Mexico's Drug War

"Immigration reform’s hidden border-crossing charge."

Here is an excerpt from Mark Johanson's article in the International Business Times:

"If the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has its way, Congress may soon authorize the study of a fee to be collected at all land crossings with Canada and Mexico. The contentious issue was buried deep within the department’s proposed 2014 budget, released last week by DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano. It may have gone relatively unnoticed if U.S. Rep. Brian Higgins, D-N.Y., hadn’t sounded the alarm late Friday... Higgins also suggested that the fee along the 5,530-mile (8,900-kilometer) Canada-U.S. border would unfairly 'subsidize' the more challenging and expensive southwestern border with Mexico. According to Section 544 of the budget proposal, the Commissioner of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection should 'conduct a study assessing the feasibility and cost relating to establishing and collecting a land border crossing fee for both land border pedestrians and passenger vehicles along the northern and southwest borders of the United States.' Currently, travelers aren’t charged fees for crossing the border by car, bus or train... It remains unclear whether the fee would focus on those entering or exiting the U.S., or both. How much each crossing may cost travelers has yet to be determined." Link to Full Article (via Salon.com)

Analysis: As a (very) small business owner, I'll be the first one to tell you that when the cost of doing business goes up - whether that cost comes from more taxes, more expensive supplies, rising travel costs, etc. - those costs almost always get passed on to the customer. In this case, the customers paying the cost of our federal government's little spending spree over the last several years are the roughly 640,000 people crossing our land borders every day. I imagine DHS took one look at those numbers and started doing the math if each of those daily border crossers equaled a dollar bill of income.

The first obvious negative impact that comes to mind is a new fee's effect on cross-border trade. Tens of thousands of people (if not more) cross the border into Mexico and Canada and the other way around to go to work every day, and even more so just to go shopping. Then there are the tens of thousands of trucks that enter the US every day to deliver things like fresh food, flowers, electronic components, trees, clothes...you name it. The fees add up quickly for DHS, but that can mean an expense of several hundred dollars per year for just one person, and thousands of dollars for a company whose employees conduct cross-border business on a regular basis.

I imagine the study will examine things like how much DHS can expect to reasonably charge a border crosser without too much protest, and the practical logistics of taking payment - sensors and stickers (like for toll roads), cash, monthly payment discounts, etc. The main security concern would be if individuals who are super-strapped for cash might look to avoid paying the fee by crossing the border illegally, but I don't really envision that happening en masse, and especially not from people who have to cross on a regular basis. I also can't imagine that DHS would charge more than a few dollars, but DHS never fails to astound in its frequent short-sightedness and lack of common sense.

I'll be curious to see the results of the study in nine months' time, but I have a feeling the negative backlash from the Canadian and Mexican governments will outweigh DHS' need to make a quick buck to help it survive sequestration cuts.

"Branding: Just Another Mexican TCO Tool"

Here is an excerpt from my latest Borders & Intelligence column for Homeland Security Today magazine:

"I’m always on the lookout for great television shows, so I was intrigued when I heard about 'Sons of Anarchy,' a drama about an outlaw motorcycle club in a fictional northern California town. Last season, the club got involved with a faux Mexican transnational criminal organization (TCO) called the Galindo cartel, which of course piqued my interest. In one episode, the local sheriff, on behalf of the district attorney, orders 'Juice' to retrieve a sample of cocaine the club planned to ship for the TCO. The sheriff claims that if the cocaine is pure, it will have markers that the crime lab can use to isolate the region of origin. So is this just dramatic TV, or can an uncut cocaine sample provide US law enforcement with that kind of intelligence? ...This method of tracing illegal drug shipments to a specific TCO or geographical region seems to be a long shot. Fortunately, there are other ways US agencies—both along the border and across the United States—can determine where a brick of cocaine, heroin, or a bale of marijuana originated, and/or where it might be destined—and stamps are the primary one."

To read the rest of this article in the digital edition of this month's issue, please CLICK HERE!

"3 men with military ties arrested in murder-for-hire sting, DEA says."

Here's an excerpt from Mariano Castillo's article on CNN.com:

"It would have been one of the most audacious plots between a Mexican drug cartel and American conspirators: a murder-for-hire in South Texas. But the men who allegedly were prepared to use their U.S. military training to carry out a mission in Laredo, Texas, for the
Zetas drug cartel were not actually making arrangements with drug traffickers. They had walked into a Drug Enforcement Administration sting operation, and were plotting with undercover agents who recorded their every move for months. Their alleged criminal plans fell apart on Saturday, the day they were to carry out a contract killing. The agents had the evidence they needed and arrested three men in Laredo. A fourth was killed by agents as the arrests were being made. Two more arrests were made in South Carolina. A sixth man also was arrested, the DEA said... There is no evidence the Zetas have considered escalating their reach to include hiring Army-trained Americans to carry out killings. But these arrests show it is not beyond the realm of possibility that there are U.S. citizens willing to do such work. The three men accused of being at the center of the operation -- Kevin Corley, Samuel Walker and Shavar Davis -- had military experience and training they were willing to use on behalf of a drug cartel, prosecutors say... According to the complaint, Corley promised the undercover agents that weapons could be easily stolen from military posts, and that he could train 40 cartel members in two weeks. He mailed an Army tactical book to the agents, the court document says. The investigation appears to have risen to another level when Corley said he could assemble a team to carry out cartel dirty work." Link to Full Article

Analysis: Many of you may remember the plot by a crack team of two Iranian men (and yes, I do say that with some sarcasm) to hire TCO members to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the US in Washington, DC. In both cases, the actual TCO in question was never aware of either plot, and in the first case, we don't know what TCO the DEA was masquerading as. It's plausible they had their informant posing as a member of Los Zetas, but we don't know for sure from publicly available information.

