Mexico's Drug War

"The Irony of Mexico’s Problems along its Southern Border."

Here is an excerpt from my latest article on MexiData.info:

"It’s interesting how observers of Mexico’s drug war often assume that the country’s biggest problems are occurring along its northern border with the United States. What many people don’t realize is that Mexico has its own southern border problems with Guatemala (and Belize), and they’re not to be taken lightly. Guatemala has a long history of instability, poverty, and being a haven for criminal activity. Its border with Mexico is tiny compared to the 2,000-mile length of Mexico’s border with the U.S., but that hasn’t made it any less problematic for a country that already has its hands full with a drug war, a sliding economy, and massive emigration issues... If the illegal cross-border transfers of food, clothing, and bicycles were the only issues at hand along Mexico’s southern border that might not be so bad. But unfortunately, that’s the nicest part of the problem."

To read the rest of this article at MexiData.info, please CLICK HERE.

"Al Capone and Today's Cartels."

I'm very excited to announce that I have officially been published in a magazine! My article, titled "Al Capone and Today's Cartels," came out this morning in Homeland Security Today (HSToday) magazine. In it, I compare the situation in 1920s Prohibition-era Chicago to that of modern-day Mexico. I also examine the strategies our government used against corruption and organized crime in Mexico to attempt to suss out potential new strategies for the Mexican government in its war against the cartels.

To read the article in HSToday, please CLICK HERE.

"El Paso 2nd safest U.S. city: Ranking a contrast to violence across border."

Here is an excerpt from Daniel Borunda's article in the El Paso Times:

"A new ranking shows El Paso moved up to the second-safest large city in the nation even while a vicious drug cartel war has turned Juárez into one of the deadliest cities in the world. El Paso   trailed only Honolulu for the lowest crime rate for cities with more than 500,000 population in an annual publication released Monday by CQ Press. The ranking is based on crime data for 2008. Civic leaders lauded the rating, saying it counters a negative perception that El Paso is a violent place because of the killings across the border... Violent crime in El Paso -- which was ranked the No. 3 safest large city last year -- has remained steady even as a drug war has claimed more than 3,000 lives in Juárez since it began in January 2008... Last weekend, Chihuahua state police reported 31 murders in Juárez. There have been more than 2,200 deaths this year." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I absolutely love reading about El Paso's safe-city ranking every year because it's such a perfect example of the conundrum posed in trying to define border violence spillover. Some might ask, how is it possible that Mexico's most violent city and one of the US' safest cities can coexist literally a stone's throw from each other?

Well, the answer is a little more complicated than you might think. Just because no one is getting killed in El Paso doesn't mean that the DTOs aren't there. I'm willing to bet a LOT of money that I don't even have that the DTOs - most likely the VCFO and the Sinaloa Federation - have plenty of representation there. We certainly know that gangs who distribute drugs and carry out hits for the DTOs in the US are in Texas, so they're likely in El Paso, too.

So why aren't they killing anyone?

It just so happens that murder and mayhem are really bad for business on US soil. Also, US law enforcement agencies in and around El Paso are particularly good at what they do. They have to be, considering the bloody insanity happening in their Mexican sister city of Cuidad Juárez.

But that's only half of what I want to address about this story. The other point I want to make is that border violence spillover cannot simply be defined by body bags and toe tags. The DTOs are everywhere in the US, and we know that they're killing and kidnapping people - almost all of whom are in the drug business - on US soil. While they're apparently not doing it in El Paso, we know there are hundreds of DTO-sanctioned kidnappings happening in Phoenix, dozens in San Diego, and many varieties of DTO-directed murders happening in cities and towns across the US.

So what can cities like San Diego, Laredo, Nogales, and others on the US side of the border take away from El Paso's experience so that they, too, can be ranked among the country's safest cities? Unfortunately, not much. I hate to say that because it would be nice if it were as easy as emulating their best practices. But US border cities and towns aren't in a vacuum of border-related "stuff." Their crime rates, people flow, and general operating environments are all viewed differently by DTOs. They make the final decision regarding how much they're willing to risk by engaging in dangerous behavior on our side of the border. 

That sounds like US law enforcement has little say or control over how things go in border cities, but that's not what I'm trying to say. San Diego's crime statistics look different than El Paso's, but that's not because law enforcement efforts are weaker; I can attest to the awesome set-up San Diego has for dealing with DTO-related criminal activity. Overall crime in San Diego has actually remained steady or slightly declined over the last several years, despite the fact that it's less than two dozen miles from Mexico's second most dangerous city - Tijuana. But more people have been murdered there in the last year than in El Paso.

What does it mean? Well, two things. First, comparing El Paso to other US border cities is like comparing apples to oranges. There are just too many variables to take into account, and those variables are coming from two different countries. Second, don't let the good news about El Paso lead you to believe border violence spillover isn't happening. In the absence of a clear and standardized definition, the meaning of spillover is in the eye of the beholder anyway. But just remember that a broader approach than just looking at annual murder statistics is needed when trying to assess the impact of DTO activity on the Mexican side of the border.

"The More Deadly Side of Growing Vigilantism in Mexico."

Here is an excerpt from my latest MexiData.info article:

"Over the last several months, reports of vigilante justice being meted out in Mexico have increased in number. Citizens are growing tired of drug-related violence, thievery, and other crimes — tired enough to take matters into their own hands. Some vigilante groups have simply resorted to non-lethal revenge tactics, like tying up alleged thieves and kidnappers, stripping them naked, and savagely beating them. A recent video of five burglars being tortured and sexually abused for their crimes was posted on YouTube. It wasn’t pretty, but they were left alive. Other targets of vigilantes aren’t so lucky."

To read the complete article on MexiData.info, please CLICK HERE.

"Mexico's Rising Drug Use and Addiction—Who is to Blame?"

Here is an excerpt from my latest article on MexiData.info:

"Over the past year, several media reports have detailed the exploding domestic drug market in Mexico, as well as soaring drug dependency rates. The reasons for Mexico’s transition from being mainly a “transport country” to becoming a “consumer country” are rather simple. But what does this transition mean for President Felipe Calderón and his attempts to squelch his country’s drug war?... Drug use in Mexico is still a fraction of that in the U.S. Officials estimate that 3.5 million Mexicans have used narcotics at least once, and that nearly 600,000 have become dependent drug consumers. That compares to roughly 22 million regular drug consumers in the U.S., but the important statistic to note is that the number of Mexican addicts has doubled in the last five years... The exploding domestic drug market means more obstacles in Calderón’s path towards reducing violence. According to an Oct. 15, 2008 article in the Los Angeles Times, there are signs that the street trade, known as narcomenudeo, is adding to overall drug violence. Analysts say the well-armed gangs that have fought each other for control of key international drug-smuggling routes are battling over the market in Mexico as well." 

To read the rest of my article on MexiData.info, please CLICK HERE.

"Juárez in shock: Attack considered city's worst multiple shooting."

Here is an excerpt from Stephanie Sanchez and Daniel Borunda's article in the El Paso Times:

"The brutality of a massacre at Juárez drug rehabilitation center in which 18 people were killed shocked a city already plagued with record-breaking violence. A motive for the attack was under  investigation, but it appeared to be linked to feuding drug trafficking groups... The incident is at least the third and largest mass shooting at drug treatment centers in Juárez since last year. Shortly before 8 p.m. Wednesday, an unknown number of gunmen with assault rifles burst into the Casa El Aliviane drug rehab center on 1243 Uranio, west of downtown Juárez near the Rio Grande across Downtown El Paso. The gunmen demanded all 20 people in the building line up in a hallway... The assailants then began firing their AK-47 rifles. Sixteen men died piled on each other at the scene. Four people were taken to a hospital in serious condition where two of them died a short time later. Officials had initially reported 19 people had died and six others were wounded. Officials said the other two wounded remained in serious condition... The Aztecas and their U.S.-based brethren the Barrio Azteca prison gang are known to run drug treatment centers for their members in Juárez, FBI agents have said. The gang is allied with La Linea, as the Juárez drug cartel is also known. 'I think the significance (in the drug rehab attack) is in the number of people killed but these were street-level people, (drug) users or gang members,' said Robert Almonte, executive director of the Texas Narcotics Officers Association. 'Why would anybody want to kill drug addicts? Because they are affiliated with a cartel,' Almonte said." Link to Full Article

Analysis: Originally when I first read this story, I was worried this was another case of tolerated collateral damage. Specifically, I though maybe two or three of the rehab patients were somehow affiliated with a rival cartel or gang, and the attackers killed everyone in a haphazard and sloppy fashion just to make sure they hit their marks. Then I read this little gem in the El Paso Times article:

"The Aztecas and their U.S.-based brethren the Barrio Azteca prison gang are known to run drug treatment centers for their members in Juárez, FBI agents have said. The gang is allied with La Linea, as the Juárez drug cartel is also known."

Apparently, drug addicts - being vulnerable and easily influenced in their state at rehab - are easy marks for DTOs and gangs looking for recruits. La Familia Michoacana, in particular, also likes to proselytize at rehab centers. So we can happily read about all the arrests and roundups of gang and DTO members in the Mexican dailies, all the while knowing that they're replenishing their ranks with addicts. Addicts who are later given drugs, then guns, then told to go kill people. And I wonder why hits in Mexico are getting more sloppy.

