Mexico's Drug War

Six Americans Follow in the Footsteps of Dead Migrants in ‘Borderland’

It’s very rare for a television show to come along that makes me think, This could really change everything. In a political time in our country when we are deeply divided over the best way to achieve immigration reform and how best to secure our borders, it’s more important than ever to more fully understand the underlying cause for mass illegal immigration into the United States. It’s also critical to realize that as we endlessly debate the issue, hundreds, if not thousands, of migrants will continue to die each year—migrants who are real people, and who will continue to risk their lives to come here no matter what we try to do to stop them.

But why do hundreds of thousands of them try to make this deadly journey knowing the dangers that await them? Why would they risk the lives of even their children to come here? And why don’t the governments of Mexico and countries in Central America try harder to prevent this outpouring of their citizens?

As I write this, I’ve been living in Tucson, Arizona for nine months. I’ve been researching and writing about the border for years, but from a distance. I have also visited different parts of Arizona several times, but nothing prepared me for the surreal experience that is actually living so close to our border with Mexico—the drugs, the illegal immigration…and the death. Nowhere else in the country north of the border can you just be driving down the road and reasonably expect to encounter a group of ragged and dehydrated migrants or armed drug smugglers hauling 60-pound bales of dope.

Every year, hundreds of thousands of migrants from Mexico and all points south embark on a deadly journey north to the Promised Land that is the United States. But what used to be simply a test of endurance has now become a struggle for survival. Cartels now control human smuggling operations all along the border, and are increasingly targeting—and killing—innocent migrants, holding them hostage for exorbitant ransom amounts or forcing them at gunpoint to work as drug mules. Can any of us really imagine what the experience of traveling hundreds, if not thousands, of miles through triple-digit heat or sub-freezing cold behind a guide who might abandon you at any moment is truly like?

This is what Al Jazeera America is trying to do with its new series called Borderland. It’s a reality show/documentary that takes six participants and has them follow the path of migrants whose journeys—and lives—ended in the Arizona desert on their way to different parts of the United States. The participants’ views on illegal immigration vary from “there are no borders” to “wall off the border.” There is a street photographer, a farmer, a Republican state Senate aide, a community organizer, a fashion blogger, and a retired Marine; three women and three men, black, white, and Latino, Republican and Democrat. And they’re in for a real shock to their systems.

Before they even start on their journey, their guide takes them to a building with a purpose unknown to them at first. It’s the Pima County morgue in southern Arizona, and they’re faced right away with the bodies of more than 150 dead immigrants. The sight and smell is overwhelming, and immediately you see strong reactions. First comes the sadness, and they all lament the passing of these anonymous corpses. But the reactions soon change to reveal each participant’s view on what put these immigrants in this dismal place. Is US immigration policy to blame for forcing these people onto a deadly path? Or is it the immigrants’ fault for consciously making a choice to break our laws and embark on a trip they knew could be fatal?

The group’s next stop is at the US side of the border, spending time with Cochise County Sheriff Mark Dannels and several border ranchers. They hear the harrowing accounts of drug smugglers running their trucks and ATVs loaded with illegal drugs through private lands, causing tens of thousands of dollars in damage to fences and livestock. Ranchers have been assaulted and burglarized by both armed drug traffickers and desperate migrants looking for food and water. They travel armed, never knowing when they’ll come across border crossers more interested in protecting their drug loads than avoiding an armed confrontation. The participants see where the pedestrian fence ends and a small barbed wire-and-post fence begins, allowing anyone on foot unfettered access to private land on US soil.

I asked Sheriff Dannels, whom I interviewed for my book Border Insecurity, what his impression was of the participants. “The group as a whole seemed to be very surprised that their international border was at such great risk for intrusion and how our border citizens were directly vulnerable to this,” he said. “Additionally, the group got to experience and see the dedicated men and women of the federal government and our local law enforcement officers/deputies who are doing what they can and giving it their best under a federal plan that needs immediate attention.  Overall, the trip brought a factual look at our border to those group members that normally get their facts from our media.”

Only after that border visit do the participants learn their real mission: to team up in pairs and follow in the exact footsteps of three immigrants whose lives ended in the Arizona desert. Their mission will take one pair to Mexico, the second to Guatemala, and the third to El Salvador. They’ll meet the families and friends of two women and a 14 year-old boy, and try to discern their life stories. They’ll talk to people in villages who also long to live in the US, and learn of their pain and suffering at the hands of violent street gangs, hunger, and poverty. They’ll try to understand what drives hundreds of thousands of people every year to risk their lives—and sometimes the lives of their children—to leave the hell that is their lifelong home for the hope they’ll make it to their vision of an American heaven.

What follows is one more version of hell for the six participants. In tracking the footsteps of their assigned migrants, they have to ride the fearsome freight train knows as La Bestia, or The Beast, with hundreds of migrants, many of whom will die or be raped before the train stops at its terminus hundreds of miles to the northwest. They’ll travel into the heart of cartel territory in Sinaloa to observe the Mexican army raid a marijuana plantation, then visit the very “cradle of drug trafficking” by way of a stop in the violent city of Culiacán.

Soon afterwards, their real struggle begins in the bustling border crosser staging area of Altar, Mexico. This is where migrants—including the three whose journeys they’re following—stock up on supplies, like backpacks, socks, and water. For women, that includes contraceptives, since roughly eight of ten female migrants will be raped during the trek north. Knowing that so many people have died on this exact route, the participants are scared. The only reason they and the TV crew are even allowed to do this is because a local priest has greased the skids with the Sinaloa cartel, which controls the town. That fact just adds to the jitters over the jarring experience to follow: brutal terrain, a 50-degree temperature drop overnight, dehydration, and emotional and physical exhaustion.

No matter what your views are on illegal immigration, those views are initially represented by one of these six participants. While your views may not completely change after watching Borderland, depending on where those views started, you will be affected. It will humanize immigrants in a way you’ve never seen before, transforming them from just statistics to real people—people who fear the lands they’re leaving more than they fear the dangers that await them. As you’ll see from the stories of Claudeth, Maira, and Omar, the dead in the desert had parents, siblings, and children. They had dreams of a better life, which to them meant just the chance to wash dishes or pick tomatoes for a few dollars an hour, or in Omar’s case, to simply be reunited with his mother.

This series doesn’t provide or even suggest specific answers to the problem of illegal immigration. It doesn’t push a political agenda, and it voices in equal measure the different viewpoints of all the participants without editorializing. What it does do is present the raw reality that is life for millions of people in Mexico and Central America—like the fact that young kids are being recruited by gangs before they even turn ten years old, upon penalty of death or harm to their families. If the US was like this, what lengths would you go to in order to provide a better life for your children—or merely stay alive—in Canada, for example? If staying in the US meant being forced to join a gang, or die in poverty, or watch your children suffer, is there anything that would stop you from crossing our northern border?

Each of us has a different answer to those questions, and Borderland—a show I think most Americans could benefit from watching—won’t try to put those answers in your head. But it will definitely foster a grand discussion on what needs to change. We can mostly agree that our immigration system is broken. We can’t agree, however, on the best way to fix it. While we argue, people continue to come, and people continue to die, no matter what we try to do to stop them. The need to reunite with family, the need to provide, and the need to survive will always trump any consequences our government—or the Sonoran desert—can impose on illegal immigrants. Always. Borderland makes that very clear, and poses the challenge not just to us, but to every government along this long northbound route: what can we do to keep more people from dying to reach America?

Borderland premieres on Al Jazeera America on April 13^th at 9pm ET/6pm PT.

Controversy Reemerges Over US Drones in Mexico

On February 22nd, the details of the arrest of Mexican drug kingpin Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzmán were slow to emerge. The notorious leader of the Sinaloa Federation, the largest and most powerful drug cartel in Mexico, had been on the run from authorities for 13 years.
Word was that he was paying his bodyguards and corrupt police at last $1 million per month to keep his whereabouts secret, and for a long time it worked.

However over the weekend, his luck ran out. Guzmán grew tired of being holed up in his mountain sanctuary and started becoming more lax in his security protocols. Mexican authorities were hot on his tail in the city of Culiacán, but he managed to escape through a series of tunnels under various buildings. Then he fled to the resort area of Mazatlán, where he was captured in a hotel room without a shot being fired, seemingly unaware that the Mexican marines were upon him.

So how did the Mexican military finally find him after all this time? Multiple media reports said the operation was in the works for several weeks, and that the DEA intercepted phone calls from a satellite phone Guzmán used during this time. Unconfirmed reports indicate the number of that satellite phone was derived from the arrest of the son of El Chapo’s partner, Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada. US officials have also confirmed that American drones were used for surveillance operations in Culiacán: “The US surveillance drone was used for two weeks between mid-January and mid-February to back up a massive operation in the northwestern city of Culiacán, a US government official told AFP on condition of anonymity.”

The key statement in this story—and also the one most likely to stir up controversy—is this: “[The drone] had been deployed in Culiacán to corroborate other intelligence and that Mexico’s military had authorized its use.” As soon as this information was published, Twitter erupted with claims that the use of U.S. drones in Mexico violated that nation’s constitution, and it was also a violation of Mexico’s sovereignty. It turns out that both of these statements are doubtful.

To read the rest of my article on Breitbart Texas, please CLICK HERE!

"Other kingpin in DEA killing may be freed."

Here is an excerpt from the Associated Press article in the Arizona Daily Star:

"Defense attorneys believe freedom is imminent for a second member of the trio of Mexican drug kingpins responsible for the 1985 slaying of a Drug Enforcement Administration agent (Kiki Camarena, pictured), one of the capo's attorneys said Saturday. In the U.S., outrage grew over this week's surprise decision to overturn Mexican drug lord Rafael Caro Quintero's conviction in the notorious killing. Caro Quintero walked free Friday after a federal court overturned his 40-year sentence in agent Enrique "Kiki" Camarena's kidnapping, torture and murder. The three-judge appeals court in the western state of Jalisco ordered Caro Quintero's immediate release on procedural grounds after 28 years behind bars, saying he should have originally been prosecuted in state instead of federal court. Also imprisoned in the Camarena case are Ernesto Fonseca Carrillo and Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo, two of the founding fathers of modern Mexican drug trafficking, whose cartel based in the northwestern state of Sinaloa later split into some of Mexico's largest drug organizations. Fonseca Carrillo's attorney, Jose Luis Guizar, said his team had filed an appeal based on the same procedural grounds used by Caro Quintero, and expected him to be freed within 15 days by a different court in Jalisco." Link to Full Article

Analysis: For those of you who aren't too familiar with the history of drug trafficking in Mexico, Caro Quintero, Fonseca Carrillo and Félix Gallardo form the narco "holy trinity" that ran the Guadalajara cartel in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1985, Caro Quintero was arrested in Costa Rica and extradited to Mexico, and Fonseca Carrillo was apprehended in Puerto Vallarta by the Mexican army. Félix Gallardo stayed out of the reach of authorities the longest, arrested in 1989 in Mexico but continued running trafficking operations by cell phone until he was transferred to the maximum security prison in Altiplano in the 1990s.

Their involvement in Kiki Camarena's murder wasn't a casual affair. Camarena was working undercover against the cartel for several years. In 1985, he identified a large marijuana growing operation at the cartel's Rancho Bufalo and pressured the Mexican government to stop it. The ranch was raided and the operation came to an end - resulting in Quintero and Carrillo's arrest shortly thereafter - but it wasn't long before the three capos realized Camarena was the infiltrator who game their operation away. Their henchmen kidnapped Camarena in broad daylight while he was on his way to meet his wife for lunch. He was tortured extensively before being killed and buried in a shallow Mexican grave.

The impact of Camarena's disappearance on US-Mexico relations was severe. US Customs brought cross-border traffic to a virtual halt as they searched every vehicle entering the US for signs of Camarena's whereabouts. The pressure on the Mexican government to find him and hold the three Guadalajara cartel leaders accountable was enormous, and a task that then-President (and PRI member) Miguel de la Madrid probably wasn't too enthusiastic about. But despite the fact the three capos were captured and later incarcerated, the cartel lived on. Félix Gallardo knew his time as a free man was limited, and he split up the Guadalajara cartel into some of the TCOs we know now - the Arellano Félix Organization, the Sinaloa cartel and the Carrillo Fuentes Organization.

To say that DEA personnel in the US are angry about Caro Quintero's release - and the potential release of Fonseca Carrillo, and maybe even Félix Gallardo - is an understatement. While it's admirable that the Mexican government is trying to follow the letter of the law, one has to ask why this is happening now, a full 28 years after they were imprisoned, and not back then. The US wants Caro Quintero extradited so he can face criminal charges here, but his whereabouts are already unknown. Releasing Carrillo and Gallardo will be another huge slap in the face to the US government, which has frustratingly remained relatively silent after ICE Special Agent Jaime Zapata was killed by Los Zetas in 2011 and two CIA employees were attacked by dirty federales in late 2012.

The next question becomes, what danger can these men pose after being mostly out of the game for 28 years? Some reports are saying they were still running some operations out of prison, but it's not necessarily the same as physically being in the mix - especially considering their former Guadalajara cartel is in various states of disrepair across the country. Would they join up with Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzmán and his Sinaloa Federation since his organization is the most solid? Or just seek a quiet and anonymous retirement in Yucatán or Los Cabos?

I don't think Caro Quintero's release is upsetting to the US because he poses a potential danger, but because it represents a distortion of justice in a murder case that, even 28 years later, is still an extremely sensitive issue for the DEA and the US government in general. The level of cooperation between our two governments has never been better, but it has been noticeable cooling off since Enrique Peña Nieto took office last December. Intelligence sharing has been restricted from the Mexican side, and now this happens without even a heads up being provided. Mind you, that would have just been a courtesy and not a requirement. The Mexican government can do what it wants, but it's still a snub considering the years-long rhetoric about drug war collaboration.

Bottom line, I wouldn't be surprised if both Fonseca Carrillo and Félix Gallardo are released soon. Maybe they'll get back into the trafficking mix, and maybe they'll just go silently into the night to enjoy their freedom while it lasts. I can't tell from the latest reports if they're going to be indicted under state authority (which I guess is what should have happened in the first place) or if the Mexican government is going to work on extradition orders. But as the article's subtitle states, "US unlikely to pressure Mexico if latest appeal is granted." I think the DEA is going to have to learn to live with the 28 years these men have served as the best justice they're going to get for Camarena's murder.

"Three Defendants Plead Guilty to Participating in Ambush Murder and Attempted Murder of ICE Agents in Mexico."

Here's an excerpt from the Department of Justice press release:

"Julian Zapata Espinoza, also known as “Piolin,” 32, pleaded guilty today to the murder of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Special Agent Jaime Zapata and the attempted murder of ICE Special Agent Victor Avila in Mexico. The court also unsealed today the guilty pleas of three other defendants on related murder, attempted murder, racketeering, and accessory charges... As set forth in court filings, on February 15, 2011, Espinoza, a commander in Los Zetas Cartel, a heavily armed Mexican narco-trafficking cartel and transnational criminal organization, attempted to hijack Special Agent Zapata’s and Special Agent Avila’s armored government vehicle as the agents were driving on Highway 57 in San Luis Potosi. Two armed Zetas hit squads, or “estacas,” forced the agents off the road, and surrounded their vehicle. Espinoza, the leader of the attack, ordered the agents to exit their vehicle. When the agents refused and attempted to identify themselves as American diplomats from the U.S. Embassy, the hit squad members fired weapons near and into the vehicle, striking both agents. Estaca members continued to fire at the vehicle as the agents attempted to escape by driving away. Special Agent Zapata died as a result of the gunshot wounds he suffered during the attack, and Special Agent Avila was seriously injured... As part of their guilty pleas, Espinoza, Rivera, and Villagran admitted to being members of a Los Zetas hit squad and to participating directly in the February 15, 2011 ambush of the two special agents. The fourth defendant, Flores, acknowledged assisting Zetas members after the February 15 attack. All four defendants face a maximum sentence of life in prison. No sentencing date has been set for the defendants." Link to Full Press Release

Analysis: Part of me wants to be happy and relieved that justice has finally been served, and that these Zetas scum are being held accountable for actions the likely took thinking no one could touch them. Another [cynical] side of me wishes I could get a comprehensive summary of the evidence (hopefully) piled against these men that encouraged them to accept a plea deal. 

According to a Brownsville Herald article from last year that talked about El Piolin's hearing getting pushed back to September 2012, "authorities reported to have turned over thousands of pages of discovery for the trial and that thousands more are being processed." I'd like to think all those pages means that there are ample reports from investigators, forensic specialists, crime scene examiners, etc. However, remember that this investigation was conducted in Mexico by mostly Mexican authorities with some US assistance that happened after the fact.

That being said, El Piolin and company already knew they wouldn't get the death sentence by the mere fact that the Mexican government agreed to extradite them. Mexico is very much against the death sentence, and this is a strict condition for extradition of any criminal indicted in the US. They still face a maximum of life in prison, so the obvious thing they would have to gain from a plea deal is a reduced sentence in exchange for providing actionable intelligence on Zetas operations, most likely in the San Luís Potosí area where these men operated.

Does this mean these are actually the men responsible for pulling the trigger and setting up Agents Zapata and Avila? Maybe, maybe not. El Piolin has said up and down that he thought Zapata and Avila were members of a rival cartel, which is patent bullcrap. Could these men have just been fall guys ordered by Los Zetas to take one for the team? That's possible, too. Will their plea deal and subsequent incarceration bring some closure to the Zapata family, ICE, and DHS? Only they can say.

It's possible I'm just too cynical for my own good, and this really is a good news story. But my spidey sense still tells me that these men were captured too quickly, too easily, and 'fessed up too smoothly. This is definitely one of those [rare] times where I hope I'm wrong.

"Immigration reform’s hidden border-crossing charge."

Here is an excerpt from Mark Johanson's article in the International Business Times:

"If the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has its way, Congress may soon authorize the study of a fee to be collected at all land crossings with Canada and Mexico. The contentious issue was buried deep within the department’s proposed 2014 budget, released last week by DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano. It may have gone relatively unnoticed if U.S. Rep. Brian Higgins, D-N.Y., hadn’t sounded the alarm late Friday... Higgins also suggested that the fee along the 5,530-mile (8,900-kilometer) Canada-U.S. border would unfairly 'subsidize' the more challenging and expensive southwestern border with Mexico. According to Section 544 of the budget proposal, the Commissioner of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection should 'conduct a study assessing the feasibility and cost relating to establishing and collecting a land border crossing fee for both land border pedestrians and passenger vehicles along the northern and southwest borders of the United States.' Currently, travelers aren’t charged fees for crossing the border by car, bus or train... It remains unclear whether the fee would focus on those entering or exiting the U.S., or both. How much each crossing may cost travelers has yet to be determined." Link to Full Article (via Salon.com)

Analysis: As a (very) small business owner, I'll be the first one to tell you that when the cost of doing business goes up - whether that cost comes from more taxes, more expensive supplies, rising travel costs, etc. - those costs almost always get passed on to the customer. In this case, the customers paying the cost of our federal government's little spending spree over the last several years are the roughly 640,000 people crossing our land borders every day. I imagine DHS took one look at those numbers and started doing the math if each of those daily border crossers equaled a dollar bill of income.

The first obvious negative impact that comes to mind is a new fee's effect on cross-border trade. Tens of thousands of people (if not more) cross the border into Mexico and Canada and the other way around to go to work every day, and even more so just to go shopping. Then there are the tens of thousands of trucks that enter the US every day to deliver things like fresh food, flowers, electronic components, trees, clothes...you name it. The fees add up quickly for DHS, but that can mean an expense of several hundred dollars per year for just one person, and thousands of dollars for a company whose employees conduct cross-border business on a regular basis.

I imagine the study will examine things like how much DHS can expect to reasonably charge a border crosser without too much protest, and the practical logistics of taking payment - sensors and stickers (like for toll roads), cash, monthly payment discounts, etc. The main security concern would be if individuals who are super-strapped for cash might look to avoid paying the fee by crossing the border illegally, but I don't really envision that happening en masse, and especially not from people who have to cross on a regular basis. I also can't imagine that DHS would charge more than a few dollars, but DHS never fails to astound in its frequent short-sightedness and lack of common sense.

I'll be curious to see the results of the study in nine months' time, but I have a feeling the negative backlash from the Canadian and Mexican governments will outweigh DHS' need to make a quick buck to help it survive sequestration cuts.

"Border Violence Spillover: A Growing, but Undefined Problem."

Here is an excerpt from my latest piece for Small Wars Journal:

"In October 2010, the first Mexican cartel-related beheading occurred in the United States. Martin Alejandro Cota-Monroy was killed because he had stolen a 400-lb load of marijuana and lied to his bosses about it, claiming the US authorities had seized the dope. When they demanded the money he owed them, Cota-Monroy begged for time to repay, offering his house as collateral. When the PEI Estatales and Sinaloa Federation discovered he didn’t have the money and didn’t even own the house, they took their payment in flesh by sending in sleepers to befriend him and sever his head while he was in a drunken stupor. This single act of violence—the first drug-related beheading ever known to have occurred in the United States—would significantly change our assessment of border violence “spillover.” Or would it?"

To read the full article at Small Wars Journal, please CLICK HERE!

"Latin America reconsiders pot legalization after ballot wins in US."

Here's some descriptive text about the interview I did for KPCC (the NPR station) in Los Angeles this morning:

"Recent marijuana legalization measures in Washington and Colorado have sparked an international dialogue on drug policy, and how to change it. This is especially true in Latin American countries, where the drug trade has had deadly consequences. So might legalizing marijuana diminish the power of the violent cartels? Here to talk about that is Sylvia Longmire. She's the author of Cartel: The Coming Invasion of Mexico's Drug Wars."

To listen to the interview (about 6 min 38 sec), please CLICK HERE!

"Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto Outlines New Drug War Plan."

