Mexico's Drug War

IN FOCUS: Money Laundering

Since Mexican President Felipe Calderon entered office in December 2006, his government has gone up against drug trafficking organizations with a vengeance. As a result, violence in several parts of Mexico has skyrocketed, and some argue his political party paid the price in recent elections for his aggressive stance. Yet, Calderon has been willing to do what previous administrations have shied away from – confronting the cartels head-on with every weapon in his arsenal. Or has he?

We read almost daily about the Mexican and US governments’ efforts to crack down on drug smuggling and weapons trafficking. Arguably, both countries are making unprecedented efforts to cooperate and coordinate law enforcement activities on both sides of the border. New agreements have been made between US agencies to improve efficiency and southbound vehicle inspections are now being performed. But it seems that the Mexican government has failed to focus on a crucial aspect of organized crime: money laundering.

Back in the 1920s and early 1930s, Prohibition was in full effect in the United States, and few places felt the effects more strongly than Chicago. It was considered the most violent and corrupt city in the country at the time, and organized crime groups like Al Capone’s syndicate operated in Chicago with impunity. However, it was not a crackdown on bootlegging or a few arrests here and there for assaults or murders that brought down Al Capone’s organization; it was the federal government finally getting involved and going after the money. Al Capone went to jail for tax evasion, not murder or bootlegging.

Along somewhat similar lines, when the US government goes after foreign terrorist organizations like al-Qa’ida or Hizballah, they don’t only go after the operatives or their weapons; they go after the money they use to fund operations. Investigations of the money laundering activities of organized crime groups in the United States are a crucial part of successful prosecutions.

So why isn’t the Mexican government going after drug money? Part of the reason is that Mexico’s laws regarding money laundering are weak. According to the International Monetary Fund’s Detailed Assessment Report On Anti-Money Laundering And Combating The Financing of Terrorism (2008), Mexico has “made progress in developing its system for combating money laundering, but further work is needed to strengthen it.” Also, Mexican anti-laundering drugs are comprehensive but don’t meet international standards; they, too, need to be strengthened for better implementation. Even more concerning, “[money laundering] offenses are not being adequately investigated.” Mexican authorities have obtained only 25 convictions for money laundering since it was criminalized in 1989.

It seems like this is one more thing Calderon doesn’t need on his plate. His cops are dirty, his army is being stretched thin, and now he needs to worry about changing laws and going after dirty money in addition to the drugs and guns. But if going after the money can bring down Al Capone and help dismantle groups like al-Qa’ida, Calderon might want to reconsider his priorities.

IN FOCUS: Making Sense of the Southbound Weapons Flow to Mexico

Here is an excerpt from my latest article on MexiData.info:

"There is no question that guns are flowing south from the United States into Mexico. Many, many guns. But the question so many people want answered is, exactly how many guns, and exactly where are they coming from?

The simple answer is, no one really knows, and no one will ever know with absolute certainty.

This fact is frustrating for many, including the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), the Mexican and U.S. governments, the National Rifle Association and anti-gun activists, and countless law enforcement officials trying to stem the southbound flow of guns. Seizure and trace statistics are funny things, in that they can be—and have routinely been—manipulated to fit almost any group’s agenda. The U.S. government has been using the statistic of 90 percent for the last year, and this number has been the source of much debate and controversy. So, what does that number mean?" To read the rest of this article on MexiData.info, CLICK HERE.

IN FOCUS: La Familia Michoacana

The publicity surrounding this up-and-coming Mexican DTO has been increasing in the last year, and it appears that La Familia is making plays to put the organization on the forefront of organized crime groups in Mexico. Even the US government has recently acknowledged the group’s power and influence, placing it on the Kingpin Designation Act list in April 2009. While La Familia has several things in common with the major Mexican DTOs, there are a few things that set it apart, making it a unique organization as organized crime groups go.

First, let’s take a look at their beginnings, which are pretty recent. George Grayson of the Foreign Policy Research Institute wrote a really nice backgrounder on La Familia, some of which I’m paraphrasing here. La Familia came about in 2004 with the goal of eradicating the trafficking of crystal methamphetamine, or “ice,” and other narcotics, kidnapping, extortion, murder-for-hire, highway assaults, and robberies. This is all according to one of La Familia’s founders, Nazario “The Craziest One” Moreno Gonzalez. They may have come about to thwart the trafficking efforts of the Milenio cartel, associated with Sinaloa’s Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman. La Familia may also have appeared to prevent Los Zetas from entering what they considered their territory.