"Mexico's EPR 'Guerrillas': A Nuisance or a Threat in 2010?"

Here is an excerpt from my latest article on MexiData.info:

"In this time of unprecedented violence and criminal activity throughout Mexico, the last thing President Felipe Calderón’s government needs is a guerrilla group resurgence. But is the chaos in some parts of Mexico tempting those who seek to end the democratic state?

The Popular Revolutionary Army, or EPR for Ejército Popular Revolucionario, is a Marxist-Leninist  guerrilla group in Mexico that advocates a socialist revolution. The group announced its existence on June 28, 1996, at the one-year anniversary memorial of the Aguas Blancas Massacre, in Aguas Blancas, Guerrero.  During this announcement, the group read from its manifesto in which they described their origins: “We come from the sadness of widows and orphans, from the absence created by our disappeared loved ones." Then they called for the overthrow of the "unjust and illegitimate" Mexican government...

In 2010, Mexico will celebrate both the 200th anniversary of its call for Independence, and the centennial of the start of the Mexican Revolution. These are two huge events that could be used as an excuse for smaller, largely ignored rebel groups like the EPR to make their voices heard by the government."

To read more about the EPR, possible assistance they might be receiving from DTOs, and the future threat they might pose in Mexico, CLICK HERE.

"Office of Mexican Newspaper Comes under Assault Rifle Attack."

Here is an excerpt from this article on the International Press Institute's website:

"Unidentified gunmen opened fire at around 1am local time on Wednesday at the editorial offices of the Coahuila-based daily Siglo de Torreón, according to the newspaper. There were no  reports of any injuries. Witnesses describe two assailants on motorcycles opening fire on the building’s façade, according to local news reports. The assault shattered the building’s glass exterior, and damaged walls, desks and furniture inside.Bullet casings from AK-47 and AR-15 assault rifles were found at the scene... Sources at the newspaper told IPI that they had not yet identified a possible motive behind the attack, and had received no warning prior to, or messages after, the incident... Mexico is the Western Hemisphere’s deadliest country for reporters, with at least four journalists murdered so far in 2009 for reasons believed to be related to their work, according to IPI’s Death Watch count." Link to Full Article

Analysis: This attack was interesting in that an entire news office was sprayed with bullets. Usually, individual reporters are threatened, kidnapped or murdered, although that's not always the case. The Washington Post reported that in late 2006 and 2007, grenades were thrown into newspaper offices in Cancun, Hermosillo and Nuevo Laredo, and gunmen attacked a radio station and newspaper in Oaxaca.

Mexico is second only to Iraq in the list of most dangerous countries to operate in as a journalist. Once a reporter starts writing truthful articles that make a DTO look bad, or reveals details about DTO personnel or operations, he or she immediately becomes a target. Despite the threats and despite the gruesome evidence that DTOs are willing to make good on their threats, there are several brave (some would call them foolhardy) reporters that are willing to tell it like it is. It can be REALLY hard to get good, reliable information on Mexican DTOs, both within Mexico and in the US. We rely heavily on good, solid reporting from newspapers like El Universal, La Jornada, Proceso, and many other good Spanish-language dailies to give us the Mexican perspective on the drug war. Without the brave souls who are willing to put their lives on the line to write and disseminate quality open source information on the drug war, many of us in the US that follow it would be clueless. 

"17 charged in string of brutal kidnappings and slayings in San Diego suburbs."

Here is an excerpt from Richard Marosi's article in the Los Angeles Times:

"Authorities announced charges Thursday against a Mexican gang that took Tijuana-style violence to the upscale suburbs of San Diego County, kidnapping, torturing and killing well-to-do residents, even after some families paid large ransoms. The gang, a rogue cell of the Tijuana-based Arellano Felix drug cartel, moved across the border in 2002 and posed as U.S. law enforcement, donning FBI and police uniforms and caps while snatching victims outside homes and public places, said San Diego County prosecutors. Nine victims were killed from 2004 to 2007, and the bodies of two of them were dissolved in chemicals at a rented house in San Diego. Gang members were also charged with trying to murder a Chula Vista police officer in September 2005, peppering his car with high-caliber bullets before fleeing in a car. The gang targeted people it suspected of having links to organized crime, although some victims had no known ties, authorities said." Link to Full Article

Analysis: When I was working as an analyst for the State of California, one of the most frustrating things for me, as well as colleagues in other border states, was the fact that no standardized definition exists for the term "spillover" or the concept of "border violence spillover." Whether or not it is occurring depends on whom you ask. In February 2009, Texas state Homeland Security Director Steve McCraw said, "Yes, absolutely it has occurred; there's no question about it," McCraw said after a hearing before the House Committee on Border and International Affairs." However, the unanimous opinion of 10 Southern Arizona law-enforcement officials interviewed by the Arizona Daily Star in April 2009 was that spillover was NOT happening. "Spillover crime would be bad for business," Douglas, Arizona Police Chief Alberto Melis said. "And they're businessmen."

But what guidance are these people using to form their very visible and influential public opinions regarding spillover? I ask this question because, reading the reasons 17 people were charged in San Diego for that string of kidnappings and killings, it's obvious to me (but apparently not to everyone) that border violence spillover is happening in San Diego, and probably plenty of other cities on the US side of the border. You might ask what guidance I'M using to form my opinion. One part of it is the fact that violent criminal activity directly related to Mexico's drug trade occurred and is occurring in the United States. A second part of it is that many of the perpetrators of these types of crimes move freely between both countries and target illegals, legal residents, and US citizens alike. True, most victims are not "innocent" in the sense that they are usually involved or connected to organized crime in some way. This fact does little to calm the fears of neighbors in the US cities and towns where these crimes are happening. The third part is the bold willingness to impersonate US law enforcement officers and use high-powered weapons in our cities to carry out the orders of foreign organized crime groups. If the actions of those 17 individuals don't qualify as border violence spillover, I don't know what ever will. 

"The growing threat of grenades from Mexico."

Here is an excerpt from Jacques Billeaud's Associated Press article in The Dallas Morning News:

"It was a scenario U.S. law enforcement had long feared: A fragmentation grenade from Mexico's bloody drug war tossed into a public place. Only the grenade thrower's bumbling in that January incident prevented bloodshed in a South Texas bar – he neglected to pull a  second safety clasp. But the act was proof that one of the deadliest weapons in Mexico's drug battle is a real threat to the U.S., and investigators are stepping up efforts to make sure it doesn't happen again. While Mexican drug violence has been spilling across the border in the form of kidnappings and killings, grenades are a particular worry because they can kill large numbers of people indiscriminately, and they are a weapon of choice among Mexican cartel members... [Grenades] are preferred by drug hit men because they are cheap and easy to find. Many are left over from Central America's civil wars and sold on the black market to drug cartels. Some are brought in by weapons smugglers. Others are diverted from the region's militaries: In April, Guatemala seized 563 grenades after a shootout with Mexican drug cartel members, and officials later determined the grenades came from Guatemalan military bases. And there is evidence that those grenades are making their way north." Link to Full Article

Analysis: When that South Korean-made grenade was thrown into a bar in Texas, I was working as an analyst for California's homeland security apparatus, so I was very concerned about a similar incident occurring in San Diego or Imperial Counties (closest to the Mexican border). That happened in February 2009, and a similar incident hasn't happened since, either in Texas or anywhere else on the US side of the border. Given the widespread availability of hand grenades in Mexico - along with the DTOs' willingness to use them - one has to wonder why they haven't been used more frequently in the US.

I can only speculate, of course, but DTOs historically haven't been too big on drawing attention from US law enforcement inside US territory. There was a huge to-do in May 2009 about a possible order by Sinaloa's "El Chapo" Guzman to engage US law enforcement (rather than run) if confronted while moving a load. Neither that order, nor the meeting where that order was supposedly given, were ever confirmed. I don't believe that order was ever given because confronting US law enforcement unnecessarily on US territory is bad for business. Like it or not, several Mexican DTOs and their US-based gang distributors have a good thing going here. Drawing major attention to themselves by lobbing grenades into public places or in front of police stations in Texas - like they do almost every day in Mexico - is not the best way to stay under the radar and keep the drug business going by keeping scrutiny to a minimum.

To further back up my theory, I'm taking a look at the Pharr grenade incident itself and the alleged perpetrators. The "attack" was completely bungled, and the grenade was thrown by a local gang member. I still don't know exactly why they did it, but rumors being thrown around at the time included an attempt to impress the Gulf cartel to seek ad-hoc employment with them, as well as some kind of gang-on-gang hit. Regardless, it was an amateur job by a group of punks who had no clue what they were doing. Not that the level of professionalism in Mexican hits is always high, but in a DTO-sanctioned job, the grenade usually goes off.

Then there's the question of whether or not the author's assertion that grenades are heading north is true. Well...maybe. I don't doubt that grenades could make their way into the US for similar attacks in the future, but if they're already there, the ATF and local cops aren't finding them; at least, not in the numbers that the Mexican authorities are finding them. And while grenade attacks are more common in Mexico and are viewed as a criminal matter, they just don't happen at all in the US. I can almost guarantee you that a grenade going off in a McDonald's or a mall or in front of a police station in Arizona would be viewed by civilians as a terrorist-style attack. DTOs know this, and they know that would be very bad for business indeed.