Here is an excerpt from Jordan Fabian's article on ABC/Univision:

"Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto said Monday his administration will shift the nation's anti-crime strategy in a break from the U.S.-backed campaign against drug cartels carried out under his predecessor, Felipe Calderón. According to multiple media reports, Peña Nieto laid out a plan before Mexico's National Council on Public Security that he would focus more on reducing crimes against ordinary citizens – such as murder, kidnapping, and extortion -- than pursuing the leaders of violent drug cartels. Peña Nieto and members of his cabinet were also critical of the previous administration's policies, which resulted in a drawn out war against cartels that has left tens of thousands dead. The centerpiece of Peña Nieto's plans is the creation of a 10,000-person national gendarmerie – or paramilitary police force -- designed to patrol far-flung areas where local law enforcement and military forces have failed to eradicate widespread crime. Similar forces are used in European countries like Spain and Italy... While Peña Nieto offered more specifics on the shift than he has since taking office, he did not indicate a timeline for when the force would be established or where or how officers would be recruited. He also reportedly did not say whether he would remove the country's military from the nation's drug war... Other reforms include a review of Mexico's detention policies, which allow certain drug suspects to be held for almost three months without being charged." Link to Full Article

Analysis: There's a lot more detail in a recent Washington Post story about just how much lack of detail EPN has provided almost three weeks into his term. A lot of us drug war observers who have taken a wait-and-see attitude are starting to get tired of waiting, as I'm sure much of Mexico is as well. For example:

"The administration said it would divide Mexico into five regions for the purposes of security planning, allowing them to design tactics specific to problems that vary widely across Mexico. It did not, however, say what those five regions would be."

The gendarmerie EPN is referring to is supposed to reach a size of 40,000 officers from the initial 10,000 recruits, but he didn't mention anything about how he would prevent the plague of plata o plomo, meaning how those officers could avoid the "take the bribe or take the bullet" corruption of police departments past. Will the US have a hand in training these officers? Will they be paid more or offered more benefits than their federal police predecessors? What will they be armed with to protect themselves? Right now, no one knows the answers to these questions...and possibly not EPN himself. And too many critics are spewing that this gendarmerie will be just another attempt at renaming and reforming the police, which has been attempted no less than seven times in the last decade with no positive results.

I do like EPN's strategy of focusing on violence reduction more than capo hunting or setting records for drug seizures. But again, I'm waiting to see specifics for how he's going to do that. State and local police departments in Mexico have been focused on the exact local crimes EPN has been referring to, and they haven't had much luck due to being mostly in the employ of battling TCOs. How can EPN hope to significantly reduce kidnapping rates when the police are either looking the other way when they happen, or are actively involved in the kidnappings themselves?

A little over a week ago, EPN announced he was going to enact sweeping reforms to the education system; specifically, he wanted to take on the Mexican teachers' union to allow promotions based on merit, the elimination of nepotism, and some other issues. I find it interesting that a president from a left-leaning party wants to take on one of the biggest unions in the hemisphere (I'd wager this one is even more powerful than the California version), and I don't know how much success he'll have unless he can convince the legislature to support him.

So far, however, EPN is behaving predictably. We knew he'd want to change up a few things from the way Calderón was steering the ship, but not make any drastic changes out of the gate. He's keeping the military in place for now while exploring his options - the proposed gendarmerie being at the top of his list for their eventual replacement. I'd like to see him offer some radical plans for reducing the TCO recruitment pool by increasing educational, after-school, and work opportunities for tweens and teens. I'd also like to see him be vocal about tackling money laundering and institution building.

I know he's just getting started, and he has six years to work with. However, he's got that dinosaur on his back called the PRI, and he has a lot to prove. Mexicans are growing weary of war and bloodshed, and are more skeptical than ever of any politician who says he or she can make their communities safer or their lives better. I'm happy to give EPN the benefit of the doubt, but that - for me - will always be tinged with a healthy dose of skepticism, no matter who sits in Los Pinos.

"Why Arresting 'El Chapo' Might Be a Bad Thing."

My apologies for posting this later than I would have liked! Here is an excerpt from my latest piece for Small Wars Journal:

"It sounds crazy, but catching the most notorious and wanted drug trafficker in the world might be a bad thing.

"Joaquin 'El Chapo' Guzmán Loera’s empire spans almost half of Mexico, employs, bribes, and kills thousands of people, and rakes in billions of dollars every year from the insatiable American demand for illegal drugs. He has been ranked for the last three years as one of Forbes magazine’s top 100 most powerful people in the world[1], and the US government is offering a $5 million reward for information leading to his capture.[2]

"Guzmán is also a smart and talented businessman, getting involved in the drug business at a very young age under the tutelage of Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, known as “The Godfather” of Mexican drug trafficking. He was a major player in the original Guadalajara cartel, and was granted his own corridor in Sonora, Mexico when Gallardo divided up his empire in 1987. El Chapo is as “old school” mobster as they come, having built up his transnational criminal organization (TCO), known as the Sinaloa Federation, into one of the richest and most powerful organized crime groups in the Western Hemisphere. So why wouldn’t Mexican and American authorities want him behind bars?"

To read my entire article at SmallWarsJournal.com, please CLICK HERE!

"Silence on Drug War in Races Speaks Volumes."

Here is an excerpt from my opinion piece for FOX News Latino:

"The United States shares a nearly 2,000-mile long border with a country that has witnessed over 100,000 drug-related murders in the last six years alone. Mexican drug cartels are making tens of billions of dollars every year from the trafficking of illegal drugs across our southwest border, along with kidnapping, extortion, fuel theft and piracy. American demand for illegal drugs has not wavered, and the U.S. Department of Justice estimates that 90 percent of marijuana, methamphetamine, heroin and cocaine consumed in the U.S. is supplied by Mexican cartels. Most disturbing of all is the fact they have a presence in almost 1,300 U.S. cities. Neither the drug war in Mexico, nor border security challenges, nor America’s failed drug policies were mentioned once during the three presidential debates. The silence on these critical issues says one thing very loud and clear: none of them will be a top priority for either President Obama or Governor Romney in 2013." 

To read the rest of my opinion piece at FOX News Latino, please CLICK HERE!

Is Chicago Becoming America’s Ciudad Juárez?

“At least seven people…have been killed and 24 others wounded in a string of shootings in the US city of Chicago in the past two days.” This was one very stark headline the morning of August 26, 2012. The attacks occurred in different parts of the city, with several in the south and west parts of the city. Shockingly, the statistics and incident details were reminiscent of grisly headlines emerging daily from a foreign city 1,500 miles away—Ciudad Juárez, arguably the deadliest place in the Western Hemisphere.

Juárez has been the epicenter of violence in Mexico’s drug war since 2007, when leaders of two major drug cartels—the Sinaloa Federation’s Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzmán and the Juárez cartel’s Vicente Carrillo Fuentes—failed to see eye-to-eye on a few things and went to war. The annual murder rate skyrocketed, hitting the plateau of 3,622 people killed in 2010 (according to New Mexico State University researcher Molly Molloy) before dropping precipitously to 1,976 in 2011. The trend seems to be continuing into this year, with only 602 murders through August 14.

Chicago, however, is following a different trend. A 2011 report by the Chicago Police Department shows the murder rate held relatively steady between 2004-2011, with a “low” of 433 in 2011 to a high of 513 in 2008. However, this occurred after over a decade of annual murder totals topping 900 during three years in the 1990s. And it looks like 2012 is taking a turn for the worse again. Between the first of the year and August 23, 351 shooting deaths occurred in the city: 37 of those in July, 47 in June, and 51 in May.

The comparison to homicides in Ciudad Juárez this year is stunning—45 were killed there in July, 49 in June, and 74 in May.

Of course, there are several ways in which Chicago and Ciudad Juárez differ that makes the similar numbers sit on footing that isn’t equal. Chicago has a population of roughly 2.7 million people, which is more than twice that of Ciudad Juárez at 1.3 million residents. The geography, industries, and average income levels are very different.

But the two cities might just have more in common than not. Ciudad Juárez is notorious for its corrupt politicians and police officers, with an entire enforcement arm of the Juárez cartel, known as “La Línea,” being comprised almost completely of dirty local cops. Chicago doesn’t exactly have a squeaky clean record in this department, either. In February 2012, University of Illinois at Chicago professor Dick Simpson, who served as alderman of the 44th Ward in Lakeview from 1971 to 1979, found that Chicago is the most corrupt city in the US through using US Department of Justice statistics. 

It should come as no surprise that Chicago has a gang problem. Just over half of this year’s 297 victims so far had gang affiliations. While most of Ciudad Juárez’s violence has been attributed to the war between big cartels, the truth is more subtle. There are more than 500 gangs operating throughout the city’s 800 colonias, or neighborhoods. And the gangs are all doing the same thing, regardless of country or nationality—fighting for turf and drug profits.

According to the US Department of Justice, Mexican cartels dominate most trafficking of wholesale quantities of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana in the Chicago area. DEA Special Agent in Charge Jack Riley told CBS news last month that Mexican cartels have a significant influence on gang violence in Chicago, with three major cartels operating here and “turning parts of this Midwest city into a Mexican border town.”

Chicago’s increasing murder rate isn’t as simple as it seems—something that can just be labeled “typical gang violence” and addressed with more police patrols and neighborhood watches. The roots of the violence run more deeply than some officials might be willing to acknowledge, and stem from another violent part of the hemisphere that is dangerously starting to look more and more similar to “The Windy City.” Residents can only hope that city officials recognize the potential implications of the Chicago-Mexico connection and address them before the murder rate soars even higher.

"Bin Laden-like SEAL Team Raid Could Take Down Mexican Drug Kingpin."

Here is an excerpt from Seth Cline's article in US News:

"The Pentagon may send Navy SEALs into Mexico to take out drug kingpin Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman in a raid mirroring the one that took out Osama bin Laden, Proceso magazine reports. Guzman, who presides over an estimated $1 billion drug empire as head of the Sinaloa cartel, has repeatedly escaped capture since breaking out of prison in 2001. His continued elusion of Mexican authorities has apparently frustrated the Pentagon enough that it has discussed a raid targeting El Chapo with Mexican President Felipe Calderon. Calderon approved of the idea, but because the Mexican Army and Navy balked, Washington will wait to propose the idea to Mexico's next president, Enrique Peña Nieto, according to Proceso's interviews with anonymous Mexican and American military sources. According to the sources, the proposed raid would be performed by two small teams of specially-trained SEALs, armed helicopters, and three missile-equipped drones. One SEAL team would be dropped on the ground and the other remaining in the air, with the drones providing backup support and surveillance. No Mexican military or police would assist in the raid.... Representatives for the U.S. Northern Command and the U.S. Special Operations Command declined to comment for this story." Link to Full Article

Analysis: This isn't a critism of Seth Cline's article, as he's basically providing a concise translation of the original Proceso article (which, if you read Spanish, you can find HERE). It IS, however, a criticism of Proceso and their attempt - yet again - to scandalize the perceived intervention of the US military in Mexico's drug war.

Back in November 2010, Proceso reported on a supposed "super spy center" that the US government stood up in Mexico City:

"With the approval of Felipe Calderón’s Administration, the U.S. Government finally got what it always wanted: To set up a super spy center in Mexico City. It was the escalation of the drug war in the country what opened the door to all U.S. intelligence agencies, including the military, to operate out of the Federal District without having to disguise their agents as diplomats. The establishment of the Office of Bi-national Intelligence (OBI) was authorized by Calderon, after negotiations with Washington, which began under the government of his predecessor, Vicente Fox Quesada. The creation of the super spy center was authorized by the director of the Center for Investigation and National Security (CISEN), Guillermo Valdés Castellanos, without taking into account any objections from the Mexican military."

Unfortunately for Proceso, not only were they wrong, but they really pissed off NORAD and US Northern Command. Two days after the article was published, NORTHCOM published its own explanation on its Facebook page:

"We have seen some mileage from a story out of Mexico alleging a 'Binational Intelligence Office' of US Government officials in Mexico. It is unfortunate that other news agencies are starting to pick up this story, because frankly it simply isn’t true. In violation of standard journalistic practice, 'Proceso' magazine never contacted the Embassy to seek confirmation of any part of this patently false story. The following points below are being communicated to media outlets who call us and we wanted to share them with you, our friends, so you can at least be aware of our perspective on this story.

· There is no “Binational Intelligence Office” in Mexico involving USG agencies. 

 

· There is a Merida Initiative Bilateral Implementation Office (BIO).  It was announced by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Mexico’s Secretary of Foreign Relations Patricia Espinosa in March 2009, and it opened August 31 in Mexico City. 

· This office allows for daily exchanges between technical staffers of agencies of both countries with the purpose of fully implementing equipment transfer and training programs under the Merida Initiative. 

· Neither officials from Mexico or the United States working in the Bilateral Implementation Office engage in intelligence or operational activities."

There are a few additional points, but you get the idea. This brings me to the point where I ask you and myself, does this story pass the giggle test? Take a look at the specificity of the operational details that were supposedly leaked by anonymous US and Mexican officials. One guy in the air and one guy on the ground, with a couple of drones and helicopters for backup? You don't need to watch "Act of Valor" to understand that US Navy SEALs do NOT operate this way. Also, tactical details generally aren't developed until a few days - and sometimes hours - before an operation because the target is often on the move, as authorities believe El Chapo generally is.

Moving beyond the operational aspect, I have to ask, Why would the Obama Administration put American lives in harm's way to eliminate a mere criminal? The White House and DHS have made themselves very clear that they consider Mexican TCOs to be criminal organizations that do not pose a national security threat to the United States. While El Chapo is arguably the most wanted man in the Western Hemisphere and runs one of the most powerful criminal organizations in the world, is this the smartest move to reduce drug-related violence in Mexico? If I had a SEAL team and could only take out the leadership of one TCO, I'd hit Heriberto "El Lazca" Lazcano and Miguel "Z-40" Treviño, the top two guys in Los Zetas, not El Chapo. 

Then there's the assumption that the Mexican government asked for this, and either is or will be okay with a covert military incursion into Mexican territory. Has the drug war gotten so bad in the minds of the Calderón administration that they're willing to (at least secretly) admit they've completely lost control and need US military help? Honestly, I don't think they're there, or at least not yet. Of course, if the SEALs were successful in both killing or capturing El Chapo in secret, they could hand him over the Mexican authorities, who could then take credit for the catch. But is there a precedent for this? It would be like killing Osama Bin Laden covertly in Pakistan (like we did), then allowing the Pakistani authorities to take credit for it. Never gonna happen.

Which brings me back to my point - What evidence is there to indicate El Chapo, and the drug war in general, is high enough of a priority to the US government to engage in this kind of activity, given the political, diplomatic, and physical risks? There isn't. And the US government never does anything like this unless there is a clear and defined goal AND benefit to our country. Personally, I believe taking out El Chapo will make things worse in Mexico, not better. It will cause massive destabilization, unless his #2, Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada, Garcia can take control quickly enough, and it will also serve as a huge green light for the salivating Los Zetas to move more aggressively to take over Sinaloa Federation territory. It certainly won't reduce the amount of illegal drugs coming into the US, nor significantly reduce violence in Mexico. So why do it? As a favor to Calderón? The election is over, the PAN lost, and the US government hasn't historically been so motivated to do Mexico such enormous favors.

Bottom line, the story is bunk. Hopefully my explanation above will help readers, and possibly other people intending to pass it on, understand why.

"Militias in Arizona thrive despite lack of authorizing law."

Here is an excerpt from Tim Steller's article in The Arizona Daily Star:

"Lawmakers killed a bill that would have created a state-sanctioned border militia, but that didn't squelch the Minuteman impulse in Arizona... People in the cause remain committed to patrolling spots near the Arizona-Mexico border to stop what they see as an invasion by smugglers or illegal immigrants, said participants, their supporters and their critics. Some may be even more motivated now that their plan for state organization was ended by a legislative maneuver... A longtime Arizona border-militia leader, Jack Foote, worked for a period with the group that wrote the bill and said its demise is motivating sympathizers of the border-militia movement... The bill would have set up a 300-member volunteer force to patrol the border at the governor's request. The group would have been armed but also vetted in an effort to weed out the violent extremists who have been attracted to the Minuteman movement. But critics of that movement, such as Mark Pitcavage of the Anti-Defamation League, said the border-militia idea is extremist in its nature, not just at its outer edges... If the border-militia movement is regenerating, that goes against a trend documented earlier this year by the Southern Poverty Law Center, which tracks groups it considers right-wing extremist. The center reported that the number of border-militia groups had significantly declined, in part because members' passions were being channeled into state legislatures. Now, in Arizona, they've been stymied.But the potential expansion of border-militia activity doesn't necessarily mean violence, members and others said." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I have to admit, I was pretty surprised at first glance that this bill never even made it to a floor vote in the Arizona legislature, considering it's probably the most hard-core border security state in the southwest. Then I thought about it a bit, and started looking at some of the public image hits Arizona has been taking lately, mostly over SB 1070. Even if the bill passed and a private-citizen border force was created that behaved impeccably, the national perception might be that a bunch of trigger-happy cowboys were wandering around the desert, looking for Mex-ee-cans to shoot.

The fact is, these types of patrol groups - call them militias, Minutemen, civil patrols, whatever - have been around for some time, and not just in Arizona. The Texas Minutemen are probably the most well-known, and they've had their own conflicts to deal with. Most members of these groups either just walk or drive the border, or sit next to a camper with binoculars or a camera, making phone calls to the nearest US Border Patrol station if they see something suspicious. A lot of civil border patrollers are former or retired law enforcement or military members, and feel their federal or state government isn't doing enough to prevent illegal immigrants or violent drug smugglers from crossing the border and/or trespassing on their property.

But then there are the bad apples. Border-militia leader and neo-Nazi J.T. Ready killed four people and apparently killed himself May 2 in Gilbert. Per the article, "Ready's rampage - in which he killed his girlfriend, her daughter, the daughter's boyfriend and their baby - was "a domestic violence tragedy" unrelated to his political and border activities, said James Turgal, the FBI special agent in charge who oversees Arizona. The FBI was investigating Ready at the time he died. For years he participated in heavily armed border patrols, and most recently he led a group called U.S. Border Guard, made up in part of members of the National Socialist Movement, a neo-Nazi group."

Maybe people like Ready and others like him are the reason Governor Jan Brewer opposed the bill, which is an uncharacteristic move for the border security hardliner. She's repeatedly called for more National Guard troops on the AZ-Mexico border, and will use any opportunity to take potshots at Janet Napolitano, DHS, and the White House for doing little to nothing to improve her definition of border security (everyone has a different one). This article didn't explain why Brewer didn't want the bill, but the head of the AZ National Guard said he was worried that the group would be armed - and that the bill creators didn't consult with him first.

I can understand that people involved in these groups would be ticked off at a perceived lack of support from an Arizona legislature they assumed (with good reason) would be supportive of their efforts. But I can also see why there might be some concern among legislators, Guardsmen, and other AZ citizens. People can already arm themselves to protect their property and family members from smugglers and immigrants (who are rarely armed, if they're just crossing with a coyote and not smuggling drugs). I trust that most gun owners who follow the law are responsible gun owners, and would prefer to pick up the phone and call Border Patrol if they're not in a life-threatening situation.

But it just takes one J.T. Ready incident to not only give a civilan border patrol movement a black eye; it would be a public relations nightmare for the state government that not only endorsed it, but helped fund it. At least with private movements, if something bad happens, the state and local governments can distance themselves from it by saying they don't condone vigilante behavior. Officially supporting such a group would be a step too far for the Arizona government in a time when they're still trying to clean up their image from the SB 1070 fiasco.

This is definitely a hot topic, so I'm curious what your thoughts are. Are armed citizen groups like this more dangerous than helpful? Or do we need more groups like them along the southwest border? Should the states going about formalizing civil patrol groups, like deputizing certain people, or keep them at arm's length?

"Head of Northern Command says it is too early to tell if drug war in Mexico is being won."

Here's an excerpt from this article translation from Mexico's La Jornada, and found on America's MexicoBlog:

"The head of U.S. Northern Command said today it is 'too early to estimate whether the drug war in Mexico is being won or lost,' despite 'the brave decision' to put the military in the streets. Gen. Charles Jacoby, head of Northern Command (Northcom), responsible for U.S. military affairs in North America (U.S., Canada and Mexico), appeared today (Tuesday) before the Armed Services Committee of the Senate and was asked to assess the security situation in Mexico... Senator John McCain had asked the general--given that almost 50 thousand Mexican citizens have been killed since 2006, almost 13,000 in 2011, and the U.S. government has issued warnings to travelers regarding areas in northern Mexico--if this 'indicates that we are winning or losing, or it is a stalemate.' Jacoby, pressed to give an assessment of whether the Mexican government's efforts on this area are a success or failure, said "the violence has grown. It was not a huge leap this year, but those numbers are unacceptable, adding that the travel warnings, like the one issued to Nuevo Laredo, are indicative of the safety issue along the border. At the same time, he felt that the strategy of decapitation of the cartels has been 'successful,' given that 22 of the 37 most wanted drug traffickers have been 'removed from the board.' However, he said, "this has not had a significant, positive effect." Link to Full Post

Analysis: I get very bothered anytime there's talk of whether or not the drug war in Mexico is being "won." I understand that Congress has to ask these kinds of questions to determine if Mérida Initiative money is being wasted, or if cross-border collaboration efforts are actually making progress. The problem is that this is not a war where anyone can easily determine who's winning and who's losing.

One mistake that US authorities can make when trying to assess progress in the drug war is to treat it like a conventional conflict. Yes, there are (more or less) two sides: the good guys (Mexican and US governments and law enforcement) and the bad guys (the TCOs). However, many members of Mexican law enforcement and the government play both sides of that coin, which makes things murky. Also, there are several different TCOs and smaller criminal groups who sometimes align with the TCOs (and sometimes not). If this were a more traditional conflict, who would raise the white flag on behalf of the bad guys if they ever wanted to surrender? Plus, they're not state actors, despite the TCOs' ability to manipulate politics at the local level. So who would the good guys say they're at war with? The vague and nebulous "organized crime," or TCOs in general?

