, and most recently he led a group called U.S. Border Guard, made up in part of members of the National Socialist Movement, a neo-Nazi group."

Maybe people like Ready and others like him are the reason Governor Jan Brewer opposed the bill, which is an uncharacteristic move for the border security hardliner. She's repeatedly called for more National Guard troops on the AZ-Mexico border, and will use any opportunity to take potshots at Janet Napolitano, DHS, and the White House for doing little to nothing to improve her definition of border security (everyone has a different one). This article didn't explain why Brewer didn't want the bill, but the head of the AZ National Guard said he was worried that the group would be armed - and that the bill creators didn't consult with him first.

I can understand that people involved in these groups would be ticked off at a perceived lack of support from an Arizona legislature they assumed (with good reason) would be supportive of their efforts. But I can also see why there might be some concern among legislators, Guardsmen, and other AZ citizens. People can already arm themselves to protect their property and family members from smugglers and immigrants (who are rarely armed, if they're just crossing with a coyote and not smuggling drugs). I trust that most gun owners who follow the law are responsible gun owners, and would prefer to pick up the phone and call Border Patrol if they're not in a life-threatening situation.

But it just takes one J.T. Ready incident to not only give a civilan border patrol movement a black eye; it would be a public relations nightmare for the state government that not only endorsed it, but helped fund it. At least with private movements, if something bad happens, the state and local governments can distance themselves from it by saying they don't condone vigilante behavior. Officially supporting such a group would be a step too far for the Arizona government in a time when they're still trying to clean up their image from the SB 1070 fiasco.

This is definitely a hot topic, so I'm curious what your thoughts are. Are armed citizen groups like this more dangerous than helpful? Or do we need more groups like them along the southwest border? Should the states going about formalizing civil patrol groups, like deputizing certain people, or keep them at arm's length?

"Mexican army captures 'El Loco,' suspect in murder of 49 in Cadereyta, Nuevo León."

Here is the translated excerpt of Ignacio Alzaga's story on Milenio.com:

"In the town of Guadalupe, Nuevo Leon, elements of the Army captured Daniel 'El Loco' Elizondo, a member of the Gulf cartel and alleged perpetrator of the execution of 49 people found in the town of Cadereyta. The Ministry of National Defense (SEDENA) reported that, 'After the discovery of 49 bodies, military personnel conducted ground surveys and other specific actions to identify, locate and arrest the alleged perpetrators of these crimes with positive results, which will be announced soon, as operations continue,' the agency said in a statement. The National Defense said during the arrest on Thursday in China, Nuevo León, of eight alleged members of the Gulf cartel, they secured four rifles, a handgun, three hand grenades, 881 cartridges of different calibers, 34 magazines for different weapons, a kilogram of cocaine, two vehicles, tactical gear and a radio." Link to Full Article

Here is an excerpt from a post about the story on Blog del Narco:

"Daniel de Jesús Elizondo Ramirez, alias "El Loco", who was the leader of "Los Zetas" in the municipality of Cadareyta, Nuevo León, was arrested in a subdivision in the municipality of Guadalupe for his participation in the event. Edgar Villegas Ruiz, the Department of Defense Director of Operations, said 'El Loco' would have received from Heriberto Lazcano, the leader of the criminal organization 'Los Zetas,' the order to transfer human remains to the main square of Cadereyta, but it was Elizondo who decided to leave them on the road... Another eight [people] were arrested in the town of China. Following that arrest, [authorities] located five mass graves, where there were nine bodies." Link to Full Article

Analysis: Based on the information I've received about this over the past two days, I think I have more questions than answers at this point. One of my TCO sources first told me about the arrest on Friday; media outlets are only reporting on it now, which is disappointing, to say the least. You probably noticed that there's a major disparity between the first story, as reported by Milenio, and the second, as reported by Blog del Narco and echoed by Associated Press reports. The initial information on the ground matched up with the first report - that Elizondo was a member of the Gulf cartel, not Los Zetas. But that didn't add up for my source, and wouldn't for anyone who's been following drug war events.

Anyway, assuming the press finally got their act straight, and we're dealing with captured suspects from Los Zetas, let's take a look at the plan (again, according to what the press is telling us from a suspect's confession). El Lazca, head of Los Zetas, ordered the murder of the 49 people. He wanted the bodies on display in the town's main square, but Elizondo took it upon himself to dump the bodies on the side of the road. They left a sign next to the bodies claiming the Zetas did it. Then days later, they hung narcobanners around town accepting responsibility for other mass killings, but denying blame for this one. Huh? If you're scratching your head, then join the party.

While things may have actually happened this way, there are a couple of things that are bugging me. First, Elizondo defied a direct order by El Lazca. No, Los Zetas are not organized hierarchically like an old-school TCO, and work more like a franchise operation. But still, they're rooted in military discipline. To defy the orders of No.1 and make decisions on your own like that, especially in the midst of one of Mexico's biggest narco body dumps? Very odd.