But to me, there are several significant differences in the two cases. The Iranian plot was outlandish at best, scheming to use a drug cartel to conduct a terrorist attack not only on US soil, but in the capital, for the bargain-basement price of $1.5 million. Why a TCO would do the dirty work of a foreign government or a foreign terrorist organization for pocket change was, an is, beyond me. But in this case, we're talking about three African-American, non-Hispanic Americans, all with some level of military training, who were more than willing to do the dirty work on behalf of the cartels on US soil. 

It's nothing new that there's a long line of people willing to work for TCOs because of the sheer volume of money, perks, and goodies involved. TCOs rarely have to work too hard to recruit young Mexicans to kill their rivals or snitches in Mexico; many times it only takes a few hundred dollars, or some fancy electronic gadgets. On the US side, however, it's a different story due to the risks involved. US-based gangs like the Mexican Mafia, Texas Syndicate, Hermanos de Pistoleros Latinos, and Mara Salvatrucha are usually the ones tapped for contracted hits or drug distribution. From the article, it doesn't sound like any of the men involved in the sting had any gang ties.

Another thing we have to consider is how realistic the offers of assistance were that the men were making. Is it really that easy to steal weapons from a military post? When I was on active duty, I rarely went into the armory on base, but I know they're usually manned/guarded 24-7. Maybe it's possible if the guard on duty is on the take, but in my eight years of active duty as a Special Agent, I can recall one case of Security Forces reporting that weapons had been stolen or were missing from the armory. Maybe the Army is different about gun counting than the Air Force, but I doubt they're so careless to where someone could say guns were easy to steal from a military post.

Then there's the claim by Corley that he could train 40 cartel members in two weeks. Maybe. But to do what, exactly? He mentioned tactics including approaches, room clearing, security and convoy security. Based on what I know of US military pre-deployment training, this is possible, but would provide only a minimal level of expertise, unless the TCO members being trained were former military or police themselves.

Regardless, the biggest concern stems from the ultimate end of the operation: the men set a date with the undercover DEA agents raid a rival cartel's ranch near Laredo, Texas and recover 20 kilos of stolen cocaine, all on behalf of Los Zetas. Corley arrived in Laredo with his cousin, Jerome Corley, Walker (an active duty Army sergeant) and Davis (a former private in the Army reserves), along with two AR-15 assault rifles, a training rifle, and five allegedly stolen ballistic vests. According to the complaint, "Corley told the undercover agent he had bought a new Ka-Bar knife to carve a 'Z' into the victim's chest and was planning on buying a hatchet to dismember the body," per the CNN.com article. It further quotes the complaint as stating that, on the day the supposed hit was to take place, the agents had the four confirm they understood they were about to accept money and drugs in exchange for a killing.

Again, part of me isn't surprised because American gang members have been doing this sort of thing for a while, but it's disturbing in a different way when you hear that active duty and former military members are involved in this sort of thing. It's also out of the realm of what we would assume when thinking about the players involved in drug trafficking and violent TCO activity on this side of the border. It's a stark reminder that no one is immune from the allure of drug money, and no one is beyond suspicion of association with TCOs just because they're not Mexican or Hispanic or a current/former gang member.

"Texans on wrong side of border fence grow anxious."

Here is an excerpt from Christopher Sherman's article for the Associated Press:

"Max Pons is already anticipating the anxiety he'll feel when the heavy steel gate shuts behind him, leaving his home isolated on a strip of land between America's border fence and the violence raging across the Rio Grande in Mexico. For the past year, the manager of a sprawling preserve on the southern tip of Texas has been comforted by a gap in the rust-colored fence that gave him a quick escape route north in case of emergency. Now the U.S. government is installing the first gates to fill in this part of the fence along the Southwest border, and Pons admits he's pondering drastic scenarios... In this lush area, the Rio Grande's wide floodplain precluded building the fence right on the border so it was set back more than a mile in places, running behind the levees. The result is a no-man's-land of hundreds of properties, and the people who work on them, on the wrong side of the divide. The arrival of the gates will reveal whether the government's solution for this border fence problem will work. Can sliding panels in the fence controlled by passcodes allow isolated workers to cross when they need to while keeping intruders out?" Link to Full Article

Analysis: I knew before I traveled to south Texas for the tail end of my October book tour that the border fence didn't follow the riverbank, and was off set by a bit. I made arrangements with the McAllen Border Patrol station to take a tour of the sector, and finally saw it for myself. For some reason, I was under the impression that the areas between the fence and the riverbank were empty; just grassy areas and sugarcane. I couldn't believe my eyes when I saw entire farms and homes!

I can completely understand Max Pons' apprehension about his living situation. Anyone who's seen the National Geographic Channel's "Border Wars" episodes filmed in the Rio Grande Valley (RGV) knows this is one of the border's busiest - and most dangerous - sectors. It's a non-stop flow of immigrants and dope smugglers who bring their people and product across the river into this no man's land, then find a way over, through, or around the fence. But as the article's author asks, can the remote-control fence gate idea actually work?

I'm not an advocate of a 2,000 mile-long fence that extends the entire border; I think it's a waste of taxpayer money to place such an expensive barrier in areas where not even animals are crossing due to the heat and desolation. But I do believe in the effectiveness of the fence to act as a deterrent along certain stretches. I say deterrent because the border fence was never designed to stop anyone. But it does allow the US Border Patrol more time to respond to border incursions, which is the ultimate point. 

But the situation in south Texas is a bit different. I can verify that Border Patrol agents to rove in vehicles on both sides of the fence, and I have seen the gates in action. They're not super-fast. I've also seen parts of the fence where smugglers in vehicles have rammed the fence and dislodged parts of it enough to get people through. The thing that concerns me is, when Border Patrol rushes to respond to a border incursion at the fenceline at other parts of the fence, generally US citizens are not in immediate danger; if smugglers or immigrants manage to evade escape, then it's mostly a really frustrating moment for the agents, who hope that state or local law enforcement can pick them up somewhere later on. But in the case of Max Pons and his neighbors, if their homes are being burglarized or, as he worries about, if they're held hostage in exchange for the fence code, can the Border Patrol respond fast enough?