If you're able to get past these issues, you then have to figure out how you'd define progress. A reduced level of violence as indicated by a drop in murder figures is a solid and easy start. On the north side of the border, perhaps a significant drop in apprehensions of criminal aliens (armed smugglers, as opposed to unarmed migrants just looking for work) or a significant reduction in the volume of cross-border drug shipments might signal progress. But would these things be enough to signal "victory"? What levels do violence and drug trafficking activity have to drop down to in order to say the drug war is being won, and what happens if the US and Mexican governments disagree on these levels?

I've written in my book and said on many occasions that I think it's a mistake to use win/loss language when talking about Mexico; I believe this is a war that needs to be managed, as true victory can't really be defined. Bringing this war to a manageable level, in my opinion, means reducing violence and drug trafficking to levels where the Mexican people feel safe and secure enough to go about their daily business almost anywhere in the country - much like we do here. We have high crime levels in many parts of the US, but that doesn't prevent people from going to work, taking their kids to school, or eating out at certain restaurants like it does in Mexico. If an American gets robbed or assaulted in a US city, he or she is usually confident that if the police are called, they'll respond right away and follow proper procedures to ID the bad guy and prosecute him if he's caught.

I did criticize the Mérida Initiative in my book (just like the GAO did in its 2010 report) for not having solid benchmarks to determine progress in the drug war. I think this is crucial, and it's very possible to determine whether or not things are getting better in Mexico, as well as north of the border. But winning or losing? It's the wrong language for this conflict, and we need to keep things from getting any worse before we can even start talking about making progress.

"US State Department Renews - And Extends - Mexico Travel Warning."

Here's an excerpt from my latest article for Homeland Security Today's Correspondents Watch:

"The last travel warning the US State Department issued for Mexico in April, 2011 sounded dire enough. It advised Americans to defer all non-essential travel to several parts of the country and detailed various violent events in different places throughout the nation. But the renewed travel warning issued Feb.8 added four more states to the ten that were identified in the previous warning, and it strengthened the cautionary language for seven of them. The warning first covers general country conditions and uses the Mexican government’s drug war death toll figure of 47,515. Several Mexican media outlets and many drug war observers believe this is a conservative estimate, placing the number closer to 53,000 drug war-related deaths. The travel advisory then points out, somewhat surprisingly, that an increasing number of innocent people are being targeted by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), something that Mexican President Felipe Calderón generally doesn’t like to acknowledge or discuss. The number of Americans killed in Mexico has gone up, according to the State Department: “US citizens reported to the Department of State as murdered in Mexico increased from 35 in 2007 to 120 in 2011.” Those figures look somewhat alarming, however, the warning doesn’t provide any context or explanation for the steep rise in American murders during those four years." 

To read the full article at HSToday.us, please CLICK HERE!

"Mexico's PRI Names Presidential Candidate."

Here is an excerpt from this Associated Press article as reported by FOX News Latino:

"The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) gave Enrique Peña Nieto a document declaring him the party's candidate Saturday. All other hopefuls had already dropped out. Legal candidate registration takes place in February and the campaign starts in March. The former Mexico State governor has a strong lead in most polls. His party ran Mexico from 1929 to 2000, when it lost to the National Action Party that still governs. National Action is still choosing its candidate but the third major force has picked its contender. Andrés Manuel López Obrador will run for the leftist Democratic Revolution Party... Growing disenchantment in Calderón's policies and the widespread violence related to the country's drug war has allowed the PRI to make a resurgence in the country's political scene. Local elections in 2011 saw the party gain back a number of political spots." Link to Full Article

Analysis: Since it's likely that many of my readers haven't closely followed Mexico's electoral politics - particularly prior to 2000 - I thought this would be a good time to provide some context on this candidate selection by the PRI, and what his potential victory next summer might mean for the drug war.

From 1929 until 2000, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) ruled over Mexico with more or less an iron fist. It wasn't considered a "real" democracy, elections notwithstanding. The PRI was also extremely corrupt, but the real issue that Mexicans today take with the PRI is that for decades, they had an implicit agreement with the drug lords who had emerged and flourished under PRI rule - drug lords like Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, Juan Ábrego, Amado Carrillo Fuentes, and the Arellano Félix family, just to name a few. The government agreed to look the other way while the drug traffickers went about their business - as long as they behaved. Back then, the PRI ran that show; if the traffickers got out of line, the Mexican government made some arrests, conducted some disappearances, and the capos got their people back in line.

The year 2000 saw the ouster of the PRI and the entrance of the National Action Party (PAN) with the election of Vicente Fox, and the subsequent election of PAN member Felipe Cálderon in 2006. Many people don't realize that the political turning point that started today's drug war brewing was the PRI's ouster in 2000; because when the PRI got tossed, so did that implicit arrangement between the government and the cartels, and so did the pax mafiosa. Vicente Fox didn't fight the traffickers as hard as Calderón is doing now, but he made a half-hearted effort. Calderón clearly made the point when he entered office that he wasn't playing games, and the cartels started fighting back even harder.

Now the evolution has made clear that, for the most part, the now-TCOs run the show, and not the government. If the government steps out of line - meaning they and their proxies, the police - don't do the TCOs' bidding, there will be killings, kidnappings, disappearances, etc.

Many people in Mexico and observers outside the country will be watching the 2012 election with much interest because the PRI, via Enrique Peña Nieto, is poised to retake Los Pinos - the Mexican version of the White House. Peña Nieto is very popular and well-liked, and he had a good record while in Mexico City. It appears he's relatively clean, or at least as clean as any Mexican politician can be. The real question is, what will his campaign platform consist of, and if he wins, how will his drug war strategy evolve from that? Much of Mexico is pinning its hopes for peace on the next president, although it's hard to see how drastically any new president could change the current strategy. Some are hoping for a return to the "old days" of an arrangement with the TCOs - even former president Vicente Fox has called for negotiations - but I don't think this is the answer, or even possible, seeing as the TCOs have little to gain from an agreement, and much to concede.

If he wins, Peña Nieto will be under a LOT of pressure to do things differently than Calderón, from the both the Mexican people and members of his party who have repeatedly criticized Calderón's militarized strategy. But he'll also be pulled in other directions; by the United States, who - despite Mexico's extreme reluctance to admit it - wields considerable influence over Mexico's counterdrug strategy, and by the international community, which expects to see an effort by the PRI to prove it's changed its corrupt and underhanded ways of old.

Looking at the election from the other side of things, I don't know if the TCOs even care who becomes president. Their source of power is derived from control of the state and municipal police, as well as the influence they wield over city mayors through threatened and actual violence. The president dictates the overall strategy, of course, but the state governors - who are elected independently - have a bit more say/control over what goes on at that level. No matter which party controls Los Pinos, I believe that the way the TCOs do business at the local level won't change that much. Unfortunately, that means that levels of violence and the conduct of the drug war is, in my opinion, unlikely to change that much, either.

This is definitely one case where I hope I'm really wrong. Who knows? Maybe Peña Nieto will, if elected, bring some fresh ideas into office with him, and be able to invigorate the Mexican congress to pass strong legislation intended to strengthen anti-money laundering laws and reform the justice system in a meaningful way. The PRI made a lot of headway in the last mid-term election, so it would be easier for Peña Nieto to pass legislation with this congress than it has been for Calderón. It's another case of stay tuned, and we'll see next year.

"Texas sheriff: Drug war violence spilling over."

Here is an excerpt from this Associated Press story, published in The Houston Chronicle:

"A shooting that injured a sheriff's deputy was the first indisputable case of spillover violence from the Mexican drug wars in Hidalgo County, the local sheriff said Monday. Sheriff Lupe Trevino, who previously said there was no direct spillover violence in the Lower Rio Grande Valley, said the Sunday shootout erupted while one of his deputies investigated a reported kidnapping and drug deal. 'I have to say that with this particular incident, the way the witnesses and the information that we have gotten particularly in the federal system, this is the first recorded spillover violence event that we have experienced — and unfortunately got one of our deputies shot,' Trevino said. One suspect was killed and two were wounded. In all, six people were taken into custody, including the alleged kidnapping victim, and are awaiting charges, the sheriff said... Trevino said the reported kidnapping was a bid to recover marijuana stolen when the Gulf cartel's reputed second-in-command, Samuel Flores Borrego, was killed in September...'Now, there are more cartel members living in Texas, in the Valley, in the United States. I'll guarantee you there's a ton of them,' he said." Link to Full Story

Analysis: That something like this has happened along the Texas-Mexico border should come as a surprise to no one. But this is what I really don't understand. Why isn't this story getting more national attention? I did a search of news stories on this particular incident, and just about everything was local in the RGV or Texas - KRGV, KGBT, The Monitor, The Houston Chronicle, etc. Although I will say, The Boston Herald did print a story on it. But why aren't the "big guys" like CNN, FOX News, and MSNBC splattering this report all over the screen?

This really shouldn't surprise me too much, either. Just last year, the first drug war-related beheading occurred in the US, specifically in Chandler, Arizona. Yep, a beheading on US soil in an apartment complex. When I tell people about that story, they look at me in awe, as if to say, why haven't I heard about this before? Then there are the five men who were electrocuted, tortured, and had their throats slit in a northern Alabama safe house in 2009. Again, only local coverage about that.

But this story in Hidalgo County is different. Most reports about possible spillover violence almost always involve bad guys killing bad guys - like the Gulf cartel members who got into a firefight on a McAllen highway a couple of weeks ago. Perhaps that's why people are disinterested; criminals killing criminals makes the work easier for law enforcement, right? But these were TCO members who shot and severely wounded an American law enforcement officer on US soil. The activities they were engaged in before the confrontation were directly related to the drug war in Mexico. Why is it that only news outlets in Texas are noticing?

The cynic in me tells me that these types of incidents are very bad PR for DHS. Everyone along the border - and particularly in south Texas - knows that cartel members are everywhere down there, but generally keep to themselves. But many border residents also knew it was a matter of time before something like this happened. This is the main reason for the subtitle of my book: The Coming Invasion of Mexico's Drug Wars. The TCOs are getting squeezed tighter and tighter by authorities on both sides of the border. However, they still need to keep the drug profits coming in. That means taking on more risk, i.e. engaging with US law enforcement and engaging in violent behavior in public on US soil.

This is not the first time that TCO members or armed drug smugglers have fired shots at US law enforcement (e.g. USBP Agent Brian Terry), and it certainly won't be the last. My question is, how many of these incidents have to happen before the US government starts rethinking its statement that the border is the safest it's ever been? And what's it going to take to move border security up the totem pole of national concerns? Hopefully, not another injured sheriff's deputy.

"The Double-Edged Sword Of A Mexican Drug Lord's Arrest."

Here's an excerpt from my latest article for Homeland Security Today's Correspondents Watch:

"Over the last year-and-a-half, the Mexican government arrested and killed more top Mexican drug lords than it has in at least the last decade. For an administration that is constantly under fire for a drug war strategy that has failed to significantly reduce violence along the US-Mexico border and beyond, these high-profile arrests are hard-won victories against transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). But are they really?"

To read the rest of the article on HSToday.us, please CLICK HERE!

PODCAST: Interview with Josh Schimberg, Executive Director of Texas NORML

In my latest podcast, I had a greatly informative and eye-opening conversation with Josh Schimberg, the Executive Director of Texas NORML (which stands for the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws), about the legalization of marijuana. We talked about what Texas NORML advocates, how marijuana compares to tobacco and alcohol, and the general attitude in America about marijuana use.

More importantly, we talked about how legalizing marijuana would potentially impact Mexico's drug war - the violence across the country, and the huge drug profits being raked in by the Mexican TCOs who produce it, smuggle it, and sell it in the US. The most surprising/shocking thing I learned? Members of NORML are not only aware of the impact illegal marijuana use has on the drug war - they make a conscious effort to not contribute to the bloodshed by "buying American" and supporting local growers.

This is a can't-miss podcast for those of you who want to learn more about the legalization debate, find out if marijuana really is or isn't that bad for you, how it stacks up to cigarettes and beer, and if you want to hear some (good) surprises along the way.

Txnorml podcast 091311

 

"Calling Casino Attack In Mexico An ‘Act Of Terror:’ Rhetoric Or Rethinking?"

Here's a excerpt from my latest article for Homeland Security Today's Correspondents Watch:

"One of the worst mass killings in Mexico’s drug war history occurred on August 25 in the violence-plagued city of Monterrey. Around 3:00 PM, a dozen men in four cars pulled up in front of the Casino Royale casino lugging several gas cans with them. In less than three minutes, they doused the small casino with gasoline and set the building on fire, killing 52 people in the ensuing blaze. Some witnesses said the attackers - allegedly members of the brutal Los Zetas transnational criminal organization (TCO) - yelled at casino patrons to get out of the building. Sadly, though, most were unable to do so. Instead of heading for the casino’s exits, most patrons fled deeper into the casino and into bathrooms, where they died of smoke inhalation. Conflicting reports claimed the emergency exits were blocked. However, one report by CNN said several vetted witnesses heard grenades exploding in the casino and saw victims - including pregnant women - intentionally being gunned down by the attackers. One woman who escaped the fire told CNN one of the attackers told the patrons, “we’re going to kill all of you.” In the wake of the tragedy, Mexican President Felipe Calderón wasted no time publicly condemning the attack. But what especially perked the ears of many of the nation’s drug war observers - and likely not just a few members of the US government - was the wording he used. Calderón called the attack an “aberrant act of terror and barbarity.” His National Security spokesman, Alejandro Poiré, bluntly stated that “an act of terrorism has been committed.” But was the Casino Royale attack a true “act of terror”? If the Mexican government believes TCOs are committing acts of terrorism, what does that imply for its drug war strategy - and that of the US government?"

To read the full article at HSToday.us, please CLICK HERE!

Attack on Monterrey casino may up the stakes for Calderon's drug war.

Twitter was on fire last night with various reports of an attack on the Casino Royale in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, that killed over 50 people and injured many more. Here's a recent report in The Wall Street Journal: 

"In what Mexican officials have called an "act of terror," a half dozen gunmen burst into a casino in Mexico's industrial capital of Monterrey Thursday, sprayed the place with gasoline, and started a fire in the bingo section, killing at least 53 people. Speaking to Monterrey's leading newspaper El Norte, Nuevo León Gov. Rodrigo Medina said that at least 53 people had been killed in the attack... Officials said they expected the death toll to continue to climb in what appeared to be an attack linked to warring drug cartels, although there was no immediate information linking the massacre to drug traffickers. Up to 80 people were in the casino when it was attacked.'Six hooded gunmen came in, shouting obscenities and firing their guns,' said a person at the scene who asked not to be named. 'They drenched the place with gasoline. People were running as the place went up in flames. Those who stayed behind burned to death.'... 'An act of terrorism has been committed," said Alejandro Poiré, the federal government's spokesman for security affairs. "This act of terror will not remain unpunished.' The mention of 'terror' has been a controversial one in Mexico's drug wars, where officials have argued hard against terminology suggesting an insurgency." Link to Full Article

However, this wasn't the only casino attack this week. The Caliente casino in Saltillo, owned by controversial former Tijuana mayor Jorge Hank Rhon, was attacked on Wednesday. A grenade attack near a Reynosa, Tamaulipas casino also occurred on Wednesday, and the Sun City casino in Saltillo) was attacked on August 15th. These other attacks involved mostly gunment (with the exception of the Reynosa incident), and few lives were lost - especially in comparison to the Casino Royale attack.

Analysis: I'm very concerned about the references Calderon and Poire are making to the Casino Royal attack as an "act of terror." I've always written/said that TCOs often behave like terrorists, and engage in terrorist-type activity. However, this doesn't necessarily make them terrorists, and to label them as such would open up a huge diplomatic and political Pandora's Box. Many of my readers and Twitter followers have already commented that the box was opened when he came into office.

The problem with that is that we don't fully understand yet the motivation behind the Casino Royal attack. But because of the string of other casino attacks (and other factors), we can start doing some intelligent speculation. Casinos are frequently owned by TCOs, or allies of TCOs who do extensive money laundering for them. Monterrey, Saltillo, and Reynosa are currently battlegrounds for the war between Los Zetas and the Gulf cartel. These attacks could be rival hits. Or, the owners of the casinos may not be following up on their end of a bargain with one of the two TCOs, and now they're paying the price. I'm more inclined to go with the first explanation; it would be too much of a coincidence that four casino owners would all be screwing their bosses over at the same time. Don't forget; according to the news reports, we don't even know if TCOs were involved, although it's a reasonable assumption.

Taking a look specifically at the Casino Royale attack, spreading gasoline around and starting a fire is a poor way to carry out a true terrorist attack. There are multiple factors here that led to the death of so many people. First, it sounds like it was a small place; only 80 people were in it at the time of the attack, and there are definitely more than 80 people in any Vegas casino in the middle of a Thursday. Second, something was wrong with the emergency exits; either there weren't enough of them, they were poorly lit/indicated, or they weren't opening. Third, many people fled to the bathrooms to escape the attackers, and they subsequently got trapped - and killed - in there by the smoke and flames.

Initial reports claimed this was a robbery attempt, and the attackers were yelling at people to get out of the casino after they started the fire. This is looking less and less like a robbery and more like a simple attempt to burn the place down. Honestly, I don't believe the attackers' intent was to kill everyone inside the casino. This is incredibly important when major political figures are throwing around sound bytes like "act of terror." Were the people in the casino terrorized? Absolutely. Are the Mexican people throughout the country terrorized by the news of what happened yesterday in Monterrey? I have no doubt. But people living in certain parts of Los Angeles and Detroit and Washington, DC (and many other US cities) are terrorized every day by gang violence that rips their children away in drive-by shootings. Does this make gang members terrorists? No.

The bottom line is, unless those men wanted to and planned to kill innocent people in the casino in order to send a message to Calderon's government, the attack wasn't a true act of terrorism.

Yesterday's attack on the Casino Royale was one of the biggest tragedies we've seen in Mexico's drug war. Whenever innocent people are caught in the crossfire of TCO violence, it has a huge impact on the morale of the Mexican people, and the viability of Calderon's strategy. How will the Mexican people choose to view this attack? As a true "act of terror" and an indiscriminate killing? As a severely botched attempt by a TCO to send a message to a rival, or uncooperative casino owner? Or yet another example of a failed drug war strategy?

Sadly, it's unlikely this will be the last tragedy of its kind in Mexico. The question is, how will Calderon's administration play future incidents in the press? By calling the Casino Royale attack an "act of terror," he and Poire may be trying to open an avenue for increased US or international assistance that would help save the face of Mexican sovereignty. He may also be pursuing a political agenda that includes pushing for passage of legislation allowing the government expanded powers to monitor TCO activity.

I'm sure more information will roll in over the next few days and weeks regarding who was responsible for the attack, and why it was committed. However, we're going to see the political fall out from this for many months - perhaps years - to come.

"Feds allegedly allowed Sinaloa cartel to move cocaine into US for information."

Here is an excerpt from Diana Washington Valdez's article in The El Paso Times:

"U.S. federal agents allegedly allowed the Sinaloa drug cartel to traffic several tons of cocaine into the United States in exchange for information about rival cartels, according to court documents filed in a U.S. federal court. The allegations are part of the defense of Vicente Zambada-Niebla, who was extradited to the United States to face drug-trafficking charges in Chicago. He is also a top lieutenant of drug kingpin Joaquin "Chapo" Guzman and the son of Ismael "Mayo" Zambada-Garcia, believed to be the brains behind the Sinaloa cartel... Zambada-Niebla claims he was permitted to smuggle drugs from 2004 until his arrest in 2009... According to the court documents, Mexican lawyer Humberto Loya-Castro, another high-level Sinaloa cartel leader, had his 1995 U.S. drug-trafficking case dismissed in 2008 after serving as an informant for 10 years for the U.S. government. Guzman and the Zambadas allegedly provided agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration, FBI and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement with information about other Mexican drug traffickers through Loya-Castro... The court documents also allege that the U.S. government is using a 'divide and conquer' strategy, 'using one drug organization to help against others.'" Link to Full Article

Analysis: This case is both interesting and strange. One of the interesting parts is the bait-and-switch the DEA pulled on Zambada-Niebla, making him think he was being sourced and then arresting him five hours later. If their intent was to get more information from him about rival cartels, maybe the DEA felt they'd have a better chance doing so by extraditing him and threatening him with decades of solitary confinement. Or perhaps enough cocaine had been allowed across the border through the arrangement with Loya-Castro, and the DEA had to wrap things up. We'll probably never know.

The divide-and-conquer strategy actually makes a lot of sense, and I've written before that Calderón may be secretly pursuing one - go after and dismantle the smaller guys so that they're left with only one or two big fish to deal with. Now, this relationship with Zambada-Niebla and Loya-Castro goes back before Calderón's administration, so we can't say the DEA was trying to follow a parallel strategy. However, the alleged arrangement with Zambada-Niebla started at the same time the drug war truly began to heat up - in 2004, when Nuevo Laredo was on fire and Los Zetas were starting to tear things up.

Ms. Valdez says this case could be a bombshell on par with the ATF Fast & Furious scandal. I can certainly see why she believes that. The report doesn't say exactly what volume of drugs Zambada-Niebla was permitted to smuggle across the border, but considering who he was working for, and the fact he was doing it for five years, it probably wasn't just a few baggies here and there. 