"Los Linces, Mexican Drug War Contemporaries of Los Zetas."

Greetings! I'm excited to let you all know I've been invited to contribute weekly articles to MexiData.info, a great resource for important happenings in Mexico. You can read all about them HERE. Meanwhile, here is an excerpt from my first article on their site:

"Drug-related violence throughout Mexico is vicious, rampant, and almost always attributed to drug trafficking organizations, or DTOs. However, that attribution is very generic. To many, DTOs are just a faceless machine of drugs, death, and destruction. To others, they are disciplined and well-structured organizations designed to make maximum profit through bribery, intimidation, and enforcement. Upper-level management, as it were, of Mexican DTOs aren’t the ones who get their hands dirty during day-to-day operations and in defense of their transport routes. This is the job of the enforcement groups... While some enforcement group activities are well publicized—and thus well-known throughout Mexico and the U.S., the VCFO’s enforcer group under La Linea has been very hard to pin down. It is called Los Linces, and very little concrete information is available about its members. On July 21, 2009, General Raúl David Guillén Altuza, chief of staff of the 5th Military Zone headquartered in Chihuahua, confirmed their existence. He also said some of their members are former Mexican military members, but not all."

If you'd like to read the rest of the article and learn more about Los Linces, CLICK HERE. And don't worry, I'll still continue to post my analysis on Mexico's Drug War here on my blog. MexiData.info is just a good way for me to diversify, and keep fighting the good fight!

"Senators Demand Rethinking of Strategy Against Crime."

Here is a translated excerpt from Victor Ballinas and Alonso Urrutia's article in the Mexican daily La Jornada:

"According to the Senate coordinators of the PRI, the PAN, and the PRD, the current wave of violence affecting Mexico makes it necessary to rethink the government's strategy in the fight against organized crime, and to hold a meeting of the National Security Council to discuss a new strategy. PRI Senate coordinator Manlio Fabio Beltrones called for an urgent review of the government's strategy, but added that the Army would have to remain on the streets until Mexico had a reliable police force to replace the military troops. PAN Senate coordinator called for a 'permanent' review of the strategy against organized crime, in response to an ever-changing situation, but he stressed that this 'does not entail a failure, but an updating of the focus in the determined fight launched by President Felipe Calderon.' Madero also defended the Army's continued deployment against organized crime. PRD Senate coordinator Carlos Navarrete declared that it was not possible to fight well-organized gangs 'without an adequately planned and properly executed policy, based on well-defined intelligence work.' Referring to a recent wave of attacks against the security forces in Michoacan, Guanajuato, and Guerrero, Navarrete declared that 'until now, the Army would chase and the others would run away; today for the first time we are seeing an organized, synchronized counterattack, and this represents an escalation of the violence and the conflict.'" Link to Full Spanish-language Article

Analysis: This multi-party discussion between Mexican senators is a great example of how something that sounds great on paper or in theory doesn't always work in reality. I will be the first one to say that Calderon's strategy of deploying the military in lieu of corrupt police to deal with DTOs is bold and necessary, yet completely unsustainable in the long-term. I agree with the senators that Mexico needs to come up with a long-term solution (I think their use of the term "permanent" is impractical). However, Calderon - and the senators - have very limited options to achieve these goals.

I'm glad Beltrones acknowledges that the military has to stay on the street until a reliable police force can be used, but exactly how reliable is reliable in Mexico? The Mexican people have little faith in the police force's ability to protect them and effectively go after DTOs, officers are routinely being arrested for being in collusion with DTOs, and officers are failing lie detector tests when questioned about their association with DTOs. There's no way Calderon can clean up the police to (for example only; not because they're perfect) US law enforcement standards in the time he has left in office. So the question becomes, how clean does the Mexican government expect their police force to be before they withdraw troops from places like Cuidad Juarez?

Navarrete said that a good policy is based on well-defined intelligence work. Unfortunately, good intelligence on DTOs is usually hard to come by. Recruiting an insider who isn't afraid enough of getting killed to talk to the DEA or Mexican federales is really hard. Sending in an undercover agent who can avoid having to kill someone else or getting killed him or herself is even harder. The Mexican government has been extremely reluctant to work jointly with US agencies, and intelligence sharing between the two countries is made even more difficult by the fact that US agencies don't know who in Mexico they can trust with sensitive information.

Although the PRI gained a lot of seats in the recent election, they still don't have an absolute majority without the help of other parties. Still, they may see their political gains as a mandate by the Mexican people to change the course of the drug war that has wreaked so much violence since Calderon came into office. It's always possible that there's a better way to do battle with the DTOs, and good luck to the Mexican Congress in finding it; I just hope that in the process, they don't give up the gains Calderon has worked so hard to achieve.

[To view my Examiner.com article on this topic, CLICK HERE.]

"12 slain in Mexico were federal police officers."

Here is an excerpt from Ken Ellingwood's article in The Los Angeles Times:

"Marking a gruesome new setback in the war on drug gangs, Mexican authorities said Tuesday 

that 12 people found tortured and fatally shot in the western state of Michoacan a night earlier were federal police officers. Officials said the slayings were the work of La Familia, a Michoacan-based trafficking group that has carried out at least 10 attacks against federal police in the state since Saturday, when authorities captured an alleged leader of the group. The 11 men and one woman were off duty when they were ambushed... The killers left a message with the heap of bodies that threatened federal police. Elsewhere, authorities came upon two posters warning that police faced death if "they didn't leave or line up" with La Familia." Link to Full Article

Analysis: For a relatively small and geographically limited DTO like La Familia Michoacana, these attacks and murders are not only brazen, but very alarming. There are a few reasons I can think of why La Familia would engage in such an extreme form of violence and intimidation. First, while La Familia is certainly an up-and-comer and one of the faster movers in the Mexican DTO world, its operations cannot compare to those of the majors, like the Sinaloa Federation or Gulf cartel. Because of their location, they are also limited in the type of drugs they have access to and the trafficking routes they can use. This may be La Familia's way of making a name for themselves; I've certainly read more about them in the last year than ever before. They may also be making a strategic move to take territory and operations from weaker parts of rival cartels.

One thing I'm curious about is whether or not any of those 12 federal officers were dirty. It's easy to assume they all were (which is usually the case), but sometimes they're killed because they refused to be bought off. It may be a combination of the two, but the reason why they were killed makes a big difference in the grand scheme of things. If La Familia killed these officers for personal or business reasons, then it's business as usual in Michoacan, and this is just a particularly gruesome mass murder. However, if they were targeted and killed just because they were federal officers, then this represents a direct attack on a state apparatus by an organized crime group. The threats of essentially "join us or die" also fall in line with a direct confrontation with a state apparatus, and that complicates any attempts to define La Familia - or other DTOs, for that matter - is simply organized crime groups.

"Is Phoenix really the 'kidnapping capital'?"

Here is an excerpt from E.J. Montini's article in The Arizona Republic:

"Phoenix police Sgt. Tommy Thompson took a telephone call not long ago from a Florida couple who were driving their motorhome through Arizona and wanted to know if they should avoid Phoenix. The folks from the Sunshine State had heard on TV that Phoenix was the "kidnapping capital" of the nation and the second-worst city for kidnapping in the entire world. They wondered if they should bypass Arizona since they couldn't afford a big ransom. That was in February. The TV folks had learned that the Phoenix Police Department had a special unit to deal with what has become a near constant stream of ransom kidnappings linked to drug-smuggling and human-smuggling gangs out of Mexico. The department let a news crew monitor their operation. In the subsequent ABC report, Phoenix is described as 'the kidnapping capital of America, with more incidents than any other city in the world outside of Mexico City.' The label stuck.... Phoenix is upfront about the roughly 370 kidnappings each year linked to criminal smuggling gangs. Other cities may not keep track of the problem in the same way or may simply avoid speaking about it publicly." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I love this article because it's a great example of (a) how the media plays a big part in shaping our perception of the drug war, and (b) how difficult it is to grasp the problem because NO ONE knows the exact number of anything involved in this war. It's impossible to know exactly how many people are being kidnapped on the US side of the border, anywhere in Mexico, and anywhere in the world, for that matter. Why? Because the victims' families are terrified; they're being threatened with harm to their loved ones (or worse) if they go to the police. Estimates vary from country to country on what percentage of kidnappings actually gets reported to the authorities, but most that I've seen hover around 10% in developing countries. The percentage is probably higher in the US because the public is generally trusting of law enforcement. However, the majority of cross-border kidnapping victims in the US are either dirty themselves, or an immediate family member of someone involved in the drug business. This greatly reduces the chances of the kidnapping being reported to US authorities.

As happy as I am that Phoenix is being so up front about their kidnapping problem (click here for a great story in Newsweek on that), I'm curious as to why they've chosen to go that route. I agree with the author that it's bad for tourism, and I'd hate to be the person at the Phoenix PD who has to answer questions from people regarding the safety of the city. Perhaps they feel that by just putting it out there, it sends a message to kidnappers that Phoenix is ready and willing to take them on. Maybe it also (wittingly or not) sends a political message to DC and the rest of the country that screams, "helloooooo, we have a problem down here!" Regardless, I'm glad the Phoenix PD is taking the bull by the horns, and as long as you're Joe Tourist and the family, I think checking out the sights there will be just fine.