Honestly, it's tough to imagine an ideal solution. I have to acknowledge that south Texas is one part of the border where a fence is needed due to the inordinately high volume of drug and human smuggling. However, because of the logistical impossibility of building the fence along the riverbank, Americans and their properties lie extremely exposed to the dangers inherent to living in such an area. I'm curious as to other people's thoughts on this situation, and would love to hear from you...especially if you live in south Texas and know anyone whose property lies south of the fence.

PODCAST: Interview with Josh Schimberg, Executive Director of Texas NORML

In my latest podcast, I had a greatly informative and eye-opening conversation with Josh Schimberg, the Executive Director of Texas NORML (which stands for the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws), about the legalization of marijuana. We talked about what Texas NORML advocates, how marijuana compares to tobacco and alcohol, and the general attitude in America about marijuana use.

More importantly, we talked about how legalizing marijuana would potentially impact Mexico's drug war - the violence across the country, and the huge drug profits being raked in by the Mexican TCOs who produce it, smuggle it, and sell it in the US. The most surprising/shocking thing I learned? Members of NORML are not only aware of the impact illegal marijuana use has on the drug war - they make a conscious effort to not contribute to the bloodshed by "buying American" and supporting local growers.

This is a can't-miss podcast for those of you who want to learn more about the legalization debate, find out if marijuana really is or isn't that bad for you, how it stacks up to cigarettes and beer, and if you want to hear some (good) surprises along the way.

Txnorml podcast 091311

 

"The Significance Of Links Between Mexican TCOs And Iraqis In San Diego."

Here's an excerpt from my latest article for Homeland Security Today's Correspondents Watch:

"On August 18, the El Cajon, California Police Department set off alarms with a press release that mentioned an association between the Sinaloa Federation and an organized crime group run by Iraqi Chaldeans. But while the knee-jerk reaction by some might be that this roundup of Iraqi criminals by multiple law enforcement agencies in San Diego County finally provided solid evidence that Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are working with terrorists, it didn't. Far from it. Yet, there are some very interesting aspects of this story regarding how certain TCOs are behaving in southern California and why they are reaching out to groups like the Iraqis in San Diego County."

To read the full article on the HSToday.us website, please CLICK HERE!

Iraqi organized crime groups in San Diego linked to Sinaloa Federation

Here is an excerpt from a press release issued yesterday by the El Cajon Police Department:

"Our officers had noticed increased narcotics trafficking and violent crime in certain neighborhoods of El Cajon. These crimes have been attributed primarily to Iraqi organized crime elements, and as this investigation has discovered, the Sinaloa Cartel, a Mexico- based drug trafficking organization (DTO) which supplies them... The targets of this investigation are members of an Iraqi DTO which has suspected affiliation with the Chaldean Organized Crime Syndicate. This syndicate began in the early 80’s in Detroit, Michigan. Crimes associated with the syndicate include murder, arson, weapons and narcotics trafficking, money laundering, fraud, theft, counterfeiting, racketeering, alien smuggling, assault, kidnapping, and armed robbery. Chaldean organized crime has historical ties to the Sinaloa Cartel, and the Mexican Mafia... During the course of 'Operation Shadowbox,' from January 2011 to present, DEA/MET and El Cajon Police have purchased large amounts of narcotics, pharmaceuticals, firearms, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) from [Iraqi] subjects at 811 E. Main... In April 2011, a DEA undercover operative was shown a hand grenade at 811 East Main and was told additional grenades were available, being obtained from a Mexican military source of supply... As the investigation continues, additional members of the Iraqi DTO are expected to be identified and arrested." Link to Full Press Release

Analysis: First I want to give you a little bit of background about these Iraqis. Chaldeans are Iraqi Christians who were persecuted after the fall of Saddam Hussein, and thus sought asylum here in the US. A large percentage of them have come, and continue to come, through the port of San Ysidro to join the vast community of Iraqi Chaldeans in San Diego County. These Iraqis are heavily scrutinized when they declare themselves because Iraq is considered a "special interest country" by DHS; i.e. a country with ties to terrorism. Therefore, Iraqis attempting to enter the US are considered "special interest aliens," or SIAs.

I really need to emphasize here that there is no evidence that operational terrorists from Iraq or elsewhere in the Middle East have entered the US in this manner. Of course, it's a huge concern for DHS that a member of Hizballah or al-Qa'ida might try to infiltrate a group of emigrating Chaldeans and sneak in with fraudulent documents. I'm not saying that this has never happened; however, if it has, no one in our government knows about it. Besides, the Chaldean community is pretty tight-knit, as are the groups of them that travel halfway across the world to Mexico in order to cross the border from Tijuana. They would be wary of an outsider trying to join their group. Again, while this scenario is always a possibility, it's less likely than you might think.

Moving onto the more interesting issue...the association between Chaldean TCOs and the Sinaloa Federation. I saw this and was immediately concerned that some media outlets would start screaming about the association between Mexican TCOs and terrorists. Trust me, that is NOT what is going on here. In fact, it's no different than all the other drug trafficking arrangements Mexican TCOs have with gangs and other criminal groups here in the US.

The association between the Chaldeans and the Federation makes a lot of business sense. Given the criminal activities the Chaldeans are allegedly involved in, according to the press release, they definitely need a big drug supplier. Who better to fit that bill than the Federation? What's even more interesting is that it's the Federation doing the supplying and not the AFO/FSO. Based on some government and on-the-ground sources, I was under the impression that the AFO/FSO still had control over the Tijuana plaza, but under an arrangement with the Federation (which has control of the Mexico border along California east to Mexicali). With these Chaldeans being right across from purportedly AFO/FSO territory, you'd think that's who they'd be dealing with. It's likely the Chaldeans have had this trafficking arrangement with the TCOs for many years, and with all the chaos in northern Baja California in the past five years, it's tough to say how that's affected supply lines to this group.