Here's the other problem I have with this. Just how good was the information he was providing? The biggest catches in the drug war have occurred in the last 18 months, and Zambada-Niebla was arrested in 2009. Were any of those arrests - mostly VIPs in TCOs who were rivals to the Federation - linked to information provided by Zambada-Niebla either during his time as an informant, or while in custody after his arrest? That information would be helpful, but unlikely to be publicized. Given how the drug war has worsened and drug trafficking volume has not lessened significantly since 2004, did it really take five years for the DEA to realize that their arrangement wasn't working too well?

Again, I understand the likely intention. Zambada-Niebla and Loya-Castro were high up enough in the Federation food chain to be able to provide good intelligence. It was both in their and the DEA's interests (not to mention the Mexican government's) to take down Federation rivals. Speaking of the Mexican government, I haven't seen much about their thoughts - or knowledge of - this arrangement. Regardless, how many American lives were affected by the illegal drugs that were allowed to enter as a result of this operation? Maybe it doesn't really matter. Remember this: drug users hurt themselves voluntarily, so if they didn't buy their drugs from a Zambada-Niebla shipment facilitated by the DEA, they would have gotten them elsewhere.

Bottom line, it doesn't look like the DEA got their money or time's worth in that arrangement. And now Zambada-Niebla is squealing like a pig to anyone who'll listen, probably in an attempt to either get his case thrown out, get returned to Mexico for trial, or get a reduced sentence. I've always said these guys aren't stupid - far from it - and Zambada-Niebla's tactics are a prime example of that.

UPDATE: I wanted to share this snippet of conversation I had with a colleague via email this morning. He (who shall remain nameless, but he's VERY good at what he does) has great contacts, and isn't buying Zambada-Niebla's story...or his lawyer's story, anyway. Here's what my colleague had to say:

"The folks I've spoken to say [Zambada-Niebla's story] is BS, and I tend to believe them. The claims made are pretty wild, and not really consistent with how [confidential informants] (CIs) are normally worked. I know that DEA agents can sometimes be cowboys, but I worked a number of joint investigations with them and these claims seem over the top based on my experience.  I can see making the offer to make him a CI used as a ruse to interview him and arrest him, but no way they let dope flow for that long."

I find his point of view to be realistic, and I trust his assessments. Let's see in the next few weeks if this angle that Zambada-Niebla's lawyer is going for manages to pay any dividends.

"Privatization Of Border Fence Raises New Concerns."

Here's an excerpt from my latest article for Homeland Security Today's "Correspondents Watch":

"In a remote stretch of desert between Calexico, California and Yuma, Arizona, there’s not much to be seen but sand and a scorching sun. And, of course, the incongruous dark brown border fence that stands out against the bland terrain like a miles-long stitch. The fence that straddles the US-Mexico border has been the source of endless controversy... The controversy over the border fence has been going on for years, and has several aspects. One is the potentially dangerous impact it has on illegal immigrants because the fence is incomplete. Consequently, migrants travel to areas where the fence end and cross the border there. Unfortunately, these areas tend to be situated in some of the most inhospitable regions for migrants traveling on foot... Despite these criticisms, there is significant demand for even more border fencing. On July 20, an Arizona law went into effect that permitted the use of private donations to complete border fence construction in that state. Supporters created a website where donations could be made, and in its first day, the program raised over $58,000 from nearly 1,300 donors... However, the project will run into many challenges."

To read the full article on the HSToday website, please CLICK HERE!

"Arizona can now build border fence [through private donations]."

Here is an excerpt from Alia Beard Rau's article in The Arizona Republic:

"Supporters of increased border enforcement now can help Arizona build its own fence along the Mexico border. new law went into effect today that allows the state to build the fence, as long as it can raise enough private donations and persuade public and private landowners to let it be done on their property. A new website for the effort, www.buildtheborderfence.com, was set to go online at midnight... State lawmakers who supported the law have said they want a consistent fence along the entire border that is solid, has multiple layers and is tall enough to keep out pedestrians... The Sierra Club opposes the law. It says Arizona already has more border walls than any other state and that the walls have caused flooding in some areas and have blocked wildlife in other areas." Link to Full Article

Analysis: This is one of the more interesting ideas I've seen regarding border security in a while, although I'm sure it won't be without controversy. I have mixed feelings about the concept of a border fence, and have generally agreed with DHS Secretary Napolitano's statement, "Show me a 50-foot fence and I'll show you a 51-foot ladder." Or something to that effect.

On my recent trip to San Diego, I saw the newest iteration of border fence in the San Ysidro area separating the US from Tijuana, and it certainly looked high-tech. It definitely dwarfed the primary fence, which was a ten-foot rusted-out relic that could serve only as a five-minute deterrent. The new fence, bathed in stadium lighting and topped with razor wire, looked at first sight as impossibly tall and quite imposing. Then I saw the dozens of holes that had been patched up, and it no longer looked so impenetrable.

But in southwest California, like in Arizona, the secondary fence isn't consistent in size or construction. The have another type of fence that consists of tall, tightly-spaced metal columns with a top that angles out over the Mexican side to discourage climbers. Yes, it does allow for free water flow and the passage of small critters back and forth. However, any migratory animal bigger than a cocker spaniel would have a hard time getting back and forth. Still, for the purpose of preventing "pedestrian and vehicle traffic," the polite way of referring to drug and human smugglers, it looked very effective.

But even if private donations are raised in sufficient quantities to finish the Arizona fence, is it a good idea? I will say, of all the southwest border states to implement such a law, the home of SB 1070 is the place to do it with success. There are enough angry ranchers and border residents who are tired of having their land traipsed on and their homes burglarized by smugglers to make this happen. Also, Arizona is one of the most dangerous human smuggling corridors, claiming the lives of hundreds - if not thousands - of migrants every year. Perhaps if word of a contiguous border fence in Arizona got out, migrants would be forced to use a different, and perhaps safer, route of passage.

That in and of itself, however, might pose a greater danger. There are still several stretches of unfenced border in California and Texas that are dangerous, due to both environmental factors and bandits who prey on migrants. The cost to migrants who have to pay coyotes would probably go up due to having to go around the Arizona fence. But isn't this the point? To deter illegal immigration and drug smuggling into Arizona? Admittedly, those are nice benefits, but there are human costs to be considered.

I can't deny that, after having seen it myself and listening to a Border Patrol agent tell me about it, a border fence acts as a significant deterrent. It doesn't completely stop illegal immigrants or drug smugglers, but it slows them down enough to allow USBP to respond more effectively. The agency is also receiving more funding to pave border roads and acquire all-terrain vehicles, which greatly improves their response time. This, combined with better fencing, does improve border security. Thus, another question is raised. Can USBP in Arizona take advantage of a privately funded border fence with a corresponding reduction in response time?

There are a few problems I see with that. First, the fence is going to have to sit on some private land, go through tribal reservations, federal lands, and probably go around some environmentally protected areas. What kind of hoops will the Border Patrol have to go through in order to access these areas, especially if they're between the fence and the actual US-Mexico border?

Well, let's not put the cart before the horse. First, the donations have to come in, then a fence builder has to be found, a contract written, etc., before anything can be built. Considering how these things go - and how many years it took to build the scant few hundred miles of border fence we currently have - I don't see a huge rush to have these questions addressed. Just some points to ponder.

Should drug legalization advocates be pursuing decriminalization instead?

After my panel interview on KNPR last week to discuss the pros and cons of legalizing marijuana, I was left with a lot of food for thought. There were some great points made by everyone involved, and I haven't thought about the issue - or the practical domestic ramifications - of such a dramatic shift in US drug policy as deeply and extensively as I have in the last week.

Then I read an intriguing Twitter post a few days ago, and my brain has been spinning ever since. Essentially, it pointed out that the United Nations requires member states to enact prohibitionist policies. So I asked myself, if this is true, why doesn't anyone mention it during debates over legalization, and how do countries like Portugal and the Netherlands get away with their liberal drug policies?

It turns out that those countries - and a few others with similar policies - have never truly legalized drugs; they have decriminalized their use. And this is where the huge amount of public misinformation and misunderstanding begins.

Many people don't understand the subtle - but distinct - legal difference between legalization and decriminalization. Legalization of a drug or several drugs means that anything associated with it - its use, possession, production, distribution, etc. - is completely legal and not subject to any criminal or civil penalty. Of course, laws can be enacted to regulate all of those things, and the breaking of those laws can draw penalties. In the example of alcohol, you can buy and consume it if you're over the age of 21, you can sell it if you have a license, and you can get arrested if you drink too much of it in public. Contrary to public perception, not one country (at least, none of the 180 signatories to the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs) has fully legalized drugs. 

However, there are several countries that have decriminalized the use and possession of various drugs. This means that people caught using or possessing them are either given a simple fine, the drugs are confiscated, or they're mandated to seek some sort of counseling or treatment (sometimes only after the third violation). Drug use is treated pretty much in the same way as a speeding violation. Those involved in the manufacture or distribution of drugs, however, can be prosecuted as criminals. Some of these countries include Portugal, the Netherlands, Spain, Argentina, Germany, Ecuador, Belgium, and Mexico. Yes, Mexico.

Before I get into the decriminalization loophole, I want to bring to your attention a document I just mentioned - the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. This is an international treaty that was created in 1961 to essentially serve as an umbrella for several different anti-drug conventions that were created several decades earlier, and was able to take into account new synthetic drugs and opioids that had come into vogue during that window. In 1972, it was supplemented by the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, which controls LSD, Ecstasy, and other psychoactive pharmaceuticals. 

Knowing about the Convention is critical to understanding some of the complexities of international drug policy - specifically, why certain countries do or don't do certain things with their drug policies. The Convention prohibits the production and supply of specific (nominally narcotic) drugs and of drugs with similar effects except under license for specific purposes, such as medical treatment and research. Article 36 requires treaty parties to criminalize "cultivation, production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, possession, offering, offering for sale, distribution, purchase, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport, importation and exportation of drugs contrary to the provisions of this Convention." It also identified/created the four schedules that we're familiar with for categorizing drugs based on their potential for addiction and medical uses.

Understanding the Convention is also important because it turns out it's the foundation for our own drug policies. Our Controlled Substances Act of 1970 and the United Kingdom's Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 were actually designed to fulfill treaty obligations. Both Acts include analogous schemes of drug scheduling, along with similar procedures for adding, removing, and transferring drugs among the schedules. The Controlled Substances Act also includes a provision mandating that federal authorities control all drugs of abuse at least as strictly as required by the Single Convention.

So how do those countries that have decriminalized drug use and possession get away with it on the international stage? Well, the Convention has a lot of loopholes. And, after all, it's the United Nations we're talking about - not exactly an authority with teeth. There has been considerable legal debate over whether or not the Convention's reference to criminalization of possession means or includes possession for personal use, or just for intent to distribute. The wording that mentions penalties and exceptions for certain countries' constitutions is necessarily vague, and treaty parties can easily find a way to decriminalize drugs - much to the UN's chagrin - through their interpretation of the Convention.

On the flip side, countries with conservative drug policies can point to the Convention as a major reason for maintaining a prohibitionist stance. After all, the US designed its own drug policy after the Convention. How would it look to the international community if the US government decided to blatantly defy the Convention by decriminalizing marijuana? I ask that rhetorically, as I've just laid out how it's not really that blatant of a rebuke. But the US is held to a different international standard than many other countries, and the UN pointing out an American refusal to stick to the Convention's principles and guidelines would go over very differently than if, say, Ghana decided to do the same thing.

So, taking all of this into account, I wonder why the drug policy reform movement isn't pursuing a decriminalization agenda rather than one for legalization. Given the legal distinction between the two, and the fact that no country has truly legalized drugs (only decriminalized them to varying extents), surely they have to know that legalization just isn't a practical goal. Decriminalization, however, is a different story. Maybe it's just easier to use the term legalization, or maybe no one wants to explain over and over the difference between the two. 

I strongly suspect that the drug reform movement isn't concerned about the practicalities, given the passion of those in the movement I've come into contact with. However, I wonder why they're so vehemently pushing for all-out legalization - given the Convention's requirements for treaty parties against it - instead of the more doable decriminalization. I'll be the first to admit I don't know a ton about NORML or the drug reform movement in general, so perhaps it's a matter of principle or the group's mission not to take baby steps. 

Just a few final points I want to make here. First, those of us involved in one way or another in the debate over drug policy need to be better about describing it more accurately. Drug reform advocates can't point to countries like Portugal and the Netherlands as good examples of countries that have legalized drugs, when in fact they've only decriminalized them to varying extents. Second, I think it's smarter for drug reform advocates to pursue a decriminalization agenda rather than a legalization one, if only because it's more practical and realistic in light of restrictions imposed by the Convention; not super-enforceable perhaps, but ones which the US government will likely always stick to. At least with decriminalization, there's are viable loopholes our government can exploit. And no matter how much legalization advocates may disagree with or despise the Convention, it's a UN treaty with 180 signatory nations, and it does mean something.

Third, the American public has been warming up to the concept of legalization over the last two decades, but how many of them know about the complexities of international drug policy and how that impacts what we can do to change our own policies? The American public isn't stupid. However, it's very easy to misinform people, especially on issues they may not closely follow or not feel too strongly about one way or another. A big push to educate Americans - and our own government, perhaps - about the relative ease of decriminalization compared to full legalization might make some big inroads for the drug reform movement, as well as our own understanding of how we view drug use.

"Guns in Mexico: A challenge to Obama and the NRA"

Here is an excerpt from my op-ed in today's San Diego Union-Tribune:

"Here is a public challenge to both the National Rifle Association and the Obama administration. I challenge you to prove that either of you has any idea what you’re talking about when it comes to southbound weapons trafficking to Mexico. The issue at hand is not whether guns sold in the United States are making their way into Mexican cartel hands; that’s indisputable. It’s trying to figure out exactly how many of those guns come from the U.S. and how many come from elsewhere... Here’s the problem: No one – not the NRA, not the Obama administration, not the Mexican government – knows what proportion of cartel guns comes from the north and from the south. But each will tell you otherwise."

To read the rest of my op-ed, please CLICK HERE!

On Being an Expert Witness When Mexicans Request Asylum

People who follow my writing generally don't know that one of the biggest parts of my consulting business is providing expert witness testimony in US asylum cases where the applicants are Mexican nationals. There has been an increase in both the number of asylum applicants from Mexico, as well as media coverage of the rare cases where they're actually granted. According to the Justice Department’s Executive Office for Immigration
Review, in FY 2010 it received 3,231 asylum requests from Mexicans but approved only 49. Another 1,671 requests were withdrawn. So, I just wanted to take the opportunity to tell you what it's like for me, as a subject matter expert on the drug war, to be a part of these cases.

It starts when I get an email from an immigration attorney asking for my help. The first thing I do is ask to see the applicant's declaration, which is a statement (either in a typed document or a USCIS Form I-589) of why he or she fears being returned to Mexico. This helps me determine whether or not I can help in the case based on my expertise, and how strong or weak the case might be.

If I think the case is strong enough, and it involves an area of Mexico and a TCO or smaller criminal organization with which I'm familiar, then I start to put together an affidavit for the court. My affidavits include information about my professional background and experience, general country conditions for Mexico, the evolution of the drug war and the TCO(s) in question, and the specific situation of the applicant. I finish off with my opinion as to why the applicant would be harmed or killed if forcibly returned to Mexico.

There are several different categories under which one of these cases can be classified and argued by the immigration attorneys. There's withholding of removal, cancellation of removal, Convention Against Torture, affirmative cases (in which the applicant has a visa and applies for asylum prior to its expiration), and probably a couple of others I haven't come across.

One of the critical aspects of these cases for the attorneys is showing that the applicant is part of a particular social group; in essence, that everyone in that designated group is subject and vulnerable to harm and/or death in Mexico. One example would be "current or former police officers who refuse bribes and don't succumb to threats," or informants or witnesses to crimes committed by TCOs in Mexico.

Once my affidavit is done, I send it to the attorney and wait for the hearing to come up. My testimony is always telephonic, and the hearing consists of the immigration attorney, an attorney representing the US government (usually from ICE), and the judge. I've dealt with mostly really nice judges, but some have just been outright rude. I've also dealt with very professional and pleasant government attorneys, and others who think they're on the set of "Law & Order" and have the mission to rip me to shreds. After all is said and done between the attorneys and applicant's and expert's testimony, it's ultimately up to the judge to decide whether or not the applicant should be returned to Mexico.

More often than not, they're sent back, but this doesn't stop some very hard-working immigration attorneys from working their tails off to convince a judge to allow their clients to stay. Most of the cases I've come into are really tragic, including police officers being kidnapped and tortured, a mother whose children were kidnapped and held for ransom while trying to cross the border, and a DEA information who was hung out to dry after risking her life to put Mexican drug traffickers in jail. It's hard to maintain a professional distance when you know that many of these applicants will be returned to Mexico and likely harmed or killed by one of the TCOs when they get there. Once my work is done as an expert, I rarely find out what happens to the applicant, and sometimes I worry that they've become just another faceless crime statistic in Mexico.

Doing this job has given me a very interesting perspective on immigration - a subject on which I usually prefer not to comment. My own family emigrated to the US from Cuba in the 1960s, so I'm very familiar with the asylum process and the heated politics surrounding it. I have a strong feeling that we're not going to start seeing larger numbers of Mexicans being granted asylum because that would open the floodgates for applicants, and the US system is not prepared to deal with that. It's a hair-breadth distinction that separates the Cuban asylum applicant from the Mexican applicant in the eyes of US immigration law, and that's infuriating to many. 

Regardless of the debate, I've spoken with these asylum applicants and their fear of returning to Mexico is not invented or imagined. Yes, they came to the US illegally, and that's enough for some people to say "send 'em back!" But knowing the violence that awaits them specifically makes it very hard for me to adopt that attitude.

Being an expert witness is tragic and fascinating work. These true stories are more engrossing than most fiction I've read, and I wish that more Americans could be made privy to these applicants' journeys and situations. I just hope that my small contribution as an expert in these cases can make some difference, and maybe help save some lives in the process.

"Legalizing Marijuana Won’t Kill the Mexican Drug Cartels."

I am very proud to share with you an excerpt from my first opinion piece for the New York Times!

"FOR a growing number of American policy makers, politicians and activists, the best answer to the spiraling violence in Mexico is to legalize the marijuana that, they argue, fuels the country’s vicious cartels and smugglers. After all, according to official estimates, marijuana constitutes 60 percent of cartels’ drug profits. Legalization would move that trade into the open market, driving down the price and undermining the cartels’ power and influence. Unfortunately, it’s not that easy. Marijuana legalization has many merits, but it would do little to hinder the long-term economics of the cartels — and the violent toll they take on Mexican society."

To read the rest of my Op-Ed on the NYTimes website, please CLICK HERE!

Understanding the Recent Congressional Report on Firearms Trafficking to Mexico

A few days ago, a sure-to-be controversial report was released, titled "Halting U.S. Firearms Trafficking to Mexico." It was sponsored and put together by three US senators - Dianne Feinstein, Charles Schumer, and Sheldon Whitehouse - for the US Senate Caucus on International Narcotics control.

Feel free to read the entire report HERE. What I'm hoping to do with this blog post is to summarize the key points, and try to suss some meaning out of all the statistics and recommendations:

Analysis: This is a relatively lengthy and detailed report (although I've seen MUCH longer on this issue). But the section of the report that will garner the most attention is this one: Based on updated ATF tracing data, of the 29,284 firearms seized and successfully traced in Mexico in 2009 and 2010, 20,504 came from a US source (meaning a gun shop, gun show, or private sale). That comes to 70 percent, if you don't want to go searching for the calculator in the junk drawer. Now, 69 percent of those firearms were sold in either California, Arizona, or Texas.

There were other things that the three senators discovered that they weren't thrilled with. First, they noted that under federal law, background checks are not required for sales by unlicensed sellers at US gun shows. Second, they said military-style weapons are readily available for civilian purchase in the US: "Many of these are imported from former Eastern bloc countries and then can be bought by straw purchasers and transported to Mexico. In addition, some importers bring rifle parts into the United States and reassemble them into military-style firearms using a small number of domestically manufactured components." There were a few other things noted, but many of them were legislative in nature and not as controversy-stimulating as these three things.

Tackling the first one, most of my readers know (and avidly take one side or the other) that it's been a constant battle between the US government and the NRA and other pro-gun groups to determine where most of the guns in Mexico come from. The first major salvos were fired after the infamous "90 percent" figure came out. That refers to reports by the ATF and Government Accountability Office that roughly 90 percent (more like 87 percent) of firearms seized in Mexico and successfully traced to a point of sale came back to US origins. 

The US government and a considerable number of mainstream media outlets used that figure as a springboard for making the US [even more] complicit in Mexico's drug war, and launching a rash of new initiatives for slowing down the southbound flow. Pro-gun groups like the NRA and conservative media outlets blasted the government statistics, claiming they were overblown to support an agenda for restricting firearms ownership and stepping all over the Second Amendment. Those groups also believe that Mexican TCOs use and obtain more military-grade weapons than US-origin rifles and handguns from places like Central America, Asia, and former Eastern bloc countries.

The crux of the problem is that no one knows, with any real degree of certainty, where most of the firearms in Mexico are coming from because 100 percent of them are not seized, and therefore 100 percent of them are not traced. In fact, it's impossible to know exactly how many rifles, handguns, grenades, and RPGs are in Mexico right now and being used by the TCOs, so the 29,284 that were seized in 2009 and 2010 could be most of them or just a drop in the bucket; I'm putting my money on the latter. Furthermore, it's impossible to know what proportion of TCO firepower consists of firearms readily available in the US, like rifles and handguns, and what proportion consists of military-grade arms, like grenades and RPGs, that are not.

That brings us to the recommendations that the three senators make. Most of them do involve increasing gun law restrictions: Reinstating the assault weapons ban, requiring ALL gun sellers at shows to run background checks, requiring the reporting of multiple long guns, and some others. This comes as no surprise, as all three senators are Democrats, and the Democratic Party generally favors gun restrictions. I'm sure if this investigation and subsequent report had been conceived by three pro-gun Republicans, it would have read very differently, so keep that in mind.