Who are the "Mata Zetas"?

A few days ago, I started seeing Spanish-language media reports about a group of Mexican hitmen killing...other hitmen. Here are a couple of translated excerpts from these reports:

"Inside an abandoned truck in a residential neighborhood in Cancun, Quintana Roo State, were found the bodies of three men, handcuffed and with plastic bags on their heads. Together with the remains was a note with the message: 'We are the new group Mata Zetas and we are against kidnapping and extortion, and we will fight them in all states for a cleaner Mexico.'" Link to El Universal Article

"A video on YouTube confirms the existence of a group of hitmen dedicated to the capture and killing of members of organized crime groups. The group calls itself 'Mata Zetas' and previously denounced a series of crimes by leaders and members of Los Zetas." Link to Terra.com.mx Article

Analysis: Normally I'm the one providing you, the reader, with some answers and explanations, but the phenomenon of 'Mata Zetas' and other vigilante groups in Mexico is still pretty new to me. I recently sent out an email to colleagues asking if they had information about an anti-Kidnapping vigilante group in Coahuila being reported by the Saltillo Vanguardia, but that group seems to be an unknown as well. Unfortunately, I have more questions than answers about the "Mata Zetas," namely, who created them, who leads them, and who funds them? I'm personally not a huge fan of vigilantism (although I am a huge fan of Jack Bauer), especially when the corpses start piling up. It's very possible, and even likely, that the "Mata Zetas" don't have the best interests of a "cleaner Mexico" at heart, and are just a front for one of Los Zetas' competitors - likely La Familia Michoacana or the Sinaloa Federation.

A theory that's a little more out there, yet concerning nonetheless, is that the "Mata Zetas" are being honest about their intentions, and could possibly be unofficially sanctioned by the Mexican government. I don't consider myself to be a conspiracy theorist, but I'm thinking of this possibility because we've seen something similar occur in Colombia - although the parties involved are a little different. In the 1980s, Pablo Escobar created his own private army of enforcers because he was getting tired of his crew members getting killed and operationg being disrupted by the Marxist FARC guerrillas. These paramilitaries eventually grew and morphed into the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), which was designated as a terrorist organization by the US in 2001. Anyway, the AUC was made up of a LOT of former Colombian army soldiers, and dozens of Colombian congressment are jailed and awaiting trial for providing support to the AUC. Many Colombians don't blame them; the AUC had the same mission as the Colombian army and the government - to get rid of FARC and National Liberation Army (ELN) terrorists. Could the "Mata Zetas" be or become to the DTOs like the AUC was in Colombia to the FARC and ELN? I'm curious to see where their notes - and deeds - pop up next.

"The Use of Religion in the World of Organized Crime."

Here is a translated excerpt from Francisco Gomez's Spanish-language article in the Mexican paper El Universal:

"A new facet utilized by organized crime groups in Mexico is the use of religion to recruit new members and to keep them in line. Religion also serves as a means of redemption for the crimes they commit. Facundo Rosas, the recently appointed Federal Police Commissioner, warns of the danger of an 'explosive mixture' of religion and criminal activity. Knowledgeable regarding the narco world, Rosas indicates that religious elements are used by criminals as a way of seeking divine or supernatural protection that will intercede with God on their behalf, and thereby expiate their sins. They also use religion to create a shared identity within the group, which leads to stability within it. Rosas cites the example of the La Familia Michoacana, which considers its murders 'social cleansings,' committed not by human beings, but rather, by divine justice. He further states that criminal organizations in Mexico are following the pattern that has been used by armed groups with political or ideological goals such as those in the Middle East." Link to Full Article

Analysis: El Universal also published three other articles on the same day (June 23rd) with a similar theme, titled "Weddings and funerals, ideal for capturing kingpins," "Some believe la Santa Muerte protects them," and "Faith and the saints, supporters of narcotraffickers." This concept shouldn't come as much of a surprise, as Mexico has been a predominantly Catholic nation since its colonization in 1521. Some people may think that criminals who produce, transport, and sell drugs, murder others with assault weapons, and hold hostages for ransom couldn't possibly believe in God and the saints. Yet, if al-Qa'ida can justify their actions by claiming their faith, why can't narcos in Mexico? Take that statement with caution, however; terrorist groups engage in murder and other activities because of God, whereas DTOs engage in murder and their activities because of monetary gain and in spite of God. Big difference.

Using religion as a recruiting tool is ingenious, and I'm wondering if DTOs came up with that idea on their own or pulled it from other successful criminal (or terrorist) groups that have done the same. Most youths who join the DTOs either have few honest prospects for supporting themselves, or are drawn into the "glamourous" life of expensive cars, clothes, women, and guns. Once they join though, that good old Catholic guilt can be a pretty strong force. Using la Santa Muerte and religious principles in general to recruit, discipline, motivate, and assuage new members and hitmen can be very effective, as La Familia Michoacana has shown.

"Suspect in murders headed Minuteman group."

Here is an excerpt from Daniel Newhauser and Dan Shearer's article in The Sahuarita Sun:

"Two of the three people arrested in connection with the May 30 murders of an Arivaca man and his daughter headed up a splinter Minuteman group, and were looking for drugs and money to fund their efforts to keep illegal immigrants and drug runners out of the country, sheriff’s officials said.Jason Eugene Bush, 34, was arrested Thursday in Kingman; Shawna Forde, 41, was arrested Friday south of Sierra Vista; and Albert Robert Gaxiola, 42, was arrested Friday afternoon in Tucson. All three have been charged with two counts of first-degree murder, one count of first-degree burglary and one count of aggravated assault in connection with the murders of Raul Flores and his 9-year-old daughter, Brisenia. Flores’ wife was shot during the incident but managed to shoot one of the intruders... Officials said Forde is associated with the Minutemen American Defense group and that Bush and Gaxiola, who is from Arivaca, are associates of Forde. The group is not associated with the national, 12,000-member Minutemen Civil Defense Corps... Within Minuteman group circles, Forde is controversial... Hal Washburn, vetting officer for Washington state chapter of the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps, said Forde was encouraged to leave the group over questions about honesty and her inability to follow orders, according to the story. San Diego Minutemen lists Forde among people they won’t work with, calling her 'unstable.'" Link to Full Article

Analysis: I was just getting ready to type that this story isn't normally the type of incident I provide commentary for, but the circumstance is so unusual and fascinating that I just couldn't resist. Forde is obviously a disturbed individuals with paranoias and extreme views regarding immigration and border security. It's incredibly sad that a man - regardless of his involvement in the drug trade - and his nine year-old daughter had to die because Forde felt justified in funding her operation by stealing drug money and killing drug dealers.

Regardless of how you feel about the official Minutemen organizations, I think it's important that they've made a quick and concerted effort to distinguish themselves from Forde's group. The MCDC does not condone murder or even violence (as far as I know), and I believe their funding comes primarily from donations. Forde's kind of vigilantism makes her and her group no better than the narco-thugs she claims to abhor. Reportedly, the plan was to kill all witnesses, and it's difficult to think that Forde and her two accomplices were sick enough to include a nine year-old in that plan; it can't be said if they knew a child would be in the home. When bullets are flying (the male victim's wife returned fire), anything can happen. But, regardless of how bad drug dealers and DTO members and enforcers are, nothing (in my opinion) justifies this kind of counter-drug vigilantism on US soil.

"Border czar warns cartels against targeting US forces."

Here is an excerpt from Andrew Beatty's article on Agence France Presse:

"US border czar Alan Bersin warned Mexico's brutal drug cartels Tuesday that threats to target law enforcement officials on both sides of the border would be met by a "significant response." Bersin said a recent call by one cartel kingpin to ramp up violence against US and Mexican law enforcement agents was potentially of 'grave significance' and was being 'taken seriously' by the administration. 'Should law enforcement, border patrol agents, customs officers or local and state law enforcement officers be targeted that would be considered a major departure from existing practice of the cartels, and a threat that called for a significant response,' he said... While drawing a line in the sand, Bersin did not specify what the US response might be, except to say efforts would be stepped up to apprehend those responsible." Link to Full Article

Analysis: While on one hand, I'm happy that Bersin is responding assertively and directly to threats against US law enforcement by Mexican DTOs, there are a couple of issues that concern me. I posted on these alleged threats back in early May, and I have since seen the "official" reports (which weren't much different than the media reports, incidentally). What I have NOT seen is any official confirmation that this meeting between Guzman and his people took place, and that this order to confront US law enforcement was actually given. Regardless of any confirmation, it looks like Bersin and DHS are accepting those threats as if they actually occurred, and responding in a manner they feel is appropriate. And this is my other concern.