Handwritten, poorly-spelled, enigmatic missives showed up in 2006 next to decapitated heads in Uruapan as part of an intense Familia propaganda campaign designed to intimidate both foes, terrorize the local population, and inhibit action by the government. Like Los Zetas, La Familia disseminates news of its deeds nationally by conventional media as well as by internet videos and carefully placed banners. On the heels of the Uruapan atrocity, La Familia took out a half-page advertisement in newspapers claiming to be crime-fighters. El Sol of Morelia and La Voz de Michoacan both ran the group’s manifesto. Such expressions of civic virtue aside, 18 of 32 police officers in the Tepalcatepec area resigned after receiving death threats from La Familia, while local newspapers exercise self-censorship concerning the sinister band.

In all, authorities attributed 17 decapitations to La Familia in 2006 alone. Between the murder of Rodriguez Valencia that August and December 31, 2008, La Familia killed scores, if not hundreds, of people. What may have begun as a small group of armed men on the prowl to protect their children from meth has turned into a major criminal outfit that is just as well-armed and organized as any top-tier drug smuggling organization in Mexico. The Attorney General’s Office claims that elements of organization not only sell narcotics in many of the municipalities of their home state, but also seek to dominate the distribution route to the US border that snakes through territory traditionally in the hands of the Sinaloa cartel. To this end, they have established safe houses as refuges for their traffickers at strategic points along the route northward. While originating in Michoacan, La Familia has extended its activities to Mexico State, where it controls or has conducted operations in numerous municipalities.

According to the Southern Pulse Intelligence Network, Moreno Gonzales revealed that La Familia had some 4,000 members working in various parts of Michoacan. Everyone received a salary of between $1,500 and $2,000 a month, and all were born in Michoacan. La Familia reportedly pays millions in bribe money every month, and offers protection to various business owners in Michoacan, the state of Mexico, and the Federal District. The protection, however, mostly translates to extortion, where some business owners are taxed every week, others once a month. In August 2008, the Mexican Attorney General’s office made an announcement, revealing that La Familia intended to control the drug smuggling market in Michoacan and open a route all the way north, passing though the traditionally held lands of the Sinaloa Federation, where many claim Joaquin Guzman has been weakened by the Mexican government’s constant focus on dismantling his organization and his ongoing battles with Los Zetas and other rival groups.

In May 2009, The Los Angeles Times reported that La Familia is undermining the electoral system and day-to-day governance of Michoacan, pushing an agenda that goes beyond the usual money-only interests of drug cartels. In late May, it became clear how deeply embedded La Familia is in the political machine. Federal authorities detained 10 mayors and 20 other local officials as part of a drug investigation, saying the group has contaminated city halls across the state. Unlike some drug syndicates, La Familia goes beyond the production and transport of marijuana, cocaine and methamphetamine and seeks political and social standing. It has created a cult-like mystique and developed pseudo-evangelical recruitment techniques that experts and law enforcement authorities say are unique in Mexico. No party has been spared its influence or interference, politicians of all stripes said in a series of interviews conducted before the arrests of the mayors. Generally, though, traffickers' political influence in Michoacan has less to do with winning office and more with controlling officeholders, to create a buffer of protection that allows their business to proceed unimpeded, said a security advisor to Calderon. La Familia reportedly recruits at drug rehab centers and indoctrinates followers with an ideology akin to religious fundamentalism, complete with group prayer sessions. Some armed guards wear uniforms with the Familia logo, witnesses say. Failure by a recruit to live by the rules is said to be punishable by death.

This cult-like behavior and extensive interference in politics portrays La Familia as a hybrid organization; a cross between organized crime syndicate, terrorist organization, and insurgency.  Grayson mentions that La Familia has a lot in common with the former United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), a disarmed umbrella group of paramilitary organizations that was designated a foreign terrorist organization by the US government in 2001. I believe that almost all Mexican DTOs can be compared to the AUC, and I did so in an article my husband and I co-wrote for Henley Putnam University’s Journal of Strategic Security. La Familia comes eve closer to the AUC because the AUC did try to dabble in politics, albeit in a different way. The AUC tried to gain some status as a legitimate political party in Colombia (it failed), whereas La Familia just wants to influence politics. With its current methods, La Familia may be more successful in the political scene than the AUC ever was. Regardless, it will be interesting to see the result of the inevitable future clashes between elements of La Familia and its rivals, as well as how the Calderon administration and the Mexican army modify their strategies to counter the group’s growth.