So, if fully implemented tomorrow (hypothetically speaking), would any of the recommendations made by the three senators have an impact on the drug war and associated violence? In my opinion, probably not. And I say that only because I don't believe anyone has a true grasp of the weapons trafficking situation across the US-Mexico border. Not because of bias or incompetence, but because of the very nature of the problem. Not many people are inspecting southbound vehicles into Mexico, where most US-origin guns are being transported. It's very difficult to detect firearms transactions between Central American dealers and TCO purchasers. Shipments of weapons come into Mexican ports, where they're rarely searched. Firearms either seized or used by Mexican soldiers and police often wind up in TCO hands, and that's not tracked.

Also, straw purchasers who work for TCOs are using our gun laws - and loopholes - against us. The assault weapons ban only covers a few of the firearms most used and coveted by TCOs. More rigorous background checks won't accomplish much because straw purchasers are selected for use by TCOs for their squeaky clean records. I do like the requirement to report sales of multiple long guns because (a) that's already being required for multiple pistol sales, and (b) I do believe that's a good indicator of a suspicious purchase. I know several people will have an angry response to this, but I just don't get why anyone without bad intentions would want to buy eight AR-15s for personal use and sporting purposes.

To wrap up, we know that a good number of firearms being used by TCOs in Mexico come from US sources. I'm not going to go into Operation "Gunwalker" in this post because that accounted for only 1,795 weapons, and we're talking about tens of thousands here. We also know that TCOs are getting a good amount of military hardware from other-than-U sources. However, no one - not the US government, not the Mexican government, and not the NRA - knows what proportion of each is being used by the TCOs, and what percentage of each comes from where. 

I don't believe that additional gun legislation is going to solve any problems related to southbound weapons trafficking, although I'm sure it would make some politicians happy to feel like they're trying to do something about it. There is no easy answer to the problem, especially since the TCO need for guns is ultimately derived from US demand for drugs, and ending that is impossible. The best we can hope for is a much-improved understanding of the nature of weapons trafficking to Mexico, and better intelligence-driven investigations and operations.

Why US Drug Policy Won't Change After 40 Years of Failure

Last week marked the 40th anniversary of the start of our "War on Drugs," which was initiated by former President Richard Nixon in 1971. That was a crazy time in US history; the end of our involvement in Vietnam, the whirlwind of a counterculture of music and drugs, and the beginning of a shift in our way of thinking and living as Americans. Nixon saw the increase in the widespread use of drugs, and decided it was a bad thing for America.

Unfortunately, 40 years and many policies later, millions of Americans are still using drugs, if somewhat differently than they were in 1971. DHS points to historic highs in the sizes and number of drug seizures at our borders and ports of entry as a sign that we're winning the war. International observers look at the situation in places like Mexico and our continuing demand is evidence that we're losing the war. The Global Commission on Drug Policy, which includes former presidents of Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Switzerland, issued a report a couple of weeks ago emphasizing that current anti-drug strategies are failing.

The report said that a decades-long strategy of outlawing drugs and jailing drug users while battling cartels that control the trade has not worked. It also recommended that governments experiment with the legal regulation of drugs, especially cannabis, referring to the success in countries such as Portugal, Switzerland and the Netherlands where drug consumption had been reduced. But the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy said in a statement that making drugs more available would make it harder to keep communities healthy and safe. 

In my humble opinion, there are two key components of current US drug policy that are keeping it on these rails from which it won't deviate: morality and history.

Governments around the world have never shied away from legislating morality to their people, and the US is definitely no exception. Various kinds of drugs have been used by people around the world for thousands of years and for dozens of reasons, but only in the last few decades have many of them become illegal in the US. Cocaine became illegal (for non-medical purposes) in 1914, heroin in 1924, marijuana in 1937, and precursor chemicals and equipment for making methamphetamine in 1983. Marijuana and cocaine were initially thought to cause crazed rape and killing sprees in blacks and Mexicans.

Of course, we now understand that the abuse (and sometimes the one-time use) of certain illegal drugs can be deadly, which gives US lawmakers the impetus to maintain current drug policy. However, very strong arguments can be made that the effects of marijuana on the body are no worse than those of alcohol or tobacco. We know that alcoholics can die from cirrhosis and smokers can die from lung cancer or emphysema. Yet, alcohol consumption and cigarette smoking are considered socially acceptable, and therefore laws aren't passed (other than age restrictions) to emphasize the moral underpinnings of their use. The US government is concerned that changing drug policy to a more liberal form would flood the market with these drugs and cause a spike in drug use among adults and encourage experimentation in children. There is, of course, no way to test this theory, which makes it all speculative. So, the US government is flying the flag of caution, maintaining its stance that all drug use is dangerous, immoral, and therefore should remain illegal.

The second component I mentioned earlier is history. What I mean by that is, the US government has a history of maintaining policies for decades that are obviously not working. For example (and with this I have extensive academic and personal knowledge), the embargo against Cuba. Cuba has been a communist state for half a century, and the US government has maintained an embargo against the island nation for roughly the same amount time. The goal was to get Fidel Castro to embrace democracy, free speech, elections, freedom of the press, etc. In over fifty years, not much in Cuba has changed. Cubans who were pro-embargo hardliners for decades have even started saying, you know, maybe this embargo thing isn't working out. Yet, the embargo persists.

In 1979, the US government created the State Sponsor of Terrorism list. The idea was to impose strict sanctions on countries on the list in the hopes they would, well, stop sponsoring terrorism. Only a handful of countries made the list, and have been added and removed at various times. Iran came on in 1984, Syria at the list's inception in 1979, and North Korea and Libya were only removed in the last few years. Yet, Iran is still sending Hizballah to do its dirty work, and Syria is still exporting some mean and nasty terrorists. Oddly enough, Cuba remains on the list, although there haven't been any examples of the Cuban government funding any sort of terrorist act in at least a dozen years. Yet, the list remains.

Morality and history aside, I think the US government is concerned that if it embraces the need for a change in drug policy, it would be seen as a sign of weakness. It might be perceived as an acknowledgment that the billions of dollars spent on drug enforcement and interdiction were wasted. Even worse, it could be seen as a concession to drug traffickers, that they're the ones winning the war and not the "good guys."

Even harder for the US government to acknowledge would be the fact that the "War on Drugs" cannot be solved by a mere shift in policy; it can only be won through a shift in American culture. Well-intentioned politicians - and Americans in general - really want to make a difference and feel like they're doing something to stop drug abuse and drug trafficking. Right now, the easiest way to do something tangible and publicly visible is to maintain a policy of interdiction, or go after the supply.

Going after the demand - while it's the ultimate solution - is not only incredibly challenging, but it might just be impossible. Many parents spent countless hours educating their children about the dangers of using drugs, and pray they'll "just say no" if offered a joint by a dealer after school. But there are also many parents who are users themselves, and their children have an uphill battle to fight to get out of that drug-filled environment.

Even more insidious is the morally- and societally-acceptable use (and often abuse) of prescription drugs. Not only is it easy to get hooked on sleeping pills and anti-anxiety medication, but they're perfectly legal to use. According to the National Drug Intelligence Center, prescription opioid (drugs based on opium) overdose deaths are increasing, primarily because the users took the drugs non-medically, other than as prescribed, or in combination with other drugs and/or alcohol. Some of these include codeine, fentanyl (Duragesic, Actiq), hydromorphone (Dilaudid), meperidine (Demerol), morphine (MS Contin), oxycodone (OxyContin), pentazocine (Talwin), dextropropoxyphene (Darvon), methadone (Dolophine), and hydrocodone combinations (Vicodin, Lortab, and Lorcet).

It's painful for me to say that I don't see an answer, either on the horizon or farther down the road. US drug policy isn't going to change because it's the only way our government knows how to fight drug use. They're just not capable of changing an entire country's culture, or American society's way of looking at drug use - both illegal and prescription. By maintaining course and sticking to its guns, the US government believes it's being steadfast and not compromising American values. Yes, DHS, its components, and state and local law enforcement agencies across the country are stopping some drugs from reaching users, but it's only a small percentage of what is getting out there. Only when we take a hard look at ourselves, what our country is becoming, and what US drug demand is inciting in Mexico and elsewhere can US drug policy truly change in a way that will actually make a difference.

"Wealthy Mexicans Are Increasingly Investing in the U.S. to Escape Cartel Violence."

Here is an excerpt from Teke Wiggin's article on FoxNews.com:

"Members of the Mexican elite are filing for EB-5 visas, which can grant the well-heeled financiers and their families green cards in exchange for investments in projects demonstrated to create or sustain 10 U.S. jobs... [There is] a rapidly increasing number of wealthy Mexicans to who are attempting to escape the violence by investing $500,000 or more in American business projects - thereby earning legal and permanent residency status in the U.S. The majority of the investments are arranged through so-called “regional centers,” designated public or private economic units, which according to law accept a minimum of $500,000 for economic growth projects in rural or high unemployment areas, or a minimum of $1 million for projects outside such areas. Mexicans last year made up a small fraction of EB-5 applicants -- who are approved around 75 percent of the time -- with just 34 filings, according to the U.S. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services. By contrast, more than 1,200 Chinese applied for the visa. But Marco Ramirez, director of USA Now, a Texas regional center that markets itself exclusively to Central and South Americans and operates in the Texas counties of Webb, Zapata, Starr, Hidalgo, Willacy, Kenedy and Cameron, says his organization has raised $90 million from 160 Mexican investors since June 2010, and expects to have about 280 commitments by the year’s end... The process, they argue, ensures all EB-5 holders who receive permanent residency rights have done so to the benefit of U.S. communities. But some critics see things differently, asking whether rich Mexicans should be able to effectively buy residency in the U.S." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I found this to be a fascinating article because I didn't know anything about the EB-5 visa - or its requirements and privileges - before finding this article through a group I follow on Twitter. Of course, my biggest question - both to myself, my readers, and our government - is, is this fair? Essentially, we're selling permanent residency to foreigners with deep pockets. So is the EB-5 visa ethical?

This particular visa category was created by the Immigration Act of 1990, so it's been around for a couple of decades. It's also available to all foreigners, not just Mexican nationals, and the money goes towards US projects that generally benefit communities in dire need. The investor doesn't have to have any say in the project itself, although if he or she wants a more hands-on role in how the money is used, then the minimum shoots up to $1 million.

I did find it interesting that only 34 Mexican applications came in last year, compared to over 1,200 Chinese applicants. Of course, the population of China is considerably higher than that of Mexico, and there are probably more Chinese millionaires than Mexican millionaires. However, it's not like the drug war violence just started yesterday; I'm curious why the number of anticipated applicants, if Marco Ramirez's projections turn out to be accurate, is only shooting up now.

It's tough for me to say if the EB-5 visa is a bad thing, a good thing, or somewhere in a gray area. It's probably the latter. After all, the money is doing a lot of good in communities that are in need of capital investment. Our economy is hurting, so the boost in the injection of dollars from the outside is a huge help. However, Mexico's economy is hurting even worse than ours, and that's money leaving their country that could be invested in Mexican projects. Of course, given the situation with corruption in Mexico, it's hard to say how much of those investment dollars would actually go towards a worthy project, and how many would go towards greasing palms and lining pockets.

As for the granting of instant permanent residency, that's the part that makes me uncomfortable. I've seen how hard "regular" immigrants work for that status, and it's not right that someone can just get it because they have money. Mind you, I'm not being naïve; there are a lot of things more critical in life than residency being bought and sold between people and governments. But this has been a legal option for more than twenty years, and I'm frankly surprised that there hasn't been more public debate about it.

One of the reasons I felt inclined to comment on this story - or at least vent my ambivalence about it - is that I'm getting more requests to testify in asylum cases than ever before, and I'm seeing a lot of stories of Mexicans whose lives would be in great danger if deported back to Mexico. That doesn't excuse the fact that most arrived in the US illegally, or are in blatant violation of federal immigration laws. However, the granting of asylum to these people - no matter how blatant the threat to their lives is - is close to impossible, and they barely have the money to pay me as an expert, let alone half a million dollars to be able to stay in the US.

Yet one could also argue that the wealthy in Mexico are under threat for the simple fact that they have money. Every day, they're moving targets for kidnapping and extortion. Because wealthy Mexicans are a rare breed, DTO members usually know who they are in every city and community, so they can't escape the drug lords' scrutiny. If they have the means to protect themselves and their spouses and children, why shouldn't they? The EB-5 visa program has strict requirements for proving the money the invest comes from legitimate sources, and the results of their investments are examined over the course of two years.

So if you can't tell by my back-and-forth on this, I'm still not sure what to think of the EB-5 visa program. As always, I'm very interested to hear my readers' own thoughts.

Can Mexico’s Anti-Drug War Movement Truly Succeed?

The Mexican people want their country back. That’s the message they plan to send on May 8^th to Mexico’s government, as well as to the narco thugs who have held their country hostage for years, through widespread planned marches and rallies.

The national sentiment of  Hasta la madre! [“We won’t take it anymore!”] has been slowly and steadily building, but was catalyzed by the death of a well-known Mexican poet’s son. Javier Sicilia, a journalist-turned-activist, lost his son to the drug war in late March 2011, and as a result has galvanized a movement of Mexicans, both domestically and in the United States, to protest the conduct of the drug war.

Sicilia says one of the goals of this mobilization is to return dignity to the names of the dead who “in the eyes of the State have been counted as collateral damage or statistics.” He also calls for a rebuilding of Mexico’s social fabric, and a re-founding of the country through a social pact formed between the Mexican people.

But can such a movement, with decidedly lofty goals and ideals, truly succeed in Mexico’s current environment?

There are several factors working in the protestors’ favor. Historically, this is the first time that so many Mexicans have come together to publicly call for an end to President Felipe Calderón’s drug war and associated violence. There are currently 38 marches and rallies taking place on May 8^th across Mexico, and some are also planned in the United States.

The El Paso Times reported that Mexican journalist and asylum seeker Emilio Gutierrez, along with a group of supporters, is encouraging people in the El Paso area to join a rally in Mesilla, Texas in support of the national marches in Mexico.

The Mexican people have already warmed up for this day, too. Media reports said that on April 7^th, up to 35,000 people in 21 Mexican states and 26 cities took to the streets to protest corruption, push for changes in the government’s fight organized crime, and lament the deaths of thousands of innocents across Mexico. These people were inspired by an open letter penned by Sicilia shortly after the death of his son.

I’ve had the chance to speak with people who are passionately answering Sicilia’s call. Some are looking at May 8^th as just a beginning, a precursor to a process that will likely take years to bear fruit. Others have used the terms “revolution” and “civil resistance,” invoking recent events in Egypt and historical figures like Gandhi and Martin Luther King to draw parallels with this phenomenon.

Unfortunately, as well-intentioned as these protestors may be, it sounds like they’re forgetting about the number one cause of the drug war that is ruining millions of Mexican lives—American drug users.

Sicilia outlined several goals for this movement in a long open letter, but they’re all domestically oriented. Many of them are vague and idealistic, like the forming of a “social pact” and “rebuilding Mexico’s social fabric.” Others are practical, like eliminating corruption from the ranks of politicians, soldiers, and police. Some are outright unrealistic, like completely legalizing all drug trafficking in Mexico.

The anti-drug war movement seems to be using Sicilia’s letter as a manifesto of sorts, but it still comes across as unfocused. Are they protesting against the Mexican government, the cartels themselves, or US drug policies? Perhaps it’s all of the above, but they don’t appear to have a solid road map for how to achieve their ultimate goal—the end of the drug war.

Most importantly, they’re leaving out the biggest problem—the insatiable American demand for drugs. Millions of drug users in the United States couldn’t care less that their habit results in the loss of thousands of Mexican lives every year. The U.S. media is providing better-than-expected coverage of these marches. But even if millions of Americans learned about the rallies and their goals, most probably wouldn’t flinch, let alone change their daily routines.

The comparisons to Egypt and Gandhi and Martin Luther King also aren’t quite accurate. The protests and civil resistance in those cases were for political reasons dealing with purely domestic issues. If the anti-drug war movement only had to deal with the Mexican government, then they’d really be on to something. But no matter how many people take to the streets in Mexico—or even in the United States—to demand an end to the bloodshed and corruption, no change in Mexican strategy or policy or social outlook is going to affect the American desire for illegal drugs.

There is no question that the Mexican people are displaying an incredible amount of courage, fortitude, and determination by taking steps to get their country back. There are many changes that the anti-drug war movement is demanding that are necessary to have a positive impact on the drug war. Regardless of the U.S. role in the drug war, the Mexican people would no doubt benefit from less corruption, elected officials who weren’t working hand-in-hand with narco thugs, and diminishing national fear as a result of communities working together.

Those changes will take time, patience, and hard work. But the anti-drug war movement can’t succeed by confining its goals to Mexico alone. Without a component to galvanize the American people or the U.S. government to dramatically reduce drug demand or revamp U.S. drug policies, it’s unlikely the drug war and bloodshed will end through Mexican protest alone.

 

Is Mexico's National Security Law becoming a version of the Patriot Act?

I ask this question with no small amount of controversy behind it, as that's what the proposed changes are stirring. But for those of you who aren't familiar with Mexico's National Security Law, here's some background.

The National Security Law was actually only recently established in 2005, during the last year of former president Vicente Fox's term. It came about partly (some would say largely) in response to the increasing threat posed by DTOs. Feeling the Law's provisions weren't strong enough, Calderón initiated changes to it in 2009, saying the law "fails to adequately define the role of the Armed Forces in regulating internal security," and that the proposed changes "will help resolve ambiguity about the procedures for military intervention in Mexico’s internal affairs."

Whether those changes will resolve any ambiguity is debatable, but what is clear is that concern over the potential for human rights abuses by the Mexican military under a changed law has soared.

According to media reports, initiative proposes that the Mexican military would serve “as a last resort, when the Council of National Security determines and the President of the Republic approves” to combat “cases or acts that constitute crimes against national security or impede the competent authorities (the Public Ministry and the Police under its command) to combat these crimes or any others whose consequences may imply risks, challenges, or threats.” The reports go on to say that "members of the political opposition remain deeply skeptical of proposed changes to the law, which advocate, among other things, the monitoring and recording of private communication for intelligence-gathering purposes. Organizations such as Human Rights Watch have drawn attention to frequent abuses by the Mexican military and contend that there is a widespread systemic failure to prosecute human rights violations in Mexican military courts."

Other reports said that opponents to the changes have raised concerns that neither citizens nor Congress will have any say on how and when military force is used. Here's some more from that report:

"Mexican politicians skeptical of changes to the National Security Law continue to criticize the initiative’s broad definition of what activities might constitute a threat to national security and what methods would be used to combat them. The national director of the PRD, Carlos Navarrete, said that the Mexican Senate had approved changes to the National Security Law last year only on the grounds that arbitrary detentions, searches without judicial authorization, and the interception of private communication would not occur. He said that the changes should have the approval of all five commissions charged with reviewing the law. So far, only one, the National Defense commission, has done so."

Members of the Mexican congress are trying to reassure people that there are protective measures in place, but they're having a hard time convincing anyone. To add to the drama, some say that members of Calderón's political party, the PAN, have collected some serious dirt on members of the PRI, which is the main opposition party. That, say some, is putting the PRI in the compromised position of having to support changes to the law.

Reading all of this today reminded me instantly of the furor by many Americans over the establishment of the Patriot Act just 45 days after 9/11, and its subsequent renewal many years and lawsuits later. Of course, the Patriot Act was designed to allow US law enforcement agencies to more effectively pursue terrorists, and Mexico's National Security Law changes are designed to allow the Mexican military to more effectively pursue DTOs. But do the differences end there?

The Patriot Act...

"...dramatically reduced restrictions on law enforcement agencies' ability to search telephone, e-mail communications, medical, financial, and other records; eased restrictions on foreign intelligence gathering within the United States; expanded the Secretary of the Treasury’s authority to regulate financial transactions, particularly those involving foreign individuals and entities; and broadened the discretion of law enforcement and immigration authorities in detaining and deporting immigrants suspected of terrorism-related acts."

The current session of Mexico's congress ends Saturday (4/30/2011), and many in Mexico are angry that their congress is rushing to push these changes through with no room for public opinion or debate. The same was said about the Patriot Act being pushed through in 45 days. The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) criticized the law as unconstitutional, especially when "the private communications of law-abiding American citizens might be intercepted incidentally," while the Electronic Frontier Foundation held that the lower standard applied to wiretaps "gives the FBI a 'blank check' to violate the communications privacy of countless innocent Americans." The same concerns are being expressed about the NSL changes regarding the monitoring and recording of private communication for intelligence-gathering purposes.

Obviously, there are considerably more details and provisions to the NSL changes and the Patriot Act. The intentions behind both pieces of legislation are good, and there's no doubt that some good will and has come out of both in the fight against terrorism and organized crime. There are plenty of Americans who swear that the Patriot Act has helped prevent another 9/11, and plenty of Mexicans who say the NSL changes are completely necessary to finally start making a dent in the drug war.

But will the cost in Mexico to make those changes be too high? Here's the biggest difference (in my opinion) between the two. If the FBI screws up and taps someone illegally, you can always count on the ACLU to sue and make it public. Actually, several transgressions by our government regarding the Patriot Act have been pointed out, and that has resulted in some changes being made to the Act's provisions. While our government isn't perfect and often secretive, the American people know that it has to be held accountable when the law is violated.

That's not usually the case in Mexico. Of the thousands of human rights abuse complaints that have been made against the Army since the drug war started, only a scant few hundred have seen the light of day, and maybe a few dozen soldiers ever sent to jail for them. Provisions or no provisions in the NSL changes; those don't mean anything to DTOs with plenty of money, influence, and threats to offer to soldiers and police. I get that the Mexican government is thinking that desperate times call for desperate measures, but is this the right thing to do? Has the drug war reached the point of potentially turning Mexico into a police state, as some fear, in order to more effectively battle the DTOs? One also has to ask, if the NSL changes do indeed turn the law into Mexico's version of the Patriot Act, does that bring the DTOs one step closer to being viewed as terrorists by the Mexican government?