Bersin is promising the DTOs a "significant response" when neither he nor DHS know what that means. The National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy was just published, but it talks more about methods of cooperation between agencies than it does about specific ways that each agency is going to attack problems with drug smuggling, weapons trafficking, and money transfer/laundering. Mind you, this is a strategy, not a tactical manual, so it's not really designed to talk specifics. Still, the US government has not put down on paper specific triggers or tripwires for mounting that "significant response" to a threat to US interests from Mexican DTOs. The problem now lies in Guzman's and other DTO leaders' perception of Bersin's assertion and any potential reaction. DTO leaders aren't stupid; they probably know that Bersin's statements don't currently have much substance to back them up. That being said, I don't think the DTOs are too interested in calling any bluffs. They are still very wary of encounters with US law enforcement, which are bad for business. Even if Guzman made those statements and threats during that meeting, it may have just been posturing to provide a morale boost (or threat of punishment) to his underlings. 

Bottom line, I realize it's important for people like Bersin to make their position known and known clearly when dealing with threats by Mexican DTOs. However, I also believe these statements need to be made with caution, and the knowledge that a DTO's response to these types of statements can be unpredictable - and deadly.

"Mexico's drug Zeta hitmen advance on kingpin's turf."

Here is an excerpt from Robin Emmott's article on Reuters.com:

"Mexico's Gulf cartel and its brutal "Zetas" hit squad are taking on the country's most wanted drug lord on his own turf, escalating a fight for supremacy in a drug war that is worrying the United States. The Zetas, considered Mexico's most violent gang and feared for beheading victims, are pushing into the northwestern state of Durango in a new battle against arch-rival Joaquin "Shorty" Guzman, Mexico's top drug fugitive. At least 235 people have died in drug violence in the mountainous state this year in a fight over smuggling routes and marijuana and opium plantations that Guzman has long dominated... "Without a doubt, the Zetas are advancing in Durango and some towns are basically under their control," said Rafael Herrera, a political analyst and former editor of a regional newspaper... Lazcano is turning his attention in Durango to controlling rural outposts along smuggling corridors previously held by Guzman to win informants, hide and attack the military." Link to Full Article

Analysis: There is no doubt that the level of violence in Durango has increased in recent months, as documented by Ms. Emmott in another Reuters article. When violence increases in a relatively specific area in Mexico, that means that either two DTOs are fighting for control of a lucrative plaza (a drug smuggling corridor) like Nuevo Laredo or Cuidad Juarez, or a DTO is having some internal control issues, like the AFO in Tijuana. I also have no doubt that some sort of conflict is going on between the Sinaloa Federation and Los Zetas. My question is what Lazcano's priorities are with this strategy. The article mentions controlling outposts along smuggling routes, winning informants, finding places to hide and attack the military, etc. However, those are lofty goals if he expects to accomplish all of them.

Let's do a quick comparison of Los Zetas and the Sinaloa Federation, while making a few assumptions. Los Zetas used to be merely enforcers for the Gulf cartel, but after Osiel Cardenas Guillen was incarcerated and extradited to the US, they took over a good chunk of the Gulf cartel's operations. While I don't think anyone is ready to say that the two organizations are one and the same or use the names interchangeably, one can reasonably assume that any moves by Los Zetas has a direct impact on Gulf business, for better or for worse. There are two important differences between the Gulf and Sinaloa cartels. The Gulf cartel controls more plazas than the Federation. However, the Federation controls significantly more physical territory than the Gulf cartel. Controlling more routes is a competitive advantage because you can move more product across the border. However, controlling more territory has the advantages of providing more places to manufacture drugs, more places to hide, more officials to bribe in population centers, and more potential recruits.

I'm sure all of the Sinaloa advantages are tempting to Lazcano and his crew, but El Chapo is quite a force to contend with. He has his own enforcement teams, Los Pelones and Los Negros among them. No one really knows the exact Zetas numbers, but the latest estimates place them between 200-250 core members. However, Los Zetas have grown into a network and almost a brand name; that network of informants and other associates could number in the thousands. This would serve as a huge benefit to Lazcano in a conflict with El Chapo's people. Undoubtedly, El Chapo has a challenge on his hands. Not only does he have Lazcano to worry about on one side, but he's also backing Teodoro "El Teo" Garcia Simental in a battle for AFO's remaining territory in northern Baja California. As is typical for these kinds of turf wars, things are likely to get worse before they get better, and as the author implies, only time will tell who has the upper hand.

"Doing Business in the Time of Mexican Drug Chaos."

Here is an excerpt from Joel Millman's article in The Wall Street Journal:

"U.S. Customs agents got a surprise on April 9, when they checked a trailer of an 18-wheel truck crossing into El Paso, Texas, from Mexico and found more than 9,000 pounds of marijuana hidden among auto parts bound for U.S. factories. A startling aspect of the bust: The pot was  packed into a shipment belonging to auto parts giant Delphi Corp... The bust highlights one of border control's endless conundrums: how to deter clever criminals from manipulating security systems for their own benefit. In an era of open trade, Customs officials encourage exporters to beef up internal security measures to earn the privilege of fast transit through border checkpoints. Thousands of manufacturers, shippers and cargo expediters have been certified under a number of U.S. government programs that designate compliance. The unintended result of that compliance: Those same exporters are increasingly likely to be targeted by smugglers, who look to piggyback their contraband on legal cargo that makes low-friction border crossings, according to law enforcement officials... So far this year, there have been at least 80 attacks on moving cargo in Mexico." Link to Full Article

Analysis: This is a really good article that explains in a decent amount of detail yet another major crime in which DTOs and their enforcers are engaging - truck hijackings. There are so many negative effects that the threat of these hijackings have on both American and Mexican businesses, and the situation is oddly reminiscent of the attacks on convoys in Iraq. Who would ever have thought that trucks carrying flat-screen televisions in Mexico would need to travel in a caravan with a GPS locator and a panic switch? Now, there are two different problems occurring here; one is the targeting of cargo trucks by DTOs and their affiliates for the cargo they're carrying. The other is the use by DTOs of cleared cargo trucks to move drugs into the US; in most cases, it appears both the drivers and the cargo owners are oblivious to the extra product being transported in those trucks. 

Although the article addresses both issues, it really focuses on the former. There's not much more I can add to what the author has already explained, except to say how disturbing it is that this is the operating environment that both major corporations and trucking companies have to deal with in Mexico. The panic switches and GPS locators are a nice touch, but they can't prevent all hijackings, especially with the speed and precision with which groups like Los Zetas execute them. Fortunately, it sounds like it's just the cargo that's being targeted and not the drivers, so the odds of a driver living through a Mexican hijacking incident is pretty good, although it will definitely leave a few marks. It's also bad for both businesses and consumers, who will eventually pay for the cost of additional transport security.

As for the planted drug situation, there's not much information in the article explaining how those drugs make their way onto cleared trucks in the first place, or what companies are doing to prevent this from happening. In the Sharp Electronics case, it looks like they wouldn't have been able to do much, since the contraband was in boxes that came from a Mexican supplier. Fortunately the drugs were detected early on, but how? How many other companies have had this problem? If the narcos are surreptitiously planting this stuff on cleared trucks, does that automatically vindicate the cargo or truck owner since they didn't know what was happening, or should they be responsible for screening their shipments before they arrive in the US? I wish the author had expanded this aspect of the story a little bit because there's a similar controversy brewing in the rail sector. The US government has brought a suit against Union Pacific because drugs were discovered in their rail cars after they arrived in the US. The US government claims that Union Pacific should inspect their trains in Mexico before they enter the US, and that the company should be held accountable for any drugs that are discovered in their trains (Union Pacific disagrees, of course). I wonder what would have happened to Sharp Electronics if those drugs had been discovered in the US instead of prior to leaving the plant. 

Either way, it looks like the trucking industry has plenty to deal with. We can only hope that between CBP inspections at ports of entry, new technology being incorporated into those inspections, and self-inspections by companies operating in Mexico, it will become increasingly difficult to sneak drug shipments onto cleared commercial vehicles. We can also hope that truckers don't start installing heat-seeking missiles on their trucks or attaching .50-caliber rifles to their cabs for protection, or else the cost of your next TV will probably be out of your budget. 

"Bold prison break? Just another day in Mexico's drug war."

Here is an excerpt from Sara Miller Llana's article in The Christian Science Monitor:

"A convoy of cars carrying more than two dozen suspected drug cartel members disguised as Mexican police officers arrives at the Zacatécas state prison before dawn. Their helicopter hovers overhead. Minutes later, the men help more than 50 inmates – many of them suspected drug traffickers – flee the prison. A countrywide manhunt ensues. No, this is not a script for a B movie. It's just another day in Mexico's high-stakes war on drug trafficking – Saturday, in fact. The story grabbed headlines worldwide. But for Mexicans – who have now grown accustomed to fugitives on the lam and traffickers taunting the state with death threats and even banners hung in public spaces to recruit new members – it was business as usual... Many of those who fled from the Cieneguillas prison in Zacatecas over the weekend are believed to be members of the Gulf cartel, one of the major organizations fighting the Mexican state and their rivals to preserve corridors to the illegal drug market in the US... Prison breaks are nothing new in Mexico. In 2001, Mexico's most wanted drug lord, Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, escaped from a high-security prison – reportedly in the back of a laundry truck. And there have been at least three breaks in Zacatecas in recent years. Such attempts began in the late 90s..with the emergence of the Zetas, who are the security enforcers for the Gulf Cartel." Link to Full Article

Analysis: A few people have asked my opinion on this prison break, and at first I wasn't really sure how to comment on it until I saw this article. There are just a few things I want to mention, which the article highlights quite nicely. First, the expertise of Los Zetas. Prison breaks and hostage rescues are two things older members of Los Zetas (i.e. former GAFES soldiers who were trained at Fort Benning) were actually trained on during their Mexican army days. I'm sure many of them have passed on these skills to newer recruits, and this prison break is a good example of that training. Second, yes, of course there was inside help - how could you have a prison break without one shot fired if a good number of prison personnel aren't in on the plan? And finally, although this prison break received a lot of press, it's not exactly the first time something like this has happened, and certainly not a first for Zacatecas. As I've said before, the only thing that DTO members and leaders fear is extradition to the US. Why? Because if they get thrown into a Mexican prison, they either live like kings for just a few years, or get busted out in an operation like this one. If they go to prison in the US, they're staying put for a LONG time. So, not only is it hard enough for the Mexican government to put these thugs in jail; apparently, it's a real problem to keep them there.