IN FOCUS: The Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act

On December 3, 1999, President Clinton signed into law the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (the “Kingpin Act”). The Kingpin Act blocks all property and interests in property, subject to US jurisdiction, owned or controlled by significant foreign narcotics traffickers as identified by the President. In addition, the Kingpin Act blocks the property and interests in property, subject to US jurisdiction, of foreign persons designated by the Secretary of Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General, the CIA Director, the FBI Director, the DEA Administrator, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State, who are found to be: (1) materially assisting in, or providing financial or technological support for or to, or providing goods or services in support of, the international narcotics trafficking activities of a person designated pursuant to the Kingpin Act; (2) owned, controlled, or directed by, or acting for or on behalf of, a person designated pursuant to the Kingpin Act; or (3) playing a significant role in international narcotics trafficking. 

Significant foreign narcotics traffickers and foreign persons designated by the Secretary of the Treasury are referred to collectively as Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers. Foreign persons designated under the Kingpin Act are referred to as "[SDNTK]s" on the Office of Foreign Assets Control's listing of "Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons" to differentiate them from the Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers named under Executive Order 12978. US persons are prohibited from engaging in any transaction or dealing in property or interests in property of [SDNTK]s and from engaging in any transaction that evades or avoids the prohibitions of the Kingpin Act. These prohibitions affect trade transactions as well as accounts, securities, and other assets.

Since the inception of the Kingpin Act, dozens of top Mexican DTO members have been added to the SDNTK list, including the Arellano Felix brothers, Osiel Cardenas Guillen, Ismael Zambada Garcia, Joaquin Guzman Loera, and Vicente Carrillo Fuentes. In June 2004, the AFO and VCFO were added to the list as organizations. In June 2007, the Gulf cartel was added, and in May 2008, the BLO was added. Most recently, in April 2009, La Familia Michoacana, Los Zetas, and the Sinaloa Federation were added to the SDNTK list as organizations.

IN FOCUS: The Tiahrt Amendment

One of the most common topics currently being discussed in the media is the flow of weapons from the US into Mexico - specifically, the purchase of handguns and rifles in mostly southwest border states for use by Mexican DTOs. Many (especially in Mexico) believe this is a gun control problem; more to the point, a problem that might be mitigated with stricter US gun laws. There have been some articles recently published regarding the "gun show loophole," which allows unlicensed gun sellers (i.e. private gun-owning citizens) to sell guns at gun shows without having to follow the same rules as licensed dealers. I firmly believe that changing gun laws won't make much difference in the overall southbound weapons flow because most of these guns are purchased by "strawmen" who have clean backgrounds. I also believe that increasing law enforcement efforts and getting a better understanding of the overall trafficking problem would go a long way towards mitigating the southbound flow of guns. Unfortunately, the US is shooting itself in the foot (no pun intended) with a little-known piece of legislation called the Tiahrt Amendment that makes the analysis and overall understanding of this problem almost impossible.

The Tiahrt Amendment is named for its original sponsor, US Representative Todd Tiahrt (R-KS)(pictured right).  The Tiahrt Amendment is a provision that members of Congress have tucked into federal spending bills that restricts cities and police from accessing and using ATF trace data from guns recovered in crimes. Trace data can be used solely in connection with a criminal investigation, and only in the jurisdication of the agency requesting the data. Trace data can NOT be used in a civil action, and is inadmissible in court for a civil action. Because trace data can only be shared with law enforcement agencies conducting a criminal investigation, that means it can NOT be shared with analysts (such as myself) who seek to discover trafficking patterns within the US and across the US-Mexico border. For example, if an analyst at DHS headquarters or a southwest border state fusion center requested trace data for guns seized in Mexico because he or she wanted to write an intelligence assessment, the ATF would not be authorized to share that data under the Tiahrt Amendment. Law enforcement agencies are prohibited from sharing the data with each other as well, since the data is restricted by jurisdiction. Even members of Congress wouldn't be able to see trace data unless they were actively involved in the prosecution of a case involving that data.

One would wonder why such an obstacle to information sharing - especially on such an important issue - would be erected and buried in a spending bill. Apparently, the National Rifle Association and other vehemently pro-gun associations very strongly support the Tiahrt Amendment because they feel it will prvent agencies like the ATF from looking up information on private gun owners who are not involved in criminal activity. Being a former law enforcement officer and pro-gun in my own fashion, I think this concern over the invasion of gun owners' privacy is ridiculous - especially at the price of preventing law enforcment officials and analysts from painting an accurate picture of the weapons trafficking problem.