Then there's the blame game. El Loco says the disparate information coming from the sign and banners was meant to cause confusion. Among who? The police and military? Local residents? Rivals? From my view here in the US, it caused more curiosity than anything else, just trying to figure out who killed all those people when TCOs are usually clambering all over each other to take credit. The investigators would have been confused if they had taken Los Zetas at their word, which isn't necessarily the best investigative tactic when you're trying to get to the bottom of things in Mexico.

I'm not sure if the location of the body dump is significant, especially if what Elizondo said is true. Who knows what was going on inside his head when he picked that spot. It's well east of downtown Monterrey, and enough of a distance away from the primary conflict between Los Zetas and the CDG. The other arrests were made in China, which is another appreciable distance east of Cadereyta, somewhat in the middle of nowhere. Honestly, the body dump in the town square would have made a more dramatic impact, if that's even possible.

But we still come back to the real question everyone wants an answer to: Who were the victims? I still believe they're either migrants or innocent locals. If the killers had left any identifiable parts on them, some may have been associated with the CDG or another rival group, lending more credibility and strength to this intimidation campaign. But if any of those people had been traced back to an absence of criminal record or association, it would be another huge black mark on Los Zetas' record - which they haven't really cared about in the past, to make note. This is actually pretty tidy for the Mexican authorities; they can claim the victims were likely whomever they want them to be for convenience - and in most cases, it's better if the victims are "bad guys."

Bottom line, I don't know if they arrested the right people; we never do. I think it was most likely Los Zetas who did the killing, and if their plan was some sort of deception operation to make their rivals look bad or bring heat upon themselves, it was a fail. And, we'll probably never know who those victims were or where they came from. We can only wait to see if, by some miracle, investigators can provide some solid, reliable answers.

"Nuevo Laredo heats up as Sinaloa-Zetas conflict leaves 23 dead."

Normally I provide an excerpt from just one news story, but due to the significance and gravity of incidents on Friday - as well as some disparate details - I'm excerpting three different articles:

"At least 23 people killed in Mexican border city as victims hanged, decapitate," FOX News (via Associated Press) - 

"The bodies of 23 people were found hanging from a bridge or decapitated and dumped near city hall Friday in the border city of Nuevo Laredo, where drug cartels are fighting a bloody and escalating turf war. Authorities found nine of the victims, including four women, hanging from an overpass leading to a main highway, said a Tamaulipas state official who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to provide information on the case. Hours later, police found 14 human heads inside coolers outside city hall along with a threatening note. The 14 bodies were found in black plastic bags inside a car abandoned near an international bridge, the official said. The official didn't release the contents of the note, or give a motive for the killings. But the city across the border from Laredo, Texas has recently been torn by a renewed turf war between the Zetas cartel, a gang of former Mexican special-forces soldiers, and the powerful Sinaloa cartel, which has joined forces with the Gulf cartel, former allies of the Zetas... Last month, 14 mutilated bodies were found in a vehicle left in the city center. Some media outlets reported that the Sinaloa cartel took responsibility for those bodies and in a message allegedly signed by its leader, Guzman, said the group was now back in Nuevo Laredo "to clean" the city." Link to Full Article

"New violence in Nuevo Laredo sparks worry over gang wars," Dudley Althaus and Dane Schiller in The Houston Chronicle - 

"Gangland killers hanged nine people side-by-side from an overpass at a busy interchange in Nuevo Laredo on Friday, and stuffed 14 decapitated bodies into a minivan left in the heart of the busiest trade route on the U.S.-Mexico border. 'This is how I am going to finish off all the fools you send to heat up the plaza," read a banner on the overpass addressed to the Gulf Cartel, which is waging war with the Zetas gang that controls the city. "We'll see you around, you bunch of parasites.' It was not immediately clear if the killers who hanged the five men and four women early Friday also decapitated the 14 other victims. Some of those hanged were bloodied and battered, and appeared to have been tortured... The banner left with the bodies on April 18, purportedly signed by Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzmán, vowed that the gangster - considered Mexico's most powerful crime boss - was taking back Nuevo Laredo from the Zetas, and was now aligned with their Gulf Cartel enemies... Peter Hanna, a retired FBI agent who spent much of his career investigating the Gulf Cartel, speculates that Guzman may be hoping to gain control of Nuevo Laredo before the July 1 presidential elections in Mexico." Link to Full Article

"The Cleansing by El Chapo in Zeta Turf," on the U.S. Open Borders blog (via original source Blog del Narco) - 

"Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman proclaimed his presence in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas and said to be cleaning the region of Zetas when he displayed 14 dismembered bodies of alleged Zeta members. El Chapo, leader of the Sinaloa cartel, demonstrated in this brutal action his presence in this border city along with other criminal groups that fall within the domain of his organization who are said to be working in keeping the area clean of Zetas and sent a message to Zeta leaders by displaying the horrific dismember bodies of several men alleged to have affilliation to Los Zetas. El Chapo Guzman also left a picture to show evidence of their presence in Nuevo Laredo where a large number of members belonging to the Sinaloa cartel pose next to a narco banner. In the narco banner, left next to a pile of dismembered bodies belonging to Los Zetas, El Chapo calls into question the lack of courage of Miguel Ángel Treviño Morales, alias El Z-40, for being afraid to face him personally and sent a message by throwing the bodies of his group in his own turf. The banner appears next to at least fourteen dismembered bodies where El Chapo promises the public that he will continue to cleanup of the area of Los Zetas, so that the people of Nuevo Laredo can live free and in peace." Link to Full Article (CAUTION: Very graphic images)

Analysis: It seems like déja vu, as this isn't the first time control of the Nuevo Laredo plaza has been dramatically contested. Before I get into my analysis of the current situation, I just want to provide a bit of history regarding Nuevo Laredo.

Back in 2004, Nuevo Laredo was one of the hottest narco hot spots in Mexico. Back then, the battle was between the Gulf cartel and the Sinaloa Federation; the irony that these two are allies now in the very same plaza isn't lost. Los Zetas were the enforcement arm of the CDG at the time, but the sands were shifting. Then-head of the CDG, Osiel Cárdenas Guillen, had been arrested the previous year, and was trying (rather successfully) to run the CDG from a Mexican prison. Los Zetas were given the green light to go all out against the Federation, and this was when beheadings and dismemberments began in earnest. Ioan Grillo points out astutely in his book El Narco that Nuevo Laredo in 2004 - not the beginning of President Calderón's term in December 2006 - was the true start of the modern drug war in Mexico.

The Nuevo Laredo-Laredo plaza is very lucrative because of the large volume of trucks that pass through the area, and the multiple (exploitable) ports of entry. It's the same reason why Tijuana-San Ysidro and Ciudad Juárez-El Paso are so valuable to TCOs, and why the cities to the south are often epicenters of violence.

After the battle ended, the Gulf cartel emerged victorious and things in Nuevo Laredo quieted down for several years. Then in 2010, Los Zetas officially split off from the CDG to form their own TCO, and the turf war began again along the Texas-Mexico border. It was originally the most heated in Matamoros and Reynosa, but spread west to Nuevo Laredo. The Gulf cartel is a shadow of its former self, due partly to Mexican government/military actions, but mostly due to these battles with an ever-strenghtening Zetas corps. The CDG has since aligned with its old enemy, El Chapo's Federation, to fight off Los Zetas in Nuevo Laredo and elsewhere.

Speaking of which, the two "megacartels" of the Federation and Los Zetas have several battlefronts open at the moment, including Veracruz and Guadalajara. The Federation could use the CDG's help - as limited as it may be - and both groups have much to gain from the expulsion of Los Zetas from Nuevo Laredo. El Chapo can chalk up a significant victory against Los Zetas and expand his empire further eastward, and the CDG could enter into a potentially lucrative trafficking arrangement with the Federation to move product through the plaza. 

I don't know that I necessarily buy Peter Hanna's speculation that El Chapo may want to win control of Nuevo Laredo before the election in July. I've always contended that the TCOs don't really care who's president, compared to their interest in who sits in the state governors', mayors', and chiefs of police seats. Yes, the president can determine where the army goes and how many soldiers are sent, but military deployments don't always have the intended effect of quieting things down. Also, the newly elected president doesn't take office until December anyway, so both TCOs have some time to carry out their strategies.

Bottom line, this is just one of many major conflicts we can expect between the Federation and Los Zetas, as they've emerged as the two power players of 2012. All the other TCOs have pretty much picked sides and aligned with one or the other, so the narco hot spots in Mexico will shift as one TCO or the other decides where they want to expand - or encroach. El Chapo made a brilliant move by bringing so much media and government attention to Nuevo Laredo with the intention of disrupting Zetas operations there, and I imagine we'll keep seeing more of these gruesome "disruptions." We can also expect Nuevo Laredo to stay hot for the next several months, unless we see something like the death or arrest of major Zetas leaders, like Miguel "Z-40" Treviño Morales.

"How Would Private Gun Ownership In Mexico Impact Border Security?"

Here's an excerpt from my latest article for Homeland Security Today's Correspondents Watch:

"“Legalization” is a loaded word in any conversation dealing with Mexico’s drug war. But it always seems to center around illegal drugs -- primarily marijuana. Not too many people, especially on the US side of the border, ever really debate legalizing something else: private gun ownership in Mexico... Some people might be surprised to learn that private ownership of a firearm in Mexico is not easily accomplished. The Mexican constitution has its own version of the US Constitution’s Second Amendment. But while Mexican citizens are guaranteed the right to own firearms, the country’s gun control laws are arguably some of the strictest in the world. The obvious concern is that by allowing thousands of additional guns to enter the fold in Mexico, the bloodshed could get worse. Millions of newly armed and perhaps untrained citizens may be inclined to start implementing the American mantra of “shoot first and ask questions later.” Or, on the flip side, violent cartel members may think twice about conducting an attack on homes or businesses where the owners are able to defend themselves."