The measure passed the Senate in 2009, and it needs to pass the House before Saturday in order to take effect. Who knows? All my musings might be for nothing if this thing dies on the floor. But if it goes forward, get ready for some ugly changes in the drug war scene.

Can Mexico's citizen movements make a difference in the drug war?

Over the last couple of weeks, I've gotten a few requests from readers and colleagues to comment on the March for Peace that's happening in Mexico on May 8th, as well as citizen movements in general across the country. These marches and demonstrations are meant to send a message to President Felipe Calderón's government that the people of Mexico have had enough of the violence, enough of the kidnappings and disappearances, and enough of the fear that plagues their daily lives.

But are these movements strong enough, and will they effect any real change in Mexico?

Analysis: The May 8 march, which is officially called Alto a la Guerra! Por un Mexico justo, en paz. Estamos hasta la madre!, got its start shortly after Mexican poet and columnist Javier Sicilia's 24 year-old son and six other youngsters were killed by DTO hitmen. The friends reportedly had a loud conversation about the drug war. All seven were later found dead in a car next to a note that said, “This is what happens to those who make anonymous calls to soldiers.” Juan Francisco Ortega Sicilia and the other six were all suffocated and their hands and feet had been bound, according to the Mexican daily Milenio. Popular indignation started immediately after Javier's son's death. Thousands of people in several Mexican cities took to the streets to protest Calderón's inability to stem drug-related violence. The large turnout was due in part, according to media reports, to the unprecedented use of social networking sites to organize the rallies.

In an open letter to Mexico, Sicilia said:

"We're fed up with you politicians ... because in your fight for power you have torn apart the fabric of the nation... Because amid this poorly conceived, poorly executed, poorly led war, this war that has put the country in a state of emergency, you have been unable to forge the consensus the nation needs to find unity... As for you, the criminals, we're fed up with your violence, with your loss of honor, your cruelty and your senselessness."

Ioan Grillo has a great article on GlobalPost.com that says the demands of these citizen movements are mixed:

"The protesters call on the criminal cartels to stop attacking innocent people, but also criticize abuses by soldiers fighting these gangs. Some say the war on drugs has failed and the government should legalize narcotics. Others demand more protection from kidnappers and extortionists... Sicilia initially caused a stir by telling reporters that the government should make a pact with cartels to stop the violence. [Later] his comments took a less controversial tone, as he argued that all members of society should come together."

It's hard to say how many people will turn out for the march on May 8th. The numbers for the marches in April were substantial, but perhaps not enough to make a strong enough impression. According to Fox News Latino, big demonstrations took place in Mexico City and in several cities hard hit by drug mob turf wars, including Monterrey, Ciudad Juarez, Guadalajara and Reynosa; the story didn't specify what they meant by "big demonstrations." Dozens of people assembled in some urban centers (especially the most affected northern border cities), while a spokesman for the organizers said close to 20,000 demonstrators held a rally in Cuernavaca and 5,000 protested in the nation's capital. As we've seen with widely publicized demonstrations in Washington, DC, the event promoters and the media estimates for attendance always varies by quite a bit.

The organizers of the May 8th march seem to be going all out, even setting up a Facebook page for it. Reports say on May 5th, the march will depart from Cuernavaca to Mexico City, in a journey that will take the marchers 85 kilometers on foot over two days. On May 7th, they'll stop at the campus of the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM), and head out on May 8th for the Zocalo, the country's main public square in Mexico City.

I think quite a few people will have their eyes on this one, for better or for worse. The Mexican government will be keenly interested, especially with a presidential election almost around the corner. The US government will be watching to see how the Mexican government responds to the call to action by its citizens. And the DTOs will be watching to see if the citizen movements are something they need to start concerning themselves with.

I will offer up the opinion that 20,000 people showing up isn't going to cut it. While estimates vary widely, there were probably a few hundred thousand people at Glenn Beck's "Restoring Honor" rally on the Washington Mall (I'm not endorsing...it's the only recent major rally there I can think of off the top of my head), and that was a big part of the influential Tea Party movement that has made an impact on our political landscape - whether people agree with it or not.

I imagine a lot of Mexicans are scared to join such a march or other anti-violence rallies for fear that DTOs will find them and retaliate. But it's time - actually, long overdue - for the Mexican people to send a strong message to their leadership that enough is enough. They're tired of the corruption, the broken justice system, the police they can't trust, and having to change their lives because their government can't protect them. It'll be an interesting day, and I hope the Mexican people can make the most of it.

UPDATE

Shortly after I wrote this post, I submitted it to a large listserv followed by hundreds of people who follow drug war events. Many of those people are Mexicans, or Americans who live or work in Mexico. I received several responses to my post - some quite indignant - that differed from my point of view. I feel it's important for me to share some different perspectives, especially since this is an issue so many are very passionate about. I'm also deliberately keeping these contributors anonymous (each paragraph is from a different person):

"You seem to be evaluating the potential for success or failure of this new movement by using the same old numbers game to count bodies that has long been employed to downplay social movements. In truth, this movement goes far beyond marches.  For example, last week Javier drilled metal plaques bearing the names of his son and the six people killed along with him into the stone facade of the Morelos government palace.  The next day, others came and put up 95 more plaques.  Javier then called for plaques to be drilled on walls in town squares in all of Mexico, and arrangements are being made as we speak to do so. In other words, far beyond marching, tens of thousands of Mexicans are right now making plans to engage in a tactical assault against the anonymity and label of 'collateral damage' surrounding the almost 40,000 deaths in Mexico since 2006 because of Calderon and Washington's Drug War... The fact that he represents a seismic shift in public opinion is evident from other details that can be observed on the ground, and not online... One of the points of this movement against the drug war is Mexicans are 'hasta la madre' with being told, from the United States, what their goals, numerical and otherwise, ought to be, so let's please be careful not to replicate the imperialism of the US imposed war on drugs with US imposed conditions or expectations on an authentic native Mexican movement."

"Mainstream media does not change the world; it simulates what's already in force. It is not the change agent you see it to be... But what you can't count is what's happening in people's minds, on both sides of the border. And that's where all real revolution begins and multiplies and eventually manifests itself in terms of boots on the ground. The consciousness of a movement is what produces its footprint on the earth, not the reverse... In that sense what is happening in Mexico could have resonance on this side of the border and at a minimum I do think consciousness has been rising in the US over the issue of the drug war and it s futility and harm but what is happening in Mexico is giving a similar consciousness there a 'footprint' that has the potential to expand exponentially but it is still early in development."

"I do not believe that the Mexican people at this point in time, living as they are, are naive to think that they only have to get the numbers out, and that media coverage will help them with their cause. If we are to rely on media coverage for our 

liberty, justice and way of life. We are in deep trouble... 

That is why they are taking to the streets. Also how patronizing of us to sit on this side of the border and say, I don't think it will work... We as americans are very implicit and complicit in what is going on. 

Until we understand that and own the blood on our hands, it will not change... 

The people in Mexico got it and we have to get it. We need to march in our cities all over the country to let our government and the people of Mexico know that we get it."

"Mexicans are tired of marches, no matter how 'new and improved' they are. As a form of political expression there has been little to show for them beginning with the Ya Basta march in 2004 which drew nearly a million people but produced few if any tangible results.  That said, only active citizen involvement and pressure will bring about change in Mexico. It's a very tough scenario given that the political parties appear utterly unable to work for the common good. Marches can be a tool if the leadership is clear about goals and clear about being non-partisan. Otherwise, it will move Mexico not one inch.  Also, the failures in the current strategy are real and should be pointed out, but we need real ideas and real proposals. 'Stop the war,' is an insufficient platform.  On Saturday the 

New York Times

 

noted the obvious, namely, that there are regions of the northern part of Mexico (with Tamaulipas as the best but not the only example) that are simply not in control of the government.  There are real issues with the cartels and other organized crime groups that will not be addressed by simply returning the army to the barracks and the Policia Federal to Mexico City."

 

 

 

"Mexican drug war denies reality."

Here is an excerpt from Denise Dresser's article in The Australian:

"MEXICAN President Felipe Calderon finally has what he wanted: the resignation of US ambassador Carlos Pascual. Calderon shot the messenger for delivering bad news via confidential cables released by WikiLeaks. Pascual's harsh assessments of the "war on drugs" that Calderon unleashed four years ago infuriated the President... Essentially, Pascual was forced to leave for describing a reality that Calderon does not want to face, and that his government would prefer to ignore. In other words, he lost his job for doing it properly. But the stubborn truth revealed by the US diplomat emerges every day, despite drug kingpins bring arrested, the number of weapons discovered or the amount of cocaine seized. Mexico is not winning the "war" against drug trafficking and organised crime: Pascual's forced resignation cannot hide the 34,000 dead, the growing number of Mexicans addicted to drugs, the surge in kidnappings and executions, and widespread impunity... Therein lie the contradictions, evasiveness and lack of transparency regarding the terms on which Calderon's war is being conducted. Everyone on his team demands that the US devote more attention and resources to Calderon's effort, but publicly denies doing so when evidence of heightened US presence in Mexico becomes public. In recent weeks, the Calderon administration has twisted itself into knots trying to explain how and why it authorised US drone planes to fly over Mexican territory for intelligence-gathering purposes. And yet, while Calderon insists that the US assume its bilateral responsibilities, he also demands the US ambassador's head for revealing his own tactical and strategic mistakes in the war he insists on prosecuting. Calderon's contradictory stance is rooted in the reflexive habits of a Mexican political class trained to gain points by kicking the US. Calderon, too, has sought refuge behind the folds of the Mexican flag and in diatribes about sovereignty under siege." Link to Full Article

Analysis: Every now and then, I read an article on the drug war and think, man, this writer really gets it. This is definitely one of those times. Dresser does an amazing job of spelling out the Mexican government's pride and intransigence when it comes to the drug war. Calderón keeps pushing the same strategy he's been using since coming into office in December 2006, but it seems obvious to everyone but him that it's not working - and actually is making things worse.

I particularly like Dresser's explanation of how Calderón wants our help, yet somehow denies it at the same time in the name of Mexican sovereignty. There's an expression in Cuba: Como el perro del hortelano, que ni come ni deja comer, translated to essentially mean like a dog who neither eats, nor allows anyone else to eat. The Mexican government obviously isn't making much progress in the drug war, yet isn't willing to publicly allow the US or anyone else to help them make any progress.

Like they say, the denial Calderón is in isn't a river in Egypt, but a sad state of affairs that has locked the drug war in a state of paralysis. Actually, that may not be entirely accurate, because while Mexico isn't moving forward, it's definitely capable of moving backwards, as has been evidenced by the hundreds of innocent Mexicans being slaughtered by Los Zetas in Tamaulipas. I don't know how bad things need to get before Calderón - and certain people in our own government - wake up and acknowledge the realities of Mexico's drug war and the failing strategies currently being applied.

"Bloggings by Boz: Traffickers as Terrorists"

A colleague of mine wrote this post on his blog, Bloggings by Boz, on April 1st. I was so impressed with it - and so in agreement with him - that I asked his permission to reprint it in its entirety below. Enjoy!

Traffickers as terrorists

Houston Chronicle:

In a potentially sweeping and politically charged escalation of the U.S. offensive against Mexican drug cartels, Rep. Michael McCaul, R-Austin, introduced legislation in Congress Wednesday to designate six murderous Mexican drug cartels "foreign terrorist organizations."

Such a designation by the State Department could expose Mexican drug traffickers and U.S. gunrunners to charges of supporting terrorism.

There is a lot of opposition to the effort. Some are concerned that the designation would increase pressure for US action. Others think it diminishes the designation on Al Qaeda and other "real" terrorists. Some have a philosophical difference, saying the groups don't meet the designation of terrorists because they are more interested in profit than ideology. The Calderon government dislikes the possible designation because they don't want their country to be identified with terrorism.

However, outside of the Mexican government, it may be the group most opposed to the designation will be the NRA. After all, designating Mexico's criminal organizations as terrorists could lead to some genuine crackdowns on guns flowing south to those organizations and prison sentences for gun shop owners who allow their merchandise to flow into the terrorists' hands.

Hypothetically, this legislation could also mean anyone supporting the terrorists financially or logistically could be prosecuted under anti-terrorism laws as well. While this wouldn't extend to the lowest level of drug user (we don't prosecute heroin users for supporting the Taliban), it could extend into drug trafficking and money laundering networks here in the US and elsewhere in the region.

Surprisingly, I find myself in agreement with Congressman McCaul, at least on the fact certain Mexican criminal groups should be on the list of terrorists. The Mexican criminal organizations do use terrorism, as I define it, as a way of advancing their economic and political goals. If the US is going to have a list of terrorist groups, then the Mexican criminal organizations that use terrorism as a tactic should be on that list.

That said, we need to remember that the list of terrorist groups is a tool, not a strategy. Countering the terrorist/criminal organizations in Mexico is a very different issue from countering the other groups on that list, including Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, the Tamil Tigers, the FARC and the remnants of the AUC or IRA. Placing the Mexican criminal organizations on the list of terrorists doesn't solve the problem nor does it even fully define the problem. While it has some symbolic significance, whether or not they are on that list should not impact the amount of attention given to the problem. The security problems in Mexico are important whether or not the groups meet the definition of "terrorists."

In some ways, this is an argument against the list itself. Even without the Mexican criminal groups added, the list of terrorist groups already contains a diverse set of organizations with different goals, motives and strategies under a single heading because they loosely share a set of tactics ("terrorism") for how they try to achieve their goals. This is also why the "Global War on Terrorism" was a misnomer and I'm glad current US officials avoid the terminology. The list of terrorist organizations is useful from a bureaucratic sense, but it's a strategic mess.

Fighting over whether to place groups in a specific lexicon box of terrorists, criminals, insurgents, religious extremists, revolutionaries, guerrillas, gangs, etc. often masks the complex nature of the organizations. The "bad guys" (the term I often choose to use so I can avoid the lexicon fight) can fall into multiple categories at the same time. Hezbollah is at times a religious, political, social, criminal or terrorist group depending on which members are acting and what they are doing. It's worth discussing and debating the nature of the groups so that they can be understood and deconstructed, but it's not effective to demand a right or wrong answer to which specific box they are in. No group has a completely pure philosophy or operation.

So, to conclude, I think the Mexican criminal organizations should be placed on the list because they use terrorism as a tactic and it would give investigators and prosecutors additional tools to fight them. That said, I don't think their presence on the list should define the entire issue nor should it imply a change in how analysts think about the problem strategically.

(re-posted with full permission of author)

"More agents now based closer to action at remote outposts."

Here is an excerpt from Brady McCombs' article in the Arizona Daily Star:

"It's early evening and the agents are between shifts at one of the Border Patrol's forward operating bases, which along with temporary camps are an increasingly integral part of the agency's strategy to slow illegal immigration and drug smuggling. The bases and camps let agents stay out for longer periods of time in remote border areas that have been difficult to patrol due to the vast distances and long drives to and from stations, said Customs and Border Protection Commissioner Alan Bersin. Agents typically stay seven days straight at the bases... There are seven permanent forward operating bases along the U.S.-Mexico border. The Border Patrol would not disclose the number of camps. Security experts and ranchers call the bases an efficient use of agency resources, getting agents off the main roads and into the smuggling corridors... But the Border Patrol agents' union has concerns about housing conditions at the camps and the lack of standby pay for agents stationed there, said Shawn Moran, vice president of the union, National Border Patrol Council. Agents are not allowed to leave without permission from a supervisor or have visitors. They must bring their own food, water and bedding, and cellphone service is usually shoddy... The increased use of bases and camps is part of an ill-advised movement by Border Patrol leaders to make the agency more military-like, Moran said. Many agents left the military seeking better working conditions and more time with their families... Life in the bases and camps may not be easy, but being in the Border Patrol means adapting to the needs of the agency, said Fred Burton, vice president of intelligence at Stratfor Global Intelligence in Austin, Texas. Getting agents closer to where they need to patrol is the same concept used by city police agencies that build substations throughout a community, Burton said. The U.S. military often uses them overseas as well, such as in Afghanistan now." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I was thrilled to read this article - the first half, anyway - because this is exactly the kind of thinking that DHS needs to continue to embrace: Taking the fight to the drug and human smugglers, instead of waiting for the criminals to come to where it's easy or more convenient. It's a huge part of the challenge to USBP agents just to get to those routes, so having these forward bases and camps is a great solution. As for the conditions, they don't sound any different to me than what I experienced in the Air Force, and are probably much better than what some of our soldiers are managing with in Iraq and Afghanistan.

While this is a concept merely on paper for me, I wanted to get the perspectives of some of my associates in the USBP to see if they believe the bases and camps work, and if the conditions are that bad. Most were of the opinion that the camps are great, and really make the job easier for them. A week away from home can be tough, especially when you have kids, but it's manageable. As for the conditions, the Border Patrol has never been advertised as a cushy job. These agents are routinely walking around in 100+ degree heat with heavy gear, and often working long hours as part of their regular duties. They were never told they'd be put up in five-star accommodations to get the mission accomplished.

I understand the role of unions, and what Mr. Moran is trying to accomplish with his complaints. But I'm concerned that his public stance about the bases and camps are going to make agents look like a bunch of whiners - which I assure you that the vast majority of them are not. As for those agents who don't care for the week-long camp-out, I'll reiterate what Fred Burton said: it's about putting the mission first and getting the job done. I have very positive feelings about this forward-operating concept, and what the USBP can accomplish by using them. If some agents don't care for it and want to leave the Border Patrol because of it, then perhaps they'd be better suited for a desk job with the FBI.

"Is U.S.-Mexico border secure enough?"

Here is an excerpt from Elizabeth Aguilera's article in the San Diego Union-Tribune:

"Along the U.S.-Mexico border, fortification has reached an all-time peak... Given this unprecedented expansion in resources during the past decade, U.S. government officials said the southwest border is the tightest it has ever been. Skeptics and “border security first” supporters are convinced it is still not enough, while advocates for comprehensive immigration reform believe it is more than adequate and the nation should push forward on other issues... 'No one has described what a secure border looks like. We have no baseline and we have no target,' said David Shirk, director of the Trans-Border Institute at the University of San Diego. 'It’s a great example of a moving standard and for the last 20 years, that standard has been moving up with no targets in sight.'... The number of apprehensions fell 62 percent from 2005 through last year — to a total of 447,731 in 2010.... Customs and Border Protection Commissioner Alan Bersin said a good portion of people who try to cross the border illegally are detained. He cited a rate of 90 percent for the San Diego sector and nearly 100 percent for El Paso. But neither he nor his staff could explain how those rates are calculated... Bersin’s goal is to keep the number of illegal border crossers low enough, and to communicate that achievement to the public so border security no longer becomes fodder for political rhetoric." Link to Full Article

Analysis: What really concerns me about Commissioner Bersin's assessment of border security is that he seems to equate it to the number of illegal immigrants who are successfully apprehended and prevented from entering the US. While illegal immigration is a huge concern for many, I don't really care about immigrants who are looking or work in the US in the sense that I don't view them as a threat to national security. What I do have a problem with is the fact that not once did Bersin talk about apprehending drug traffickers or terrorists, or how DHS is doing such a great job of developing programs to separate them from the crowd of "regular" immigrants.

Granted, illegal immigrants attempting entry into the US usually have different ways of doing it than drug smugglers. The former often use coyotes and attempt to cross in rural areas between officials ports of entry, making their capture the responsibility of the Border Patrol and local law enforcement. Drug smugglers often use ports of entry and try to smuggle drugs in hidden compartments of vehicles. But more and more we're seeing drug smugglers bringing loads across the border by using tunnels, ultralight aircraft, boats and rafts, and hikers. This makes them the responsibility of CBP, Border Patrol, local law enforcement, the National Guard, and anyone else remotely involved in border security.

So which one seems to be the bigger problem, and/or the bigger concern? All those agencies have limited personnel and resources. Which problem should they be focusing on? I wholeheartedly agree with David Shirk in that no one can really clearly define what border security means, and that DHS has not established any benchmarks or targets for it. It's all well and good that we're seeing the lowest rates of illegal entry ever, but how exactly does that translate to better border security? I saw no mention of apprehension rates of drug smugglers or special interest aliens (immigrants from countries with ties to terrorism).

It's a telling sign to me that DHS says the number of illegal immigrants trying to come across the border is lower than it's ever been, yet we haven't seen a parallel decrease in drug smuggling activity. I'm not saying that we should ignore all border crossers who have nothing to do with drug smuggling, but there needs to be some sort of intelligent and focused approach to separating the two (or three, if you count potential terrorists) groups and assigning priorities. The immigration issue is highly complex and politically charged, and potential solutions extend well beyond the border, like the article says. The drug problem does too, but DHS and the federal government have chosen the strategy of interdiction as the best way to fight the drug war. If that's the way they want to keep going, then Bersin and Co. shouldn't worry so much about touting the reduced number of illegal immigrant apprehensions and focus more on how many drug smugglers and potential terrorists they're catching - or not catching.

"McCaul seeks to have cartels designated as terrorists."