So what does this all mean? While the Tiahrt Amendment is not solely to blame for the US Government's inability to stem the southbound flow of weapons, it is largely to blame for its inability to completely and accurately understand the extent of the problem because the information desperately needed by southwest border analysts is legally restricted to ATF databases. This is NOT knocking on the ATF at all; just the opposite, actually. The ATF has their hands tied by legislation it did not write or approve, and they're just following the law.Yes, the ATF has their own analysts, and they have a better grip on the details and extent of southbound weapons trafficking than any other US agency. But thanks to the Tiahrt Amendment, they can't freely share that information with anyone who asks for it. I imagine there are also considerable political and diplomatic issues surrounding trace data. The US Government has publicly acknowledged it is partly responsible for weapons ending up in the hands of Mexican DTOs. However, the widespread availability of trace data would cause a LOT of finger pointing at certain states and open up the gun law and Second Amendment can of worms.

Fortunately, there is a tiny light on the horizon. From the press reports I've seen, the Obama Administration wants to repeal the amendment. I don't know when this would happen, and exactly what changes would occur in trace data sharing. However, any increase in information sharing between the ATF and federal, state, local, and tribal agencies involved in analyzing weapons trafficking patterns would go a LONG way towards helping our governments REALLY understand just how big this problem is, and what resources to allocate to fight it.

IN FOCUS: Border Tunnels

Over the last few years, Mexican DTOs have been feeling pressure on their smuggling operations from both Mexican and US law enforcement. Human smugglers have also been feeling the same pressure, as detection and interdiction efforts have improved and viable land routes for both drugs and people have been squeezed. Both types of smugglers have had to get creative, and that's where the border tunnel comes into play.

According to press reports that cite US immigration officials, at least 75 border tunnels have been discovered along the US-Mexico border since the 1990s. Although I'm restricted from saying what the actual number is, I know it's higher than 75. Some of these tunnels are small and crudely dug, but others are absolute marvels of construction, taking into account what they're used for and the clandestine circumstances under which they're built. A few of these tunnels have wooden support beams throughout, concrete flooring, extensive lighting, and ventilation systems. Some even have rails for moving carts filled with narcotics headed north into the US - or bundles of money heading south into Mexico. 

One of the more sophisticated border tunnels (pictured right) was discovered in January 2006 in a fruit distribution center in Otay Mesa, California. The tunnel went 85 feet underground and emerged a half mile away in Tijuana, where it was used by the Arellano Felix Organization to smuggle drugs into the US.

Several tunnel detection methods are currently in use by border officials, but they all have their drawbacks. These methods include ground-penetrating radar and sonic equipment, but ICE officials will tell you that investigation and good observation methods tend to trump tunnel detection technology.

In 2003, ICE formed the San Diego Tunnel Task force - the only one of its kind, although Nogales has a more informal group with the same mission. It's a multiagency effort, including US Border Patrol, DEA, US Dept of Justice, and US Navy personnel. Typically, most tunnels are discovered when somebody tips off authorities to signs of suspicious work: digging sounds, activity at odd hours, or numerous trucks. Tunnels rarely last more than a couple of months before they are unearthed, border officials said. Once they're discovered, they're filled with concrete - often at great expense. The Otay Mesa tunnel cost $700,000 to fill. Despite the shirt-lived nature of these tunnels, drug smugglers keep digging and human smugglers keep moving people in this often dangerous manner.

IN FOCUS: Corruption in Mexico

It is difficult to examine many of the problems currently going on in Mexico without the word "corruption" being thrown around. It is assumed that most government officials, judges, and police officers are on the take, either from each other, the public, or drug cartels. How has corruption become such an ingrained part of Mexican society, and why is it so difficult - if not impossible - to stamp out?

I found a great article on Prof. Claudio Lomnitz's study of the history of corruption in Mexico in the University of Chicago Chronicle. According to Lomnitz, corruption in Mexico goes back to colonial times, when officials appointed by the Spanish crown were expected to extract money from local sources to support themselves. Those appointments didn't last long, and they were usually "bought." The church had its own issues with corruption at the time, having its own source of income and exchanging offices for money. After independence, the system continued because bureaucrats needed some way to make up for the shortfalls in their incomes from small tax revenues. Lomnitz says, "In most cases there just wasn't enough money to pay for the services people needed, so corruption developed as a means of raising revenue, although it has always been more than a way of financing government operations."

In modern Mexico, this system attempts to ensure that services are rendered to certain people. As in colonial times, it also attempts to make up the shortfall in salaries. I have personally heard Mexican government officials say that corruption is almost a necessity in Mexico to maintain order and stability. It is seen as a way of life. As long as most people feel they are getting their share - even if it is through corrupt means - then it keeps the masses happy.