Back to the main point, this is NOT representative of an alliance between Middle Eastern terrorists and Mexican TCOs. This particular Chaldean organized crime group is involved in a lot of nasty things, but they're all typical for organized crime. The main role the TCOs are playing here is that of illegal drug supplier, and possibily military arms supplier. Nothing more profound - at least not at this point - should be drawn from this investigation.

"Feds allegedly allowed Sinaloa cartel to move cocaine into US for information."

Here is an excerpt from Diana Washington Valdez's article in The El Paso Times:

"U.S. federal agents allegedly allowed the Sinaloa drug cartel to traffic several tons of cocaine into the United States in exchange for information about rival cartels, according to court documents filed in a U.S. federal court. The allegations are part of the defense of Vicente Zambada-Niebla, who was extradited to the United States to face drug-trafficking charges in Chicago. He is also a top lieutenant of drug kingpin Joaquin "Chapo" Guzman and the son of Ismael "Mayo" Zambada-Garcia, believed to be the brains behind the Sinaloa cartel... Zambada-Niebla claims he was permitted to smuggle drugs from 2004 until his arrest in 2009... According to the court documents, Mexican lawyer Humberto Loya-Castro, another high-level Sinaloa cartel leader, had his 1995 U.S. drug-trafficking case dismissed in 2008 after serving as an informant for 10 years for the U.S. government. Guzman and the Zambadas allegedly provided agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration, FBI and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement with information about other Mexican drug traffickers through Loya-Castro... The court documents also allege that the U.S. government is using a 'divide and conquer' strategy, 'using one drug organization to help against others.'" Link to Full Article

Analysis: This case is both interesting and strange. One of the interesting parts is the bait-and-switch the DEA pulled on Zambada-Niebla, making him think he was being sourced and then arresting him five hours later. If their intent was to get more information from him about rival cartels, maybe the DEA felt they'd have a better chance doing so by extraditing him and threatening him with decades of solitary confinement. Or perhaps enough cocaine had been allowed across the border through the arrangement with Loya-Castro, and the DEA had to wrap things up. We'll probably never know.

The divide-and-conquer strategy actually makes a lot of sense, and I've written before that Calderón may be secretly pursuing one - go after and dismantle the smaller guys so that they're left with only one or two big fish to deal with. Now, this relationship with Zambada-Niebla and Loya-Castro goes back before Calderón's administration, so we can't say the DEA was trying to follow a parallel strategy. However, the alleged arrangement with Zambada-Niebla started at the same time the drug war truly began to heat up - in 2004, when Nuevo Laredo was on fire and Los Zetas were starting to tear things up.

Ms. Valdez says this case could be a bombshell on par with the ATF Fast & Furious scandal. I can certainly see why she believes that. The report doesn't say exactly what volume of drugs Zambada-Niebla was permitted to smuggle across the border, but considering who he was working for, and the fact he was doing it for five years, it probably wasn't just a few baggies here and there. 

Here's the other problem I have with this. Just how good was the information he was providing? The biggest catches in the drug war have occurred in the last 18 months, and Zambada-Niebla was arrested in 2009. Were any of those arrests - mostly VIPs in TCOs who were rivals to the Federation - linked to information provided by Zambada-Niebla either during his time as an informant, or while in custody after his arrest? That information would be helpful, but unlikely to be publicized. Given how the drug war has worsened and drug trafficking volume has not lessened significantly since 2004, did it really take five years for the DEA to realize that their arrangement wasn't working too well?

Again, I understand the likely intention. Zambada-Niebla and Loya-Castro were high up enough in the Federation food chain to be able to provide good intelligence. It was both in their and the DEA's interests (not to mention the Mexican government's) to take down Federation rivals. Speaking of the Mexican government, I haven't seen much about their thoughts - or knowledge of - this arrangement. Regardless, how many American lives were affected by the illegal drugs that were allowed to enter as a result of this operation? Maybe it doesn't really matter. Remember this: drug users hurt themselves voluntarily, so if they didn't buy their drugs from a Zambada-Niebla shipment facilitated by the DEA, they would have gotten them elsewhere.

Bottom line, it doesn't look like the DEA got their money or time's worth in that arrangement. And now Zambada-Niebla is squealing like a pig to anyone who'll listen, probably in an attempt to either get his case thrown out, get returned to Mexico for trial, or get a reduced sentence. I've always said these guys aren't stupid - far from it - and Zambada-Niebla's tactics are a prime example of that.

UPDATE: I wanted to share this snippet of conversation I had with a colleague via email this morning. He (who shall remain nameless, but he's VERY good at what he does) has great contacts, and isn't buying Zambada-Niebla's story...or his lawyer's story, anyway. Here's what my colleague had to say:

"The folks I've spoken to say [Zambada-Niebla's story] is BS, and I tend to believe them. The claims made are pretty wild, and not really consistent with how [confidential informants] (CIs) are normally worked. I know that DEA agents can sometimes be cowboys, but I worked a number of joint investigations with them and these claims seem over the top based on my experience.  I can see making the offer to make him a CI used as a ruse to interview him and arrest him, but no way they let dope flow for that long."

I find his point of view to be realistic, and I trust his assessments. Let's see in the next few weeks if this angle that Zambada-Niebla's lawyer is going for manages to pay any dividends.

Interview for The Jaco Report on St Louis FOX2 News

Last week, I did a lengthy interview for The Jaco Report, a news program on the local St Louis FOX2 station. We talked about the heroin trade in St Louis, as well as the overall drug war and its impact on the US. It aired this morning, and if you'd like to watch, please follow the link by clicking on the image below:

"Legalizing Marijuana Won’t Kill the Mexican Drug Cartels."