To read the full article at HSToday.us, please CLICK HERE!

A few words about Love Thy Neighbor, Mexico

A little over a year ago (maybe more, maybe less...my memory is like a sieve), I was asked to serve on the Board of Advisers for an organization out of Stanford University called Love Thy Neighbor, Mexico. In a nutshell, their goal is to educate people between the ages of 18-30 that American drug use/demand is one of the primary and immediate causes of the violence in Mexico. College kids are one of their largest target audiences, mostly because many use marijuana, and are more prone to experiment with drugs during that time frame.

I had no problem saying yes right way to supporting their organization, and trying to get their message out whenever possible. They have a Facebook page with almost 20,000 likes, a great website with lots of good information, and you can even follow them on Twitter at @LTN_Mexico. My interest in their cause was rekindled last night during a conversation I had with someone, who astutely pointed out that most American drug users don't make the connection in their minds between their drug use and the drug war. It's very frustrating for someone like me who reads about the brutal violence and cruelty on a daily basis, and it makes me ask (to no one in particular), Where do these people think their drugs are coming from? And where do they think their money is going? That's the problem: they don't think.

I did a podcast several months ago with the head of Texas NORML (the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws), who made the very interesting comment that NORML encourages its members to "buy local," meaning to buy their marijuana from US growers, not the dope that comes from Mexico. While I think this is great, I know even that is a challenge for many. American-grown marijuana is often higher quality (i.e. higher THC content and seedless) than the Mexican imported stuff, but it's usually more expensive. Many marijuana users here aren't connoisseurs, don't want to pay a lot of money for their dope, and often just use whatever their friends have on them.

So, for all you Americans out there who use drugs - whether casually or habitually - and think it's a victimless crime: You are a big part of the problem! Yes, the other part of the problem is the fact that marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine are all illegal. That is not what this post is about, and I'm not going to debate that here. I have to point out to you that your drugs have to come from somewhere, and right now there's a 90% chance they come from Mexico. In turn, the money you use to pay for those drugs has to go somewhere, and there's a 90% chance that money is going into the hands of a Mexican cartel. They will use that money, in part, to buy guns. Those guns are used to kill other Mexican cartel members, Mexican police officers and soldiers, and innocent people (some of which are children and infants) who don't do what the cartels order them to do. 

Bottom line, the actions of American drug users have immediate and deadly consequences in Mexico. They are also putting our US law enforcement officers along the border and beyond at high risk. Our cops are increasingly being confronted by violent drug smugglers all because those smugglers are willing to kill just to make sure you get your baggie of pot for the weekend's parties.

Just think about it. Watch the short video below, and let the facts - and the connection between us and our neighbor to the south - sink in. Pass this on to young folks, college kids, people you party with, and anyone who needs a bit more understanding of how we're connected.

 

"3 men with military ties arrested in murder-for-hire sting, DEA says."

Here's an excerpt from Mariano Castillo's article on CNN.com:

"It would have been one of the most audacious plots between a Mexican drug cartel and American conspirators: a murder-for-hire in South Texas. But the men who allegedly were prepared to use their U.S. military training to carry out a mission in Laredo, Texas, for the
Zetas drug cartel were not actually making arrangements with drug traffickers. They had walked into a Drug Enforcement Administration sting operation, and were plotting with undercover agents who recorded their every move for months. Their alleged criminal plans fell apart on Saturday, the day they were to carry out a contract killing. The agents had the evidence they needed and arrested three men in Laredo. A fourth was killed by agents as the arrests were being made. Two more arrests were made in South Carolina. A sixth man also was arrested, the DEA said... There is no evidence the Zetas have considered escalating their reach to include hiring Army-trained Americans to carry out killings. But these arrests show it is not beyond the realm of possibility that there are U.S. citizens willing to do such work. The three men accused of being at the center of the operation -- Kevin Corley, Samuel Walker and Shavar Davis -- had military experience and training they were willing to use on behalf of a drug cartel, prosecutors say... According to the complaint, Corley promised the undercover agents that weapons could be easily stolen from military posts, and that he could train 40 cartel members in two weeks. He mailed an Army tactical book to the agents, the court document says. The investigation appears to have risen to another level when Corley said he could assemble a team to carry out cartel dirty work." Link to Full Article

Analysis: Many of you may remember the plot by a crack team of two Iranian men (and yes, I do say that with some sarcasm) to hire TCO members to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the US in Washington, DC. In both cases, the actual TCO in question was never aware of either plot, and in the first case, we don't know what TCO the DEA was masquerading as. It's plausible they had their informant posing as a member of Los Zetas, but we don't know for sure from publicly available information.