"The Sicario: A Juárez hit man speaks."

Here is an excerpt from Charles Bowden's article in Harper's Magazine:

"I am ready for the story of all the dead men who last saw his face. As I drank coffee and tried to frame questions in my mind, a crime reporter in Juárez was cut down beside his eight-year-old daughter as they sat in his car letting it warm up. This morning as I drove down here, a Toyota passed me with a bumper sticker that read, with a heart symbol, i love love. This morning I tried to remember how I got to this rendezvous. I was in a distant city and a man told me of the killer and how he had hidden him. He said at first he feared him, but he was so useful. He would clean everything and cook all the time and get on his hands and knees and polish his shoes. I took him on as a favor, he explained. I said, 'I want him. I want to put him on paper.' And so I came. The man I wait for insists, 'You don’t know me. No one can forgive me for what I did.' He has pride in his hard work. The good killers make a very tight pattern through the driver’s door. They do not spray rounds everywhere in the vehicle, no, they make a tight pattern right through the door and into the driver’s chest. The reporter who died received just such a pattern, ten rounds from a 9mm and not a single bullet came near his eight-year-old daughter. I wait. I admire craftsmanship... I have spent years getting to this moment. The killers, well, I have been around them before. Once I partied with two hundred armed killers in a Mexican hotel for five days. But they were not interested in talking about their murders. He is." Link to Extended Excerpt on Anderson Cooper 360

Analysis: THIS is what an interview with an assassin should look like. It is a gripping ten-page account of the interview between the author - a veteran and award-winning journalist - and the subject, a world-weary and repentant sicario who has been staying out of the business for the last two years. The article is gripping, intense, and incredibly vivid in its detail and emotion. It's unfortunate that you can only read an excerpt of it online, but it's completely worth the drive to your local bookstore to pick up a copy of May 2009 edition of Harper's in order to read it (and thanks to James Creechan and Lindsay Beyerstein for recommending this!).

There are a few things about the article that I want to point out, which will hopefully encourage those of you with a profound interest in this topic to go out and buy the mag. First, the writing is really good. Yes, it's very dramatic and reads like a novel in some places. But isn't that what keeps you interested? Bowden, unlike some writers, doesn't use that tactic to detract from shaky "facts" or a mediocre story. The subject and the interview are very grave, which merits a degree of drama, in my opinion. I think it adds context and perspective, especially for those who don't follow border violence issues and don't realize just how bad things are in some places in Mexico.

Several important aspects of the drug smuggling business are revealed here, and it's not in a question-and-answer format that makes you wonder whether or not the answers were planted or the subject was set up to answer in a certain way. For example, the subject explains at great length that he never really knew who he was working for. He got orders, carried them out, and got paid in cash, booze, drugs, and women. He had rules to follow, and as long as he followed them, he stayed alive.

He explains that towards the end of his "career," after things started getting really bad in 2006, he was kidnapped twice. He talked about how his captors and torturers were amateurs in their methods - something I've noticed going on in the Tijuana area for about a year or so. This is part of what's contributing to the more grisly slayings and collateral damage - the fact that some newer hitmen are inexperienced, not as likely to follow the rules, and bloodthirsty. There's a part of the article where the subject talks about the difference between men that kill as a job and men that kill because they like killing. He felt that the men who enjoyed killing for its own sake were sick and needed to be killed themselves because they were a liability...an interesting viewpoint.

One of the more disturbing parts is his discussion of the corruption among Mexican law enforcement and the collusion between police and the DTOs. I knew corruption was widespread in many, if not most, areas of Mexico, but I had no idea it was this pervasive. The mere thought of Mexican cops taking part in kidnappings and torture - regardless of whether or not the victims are dirty themselves and owe money to a drug lord - is tough to swallow. However, it makes the problem of corruption so real, and helps the reader see what in incredible obstacle corruption poses to the Calderon administration.

So if you haven't figured it out yet, I think this is an incredibly good read, and well worth the time, effort, and $6.95 to get it at the news stand. It's an insight into a world who some think they know, yet we've only begun to scratch the surface; we may never get to the day-to-day truth that lies deep beneath for so many in Mexico.

"Mexican drug lord orders deadly force."

Here is an excerpt from Josh Meyer's article in The Baltimore Sun:

"The reputed head of Mexico's Sinaloa drug cartel has instructed his army of associates to use deadly force if necessary to protect their increasingly contested trafficking operations, even against U.S. law enforcement, according to authorities here and in Washington. The threatened offensive by Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, Mexico's most-wanted man, was described by U.S. officials as being highly unusual, given that his associates have avoided violent confrontations with American law enforcement officers, and have kept their blood feuds with fellow traffickers largely south of the border. Guzman is believed to have delivered the message personally in early March, during a three-day gathering of his associates in Sonoita, a small Mexican town just a few miles south of the Arizona border, according to U.S. intelligence bulletins sent to several state and federal law enforcement officials. The Sonoita meeting is one of many indications that Mexico's most-wanted man is becoming more brazen even in the face of a massive Mexican government crackdown on his activities and deadly turf rivalries with other traffickers." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I'm really concerned about this, as it's plausible enough to be true. I haven't seen the bulletin in question yet, and even if I had, I might not be able to comment on it anyway as it's probably marked as Law Enforcement Sensitive. So, going solely on the information in this newspaper article, I agree with the author's assessment that Guzman's brazenness is unexpected, yet not out of the realm of possibility with everything that the Mexican government has been doing to crack down on his operations. Still, DTOs have shied away from directly confronting US law enforcement because it's not good business sense to engage US authorities unless absolutely necessary.

I'm curious if the bulletin has more details regarding the rules of engagement, or ROEs, for US authorities. Did Guzman differentiate between engaging locals and feds? Did he order his people to fire only if fired upon? Did he offer instructions for disposing of any US law enforcement bodies after a deadly shootout, or were his orders only to shoot and run? These questions may sound inconsequential, but considering that DHS is drawing up a new (and I imagine lengthy) border response plan, the response to any intentional deadly-force engagement by DTOs with US local or federal law enforcement is likely to be bigger and more intense than it would have been, say, two or three months ago. All this being said, the order may just have been an attempt by Guzman to instill some courage (or at least bravado) in his drug runners, who may have been more prone to dump pricey shipments at the first sign of US authorities. Drug runners are mostly still wary of US law enforcement, but I think this information is plausible, and US law enforcement along the border is wise to be even more cautious than usual.

"Grisly slayings brings Mexican drug war to US."

Here is an excerpt from Pauline Arrillaga's Associated Press article:

"Shelby County Sheriff Chris Curry found out firsthand what federal drug enforcement agents have long understood. The drug war, with the savagery it brings, knows no bounds. It had landed in his back yard, in the foothills of the Appalachians, in Alabama's wealthiest county, around the corner from The Home Depot... Five men dead in an apartment in a county that might see five homicides in an entire year... Some of the men showed signs of torture: Burns seared into their earlobes revealed where modified jumper cables had been clamped as an improvised electrocution device. Adhesive from duct tape used to bind the victims still clung to wrists and faces, from mouths to noses... It didn't take long for Curry and federal agents to piece together clues: A murder scene, clean save for the crimson-turned-brown stains now spotting the carpet. Just a couple of mattresses tossed on the floor. It was a typical stash house... Now the cartels have brought the fight to us: In 230 U.S. cities, the Mexican organizations maintain distribution hubs or supply drugs to local distributors, according to the Justice Department's National Drug Intelligence Center... What's new is where that violence is erupting, where distribution cells and hubs and sub-hubs have surfaced. How an apartment in Alabama became the site of a drug hit in many ways tells the story of the narco-trade in America in 2009, and of the challenges we face in combatting a blight that has spread to big cities and small all across the land."  Link to Full Article

Analysis: This is a really great article, and it approaches the border violence "spillover" phenomenon from a non oft-explored angle - border violence that's happening far away from the border. It's public knowledge that Mexican DTOs have been operating in hundreds of American towns and cities, and the media has been publicizing that a little more as of late. However, you don't hear many news stories of drug-related murders in small towns in the southeast or midwest US. I imagine the local news carry those items more than the national audience will never know, and as the article says, the locals in those towns are very concerned and starting to become afraid of the spread of narco-violence away from the southwest border.