I am very proud to share with you an excerpt from my first opinion piece for the New York Times!

"FOR a growing number of American policy makers, politicians and activists, the best answer to the spiraling violence in Mexico is to legalize the marijuana that, they argue, fuels the country’s vicious cartels and smugglers. After all, according to official estimates, marijuana constitutes 60 percent of cartels’ drug profits. Legalization would move that trade into the open market, driving down the price and undermining the cartels’ power and influence. Unfortunately, it’s not that easy. Marijuana legalization has many merits, but it would do little to hinder the long-term economics of the cartels — and the violent toll they take on Mexican society."

To read the rest of my Op-Ed on the NYTimes website, please CLICK HERE!

Why US Drug Policy Won't Change After 40 Years of Failure

Last week marked the 40th anniversary of the start of our "War on Drugs," which was initiated by former President Richard Nixon in 1971. That was a crazy time in US history; the end of our involvement in Vietnam, the whirlwind of a counterculture of music and drugs, and the beginning of a shift in our way of thinking and living as Americans. Nixon saw the increase in the widespread use of drugs, and decided it was a bad thing for America.

Unfortunately, 40 years and many policies later, millions of Americans are still using drugs, if somewhat differently than they were in 1971. DHS points to historic highs in the sizes and number of drug seizures at our borders and ports of entry as a sign that we're winning the war. International observers look at the situation in places like Mexico and our continuing demand is evidence that we're losing the war. The Global Commission on Drug Policy, which includes former presidents of Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Switzerland, issued a report a couple of weeks ago emphasizing that current anti-drug strategies are failing.

The report said that a decades-long strategy of outlawing drugs and jailing drug users while battling cartels that control the trade has not worked. It also recommended that governments experiment with the legal regulation of drugs, especially cannabis, referring to the success in countries such as Portugal, Switzerland and the Netherlands where drug consumption had been reduced. But the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy said in a statement that making drugs more available would make it harder to keep communities healthy and safe. 

In my humble opinion, there are two key components of current US drug policy that are keeping it on these rails from which it won't deviate: morality and history.

Governments around the world have never shied away from legislating morality to their people, and the US is definitely no exception. Various kinds of drugs have been used by people around the world for thousands of years and for dozens of reasons, but only in the last few decades have many of them become illegal in the US. Cocaine became illegal (for non-medical purposes) in 1914, heroin in 1924, marijuana in 1937, and precursor chemicals and equipment for making methamphetamine in 1983. Marijuana and cocaine were initially thought to cause crazed rape and killing sprees in blacks and Mexicans.

Of course, we now understand that the abuse (and sometimes the one-time use) of certain illegal drugs can be deadly, which gives US lawmakers the impetus to maintain current drug policy. However, very strong arguments can be made that the effects of marijuana on the body are no worse than those of alcohol or tobacco. We know that alcoholics can die from cirrhosis and smokers can die from lung cancer or emphysema. Yet, alcohol consumption and cigarette smoking are considered socially acceptable, and therefore laws aren't passed (other than age restrictions) to emphasize the moral underpinnings of their use. The US government is concerned that changing drug policy to a more liberal form would flood the market with these drugs and cause a spike in drug use among adults and encourage experimentation in children. There is, of course, no way to test this theory, which makes it all speculative. So, the US government is flying the flag of caution, maintaining its stance that all drug use is dangerous, immoral, and therefore should remain illegal.

The second component I mentioned earlier is history. What I mean by that is, the US government has a history of maintaining policies for decades that are obviously not working. For example (and with this I have extensive academic and personal knowledge), the embargo against Cuba. Cuba has been a communist state for half a century, and the US government has maintained an embargo against the island nation for roughly the same amount time. The goal was to get Fidel Castro to embrace democracy, free speech, elections, freedom of the press, etc. In over fifty years, not much in Cuba has changed. Cubans who were pro-embargo hardliners for decades have even started saying, you know, maybe this embargo thing isn't working out. Yet, the embargo persists.

In 1979, the US government created the State Sponsor of Terrorism list. The idea was to impose strict sanctions on countries on the list in the hopes they would, well, stop sponsoring terrorism. Only a handful of countries made the list, and have been added and removed at various times. Iran came on in 1984, Syria at the list's inception in 1979, and North Korea and Libya were only removed in the last few years. Yet, Iran is still sending Hizballah to do its dirty work, and Syria is still exporting some mean and nasty terrorists. Oddly enough, Cuba remains on the list, although there haven't been any examples of the Cuban government funding any sort of terrorist act in at least a dozen years. Yet, the list remains.

Morality and history aside, I think the US government is concerned that if it embraces the need for a change in drug policy, it would be seen as a sign of weakness. It might be perceived as an acknowledgment that the billions of dollars spent on drug enforcement and interdiction were wasted. Even worse, it could be seen as a concession to drug traffickers, that they're the ones winning the war and not the "good guys."

Even harder for the US government to acknowledge would be the fact that the "War on Drugs" cannot be solved by a mere shift in policy; it can only be won through a shift in American culture. Well-intentioned politicians - and Americans in general - really want to make a difference and feel like they're doing something to stop drug abuse and drug trafficking. Right now, the easiest way to do something tangible and publicly visible is to maintain a policy of interdiction, or go after the supply.

Going after the demand - while it's the ultimate solution - is not only incredibly challenging, but it might just be impossible. Many parents spent countless hours educating their children about the dangers of using drugs, and pray they'll "just say no" if offered a joint by a dealer after school. But there are also many parents who are users themselves, and their children have an uphill battle to fight to get out of that drug-filled environment.