But to me, there are several significant differences in the two cases. The Iranian plot was outlandish at best, scheming to use a drug cartel to conduct a terrorist attack not only on US soil, but in the capital, for the bargain-basement price of $1.5 million. Why a TCO would do the dirty work of a foreign government or a foreign terrorist organization for pocket change was, an is, beyond me. But in this case, we're talking about three African-American, non-Hispanic Americans, all with some level of military training, who were more than willing to do the dirty work on behalf of the cartels on US soil. 

It's nothing new that there's a long line of people willing to work for TCOs because of the sheer volume of money, perks, and goodies involved. TCOs rarely have to work too hard to recruit young Mexicans to kill their rivals or snitches in Mexico; many times it only takes a few hundred dollars, or some fancy electronic gadgets. On the US side, however, it's a different story due to the risks involved. US-based gangs like the Mexican Mafia, Texas Syndicate, Hermanos de Pistoleros Latinos, and Mara Salvatrucha are usually the ones tapped for contracted hits or drug distribution. From the article, it doesn't sound like any of the men involved in the sting had any gang ties.

Another thing we have to consider is how realistic the offers of assistance were that the men were making. Is it really that easy to steal weapons from a military post? When I was on active duty, I rarely went into the armory on base, but I know they're usually manned/guarded 24-7. Maybe it's possible if the guard on duty is on the take, but in my eight years of active duty as a Special Agent, I can recall one case of Security Forces reporting that weapons had been stolen or were missing from the armory. Maybe the Army is different about gun counting than the Air Force, but I doubt they're so careless to where someone could say guns were easy to steal from a military post.

Then there's the claim by Corley that he could train 40 cartel members in two weeks. Maybe. But to do what, exactly? He mentioned tactics including approaches, room clearing, security and convoy security. Based on what I know of US military pre-deployment training, this is possible, but would provide only a minimal level of expertise, unless the TCO members being trained were former military or police themselves.

Regardless, the biggest concern stems from the ultimate end of the operation: the men set a date with the undercover DEA agents raid a rival cartel's ranch near Laredo, Texas and recover 20 kilos of stolen cocaine, all on behalf of Los Zetas. Corley arrived in Laredo with his cousin, Jerome Corley, Walker (an active duty Army sergeant) and Davis (a former private in the Army reserves), along with two AR-15 assault rifles, a training rifle, and five allegedly stolen ballistic vests. According to the complaint, "Corley told the undercover agent he had bought a new Ka-Bar knife to carve a 'Z' into the victim's chest and was planning on buying a hatchet to dismember the body," per the CNN.com article. It further quotes the complaint as stating that, on the day the supposed hit was to take place, the agents had the four confirm they understood they were about to accept money and drugs in exchange for a killing.

Again, part of me isn't surprised because American gang members have been doing this sort of thing for a while, but it's disturbing in a different way when you hear that active duty and former military members are involved in this sort of thing. It's also out of the realm of what we would assume when thinking about the players involved in drug trafficking and violent TCO activity on this side of the border. It's a stark reminder that no one is immune from the allure of drug money, and no one is beyond suspicion of association with TCOs just because they're not Mexican or Hispanic or a current/former gang member.

"US Gangs That Work With Mexican TCOs — Spillover Or Standard Violence?"

Here's an excerpt from my latest article for Homeland Security Today's Correspondents Watch:

"In February 2012, two alleged members of the San Diego, Calif., gang Los Palillos (“the toothpicks”) went on trial in San Diego for conspiracy to commit kidnapping for ransom and murder -- with gang and gun-use allegations. Jose Olivera Beritan and David Valencia were just two of the 17 gang members who were indicted in 2009 for murder and kidnapping charges. At the time, nine Palillos were already in jail -- three had been killed in gang-related violent incidents, and several more were at large... Jurors in the Beritan and Valencia trial got more than an earful of the alleged atrocities committed by Los Palillos members, according to reports in The San Diego Union-Tribune. For example, prosecutors told jurors the story of a house in the Paradise Hills area of San Diego where gang members would stash kidnap victims while they waited for ransoms to be paid. In 2007, two men were bound and held captive there for two weeks. Then they were strangled to death, and gang members stuffed their bodies into 55-gallon barrels. To dispose of the bodies, the Palillos dissolved them in acid, a mixture that TCO killers refer to as pozole. In light of the direct connection between Los Palillos and AFO, this case renews the debate over border violence spillover -- namely, what counts as spillover and what is just typical gang violence."

To read the full article at HSToday.us, please CLICK HERE!

"Head of Northern Command says it is too early to tell if drug war in Mexico is being won."