I like that the author explained how easy it is for DTO associated in the US to blend into the population because of the growing Hispanic population in more rural areas. One thing she doesn't mention is the DTOs' affiliation with US based gangs and the violence in US cities that arises from that relationship. Unfortunately, this is where some definitions of DTO-related violence gets gray and hazy. US-based gangs distribute the drugs that are smuggled into the US by DTOs. Often, US-based gangs are contracted by the DTOs to carry out executions inside the US. When a gang member murders someone in Texas on behalf of a DTO, should we classify that as DTO-related violence? Gang violence? Or just a "simple" murder? Defining spillover, which was already complicated and considerably nebulous, is even more difficult when you take geography and gang activity into consideration.

I'm a huge fan of George Friedman's and Strategic Forecasting in general, so I was happy to see he was quoted in this article - it lends a lot of credence. And yes, what's going on in Mexico is more of a mess than a war sometimes. Endemic corruption is an institutional problem, not something that can be ameliorated with better policing - especially when police are the problem. As long as the demand for drugs in the US is fueling DTO business in Mexico, and as long as corruption and fear of DTO retribution fuels DTO business in Mexico, the war AND the mess will continue on both sides of the border and beyond.

"Guatemala finds Mexico drug smuggler training camp."

Here is an excerpt from Sarah Grainger's article on Reuters.com:

"Guatemalan security forces have discovered a camp run by Mexico's most violent drug gang where traffickers trained dozens of gunmen, police said on Friday. Security forces were tipped off about suspicious activity at a ranch in Quiche, in the central highlands, by residents who said men in ski masks were asking villagers to join their ranks... Two commanders of the Zetas, the armed wing of Mexico's Gulf cartel, and 37 recruits fled the camp before the police and army arrived, leaving behind 500 grenades, six rifles and hundreds of rounds of ammunition... Guatemalan authorities, helped by personnel from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, also found an illegal airstrip, an obstacle course and equipment for practicing shooting at moving targets... Police believe a series of attacks on buses in Guatemala City in the past week were orchestrated by the Zetas to distract attention from the border where they had been shipping illegal arms and drugs into and out of the country." Link to Full Article

Analysis: We've seen this type off off-site training many times before, but it's normally associated with terrorist organizations like al-Qa'ida and the FARC. This is a classic example of how Mexican DTOs use the same techniques, tactics, and procedures as terrorist groups. The attacks on the buses are particularly disturbing. According to an article by Air Security International, youth gangs killed at least one passenger and one passerby, and injured seven other people, including a police officer and a bus driver. Guatemalan authorities believe that criminal organizations hired the youth gangs to extort money from drivers in exchange for safe passage. Despite the inherent terrorist nature of these training activities and attacks on civilians, DTOs continue to be regarded as mere organized crime groups. Until DTOs can be recategorized or redefinedin a way that truly captures their brutality and disregard for human life, insufficient resources will be allocated by both the Mexican and US governments to combat DTO-related violence.

"Redefining Terrorism: Why Mexican Drug Trafficking is More than Just Organized Crime."

Here is an excerpt from my and my husband's article in Henley-Putnam University's Journal of Strategic Security:

"Mexican drug traffickers are more than criminals. They are terrorists. And that’s not hyperbole. The tactics, strategy, organization, and even (to a limited extent) the goals of the Mexican drug cartels are all perfectly consistent with those of recognized terrorist organizations. Admittedly, the cartels lack the motivating political or religious ideology most terrorist groups display, and some argue this precludes the application of the “terrorist” label. However, we will show this objection is inclusive at best. Were the United States government to formally recognize the Mexican cartels as the terrorists they are—or at least hybrid organizations that employ terrorist tactics — a more effective range of options would become available for combating the cartels and curtailing the violence that today engulfs the US/Mexico borderlands."

I won't provide an analysis on my own article because (a) the article itself is an analysis, and (b) that's just silly...it's up to the reader to decide if our analysis makes sense, and if it's time to redefine the problem in Mexico in order to combat it more effectively. You can download the journal here to access the full article.

"A Tale of Two Laredos."

Here is an excerpt from Todd Bensman's article on GlobalPost.com:

"All is quiet now on Coahuila Street. But traces of the violence that destroyed the lives of two American brothers with businesses here linger. A blackened structure is all that's left of Alan Gamboa's once-profitable radio communications business, after it was drenched in diesel and burned to the ground the night of Dec. 5. His brother, Ricardo Gamboa, is still missing — and feared dead — after being kidnapped by cartel gangsters on Coahuila Street the previous morning. Violence and kidnappings have become almost commonplace in Mexico, as the country's civil drug war rages. Often, the murder and kidnap victims are American residents of border cities like Laredo, who are involved in the drug trade. But the violence that upended the Gamboa brothers' lives is different. By all accounts, they were not drug dealers. Their only transgression, it seems, was to rent a house to the U.S. State Department and Drug Enforcement Administration, which set up an anti-cartel intelligence operation with Mexican federal police in the rented space. The brothers' tragic story offers a rare glimpse into a part of Mexico's drug war that gets little notice. The narrative of the conflict as a fight to the death between drug cartels and the Mexican government often excludes another player: the U.S. government. And as the Gamboa tale demonstrates, the American government's actions in Mexico can also lead to casualties." Link to Full Article

Analysis: This is a very interesting article regarding the innocent civilians that end up involved in Mexico's drug war, and a view point that isn't often explored. Human intelligence sources and the general assistance of locals are required in any counterdrug operation. Sometimes those sources of intelligence or assistance are what the intelligence community calls "witting," or completely knowledgeable about their role and potential consequences of their involvement. Sometimes they are "unwitting," which means they don't know the full identities of the people they are working with or their intentions.

In this case, it appears Americans who reside in Texas but work in Mexico provided assistance to the US Government unwittingly, and are now being punished by cartel enforcers because they see them and their families as collaborators. So the debate becomes, should the US State Department have been more forthcoming about their intended uses for the Gamboa house, or should the Gamboas have been less naive and more inquisitive about their new renters? I think a strong argument can be made for both sides.

As for the State Department, as long as they followed US and Mexican laws regarding the rental transaction, I'm willing to bet they had no legal requirement to tell the Gamboa brothers (who are estranged) anything about their planned use of the house. For example, if you own a house and rent it out to a nice couple with steady income and great credit, you can't demand that they tell you if they plan to use it to make pornographic movies, even though that might change your desire to rent your home out to them. Also, the information surrounding the planned use of the home may have been classified or, at the least, operationally sensitive, and the State Department may not have been allowed to share that information with the Gamboas. I do find it interesting that the Gamboas didn't dig a little deeper during the transaction - although it appears that Ricardo knew little to nothing about the rental since his brother Alan managed it. I would be HIGHLY suspicious if all those armored vehicles showed up at my front door with a bunch of G-Men offering eight months rent in advance.

As for the Gamboa brothers, their situation is tragic, and made more so by their apparent naivete. Nuevo Laredo is one of the more violent border cities in Mexico, and not much happens there that the Gulf cartel and their enforcers - Los Zetas - don't know about. I find it hard to believe the Gamboas thought their actions in any capacity would go unchecked. However, I'll give the Gamboa brothers the benefit of the doubt by believing they really didn't think the rental circumstances were unusual. I don't know if they truly believed they could stay neutral - or at least untouched - in the drug war in a place like Nuevo Laredo, but they were probably trying hard to do so. As it is with all Mexican kidnapping cases, I'm not optimistic about Ricardo's chances with his abductors, but I hope he's returned safely to his family.

This case is a good example of the difficulties both the Mexican and US Governments have in obtaining reliable, willing, and uncorrupted human sources on both sides of the border, but particularly in Mexico. I would imagine that any potential unwitting, clean sources like the Gamboas would have no interest whatsoever in assisting either government for fear of cartel retribution. Thus, government agencies are resigned to conducting operations in a more clandestine fashion. While not informing landlords or car salesmen or restaurant owners or others of their roles in assisting the US or Mexican Governments may well be legal and operationally necessary, it places these individuals and their families in danger because of the appearance of collusion. While some may say this is the cost of doing business in such a dangerous place against such a formidable foe, I'm sure the Gamboas and others trying to stay out of the drug war feel that's a price they shouldn't have to pay.

"Mexico drug cartels buying public support."