Even more insidious is the morally- and societally-acceptable use (and often abuse) of prescription drugs. Not only is it easy to get hooked on sleeping pills and anti-anxiety medication, but they're perfectly legal to use. According to the National Drug Intelligence Center, prescription opioid (drugs based on opium) overdose deaths are increasing, primarily because the users took the drugs non-medically, other than as prescribed, or in combination with other drugs and/or alcohol. Some of these include codeine, fentanyl (Duragesic, Actiq), hydromorphone (Dilaudid), meperidine (Demerol), morphine (MS Contin), oxycodone (OxyContin), pentazocine (Talwin), dextropropoxyphene (Darvon), methadone (Dolophine), and hydrocodone combinations (Vicodin, Lortab, and Lorcet).

It's painful for me to say that I don't see an answer, either on the horizon or farther down the road. US drug policy isn't going to change because it's the only way our government knows how to fight drug use. They're just not capable of changing an entire country's culture, or American society's way of looking at drug use - both illegal and prescription. By maintaining course and sticking to its guns, the US government believes it's being steadfast and not compromising American values. Yes, DHS, its components, and state and local law enforcement agencies across the country are stopping some drugs from reaching users, but it's only a small percentage of what is getting out there. Only when we take a hard look at ourselves, what our country is becoming, and what US drug demand is inciting in Mexico and elsewhere can US drug policy truly change in a way that will actually make a difference.

"Wildfires And Gunfire: Threats To Emergency Responders On The Border"

Here's an excerpt from my latest article for Homeland Security Today's Correspondents' Watch:

"Emergency responders who deal with dangerous wildfires, flash floods, mudslides and the aftermaths of earthquakes, are used to putting their lives in danger to save others. But the sorts of danger they typically don’t expect are the threats that come in the form of drug- and human-smugglers. Wildfire season is in full swing, and the entire southwest border is feeling the sting of massively destructive blazes that already have consumed hundreds of thousands of acres. More than 2,100 firefighters from across the country have been sent to various parts of Arizona to deal with the second worst fire disaster in the state’s history. Fires in Texas that started in early spring have ravaged almost two million acres - and this year’s fire season still has many more months left. It’s quite a testament to the bravery and skill of these crews that they can come together from so many different places and departments, come up with a plan, and work together effectively to execute it. And that’s what makes it so unfortunate that the latest danger for them is not the fires, but their fellow human beings hiding behind them – the armed drug and human smugglers."

To read the rest of the article on HSToday.us, please CLICK HERE!

"Mexico’s Drug War Is Impacting Communities Well Beyond The Border."

Here is an excerpt from my latest article for Homeland Security Today's "Correspondents' Watch":

"Many Americans believe criminal incidents related to Mexico’s narco-wars are generally limited to Mexico itself, or at least only to border cities and towns in California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas. But because Mexico-based transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are operating in more than 270 US cities from coast to coast, that isn’t the case... There are criminal activities related to the drug war that are happening thousands of miles from the border... US homeland security officials focus a lot of their efforts and resources on the southwest border in an attempt to mitigate the effects of TCOs on the United States. Because of the publicity surrounding these efforts and media attention paid to the debate over the security of the southwest border, TCO activities in the US interior often go unnoticed."

To read the full article on HSToday.us, please CLICK HERE!

"Questioning Arizona's Sinaloa Gang Bust."

Here is an excerpt from Patrick Corcoran's excellent analysis on InSightCrime.org:

"U.S. authorities announced the break up of an Arizona gang said to be working for Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel, though how far this will really be a blow for Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman Loera's organization is a matter of debate. Officials expressed satisfaction at the arrest of 27 members of the Jesus Valencia Rodriguez Organization, capturing more than half the group's known membership... While the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) linked those arrested in Arizona directly to Guzman Loera's Sinaloa Cartel, it is not clear how close the relationship actually is. The authorities said that the Jesus Valencia Rodriguez organization had direct ties not to Guzman or his partner Ismael Zambada, but to the Paez Soto family, which operates in Caborca, Sinaloa. Furthermore, authorities said that the Jesus Valencia Rodriguez group is based in Mexico, so it is unclear how close those arrested were to the top of that organization. In the past, U.S. authorities have played up connections between Americans arrested in drug sweeps and their more notorious suppliers in Mexico, despite a enormous geographical and operational distance between the two... According to the AP, this was typical. Many of those whose arrests were hailed as an unprecedented strike against Guzman and other Mexican capos were low-level American pushers whose place in the global narcotics supply chain was so far removed from Sinaloa that they had no idea that it even existed." Link to Full Article

Analysis: First, I highly recommend that you read the entire article, because it brings up some really important points. Second, I only wanted to add to Patrick's excellent analysis because I've written somewhat tangentially about this subject before. The drug war is filled with exaggerations and misinformation, and it's a source of much frustration for me.

There are dozens of examples like the ones Patrick points out regarding the association between drug dealers arrested here in the US and major cartels in Mexico. In addition to Operation Xcellerator in 2009, which was decidedly NOT a crushing blow to the Sinaloa Federation, US authorities have carried out massive gang sweeps and one operation against members of La Familia Michoacana in 2010. That one was also labeled a "crushing blow," and was similarly no such thing.

Then there are attempts to link domestic marijuana growers and drug-dealing gang members to the major cartels. We know the link is there, but proving it - especially in court - is challenging at best. When Mexicans are brought by the DTOs into the US for the purpose of growing marijuana in our national parks and forests, those Mexicans usually don't know who they're working for. And that's intentional; if they're caught, there's nothing they can confess to the police. Drug distribution operations in the US are run by the DTOs like a terrorist cell structure. There are many levels of middle and lower management, and US-based gangs are subcontracted out to sell to users on the street; they often don't know exactly where the drugs come from for the same reason - they can't be traced back to a particular DTO or drug lord.

While it looks great in the media to tout a major drug bust or arrest of several hundred purported members of a major DTO inside the US, those reports are often inaccurate and misleading. Making a seizure of a few hundred pounds of marijuana here, a few pounds of heroin or methamphetamine there, and arresting a few hundred gang members isn't going to crush American drug demand OR Mexican DTO operations any time soon.