Here's an excerpt from this article translation from Mexico's La Jornada, and found on America's MexicoBlog:

"The head of U.S. Northern Command said today it is 'too early to estimate whether the drug war in Mexico is being won or lost,' despite 'the brave decision' to put the military in the streets. Gen. Charles Jacoby, head of Northern Command (Northcom), responsible for U.S. military affairs in North America (U.S., Canada and Mexico), appeared today (Tuesday) before the Armed Services Committee of the Senate and was asked to assess the security situation in Mexico... Senator John McCain had asked the general--given that almost 50 thousand Mexican citizens have been killed since 2006, almost 13,000 in 2011, and the U.S. government has issued warnings to travelers regarding areas in northern Mexico--if this 'indicates that we are winning or losing, or it is a stalemate.' Jacoby, pressed to give an assessment of whether the Mexican government's efforts on this area are a success or failure, said "the violence has grown. It was not a huge leap this year, but those numbers are unacceptable, adding that the travel warnings, like the one issued to Nuevo Laredo, are indicative of the safety issue along the border. At the same time, he felt that the strategy of decapitation of the cartels has been 'successful,' given that 22 of the 37 most wanted drug traffickers have been 'removed from the board.' However, he said, "this has not had a significant, positive effect." Link to Full Post

Analysis: I get very bothered anytime there's talk of whether or not the drug war in Mexico is being "won." I understand that Congress has to ask these kinds of questions to determine if Mérida Initiative money is being wasted, or if cross-border collaboration efforts are actually making progress. The problem is that this is not a war where anyone can easily determine who's winning and who's losing.

One mistake that US authorities can make when trying to assess progress in the drug war is to treat it like a conventional conflict. Yes, there are (more or less) two sides: the good guys (Mexican and US governments and law enforcement) and the bad guys (the TCOs). However, many members of Mexican law enforcement and the government play both sides of that coin, which makes things murky. Also, there are several different TCOs and smaller criminal groups who sometimes align with the TCOs (and sometimes not). If this were a more traditional conflict, who would raise the white flag on behalf of the bad guys if they ever wanted to surrender? Plus, they're not state actors, despite the TCOs' ability to manipulate politics at the local level. So who would the good guys say they're at war with? The vague and nebulous "organized crime," or TCOs in general?

If you're able to get past these issues, you then have to figure out how you'd define progress. A reduced level of violence as indicated by a drop in murder figures is a solid and easy start. On the north side of the border, perhaps a significant drop in apprehensions of criminal aliens (armed smugglers, as opposed to unarmed migrants just looking for work) or a significant reduction in the volume of cross-border drug shipments might signal progress. But would these things be enough to signal "victory"? What levels do violence and drug trafficking activity have to drop down to in order to say the drug war is being won, and what happens if the US and Mexican governments disagree on these levels?

I've written in my book and said on many occasions that I think it's a mistake to use win/loss language when talking about Mexico; I believe this is a war that needs to be managed, as true victory can't really be defined. Bringing this war to a manageable level, in my opinion, means reducing violence and drug trafficking to levels where the Mexican people feel safe and secure enough to go about their daily business almost anywhere in the country - much like we do here. We have high crime levels in many parts of the US, but that doesn't prevent people from going to work, taking their kids to school, or eating out at certain restaurants like it does in Mexico. If an American gets robbed or assaulted in a US city, he or she is usually confident that if the police are called, they'll respond right away and follow proper procedures to ID the bad guy and prosecute him if he's caught.

I did criticize the Mérida Initiative in my book (just like the GAO did in its 2010 report) for not having solid benchmarks to determine progress in the drug war. I think this is crucial, and it's very possible to determine whether or not things are getting better in Mexico, as well as north of the border. But winning or losing? It's the wrong language for this conflict, and we need to keep things from getting any worse before we can even start talking about making progress.

"US State Department Renews - And Extends - Mexico Travel Warning."

Here's an excerpt from my latest article for Homeland Security Today's Correspondents Watch:

"The last travel warning the US State Department issued for Mexico in April, 2011 sounded dire enough. It advised Americans to defer all non-essential travel to several parts of the country and detailed various violent events in different places throughout the nation. But the renewed travel warning issued Feb.8 added four more states to the ten that were identified in the previous warning, and it strengthened the cautionary language for seven of them. The warning first covers general country conditions and uses the Mexican government’s drug war death toll figure of 47,515. Several Mexican media outlets and many drug war observers believe this is a conservative estimate, placing the number closer to 53,000 drug war-related deaths. The travel advisory then points out, somewhat surprisingly, that an increasing number of innocent people are being targeted by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), something that Mexican President Felipe Calderón generally doesn’t like to acknowledge or discuss. The number of Americans killed in Mexico has gone up, according to the State Department: “US citizens reported to the Department of State as murdered in Mexico increased from 35 in 2007 to 120 in 2011.” Those figures look somewhat alarming, however, the warning doesn’t provide any context or explanation for the steep rise in American murders during those four years." 