Here is an excerpt from Tracy Wilkinson's article in the Los Angeles Times:

"The small houses of the Independencia neighborhood climb a hill that rises from the bone-dry Santa Catarina riverbed. Gang graffiti proliferate the higher you go, until they completely cover the cinder-block walls with slogans, threats and declarations...It is here that Mexico's biggest drug traffickers find an easy following of collaborators and pliable disciples. This is the traffickers' so-called social base: people loyal out of economics more than anything else, people who peddle the drugs and eagerly turn out when the traffickers want to mount street demonstrations against the government and the army. Independencia is distinctive among Monterrey's marginal neighborhoods, community activists say, because it is home to generations of small-time drug dealers, and because it has been penetrated in the last two years by agents of the Gulf cartel, one of Mexico's most notorious and violent trafficking organizations. Those traffickers demonstrated their pull in this neighborhood last month when they paid residents to block Monterrey's major thoroughfares with hours-long demonstrations, day after day for two weeks." Link to Full Article

The reason this behavior by the DTOs is so disturbing is because it is so reminiscent of guerrilla (a.k.a. terrorist) groups operating elsewhere in Latin America - in some cases, as far back as the 1920s. One of the fundamental tenets of guerrilla warfare is to obtain the support of the people. Historically in Latin America (e.g. Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua), this support has come from peasants living in rural areas, and without it, many revolutions might have failed. In Nicaragua in the 1920s and 1930s, Augusto Sandino gained support from the rural populace, and it allowed him to wage an almost-successful campaign against the US Marine Corp. He had villages from which to recruit guerrilla fighters, use for logistical support, and use for a place to rest and regroup. In Colombia, the FARC and ELN have relied on similar support from like-minded peasants, although that support is diminshing. Often, popular support is gained through a combination of general discontent with the government by the populace and propaganda efforts by the guerrillas. This combination has led to bloody revolutions and drawn-out insurgencies in many Latin American countries in the last few decades.

The use of propaganda by Mexican DTOs - specifically banners that tell the Mexican people their government can't protect them - and bribes to obtain public support is not a good sign of things to come. However, the situation is a little different in Mexico than the examples I listed above. There are portions of the populace that are unhappy with the Mexican army and with the Calderon administration This does not automatically mean these people automatically back the DTOs; they usually despise the DTOs even more. The concern is the young people Wilkinson mentions in her article who are poor with no prospects, and are willing to accept small bribes or small drug dealing jobs in exchange for showing up at a demonstration. The effect of such mass protest is often the same, regardless of how or why the protesters got there. Similar to guerrilla groups, these adolescents provide ripe recruiting grounds for the DTOs to hire thugs, and towns like Independencia provide safe haven for DTOs to conduct criminal activity, rest, and regroup. This is just another example of why putting Mexican DTOs in the simple category of "organized crime" is outdated and wholly inappropriate.

"U.S. may deploy troops if Mexico border violence escalates."

Here is an excerpt from this article in the Los Angeles Times:

"With drug-related violence growing along the Mexico border, the U.S. is willing to consider deploying troops to the Southwest -- but only as a last resort -- a Department of Homeland Security official told members of Congress on Thursday. Help might come from the National Guard or even the Army if the deadly threat from Mexico's powerful cartels gets so bad that Homeland Security officials cannot secure border towns, Roger Rufe, the department's director of operations, told a House subcommittee. But echoing comments a day earlier from President Obama, Rufe said there currently was no need to militarize the border." Link to Full Article

Analysis: There are two essential elements of this story I'd like to address. First, the controversial subject of the deployment of US troops within our borders. Part of the controversy comes from the fact that few people know the posse comitatus rules were re-written a couple of years ago. Posse comitatus is a decades-old piece of legislation that essentially prohibits the US military from engaging in law enforcement activities. There have always been some exceptions, but in the last few years, those exceptions have been expanded. After Katrina, they were expanded to allow the US military to participate in humanitarian relief inside the US. Then in 2007, in the very middle of the 439-page John Warner National Defense Authorization Act, the posse comitatus rules were expanded yet again to allow the US Government to deploy the US military to the border if - and only if - homeland security personnel and local law enforcementr were overwhelmed and unable to contained violence coming across the border from Mexico. This change received little to no publicity; I learned about it mostly through blog posts, then had to dig through the Act to find the section...not fun. Anyway, the bottom line is, sending the US Army to the border may sound illegal, and although it is an extreme measure, the President is completely authorized to do it.

The second aspect of this strategy is deciding when to employ it. As it was made pretty clear during this week's hearings on the Hill, no one is exactly sure what steps need to be taken in what order by which agencies to head towards the path of troop deployments. I'm sure a lot of people in DC and the four southwest border states are really busy working on a plan, although Texas seems to have a head start in the planning department. This is definitely a strategy for worst-case-scenario come to life. Let's use the example of El Paso, since it's across the border from Cuidad Juarez, the most violent city in Mexico right now. For the US Army to warrant deployment to El Paso, all the police officers and Sheriff's deputies within a large geographic radius would need to be outmanned and outgunned. US Customs for the port of entry and Border Patrol for the surrounding areas would need to be outmanned and outgunned. Then, after the National Guard was called in by the Texas Governor, they would need to be outmanned and outgunned before the US Army would be called in. This is all presumption on my part, and I have no idea if this is the course of "tripwires" or "redlines" that would need to be crossed. I can tell you that things need to get REALLY bad in a US border city for the active duty cavalry to get a call from the President. But don't worry, if it happens, it's legal.

"Mexico is no failed state, but it needs aid."

The following is an excerpt from an article written by Tony Garza, former US Ambassador to Mexico, for the Houston Chronicle:

"Unfortunately, talk of Mexico in the United States these days has turned increasingly to a debate over our neighbor’s viability as a nation. By doing so we are fueling a perception that is neither accurate nor constructive. Failed states do not have functioning executive, legislative and judicial branches. They do not boast the world’s 12th largest economy, nor do they trade with the United States at a pace of more than $1 billion a day. And, failed states do not demonstrate — as President Felipe Calderon has done — the political will to take on the transnational cartels that threaten the region’s security and the courage to sustain that fight until victory is secured." Link to Full Article

Analysis: When the US Army published its Joint Operating Environment report for 2008, it caused quite a stir in the media. Dozens of news outlets started reporting that Mexico was doomed to become a failed state, citing this report. In fact, there is only a brief mention of the drug war in Mexico...two very short paragraphs in a 51-page document, in fact. The JOE report describes the "rapid and sudden collapse" of Mexico as a "worst-case scenario." Isn't that a worst-case scenario for ANY country? It also describes the potential for Mexico's collapse as "less likely" than that of Pakistan. Considering Garza's comments above (with which I'm in total agreement), placing Mexico and Pakistan in the same category is foolish at best. There is no doubt that Mexico is in the middle of a violence crisis not seen since the Mexican Revolution, and that the country is suffering economically. However, Colombia has been in the throes of a civil war being fought by tens of thousands of terrorists for forty years, and I can't recall a time in recent memory where the news media warned about Colombia's potential collapse. Bottom line, the media's interpretation of the JOE report is overblown, exaggerated, and doomsday-esque. While things in Mexico will probably get worse before they get better, the country is NOT going to collapse.

IN FOCUS: Border violence "spillover"

This is a topic that causes frustration because the term "spillover" is used by so many people and agencies with little consistency or agreement. On almost any given day, you can see several government or law enforcement officials on television saying spillover hasn't happened yet, spillover is happening now, or spillover has been happening for years. So which is it?

Well, the problem lies in the fact that there is no single, standardized definition for border violence spillover. Some agencies are looking for spikes in crime levels on the US side that parallel spikes in crime on the Mexican side. Other agencies are basing their assessments of spillover on case information or anecdotal evidence of Mexican DTO-related crimes occurring in US cities, such as targeted killings or kidnappings. Some officials won't call it spillover unless innocent US citizens (i.e. unrelated to the drug trade) on US territory become DTO targets.

First, let's examine the crime statistics angle. One can assume that crime statistics originating from US law enforcement agencies are reliable because agencies on the US side of the border don't suffer from the same corruption issues as Mexican agencies. However, US crime statistics generally don't differentiate between drug-related and non-drug related crimes. It is entirely possible that murders for a US border city could drop from one year to the next, yet the proportion of drug-related murders can rise in the same year. Also, statistics alone don't account for sociological factors occurring in border cities that may skew the meaning of those statistics, such as changes in immigration patterns or economic declines. Finally, crime statistics for cities on the Mexican side of the border are notoriously inaccurate for various reasons, including corruption, lack of reporting, and investigative ineptitude. Mexican crime statistics also do not differentiate between drug-related and non-drug-related crimes.

Next, let's consider case information or anecdotal evidence. We know from publicly available information that the FBI is investigating an increasing number of cross-border kidnapping cases. We also know that hundreds of people in the southwest border states - mostly affiliated with the DTOs in come way - have been kidnapped for ransom or retribution. According to the US Department of Justice, several US-based gangs are affiliated with Mexican DTOs, either distributing drugs for them or contracting themselves out for hits inside the United States. Depending on which source you believe, anywhere from 90-97% of weapons illegally entering Mexico originate in the United States, with most of them coming from the four southwest border states. So does all this criminal activity that seems obviously related to the Mexican drug trade add up to spillover?

Finally, let's take a look at the US-citizens-as-targets issue. There is almost universal agreement among agencies that in almost all cases of border violence, US citizens NOT associated with the Mexican drug trade in any way, shape, or form are NOT being targeted for violence by DTOs or US-based gangs affilated with DTOs. Occasionally, innocent US citizens do get caught in the cross-fire, but usually it's a case of being in the wrong place at the wrong time. Does this mean that spillover is NOT happening?

Ultimately the issue of border violence spillover is a subjective one, and I believe it can't be proven one way or another. I think a strong argument can be made for either position. However the next time you see or hear someone authoritatively trying to say spillover is happening or isn't happening, ask them what their sources are or what proof they have...I'd sure love to see it.