"Creativity in a Bad Cause"

Here is an excerpt from my latest feature article in Homeland Security Today magazine:

"The days of smugglers trying to move illegal drugs across the border in cars, boats, and on foot are far from over. But both U.S. and Mexican authorities are putting enough of a squeeze on Mexican drug trafficking organizations that they’re feeling the need to get more creative in the ways they try to move their product. This is good news for law enforcement agencies, which are seeing record drug seizures in some areas. However, this is also bad news because it means smugglers are still managing to stay one step ahead of the authorities in their desperation to keep the drug money flowing. Here are some of the more innovative ways cartels are trying to smuggle drugs, and the challenges these methods pose to our Homeland Security agencies."

To read the full article on Homeland Security Today's website, please CLICK HERE.

"DEA leads roundup of cartel suspects as 'message' to drug gang leaders in Mexico."

Here's an excerpt from Alicia Caldwell's Associated Press article in the Minneapolis Star-Tribune:

"Federal, state and local authorities conducted a massive sweep Thursday in the United States and Latin America of suspected Mexican drug cartel members in the United States in a widespread domestic response to the killing of a U.S. agent in Mexico last week. Carl Pike, assistant special agent in charge of the Drug Enforcement Administration's special operations division, said the sweep is a direct reaction to the shooting death of Customs and Immigration Enforcement agent Jaime Zapata in Mexico last week... Pike said the roundup, which began Wednesday and was expected to continue into Friday, is targeting suspected criminals with ties to any Mexican drug cartel to try to disrupt drug trafficking operations in the United States... By Thursday morning, thousands of law enforcement officers in areas including Atlanta, St. Louis, Denver, Detroit, San Antonio, San Diego, Chicago, Newark and Miami had seized more than $4.5 million in cash and nearly 20 guns, arrested more than 100 people and confiscated about 23 pounds of methamphetamine, 107 kilograms of cocaine, 5 pounds of heroin and 300 pounds of marijuana at several hundred locations... Pike said that while the sweeps are a direct response to Zapata's killing, the majority of suspects were already targets of other investigations." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I don't want to take anything away from the hard work all these DEA and ICE agents put into this sweep, especially knowing it was something personal for many of them. But I can't help to say...that's it??? Just 20 guns and less than 500 pounds of drugs that came from a raid by thousands of law enforcement officers? Even the cash, which sounds like a lot, is pennies when you look at the grand scheme of how much money Mexican DTOs are raking in from US drug sales. And the 100 people they arrested? They were already targets of other investigations, so it wasn't that hard to put a list together of people to go after. They were likely very low-level people within the DTO - if they were even a member at all, and not a gang member subcontracted out for drug distribution. That means those 100 people will be replaced in a heartbeat.

Pike said, "We are basically going out to disrupt narcotics distribution here in the United States no matter what cartel their allegiance is to." If he thinks this roundup is going to cause any noticeable disruption in narcotics distribution in the US, he's sadly mistaken. He also said, "If we don't push back, some other 18-year-old cartel member is going to think, 'They didn't do anything, so all U.S. citizens are fair game.'" Of course, the US government and law enforcement agencies had to do something. But the question is, are these kinds of raids actually accomplishing anything substantial, or are they window dressing intended to placate the American people and the Mexican government?

Let's not forget that a similar nationwide raid was conducted in October 2009 against La Familia Michoacana. Over 3,000 US law enforcement agents participated in raids across the country, and they arrested over 300 people associated with LFM. However, it had little effect on LFM as an organization, and drug trafficking in those cities were only mildly disrupted, if at all. Only after Mexican authorities took out LFM's leader a few months ago did the DTO start to show any cracks.

Another question to ask is, why did the DEA and ICE wait to put these simultaneous raids together until an ICE agent was shot and killed in Mexico? I saw the word "respond" and "response" several times in that article. Why are we being reactive and not more proactive? And how does this necessarily avenge Zapata's death? You're taking a few dozen low-level players off the street and a little bit of dope and cash. Maybe some of them work for Los Zetas, but it's probably a mix of DTO allegiances. This raid will not, in any way, serve justice to Zapata's killer or Los Zetas as an organization. Instead of making a big show and going after the minnows, we need a larger and more comprehensive joint strategy for going after the big fish.

Interview by Australia's "Lateline"

I just wanted to let my readers know that an interview I did for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation's "Lateline" (similar to NBC's "Dateline") aired last night, and is available online if you'd like to see it! The piece is on Mexican cartels operating within the US, and my brief clip talks about DTOs who grow marijuana in our national parks.

To read the transcript and watch the video, CLICK HERE.

"Pinal sheriff: Armed conflict with drug cartels coming soon."

Here is an excerpt from Ari Cohn Ahwatukee's article in the East Valley Tribune:

"Armed conflict in Arizona between sheriff's deputies and heavily equipped drug cartel squads is inevitable, Pinal County Sheriff Paul Babeu said Tuesday during a speech in Ahwatukee Foothills. 'We're expecting a conflict,' Babeu told the Ahwatukee Republican Women's organization... 'I absolutely believe you're going to see that happen in the next 30 to 60 days. It's not like I'm trying to start a war with the cartels. They're coming through like they own this place, and we're trying to stop them. I pray that every time, they surrender.' ... Babeu ripped into Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano's contention that the border is as safe and secure as it has ever been... A significant percentage of illegal immigrants caught in Pinal County are from countries other than Mexico, he said, including "countries of interest" such as Yemen, Somalia and Syria... Drug seizures in Pinal County have more than doubled in the last two years, while the number of high-speed police pursuits rose from 142 in 2007 to 340 in 2010, he said." Link to Full Article

Analysis: No one can accuse Sheriff Babeu of being indirect. For those of you unfamiliar with some of the law enforcement personalities in Arizona, Sheriff Babeu and Sheriff Joe Arpaio of Maricopa County are easily the most visible and most vocal. Arpaio is a highly controversial figure because he's staunchly against illegal immigration, and enforces immigration laws in his county with a vengeance. He also travels all over the country to give talks and make appearances, and his life has been threatened on more than one occasion because of his views. Babeu is like the second coming of Arpaio, whom he counts among his friends and allies, and is highly and publicly critical of the lack of US government response to what he perceives as a crisis situation in Arizona.