Here is an excerpt from Stewart Powell's article in The Houston Chronicle:

"In a potentially sweeping and politically charged escalation of the U.S. offensive against Mexican drug cartels, Rep. Michael McCaul, R-Austin, introduced legislation in Congress Wednesday to designate six murderous Mexican drug cartels 'foreign terrorist organizations.' Such a designation by the State Department could expose Mexican drug traffickers and U.S. gunrunners to charges of supporting terrorism... McCaul, the former federal prosecutor and ex-deputy attorney general of Texas, unveiled the legislation as he raises his profile in Washington for a possible bid for statewide office... The proposal would enable prosecutors to levy up to 15 additional years of prison time on each conviction of providing "material support or resources" to the six cartels — and a federal death sentence if deaths resulted from the cartels' actions. Mexican drug cartels may not be 'driven by religious ideology' that propels other foreign terrorist organizations such as al-Qaida or Hezbollah, McCaul said. But the Mexican gangs are 'using similar tactics to gain political and economic influence,' relying on 'kidnappings, political assassinations, attacks on civilian and military targets, taking over cities and even putting up checkpoints in order to control territory and institutions.'... To qualify for the designation, the State Department says an organization must have carried out terrorist attacks or 'engaged in planning and preparations for possible future acts of terrorism.'... Sen. John Cornyn, R-San Antonio, a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, also counseled caution about designating Mexican cartels terrorist organizations. 'Cartels are in it for one thing - money,' Cornyn said. 'To me, we need to be clear about what is happening in Mexico. We have got to be careful about the label because sometime those labels can create misleading impressions.'" Link to Full Article

Analysis: This isn't the first time an American politician has called the DTOs terrorists, but it's the first time legislation has been introduced to formally label them as such. One of the solutions to the drug war that I propose in Cartel: The Coming Invasion of Mexico's Drug Wars, is that both the US and Mexican governments need to stop treating the DTOs like simple criminals. However, I suggest that a NEW label be created for them that would encompass activities of terrorists, insurgencies, and organized crime groups. DTOs have exhibited characteristics of all three, yet they can't be put into a box that purely defines them as any of the three alone.

For some perspective, Rep McCaul has a history of making loud and sometimes controversial pronouncements regarding events in the drug war...and they're not always the smartest ones. For example, back in February when ICE Agent Jaime Zapata was killed near San Luis Potosí, McCaul called for the immediate extradition of anyone and everyone involved in his murder. I'm sure that made for a great sound byte, but the extradition agreement between the US and Mexico is pretty clear. A Mexican national can only be extradited to the US if they've committed a crime on US soil, or under the most extraordinary of circumstances; I'm not sure if Zapata's murder would qualify. Anyway, it demonstrates McCaul's unfortunate ignorance of extradition law, which makes me wonder how tuned in he is to US policy regarding the designation of terrorist groups.

That being said, the US government has made some unusual FTO designations in the past. For example, in 2001, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) - an umbrella group of paramilitaries who defended drug lords - were formally designated as an FTO. They were responsible for 75% of drug war-related murders in Colombia, and most of them were innocent civilians. They also displaced hundreds of thousands of Colombians from their homes so they wouldn't be able to provide refuge or materiel support to leftist rebels. Yet, they had no religious ideology to speak of, and any political aspirations the AUC might have had disappeared very quickly in the mid-1980s. They made plenty of profit, between dealing in cocaine and protecting Colombia's drug lords from attacks by groups like the FARC and ELN. Yet, their lack of ideology and terrorist intentions towards the US didn't prevent them from being labeled as an FTO.

While some rebranding of Mexico's DTOs is very necessary, calling them foreign terrorist organizations is going to far, and oversimplifies the problem. It would also pose way too many political and diplomatic challenges for both the US and Mexican governments, who are just not ready to go there. I'm a really big fan of the work John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus have done regarding the rebranding of the DTOs as a criminal insurgency. I highly recommend you take a look at their writings, because they've done their homework and I really like their perspective.

Bottom line, I think McCaul's intentions may be more political than anything else regarding his legislation, but maybe it'll get Washington thinking outside the box when it comes to how we perceive DTOs as organizations.

"U.S. Drones Fight Mexican Drug Trade."

Here is an excerpt from Ginger Thompson and Mark Mazzetti's article in The New York Times:

"Stepping up its involvement in Mexico’s drug war, the Obama administration has begun sending drones deep into Mexican territory to gather intelligence that helps locate major traffickers and follow their networks, according to American and Mexican officials. The Pentagon began flying high-altitude, unarmed drones over Mexican skies last month, American military officials said, in hopes of collecting information to turn over to Mexican law enforcement agencies... President Obama and his Mexican counterpart, Felipe Calderón, formally agreed to continue the surveillance flights during a White House meeting on March 3. The American assistance has been kept secret because of legal restrictions in Mexico and the heated political sensitivities there about sovereignty, the officials said... Pentagon, State Department, Homeland Security and Mexican officials declined to comment publicly about the introduction of drones in Mexico’s counternarcotics efforts. But some officials, speaking only on the condition of anonymity, said the move was evidence of the two countries’ deepening cooperation in efforts to prevail over a common threat." Link to Full Article

Analysis: The timing of this article is pretty interesting for me, because I just gave a short presentation at US Northern Command's annual counternarcotics conference on DoD support to drug war efforts. Some media outlets on both sides of the border may make this out to be controversial, or OMG, we're spying on Mexico!! But it's not like that at all, and this is actually a really good thing.

First of all, I can tell you first-hand that DoD is completely committed to helping our law enforcement agencies and the Mexican government in this fight however they can. NORTHCOM is also extremely sensitive to Mexico's domestic concerns over violation of sovereignty, and has taken great care to publicly tell anyone who will listen that US military support to Mexico is by-invitation-only, and within all legal constraints.

I'm not surprised at all that these drone flights were kept secret; I would have done the same thing. ICE is saying that these flights helped collect intelligence that nailed the killers of Agent Zapata last month; I'm sure they'll continue to collect useful intelligence in the future, that will likely be shared with (trustworthy, hopefully) Mexican counterparts.

Overall, while I think this situation has the potential to be blown way out of proportion by both American and Mexican media, I really think that as long as both governments can adequately portray the positive aspects of these flights and US military assistance, the Mexican people will ultimately be OK with it. While they're still in the minority, the number of Mexicans who want even more US military assistance (in the form of boots on the ground) has grown to 25%, according to a Pew Research Center poll from last year. That number is actually huge, if you know anything about how much Mexico generally resents any type of US involvement in their affairs.

After hearing some presentations and many comments at that conference yesterday, I hope that these drone flights are actually just the beginning of such cooperation between our militaries and governments, and that future DoD assistance and involvement can continue to achieve some tangible - and meaningful - results.

"Moving Illegal Proceeds: Opportunities Exist for Strengthening the Federal Government's Efforts to Stem Cross-Border Currency Smuggling."

On March 9, 2011, the Government Accountability Office issued a report detailing the challenges posed to US Customs and Border Protection with its Outbound Inspection Program; essentially, the process by which it attempts to stop bulk cash shipments to both Mexico - which accounts for 97 percent of shipments - and Canada.

Here are a few excerpts from the executive summary:

"The National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) has stated that proceeds from drug trafficking generated in this country are smuggled across the southwest border and it estimates that the proceeds total from $18 billion to $39 billion a year."

"This testimony is based on our October 2010 report on cross-border currency smuggling and updated information on bulk cash seizures and the status of one our recommendations. Like the report, it will cover the following three issues: (1) the actions CBP has taken to stem the flow of bulk cash leaving the country through land ports of entry and the challenges that remain, (2) the regulatory gaps that exist for cross-border reporting and other anti-money laundering requirements involving the use of stored value, and (3) the extent to which FinCEN has taken action to address these regulatory gaps."

"In March 2009, CBP reestablished the Outbound Enforcement Program within its Office of Field Operations. As a result of its outbound enforcement activities, CBP seized about $67 million in illicit bulk cash leaving the country at land ports of entry--97 percent of which was seized along the southwest border-- from March 2009 through February 22, 2011. Total seizures account for a small percentage of the estimated $18 billion to $39 billion in illicit proceeds being smuggled across the southwest border annually. CBP has succeeded in establishing an Outbound Enforcement Program, but the program is in its early phases and there is a general recognition by CBP managers and officers that the agency's ability to stem the flow of bulk cash is limited because of the inherent difficulty in identifying travelers who attempt to smuggle cash. Beyond this inherent difficulty, in our October 2010 report we identified management challenges in three main areas. First, addressing limitations in staffing, infrastructure, and technology, among other things, could require substantial capital investments at all ports of entry."

Analysis: If you don't have time to read the whole report, I think it's very helpful to go through the full executive summary, which you can read HERE. I won't go into a full analysis here because the GAO has a good track record for nailing problems with government agencies on the head, and I don't believe this is an exception. One statement in particular that really resonates - at least with me, anyway - is "addressing limitations...could require substantial capital investments at ALL ports of entry." We know DHS has allocated some money towards the expansion and renovation of some POEs. While some of those were in dire need of updating, there was some controversy when this money was initially being doled out (at some point in 2009, I believe) because a considerable amount was going to some POEs on the northern border that don't really get that much cross-border traffic. The GAO report says that ALL POEs could require a significant influx of cash, which is something I've been saying for quite some time.

As always, I like that (it seems on the surface, anyway) CBP is taking the recommendations to heart. But given that CBP is only one cog in the huge bureaucratic wheel that is DHS, it's unlikely that we'll see any major changes occur very quickly.

Why Crime Statistics Alone are a Bad Benchmark for Border Security

[This is an op-ed piece I shopped around to a few media outlets in February, but no one bit. Instead of letting it going to waste in my computer files, I wanted to share it with my readers.]

UPDATE: It got picked up by the East Valley Tribune in Arizona! Below is the original (longer) piece I submitted, but if you want to see it in finished form on the paper's website, please CLICK HERE.

Throughout 2010, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano said repeatedly that our southwest border “is as safe and secure as it’s ever been.” On Jan. 31, 2011, she asked public officials to stop exaggerating claims of violence on the U.S. side of the border. On the same day, she told a gathering at the University of Texas in El Paso that it was inaccurate to state that the border is overrun with violence and out of control. To back up her position, she always cites statistics from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program.

Unfortunately, that’s why she has no idea what she’s talking about.

It’s not that there’s anything wrong with the statistics in the UCR database. It’s the way in which DHS has chosen to use these statistics—and ignore other valuable and relevant information—that has led the agency into a position of ignorance when it comes to the overall border security threat picture.

There’s a lot that needs to be known and understood about the FBI crime statistics Secretary Napolitano refers to. First, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies across the country supply the crime data voluntarily. While the inclusion rate is quite high, some agencies choose not to provide this information. For example, you won’t find crime statistics from authorities in the Tahono O’oodam Nation in Arizona, a tribe whose reservation is divided in two by the border and is sometimes viewed as being uncooperative in law enforcement efforts against drug and human smuggling activity.

Second, most drug-related violent activity reported to or identified by law enforcement in the U.S. is committed by criminals against criminals. Generally speaking, criminals who become victims of crime themselves tend to not call the cops. For example, in 2009, 368 kidnappings were reported to police in Phoenix, Arizona. The police department there says the majority of them are linked to drug-trafficking and human-smuggling operations. More importantly, they say the real number is likely much higher, since many go unreported.

In another example, illegal immigrants are huge targets for Mexican drug cartels operating on both sides of the border. They’re often kidnapped and held for ransom, many times in safe houses in southwest border states, until their family members in the U.S. can pay the ransom. If they can’t, often the victims are killed. Even if an illegal immigrant makes it safely to their destination, they usually won’t report crimes as serious as armed assault or rape because they fear deportation. 

Third, looking at the statistics themselves doesn’t tell the story in enough detail. For example, burglary—from rural ranches to apartments in urban areas—is a common border-related crime because drug traffickers and human smugglers alike are looking for drugs or money. Looking at FBI statistics for burglary in the four Arizona border states between 2005 and 2009, there’s no discernible pattern whatsoever; they alternate between going up and down each year. Furthermore, they don’t tell you if the burglary was committed by a Mexican drug trafficker, human smuggler, illegal immigrant, or greedy American citizen. If you look at violent crime statistics for four counties in Texas directly across the border from violent areas in Mexico—Cameron, El Paso, Hidalgo, and Webb—they consistently go up from 2007-2009.

Another problem with solely citing FBI crime statistics is that there are too many ways in which the data can be broken down and interpreted, and simultaneously not enough ways to define it. While some crime reports contain information about the offenders and victims, many do not, and I say with confidence that most people in either category wouldn’t voluntarily affiliate themselves with a Mexican drug cartel.

So how can Secretary Napolitano use FBI crime statistics for support when she says our southwest border has never been more secure, and subsequently accuse lawmakers of exaggerating the levels of border violence? She can’t, with any credibility anyway. I’m not saying she’s outright wrong, but I am saying she probably doesn’t know if she’s right.

When you’re trying to analyze something as huge as border security and the impact Mexico’s drug war is having on larger border cities and smaller rural communities, you can’t just cite numbers in a database, call them facts and say that’s that. DHS has to work harder to connect with border counties, towns, and tribal areas to find out first-hand what impact smuggling activity is having, and what their law enforcement needs are. Securing our border is a multi-faceted problem that deserves a multi-faceted approach.

Crime statistics are important indicators, and serve many purposes for law enforcement and government agencies along the border. However, there are other avenues that should be explored in combination with statistics to get a more realistic view of drug-related criminal activity in the border states. Law enforcement agencies in border counties should be canvassed to find out as much as possible about the characteristics of crimes committed in the jurisdiction—specifically, characteristics not entered into the FBI system that might relate to drug activity. Also, their sources and confidential informants can be tapped to get an overall idea of drug-related crimes that are happening and not being reported. Non-profit organizations that provide support to immigrant communities can be contacted to determine if they’ve had any surges of calls from victims of crime who are afraid to call the police.

If Secretary Napolitano wants to convince lawmakers—and the American public—that our border truly has never been more secure, it will only happen if she can say that she’s looked at more than just FBI crime statistics. 

"ATF Let Hundreds of U.S. Weapons Fall into Hands of Suspected Mexican Gunrunners."

Here is an excerpt from John Solomon, David Heath, and Gordon Witkin's piece for The Center for Public Integrity:

"Hoping to score a major prosecution of Mexican drug lords, federal prosecutors and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives permitted hundreds of guns to be purchased and retained by suspected straw buyers with the expectation they might cross the border and even be used in crimes while the case was being built, according to documents and interviews. The decision — part of a Phoenix-based operation code named “Fast and Furious” — was met by strong objections from some front-line agents who feared they were allowing weapons like AK-47s to “walk” into the hands of drug lords and gun runners, internal agency memos show. Indeed, scores of the weapons came back quickly traced to criminal activity... One of those front-line agents who objected, John Dodson, told the Center he and several of his colleagues wanted to intercept some of the weapons but their objections were repeatedly overruled by ATF supervisors. The supervisors instructed them to simply record the straw purchases in a database, flag them as 'suspect,' and monitor the suspected gun runners until evidence piled up about their connections to Mexican drug lords... Mark Chait, ATF’s assistant director in charge of field operations, told the Center he personally decided to change the strategy in September 2010 after years of futile efforts to interdict guns from small-time straw buyers with little hope of dismantling major drug trafficking organizations in Mexico. The agency’s earlier focus on straw buyers was criticized last fall in a review by the Justice Department’s inspector general of ATF’s border effort, known as Project Gunrunner... In addition, ATF officials have so far been frustrated in efforts to persuade the White House to implement even a simple change in firearm sales reporting requirements to help detect possible gun-running at the border." Link to Full Article

Analysis: There is a lot of information coming out about this scandal these days, and some are saying "Project Gunwalker" may end up being as big - if not bigger - than the Iran/Contra Affair. The article above is really long, and there are other stories I want to include snippets of before I offer my take. First, ATF Agent Dodson, who's mentioned in the story above, was interviewed by CBS News, and made some incendiary comments:

"Agent Dodson and other sources say the gun walking strategy was approved all the way up to the Justice Department. The idea was to see where the guns ended up, build a big case and take down a cartel. And it was all kept secret from Mexico... Senior agents including Dodson told CBS News they confronted their supervisors over and over... According to Dodson, 'They said, "Did you hear about the border patrol agent?" And I said, "Yeah." And they said "Well it was one of the Fast and Furious guns." There's not really much you can say after that.' Two assault rifles ATF had let go nearly a year before were found at Terry's murder." Link to CBS News story

As a result of this mess, the acting head of the ATF has ordered a review of the agency's efforts to combat southbound weapons trafficking:

"The statement, issued by ATF’s acting director, Kenneth E. Melson, said the agency 'will ask a multi-disciplinary panel of law enforcement professionals to review the bureau’s current firearms trafficking strategies employed by field division managers and special agents.' The statement said the review 'will enable ATF to maximize its effectiveness when undertaking complex firearms trafficking investigations and prosecutions. It will support the goals of ATF to stem the illegal flow of firearms to Mexico and combat firearms trafficking in the United States.'" Link to CPI blog post

First, let's start with the operation itself. This was (it appears) a standard sting operation. For those of you not entirely familiar with what that is, it's a law enforcement technique where the seller of some type of (usually illegal) item is either an officer or a civilian working in conjunction with the police. For example, a gas station clerk may be working with the police and selling cigarettes to minors who he knows are using fake IDs. Or an officer might work undercover as a drug dealer and sell illegal drugs to individuals repeatedly in order to help build up a case. In this instance, gun sellers were selling firearms to suspected straw buyers with ATF's knowledge under the guise that the ATF could track them and build a case against one or several Mexican DTOs. As you can now see, that didn't work out so well.

I asked a question on Twitter to my followers not long ago, "What's the difference between letting guns 'walk' in a sting operation and letting 'drugs' walk? Both kill." The best response I got was that the buyers and ultimate users of the drugs make a choice to use them, so they're responsible for any negative consequences that arise from that transaction. Likewise, a 16 year-old who uses a fake ID to buy cigarettes is ultimately responsible for any legal action brought against him, as well as any health problems that arise from smoking. The people who fall victim to the business end of firearms that are allowed to 'walk,' however, don't have that choice. Just ask USBP Agent Terry's family.

While in retrospect, most of us can agree that the ATF's decision to work a sting operation this was was a bad idea, I can understand why they chose to go that route. The ATF has been getting hammered by both the NRA and the Government Accountability Office for wasting too much time going after the "little guy" and individual straw buyers, and not putting forth enough effort to go after the whale. I imagine this was the ATF's attempt to trace those guns back to the ultimate purchaser - one of the major DTOs.

The problem is that the routes these guns follow once they cross into Mexico are quick, varied, and complex. They get stashed in warehouses, where they're later divided up and distributed to different people who may either be working directly for a DTO, or be subcontracted out as ad-hoc hitmen. This is all managed by mid-level people or lower, so the kingpins never see or handle the day-to-day operations of weapons movements in Mexico. Trying to nail a major DTO with a series of sting operations may have been laced with the best of intentions, but it was a pipe dream at best.

So what's next for the ATF? I don't know if anyone has a good answer for that. The agency bears the brunt of the mission to deter southbound weapons trafficking, and its main strategy in the last couple of years has been a scandalous bust. I have a feeling that no matter what revamped strategy they come up with, it will be overshadowed for some time with reports of guns turning up at crime scenes that are traced back to "Operation Gunwalker."

Julián Zapata Espinosa and five others arrested for ICE agent's murder

I just finished watching the live broadcast of the SEDENA announcement concerning the arrest of several individuals in connection with the murder of ICE Agent Jaime Zapata. The alleged shooter is Julián "El Piolín" Zapata Espinosa, reportedly the Los Zetas plaza boss for San Luís Potosi. The other guys are pretty much inconsequential, and as it is, I'm having a very hard time finding any information on the main suspect. I did find a report from December 2009 about a raid where a Julián Zapata EspinoZa was arrested in San Luís Potosi, but I don't know if it's the same guy (the spelling of the last name is different). One interesting, and somewhat laughable, detail is that Zapata Espinosa said the shooting was a result of "a confusion," meaning they thought Jaime Zapata and Victor Avila were members of rival cartels...despite the diplomatic tags, their US government ID, and their lack of weapons.

Analysis: I think a lot of people were expecting someone else; perhaps because rumors were floating around that the Mexican army had arrested Jesus "El Mamito" Rejón - a DEA most-wanted narco with a $5 million tag on his head - when he, in fact, had only been named a suspect. There were also rumors floating that the Mexican navy may have killed or captured Miguel "Z-40" Treviño, on of the two Los Zetas chiefs, in Monterrey last night. Neither of those rumors has panned out, or at least, not yet.

Now the question becomes, will the Mexican government extradite Zapata Espinosa to the US? They've been historically more than hesitant to do so because they're not fans of some US states' death penalty. That didn't stop them from extraditing former Gulf cartel leader Osiel Cárdenas Guillen in 2007, but he avoided a potential death penalty by providing good intel to US authorities. I doubt Zapata could provide enough intel to get the same deal, but you never know.

I'm looking forward to seeing how this pans out over the next couple of weeks, mainly to see if the arrests meet the satisfaction of the US government, and if Zapata is the real deal or just a fall guy.

"Homeland Security Implications Of Los Zetas Attack On ICE Agents."

Here's a brief excerpt from my latest article in the News Analysis section of Homeland Security Today's website:

"On February 15, 2011, the landscape of Mexico’s drug war shifted in such a way that it couldn’t help but grab our attention. Two American law enforcement officers—agents with US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or ICE—were shot, and one killed, by members of a major Mexican drug trafficking organization. While they weren’t necessarily attacked because they were US federal agents, they were definitely left for dead in spite of it. Much to our national chagrin, this event has dramatic implications for our role in the drug war, and for our national security as a whole."

To read the full article, please CLICK HERE.

We argue over guns going south, but why not drugs going north?

About a year and a half ago, FOX News' William LaJeunesse put out a report about the "Myth of 90 Percent." Essentially, it said that only a small percentage of firearms being used by Mexican DTOs came from US sources, as opposed to the "90 percent" figure that American officials like to cite instead. You can read my blog post about that story HERE.