To read the full article at HSToday.us, please CLICK HERE!

"Texans on wrong side of border fence grow anxious."

Here is an excerpt from Christopher Sherman's article for the Associated Press:

"Max Pons is already anticipating the anxiety he'll feel when the heavy steel gate shuts behind him, leaving his home isolated on a strip of land between America's border fence and the violence raging across the Rio Grande in Mexico. For the past year, the manager of a sprawling preserve on the southern tip of Texas has been comforted by a gap in the rust-colored fence that gave him a quick escape route north in case of emergency. Now the U.S. government is installing the first gates to fill in this part of the fence along the Southwest border, and Pons admits he's pondering drastic scenarios... In this lush area, the Rio Grande's wide floodplain precluded building the fence right on the border so it was set back more than a mile in places, running behind the levees. The result is a no-man's-land of hundreds of properties, and the people who work on them, on the wrong side of the divide. The arrival of the gates will reveal whether the government's solution for this border fence problem will work. Can sliding panels in the fence controlled by passcodes allow isolated workers to cross when they need to while keeping intruders out?" Link to Full Article

Analysis: I knew before I traveled to south Texas for the tail end of my October book tour that the border fence didn't follow the riverbank, and was off set by a bit. I made arrangements with the McAllen Border Patrol station to take a tour of the sector, and finally saw it for myself. For some reason, I was under the impression that the areas between the fence and the riverbank were empty; just grassy areas and sugarcane. I couldn't believe my eyes when I saw entire farms and homes!

I can completely understand Max Pons' apprehension about his living situation. Anyone who's seen the National Geographic Channel's "Border Wars" episodes filmed in the Rio Grande Valley (RGV) knows this is one of the border's busiest - and most dangerous - sectors. It's a non-stop flow of immigrants and dope smugglers who bring their people and product across the river into this no man's land, then find a way over, through, or around the fence. But as the article's author asks, can the remote-control fence gate idea actually work?

I'm not an advocate of a 2,000 mile-long fence that extends the entire border; I think it's a waste of taxpayer money to place such an expensive barrier in areas where not even animals are crossing due to the heat and desolation. But I do believe in the effectiveness of the fence to act as a deterrent along certain stretches. I say deterrent because the border fence was never designed to stop anyone. But it does allow the US Border Patrol more time to respond to border incursions, which is the ultimate point. 

But the situation in south Texas is a bit different. I can verify that Border Patrol agents to rove in vehicles on both sides of the fence, and I have seen the gates in action. They're not super-fast. I've also seen parts of the fence where smugglers in vehicles have rammed the fence and dislodged parts of it enough to get people through. The thing that concerns me is, when Border Patrol rushes to respond to a border incursion at the fenceline at other parts of the fence, generally US citizens are not in immediate danger; if smugglers or immigrants manage to evade escape, then it's mostly a really frustrating moment for the agents, who hope that state or local law enforcement can pick them up somewhere later on. But in the case of Max Pons and his neighbors, if their homes are being burglarized or, as he worries about, if they're held hostage in exchange for the fence code, can the Border Patrol respond fast enough?

Honestly, it's tough to imagine an ideal solution. I have to acknowledge that south Texas is one part of the border where a fence is needed due to the inordinately high volume of drug and human smuggling. However, because of the logistical impossibility of building the fence along the riverbank, Americans and their properties lie extremely exposed to the dangers inherent to living in such an area. I'm curious as to other people's thoughts on this situation, and would love to hear from you...especially if you live in south Texas and know anyone whose property lies south of the fence.

"Where Does Border Security Rank In National Priorities?"

Here's an excerpt from my latest article for Homeland Security Today's Correspondents Watch:

"On January 24, President Obama delivered his fourth State of the Union address. Given the typical length of presidential State of the Union addresses, he was able to cover a wide variety of topics, with the American economy as the centerpiece – and for good reason. However, when discussing foreign policy and external threats, the southwest border merited one sentence; Mexico was never mentioned, and the subject of illegal immigration and immigration reform consisted of just one tiny paragraph. Obama said: “I believe as strongly as ever that we should take on illegal immigration. That's why my Administration has put more boots on the border than ever before. That's why there are fewer illegal crossings than when I took office … We should be working on comprehensive immigration reform right now.” The Texas Border Coalition—a collective voice of border mayors, county judges and economic development commissions—definitely took notice of the omission... So what does that tell us about where border security policy lies in the grand scheme of US government priorities?"

To read the full article at HSToday.com, please CLICK HERE!

What's the real goal of ending the drug war?

I just finished watching another episode of "Drugs, Inc." on the National Geographic Channel, a show that explores the illegal drug trade through interviews with manufacturers, dealers, and users. This week's episode was called "Pill Nation," and focused on the American obsession with legal prescription drugs - particularly powerful opiates, like oxycodone.