Another angle of corruption in Mexico is the dreaded plata o plombo - "silver or lead," meant as take the bribe or take the bullet. This is a form of corruption encouraged by fear, as opposed to social acceptance or economic survival. Many police officers in Mexico are corrupt because they or their families are physically threatened by DTO members. Public executions of over 450 police officers and soldiers in Mexico last year are proof that the DTOs are more than willing to make good on their threats.

So how does the Calderon administration, which is so committed to cleansing Mexico of this endemic corruption, accomplish this goal? The sad fact is, it can't. Calderon is up against roughly 500 years of history ingrained into his people. He also has two other major things working against him: the economy and an organized crime crisis. If the average Mexican citizen could make a fair living by living fairly, then corruption wouldn't be seen as necessary. While corruption exists in the United States (and every country, for that matter), it exists to a much smaller extent because public servants - for the most part - earn a fair salary with which they can make a living. The Mexican economy is the 12th largest in the world, but the country has an extremely high rate of underemployment, and most people do not earn what Americans would call fair salaries for their work. Unless economic conditions in Mexico improve, the economic challenge to eliminating corruption will remain. The organized crime threat from DTOs is so pervasive, few public or law enforcement officials in Mexico can escape it. When accepting a bribe is a matter of life or death, rather than being honorable or corrupt, the choice is easy for many. Mexican society may not see this as a form of corruption as Americans do, since it is a manner of survival that American cops don't have to deal with. Regardless, the unreliability of Mexican law enforcement is the largest obstacle Calderon must face. Short of removing the large majority of Mexican law enforcement from their posts, which is impractical and probably impossible, Calderon will have to continue to rely on the more reliable, very loyal, and considerably less corrupt Mexican Army as the only stop-gap measure at his disposal.

IN FOCUS: Border violence "spillover"

This is a topic that causes frustration because the term "spillover" is used by so many people and agencies with little consistency or agreement. On almost any given day, you can see several government or law enforcement officials on television saying spillover hasn't happened yet, spillover is happening now, or spillover has been happening for years. So which is it?

Well, the problem lies in the fact that there is no single, standardized definition for border violence spillover. Some agencies are looking for spikes in crime levels on the US side that parallel spikes in crime on the Mexican side. Other agencies are basing their assessments of spillover on case information or anecdotal evidence of Mexican DTO-related crimes occurring in US cities, such as targeted killings or kidnappings. Some officials won't call it spillover unless innocent US citizens (i.e. unrelated to the drug trade) on US territory become DTO targets.

First, let's examine the crime statistics angle. One can assume that crime statistics originating from US law enforcement agencies are reliable because agencies on the US side of the border don't suffer from the same corruption issues as Mexican agencies. However, US crime statistics generally don't differentiate between drug-related and non-drug related crimes. It is entirely possible that murders for a US border city could drop from one year to the next, yet the proportion of drug-related murders can rise in the same year. Also, statistics alone don't account for sociological factors occurring in border cities that may skew the meaning of those statistics, such as changes in immigration patterns or economic declines. Finally, crime statistics for cities on the Mexican side of the border are notoriously inaccurate for various reasons, including corruption, lack of reporting, and investigative ineptitude. Mexican crime statistics also do not differentiate between drug-related and non-drug-related crimes.

Next, let's consider case information or anecdotal evidence. We know from publicly available information that the FBI is investigating an increasing number of cross-border kidnapping cases. We also know that hundreds of people in the southwest border states - mostly affiliated with the DTOs in come way - have been kidnapped for ransom or retribution. According to the US Department of Justice, several US-based gangs are affiliated with Mexican DTOs, either distributing drugs for them or contracting themselves out for hits inside the United States. Depending on which source you believe, anywhere from 90-97% of weapons illegally entering Mexico originate in the United States, with most of them coming from the four southwest border states. So does all this criminal activity that seems obviously related to the Mexican drug trade add up to spillover?

Finally, let's take a look at the US-citizens-as-targets issue. There is almost universal agreement among agencies that in almost all cases of border violence, US citizens NOT associated with the Mexican drug trade in any way, shape, or form are NOT being targeted for violence by DTOs or US-based gangs affilated with DTOs. Occasionally, innocent US citizens do get caught in the cross-fire, but usually it's a case of being in the wrong place at the wrong time. Does this mean that spillover is NOT happening?

Ultimately the issue of border violence spillover is a subjective one, and I believe it can't be proven one way or another. I think a strong argument can be made for either position. However the next time you see or hear someone authoritatively trying to say spillover is happening or isn't happening, ask them what their sources are or what proof they have...I'd sure love to see it.