Today, Stratfor put out a similar report - albeit not as condemning - in its "Security Weekly" report. Here's an excerpt:

"Interestingly, the part of this argument pertaining to guns has been adopted by many politicians and government officials in the United States in recent years. It has now become quite common to hear U.S. officials confidently assert that 90 percent of the weapons used by the Mexican drug cartels come from the United States. However, a close examination of the dynamics of the cartel wars in Mexico — and of how the oft-echoed 90 percent number was reached — clearly demonstrates that the number is more political rhetoric than empirical fact. As we discussed in a previous analysis, the 90 percent number was derived from a June 2009 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report to Congress on U.S. efforts to combat arms trafficking to Mexico (see external link). According to the GAO report, some 30,000 firearms were seized from criminals by Mexican authorities in 2008. Of these 30,000 firearms, information pertaining to 7,200 of them (24 percent) was submitted to the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) for tracing. Of these 7,200 guns, only about 4,000 could be traced by the ATF, and of these 4,000, some 3,480 (87 percent) were shown to have come from the United States.

"This means that the 87 percent figure relates to the number of weapons submitted by the Mexican government to the ATF that could be successfully traced and not from the total number of weapons seized by Mexican authorities or even from the total number of weapons submitted to the ATF for tracing. In fact, the 3,480 guns positively traced to the United States equals less than 12 percent of the total arms seized in Mexico in 2008 and less than 48 percent of all those submitted by the Mexican government to the ATF for tracing. This means that almost 90 percent of the guns seized in Mexico in 2008 were not traced back to the United States. The remaining 22,800 firearms seized by Mexican authorities in 2008 were not traced for a variety of reasons... Of course, some or even many of the 22,800 firearms the Mexicans did not submit to ATF for tracing may have originated in the United States. But according to the figures presented by the GAO, there is no evidence to support the assertion that 90 percent of the guns used by the Mexican cartels come from the United States — especially when not even 50 percent of those that were submitted for tracing were ultimately found to be of U.S. origin."

Link to Full Article 

Analysis: The first point I want to make - and one that Scott Stewart seems to have missed - is that NO ONE knows exactly what proportion of firearms used by Mexican DTOs comes from US sources. It could be 95 percent, or it could be 27 percent. It's a highly charged and polarizing issue, which means that pro-gun groups and gun-control advocates are going to use existing statistics and publicly available trace data in whatever ways support their convictions and further their agendas. That doesn't change the fact that we will NEVER know the exact proportion - to within 20 percentage points, in my opinion - of American guns being used to kill people in Mexico.

The second point I want to make is one I can't take credit for. I was interviewing ATF Special Agent in Charge Bill Newell back in December for my book, and he said something that I found really interesting. He surmised that people spend a lot of time arguing about the exact percentage of American guns going south to Mexico, but no one argues about the percentage of drugs going north.

Currently accepted statistics from our border agencies tell us that they think they're seizing about 10 percent of all drugs coming from Mexico into the US. We're also told that 90 percent of our cocaine and 60 percent of our marijuana comes from Mexican DTOs. Based on the lack of media reporting, no one argues with these numbers. There also doesn't seem to be a huge firestorm between lobby groups, the media, drug users, and the Mexican government over these numbers. But are they even accurate? We're seizing a smaller percentage of drugs on the border than the percentage of guns being seized by Mexican officials and traced by the ATF. But no one on either side of the border is screaming that it's actually only 43 percent of our cocaine and 37 percent of our marijuana coming from Mexico.

Why? Because everyone in both countries can easily acknowledge that we have a shared drug trafficking and drug use problem that seriously needs to be addressed and resolved. Why can't we acknowledge the same about our shared weapons trafficking problem without getting wrapped around the axle over the exact percentage figure??? Hypothetically speaking, let's say only 40 percent of the guns being used by DTOs in Mexico came from US sources, and by some insane miracle, we knew this to be a hard fact. Does that all of a sudden make it OK? Do we no longer have a southbound weapons trafficking problem, and can the ATF hang up their hats and go home early? What would be an acceptable figure for the American gun lobby to say, "See? We told you so!", and for the US government to say to Mexico, "It's really not our problem, so you have to fix it on your own."

You've read my rants on the use of statistics, and I don't like them simply because they can be so easily manipulated. To deny that US-origin guns play a significant role in the drug war simply because we can't arrive at one specific statistic is foolish and dangerous. No matter what the exact number or proportion is, we have a legitimate southbound weapons trafficking problem that needs to be addressed and mitigated by all the tools at our disposal - laws, policy, and enforcement.

"Pinal sheriff: Armed conflict with drug cartels coming soon."

Here is an excerpt from Ari Cohn Ahwatukee's article in the East Valley Tribune:

"Armed conflict in Arizona between sheriff's deputies and heavily equipped drug cartel squads is inevitable, Pinal County Sheriff Paul Babeu said Tuesday during a speech in Ahwatukee Foothills. 'We're expecting a conflict,' Babeu told the Ahwatukee Republican Women's organization... 'I absolutely believe you're going to see that happen in the next 30 to 60 days. It's not like I'm trying to start a war with the cartels. They're coming through like they own this place, and we're trying to stop them. I pray that every time, they surrender.' ... Babeu ripped into Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano's contention that the border is as safe and secure as it has ever been... A significant percentage of illegal immigrants caught in Pinal County are from countries other than Mexico, he said, including "countries of interest" such as Yemen, Somalia and Syria... Drug seizures in Pinal County have more than doubled in the last two years, while the number of high-speed police pursuits rose from 142 in 2007 to 340 in 2010, he said." Link to Full Article

Analysis: No one can accuse Sheriff Babeu of being indirect. For those of you unfamiliar with some of the law enforcement personalities in Arizona, Sheriff Babeu and Sheriff Joe Arpaio of Maricopa County are easily the most visible and most vocal. Arpaio is a highly controversial figure because he's staunchly against illegal immigration, and enforces immigration laws in his county with a vengeance. He also travels all over the country to give talks and make appearances, and his life has been threatened on more than one occasion because of his views. Babeu is like the second coming of Arpaio, whom he counts among his friends and allies, and is highly and publicly critical of the lack of US government response to what he perceives as a crisis situation in Arizona.

No matter how you feel about Babeu or his publicity tactics, I agree that Arizona is seeing an unprecedented influx of dangerous criminals and drug/human smuggling activity. This activity is starting to put the American public in danger in certain parts of the state, and several law enforcement agencies have acknowledged that their powerless to stop it due to lack of resources.

As for Babeu's "armed conflict" statement, it comes across as alarmist and showy, but that doesn't mean there's not an element of truth to it. Law enforcement officers in Texas and Arizona have gotten into shootouts and high-speed car chases with drug traffickers on quite a few occasions in the past, so Babeu's prediction doesn't come as a surprise. But his window of 30 to 60 days is meaningless because it's already happening closer to the border; I wouldn't be surprised if one of his deputies got into a shootout with traffickers next week.

While I'm not a fan of alarmist media reports or spinning up by public officials, I imagine this is his way of trying to get the federal government to wake up and take notice of the major problems affecting the southwest border states. It's hard to disagree with that.

"Barriers aren't just for the border now."

Here is an excerpt for Brady McCombs' article in the Arizona Daily Star:

"The landscape of saguaros, mesquite trees and prickly pear cactus here has a new feature - steel railroad rails welded into crisscrosses and connected by flat rails. This rusting structure is a vehicle barrier designed to stop drug and people smugglers who barrel across the desert in trucks. The barriers are common at the international line - there are more than 139 miles of them along Arizona's stretch of U.S.-Mexico border. But this isn't the border. This 1.3-mile stretch of "Normandy-style" vehicle barriers was recently erected 70 miles north of the border on the Bureau of Land Management's Sonoran Desert Monument, just south of Interstate 8 and southwest of Casa Grande. It is likely the first time border barriers have been used this far north, and the latest example of how managing public lands along the U.S.-Mexico border is now as much about dealing with trash and trails left behind by illegal border crossers as it is about monitoring endangered animals or watering holes. BLM officials put up the barrier to redirect traffic around the federally protected Table Top Wilderness Area, where cars are prohibited... The barrier is on the southern boundary of Table Top, which borders the northern edge of the Tohono O'odham Nation. Smugglers have carved a grid of illegal roads through the wilderness area as they cross the O'odham land and cut through Table Top on their way toward Phoenix, inflicting serious damage to the habitat. The recently completed barrier has already diverted vehicle smuggling around the wilderness area, and BLM crews have begun restoring the lands damaged by the roads... There are already vehicle barriers or fences up along the international border in the Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument, Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Refuge, Buenos Aires National Wildlife Refuge and the Coronado National Forest... Federal law enforcement officers at the six border public lands visited by GAO officials this year said they spend 75 to 97 percent of their time responding to threats from illegal cross-border activity, the report found. At Organ Pipe, drug smugglers regularly use the visitor center parking lot as a staging area, says a Border Patrol threat assessment in the GAO report... The estimated 2,000 tons of trash left behind by smugglers and illegal immigrants has harmed the fragile Sonoran Desert, landing Buenos Aires, Organ Pipe and Cabeza Prieta on lists of most imperiled federal lands at different points this decade... Since last fall the GAO has been evaluating the relationship between federal land managers and federal law enforcement, issuing two reports in the past four months about an improving but flawed relationship. The first report concluded that federal rules governing public lands along the border cause some delays but do not prevent the Border Patrol from handling its assignment to secure the border." Link to Full Article

Analysis: There are two different and major issues brought up in this article. The first is the "please go around" policy the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) has had little choice but to implement, and the second is the trashing of our southwest desert and national parks by drug and human smugglers. I'm not sure which disturbs me more, but let's take a look at each one.

We all know that drug and human smuggling activity doesn't automatically stop and disappear within a certain distance from the border. So it's not entirely surprising that these barriers are being erected 70 miles inland. However, it is remarkably disturbing to me that the approach being taken is one of deflection rather than interdiction. I know the BLM and other law enforcement agencies just don't have the people or resources to stop and arrest every drug and human smuggler that wants to barrel through these areas and trample the environment. That's a secondary concern to me; I can't stand that these smugglers have to be merely redirected and aren't being outright stopped. I wouldn't be surprised to see signs erected in the next year that say "Please excuse our mess."

The next issue, speaking of messes, is the outright trashing of these parks and forests by smugglers. I ticked off a few people a few days ago when I posted a comment on Twitter along the lines of, why do environmentalists get so mad about the damage caused by the border fence and stay relatively silent when it comes to the trash left behind by smugglers? I got a couple of decent responses. One was that the level of environmental damage caused by the fence is far greater than that caused by smugglers, so it was unfair for me to compare the two. Another was that environmentalists do care, but who would they protest or complain to? Narcos and coyotes in Mexico?

I think those are good arguments. However, I have my own response to both. First, I don't think there's a threshold for a level of environmental damage before people should start to get involved. There's a government website dedicated to informing the public about the tons of trash left by smugglers, as well as the efforts by agencies and volunteers alike to clean it up. Please check it out at http://www.azbordertrash.gov so you can find out more about how this is more than just a few shirts and empty water bottles strewn about. I'm not pointing this out because I'm a tree-hugger; far from it. I just don't believe that if you fight for a cause, you should get to pick and choose what to get upset about based on level of severity. I also get upset that environmentalists don't get upset about the damage caused by illegal marijuana grows run by Mexican DTOs in US national parks and forests, but that's another blog post.

The next point: Who would said environmentalists, or just concerned citizens, complain to? Our federal and state governments, of course. No, technically they're not the ones causing the damage, unlike the border fence that they pay for. However, our government is charged with protecting our territory from damaging incursions by drug and human smugglers, and it's only our governments that are capable of providing more resources to the agencies that can stop those smugglers. Trust me, the BLM and Border Patrol don't want to spend their time picking up trash! They want to catch bad guys. Badly. But since in many cases, they don't have enough trained people to stop these folks at the border, they're left with erecting vehicle barriers that just redirect smugglers further inland to continue their illegal activities.

So don't go across the border and complain to a smuggler...that's no bueno. But if you care about the environment along the southwest border and beyond, or if you're simply ticked off that we can't stop these criminals and have to force them to "please go around," you can be vocal about it, and you can complain. I've been calling for more resources to be sent to the right places in order to better address border security problems, and your elected officials are always a good place to start if you want to do the same and don't have the luxury of a public "pulpit" like a blog. It's our soil, folks; let's not give it away because we didn't try hard enough to keep it.

"Obama Administration's New Proposed Gun Regulation for Border States Met With Bipartisan Dissent."

Here is an excerpt from Stephen Clark's article on FOX News.com:

"The Obama administration's plan to force new reporting requirements on thousands of gun dealers near the Mexico border is under fire from members of his own party. At least three Democrats in the Senate and several more in the House are voicing opposition to a proposed regulation from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives that would require about 8,500 gun dealers in four states – California, New Mexico, Arizona and Texas – to report gun sales of two or more high-powered rifles sold within five consecutive business days... The new regulation would cover semiautomatic rifles greater than .22 caliber with detachable magazines. Sen. Mark Begich, D-Alaska, has asked the ATF to withdraw its request to the White House for emergency authority to enact the regulation. While I understand the importance of cracking down on violence and gun trafficking along the U.S.-Mexico border, this wide-reaching regulation would punish law-abiding American gun owners and impede their Second Amendment rights," Begich wrote in a letter last week to ATF Acting Director Kenneth Melson. "Instead, we must secure our border and target Mexican drug cartels, as well as participating offenders in the United States." The ATF has rejected the notion that its regulation will violate Second Amendment rights or impose burdensome paperwork on gun dealers... Scott Thomasson, the chief spokesman for ATF, told FoxNews.com that the agency is pushing for this new regulation now because since 2004, there's been a 100 percent increase by Mexican drug cartels using rifles, which are not covered by any reporting requirements." Link to Full Article

Analysis: My best friend always tells me I shouldn't write blog posts - or anything else for that matter - when I'm mad. I totally understand the reasoning; I'm an analyst after all, and work pretty hard to maintain a level head and examine all sides of an issue. But when I read articles like this, it's really hard for me to keep my blood from boiling, and I'll explain why.

My regular readers know I'm not anti-gun; quite the opposite. I was a military law enforcement agent for over eight years, and got pretty attached to both my Beretta 9mm, and later my SigSauer P228 after my agency switched over. I currently have a SigSauer P250 that converts from a 9mm to a .40-caliber, as well as a Mossberg 10-gauge shotgun with a breacher tip on the barrel that I'm completely in love with. When I bought these guns, I almost wished the salesman at the store had asked for more information from me. I know I'm a law-abiding citizen, and I know that I plan to use these firearms for home defense. But what about the guy next to me? Or the guy next to him? Is asking for a driver's license and a filled-out ATF form enough? This is my VERY pro-law enforcement side coming out.

Some people would say even that's too intrusive, and the ATF is imposing too many measures that "impede their Second Amendment rights." This is where we take a look at the new proposed regulation that requires the reporting of two or more rifles being sold to the same person within five days. This requirement is already in place for handguns, folks. And yes, I imagine that die-hard NRA members HATE this requirement, and I'm hearing the "It's a slippery slope to having the government come seize all our guns" argument in my head. So, knowing that Mexican DTOs love their high-powered rifles that they so easily buy in the US through straw purchases, why is there so much drama surrounding the extension of an existing requirement to cover rifles?

I know why there's so much drama, and I can't wait (I say this sarcastically) for the deluge of gun fanatics who will comment on this post, saying it's too much government, Obama wants to take our guns away, etc. etc. I'd like to posit this question, in response to Senator Begich's statement. How does this proposed requirement "punish" law-abiding citizens? And furthermore, how does it impede Second Amendment rights? If you want to buy ten rifles over the course of three days, guess what? You can still do it! You won't get fined, sent to jail, get spoken to harshly, or tarred and feathered - just some examples of what I consider punishment. And you still get to buy your guns, which - from what I recall, anyway - is right in line with the Second Amendment. Many people tend to forget that the role guns play in the lives of Americans have less to do with the Second Amendment and more to do with federal and state laws, as well as case law determined by hundreds of court decisions over the last 234 years. I challenge Senator Begich to show me, from a legal perspective, how the proposed regulation impedes upon anyone's right to ultimately purchase or own as many firearms as they want.

Here's my bottom line. We need to figure out SOMETHING to more effectively investigate criminals who are trafficking guns from the US into Mexico. I think the proposed ATF requirement is a step in the right direction. I also think the NRA doesn't give a rat's behind about southbound weapons trafficking. The group gives the impression that it doesn't care what goes on south of the border as long as all Americans can buy guns whenever and wherever they want. That may not be the case, but perception is reality, and I think it's totally irresponsible to think we can just wash our hands of any association whatsoever with US-origin guns being used in the drug war. I wonder what the NRA will say when one of those guns is used to kill an American law enforcement officer.

I'm just tired of lobby groups and other people throwing around our Second Amendment rights like it spells out exactly what were entitled to when it comes to gun ownership. I think it gives us more mellow gun owners a bad name; kind of like people who burn flags or make a painting of the Virgin Mary with dog crap smeared on it, then invoke the First Amendment. The courts have been debating this forever, so who is Senator Begich to make the determination that the proposed regulation punishes Americans and steps all over the Second Amendment? Our law enforcement agencies have a HUGE job to do, and I'm just sick of politics and petty arguments getting in the way of that.

So, as they say, bring on the pain...I know it's coming.

"Message Attributes Mexican Politician’s Kidnapping to Zapatistas."

Here is an excerpt from Buggs' article on the Borderland Beat blog:

"A message signed by someone claiming to be a member of the Zapatista National Liberation Army, or EZLN, says that group was responsible for the kidnapping of Mexican former presidential candidate Diego Fernandez de Cevallos, who spent nearly eight months in captivity last year... The signer claims to be a subordinate of “Subcomandante Marcos,” leader of the long-quiescent EZLN guerrilla group, and states that Fernandez de Cevallos, the presidential candidate of the now-governing National Action Party, or PAN, in 1994, was “one of the main enemies of our project” to secure autonomy for indigenous peoples... The message says the government’s strategy for dealing with its opponents has forced the EZLN, which has mainly devoted itself to social and community activism since a brief uprising in January 1994, “to have to resort to constructive violence” and “take appropriate action in secret.” It said the Zapatista movement, which has a leftist, Indian-rights agenda, has its sights set on the “total destruction of the current Mexican political system” and will use the ransom paid for Fernandez de Cevallos’ release to that end... In a public appearance after his release on Dec. 11 of last year, Fernandez de Cevallos provided few details about his captors nor the manner in which they freed him, although he said the government had a “pending” task of bringing them to justice... In his comments after he was set free, Fernandez de Cevallos said both political and financial factors were involved in his kidnapping." Link to Full Article

Analysis: There are so many things wrong and right about this story that I'm having a hard time making heads or tails of it. My first instinct when Cevallos was kidnapped was so assume that one of the DTOs snatched him, and his family would be lucky to see him alive again. Then the news started trickling out that his family was engaging in negotiations with the kidnappers, and those negotiations started to stretch out into months, rather than weeks. This case started to look like something out of Colombia, run by professional narcoterrorist kidnappers, rather than greedy and sloppy cartel members or low-level thugs out to make a buck.

I have a feeling a lot of people were thrown for a loop when this story about a purported EZLN message claiming responsibility came out. For those of you who aren't familiar with the EZLN - more commonly known as the "Zapatistas" - they're an indigenous rights group in Mexico's southernmost state of Chiapas with a fiery political agenda. They made the news in 1994 with an armed uprising under the leadership of the masked Subcomandante Marcos, but in less than a year they renounced any sort of violent intentions and decided to pursue their political goals peacefully.

Since the mid-1990s, the EZLN has been pretty quiet, and no one has paid them much mind since the drug war violence started in earnest in 2006. So there are two questions we have to ask. First, if the EZLN did actually kidnap Cevallos, why now, and why would they renounce their pledge of non-violence? Second, if the EZLN is being framed, who's doing the framing, and how do they stand to benefit from it?

Going with the first scenario, I'm trying to think why the EZLN would start to make a big stink at this particular moment. Perhaps they're looking for attention in the midst of a time when indigenous rights groups are being drowned out by the drug war. Maybe they felt that kidnapping a high-profile politician like Jefe Diego was the only way their voices would be heard above the fray. Certainly, the $30 million ransom paid for Cevallos' release will fund the EZLN's ambitions for quite some time. However, the EZLN had been respected as a legitimate organization by the Mexican government for several years. The governor of Chiapas is vehemently denying the EZLN had anything to do with his disappearance. Why would they do something like this to screw that up?

Let's go with the second scenario for a moment. Who would stand to benefit in Mexico right now by making the EZLN look bad? The DTOs aren't in any sort of direct competition with the EZLN. Maybe one of the smaller cartels thought it might draw attention and resources away from them and towards the EZLN in Chiapas. Maybe it's a personal/vengeance attack between someone in another group and the EZLN leadership. 

Either way, it's unusual for a claim of responsibility - or ransom negotiations, for that matter - to take so long when a DTO is involved. This is more reminiscent of something the FARC or ELN in Colombia would do, especially considering Cevallos seemed to be in decent physical shape when released, and the Colombian guerrilla/terrorist groups tend to value their hostages more than Mexican kidnappers do. My curiosity is further piqued by Cevallos' statement that his kidnapping was motivated by both political and financial reasons. DTOs don't have any direct political aspirations; they just want to manipulate and control the people in office through extortion and death threats. I don't know that holding Cevallos hostage for 11 months would accomplish a goal for one of the DTOs that something less labor- and time-intensive wouldn't have.

Unfortunately, the only person who can shed any light on this mystery is Cevallos, and he's not making any statements. I imagine this is likely one of the conditions of his release, lest he or one of his family members get kidnapped - or worse. Considering the chances of the Mexican authorities actually finding the people responsible are slim at best, we may never know who was at the bottom of this, or be able to truly assess what it means for the Mexican political and drug war landscape.