Most disturbing to me was the segment on Tiffany, a mother-to-be who had been addicted to OxyContin for four years, and now her unborn baby was also addicted. I watched after the baby was born as the nurses had to put morphine in her two week-old baby's formula bottle to prevent him from withdrawal-induced seizures. I learned about "pill mills" in my home state of Florida where corrupt doctors in pain clinics freely prescribe strong pain meds to pretty much anyone who asks for them - for a price, of course. I also learned that almost twice as many Americans overdose from legal, regulated, and controlled drugs than all illegal drugs combined.

In this episode, and particularly in another one about meth, it became clear to me that people who choose to use any mind-altering substance do so for reasons that go far beyond their legality or source, or any pain or violence their acquisition might cause. The meth users who were interviewed were living in a hovel, the wife prostituting herself and the husband occasionally stealing so they could buy the next day's fix. Proponents of legalization might offer that if methamphetamine were legal, regulated and controlled, these two individuals wouldn't have to resort to these extreme measures. After watching these two, as well as heroin, oxycodone, and other addicts, it was clear to me that America's drug problem isn't the drugs; it's America.

I mean this in the context that addicts will use mind-altering substances to the detriment of their health, their families, their jobs, their homes, and even their unborn children. Why do these people run themselves into the ground like this, just for a fix? Based on my own research, the answer is complex and unique to each individual. But I can see the desperation in the faces of these users for the escape their drug of choice provides. And the primal need to fulfill that, whether drugs are legal, illegal, or prescribed.

This brings me to my somewhat philosophical question, what's the ultimate goal of ending the drug war? Is it to end the violence brought about by the black market? Is it the Libertarian pursuit of the end of drug prohibition on principle? Is it to try to keep unborn children from becoming addicted to drugs before birth, or to keep women from selling their bodies to pay high drug prices?

Obviously the answer is different for different people. I just think it's important to remember that our drug demand is so incredibly high in America due to complex societal reasons, and that's not something that can be fixed by legalizing drugs or ending the drug war. People with deep emotional scars or few prospects in life will seek to dull the pain no matter how high or low the financial or legal cost. For those of you who are parents, can you imagine being such a slave to your pill addiction that you won't even willingly spare your unborn child from it?

So now I'm wondering, if the drug war were to end tomorrow and all drugs were legalized, is that enough of a victory, knowing that we've only addressed the symptoms and not the disease? Would ours be a better society if people had the freedom to buy drugs cheaply and use them freely without fear of arrest? Proponents of legalization believe overdoses would drop because the content of drugs - which is unpredictable at best, deadly at worst - would be strictly regulated and dosed. But seeing how many Americans are hooked on and dying from legal drugs that meet these criteria kind of throws that argument out the window for me.

Don't get me wrong; ending the drug war one way or another is imperative. But have we really looked beyond that? Should that be the goal, or is it too pie-in-the-sky to fix the American desire for escapism through mind-altering substances? This isn't an argument for or against legalization, as I'm trying to go deeper than that. I'm just seeing that people who use drugs and become addicted to them don't see much farther beyond how they're going to get their next fix, and no piece of legislation or peace negotiation is going to fix that.

"Why Border Violence Spillover Needs To Be Defined."

Here's an excerpt from my latest article for Homeland Security Today's Correspondents Watch:

"If you asked Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano or El Paso Mayor John Cook if the violence associated with Mexico’s bloody drug war has spilled over into the United States, their answer would be a resounding “No!” But if you asked Southwest border region sheriffs and ranchers whose properties run along the border, some would answer with a resounding “Yes!” So who’s right? Unfortunately, no one can say. Because there is no official, standardized definition of spillover border violence spillover, its existence is in the eye of the beholder. During a time when US agencies and politicians are struggling to figure out what a secure border looks like and how to make it happen, the disagreements over spillover violence is tantamount to throwing fuel on a fire."

To read the rest of the article on HSToday.us, please CLICK HERE!

"Hezbollah Presence In The United States Is No Surprise."

Here's an excerpt from my latest article in Homeland Security Today's Correspondents Watch:

"One of the biggest concerns for officials involved in border security is the potential for members of terrorist groups to sneak into the United States from Mexico. Elected officials and counterterrorism authorities believe that members of Hezbollah have entered our country this way, and have used this possible security risk as a basis for initiating stronger border security measures. Such statements tend to make headlines, and those headlines tend to shock Americans into thinking the next 9/11 will come from Mexico. The real response to such statements reasonably could be, 'so what?' What many people don’t know is that thousands of people associated with Hezbollah have been quietly making a living in various parts of the United States for a long time, and sending money back to the Middle East to help fund terrorist activities there. The real kicker is that we’re helping them, and have been for quite a while."

To read the rest of the article at HSToday.us, please CLICK HERE!