No matter how you feel about Babeu or his publicity tactics, I agree that Arizona is seeing an unprecedented influx of dangerous criminals and drug/human smuggling activity. This activity is starting to put the American public in danger in certain parts of the state, and several law enforcement agencies have acknowledged that their powerless to stop it due to lack of resources.

As for Babeu's "armed conflict" statement, it comes across as alarmist and showy, but that doesn't mean there's not an element of truth to it. Law enforcement officers in Texas and Arizona have gotten into shootouts and high-speed car chases with drug traffickers on quite a few occasions in the past, so Babeu's prediction doesn't come as a surprise. But his window of 30 to 60 days is meaningless because it's already happening closer to the border; I wouldn't be surprised if one of his deputies got into a shootout with traffickers next week.

While I'm not a fan of alarmist media reports or spinning up by public officials, I imagine this is his way of trying to get the federal government to wake up and take notice of the major problems affecting the southwest border states. It's hard to disagree with that.

"Barriers aren't just for the border now."

Here is an excerpt for Brady McCombs' article in the Arizona Daily Star:

"The landscape of saguaros, mesquite trees and prickly pear cactus here has a new feature - steel railroad rails welded into crisscrosses and connected by flat rails. This rusting structure is a vehicle barrier designed to stop drug and people smugglers who barrel across the desert in trucks. The barriers are common at the international line - there are more than 139 miles of them along Arizona's stretch of U.S.-Mexico border. But this isn't the border. This 1.3-mile stretch of "Normandy-style" vehicle barriers was recently erected 70 miles north of the border on the Bureau of Land Management's Sonoran Desert Monument, just south of Interstate 8 and southwest of Casa Grande. It is likely the first time border barriers have been used this far north, and the latest example of how managing public lands along the U.S.-Mexico border is now as much about dealing with trash and trails left behind by illegal border crossers as it is about monitoring endangered animals or watering holes. BLM officials put up the barrier to redirect traffic around the federally protected Table Top Wilderness Area, where cars are prohibited... The barrier is on the southern boundary of Table Top, which borders the northern edge of the Tohono O'odham Nation. Smugglers have carved a grid of illegal roads through the wilderness area as they cross the O'odham land and cut through Table Top on their way toward Phoenix, inflicting serious damage to the habitat. The recently completed barrier has already diverted vehicle smuggling around the wilderness area, and BLM crews have begun restoring the lands damaged by the roads... There are already vehicle barriers or fences up along the international border in the Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument, Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Refuge, Buenos Aires National Wildlife Refuge and the Coronado National Forest... Federal law enforcement officers at the six border public lands visited by GAO officials this year said they spend 75 to 97 percent of their time responding to threats from illegal cross-border activity, the report found. At Organ Pipe, drug smugglers regularly use the visitor center parking lot as a staging area, says a Border Patrol threat assessment in the GAO report... The estimated 2,000 tons of trash left behind by smugglers and illegal immigrants has harmed the fragile Sonoran Desert, landing Buenos Aires, Organ Pipe and Cabeza Prieta on lists of most imperiled federal lands at different points this decade... Since last fall the GAO has been evaluating the relationship between federal land managers and federal law enforcement, issuing two reports in the past four months about an improving but flawed relationship. The first report concluded that federal rules governing public lands along the border cause some delays but do not prevent the Border Patrol from handling its assignment to secure the border." Link to Full Article

Analysis: There are two different and major issues brought up in this article. The first is the "please go around" policy the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) has had little choice but to implement, and the second is the trashing of our southwest desert and national parks by drug and human smugglers. I'm not sure which disturbs me more, but let's take a look at each one.

We all know that drug and human smuggling activity doesn't automatically stop and disappear within a certain distance from the border. So it's not entirely surprising that these barriers are being erected 70 miles inland. However, it is remarkably disturbing to me that the approach being taken is one of deflection rather than interdiction. I know the BLM and other law enforcement agencies just don't have the people or resources to stop and arrest every drug and human smuggler that wants to barrel through these areas and trample the environment. That's a secondary concern to me; I can't stand that these smugglers have to be merely redirected and aren't being outright stopped. I wouldn't be surprised to see signs erected in the next year that say "Please excuse our mess."

The next issue, speaking of messes, is the outright trashing of these parks and forests by smugglers. I ticked off a few people a few days ago when I posted a comment on Twitter along the lines of, why do environmentalists get so mad about the damage caused by the border fence and stay relatively silent when it comes to the trash left behind by smugglers? I got a couple of decent responses. One was that the level of environmental damage caused by the fence is far greater than that caused by smugglers, so it was unfair for me to compare the two. Another was that environmentalists do care, but who would they protest or complain to? Narcos and coyotes in Mexico?

I think those are good arguments. However, I have my own response to both. First, I don't think there's a threshold for a level of environmental damage before people should start to get involved. There's a government website dedicated to informing the public about the tons of trash left by smugglers, as well as the efforts by agencies and volunteers alike to clean it up. Please check it out at http://www.azbordertrash.gov so you can find out more about how this is more than just a few shirts and empty water bottles strewn about. I'm not pointing this out because I'm a tree-hugger; far from it. I just don't believe that if you fight for a cause, you should get to pick and choose what to get upset about based on level of severity. I also get upset that environmentalists don't get upset about the damage caused by illegal marijuana grows run by Mexican DTOs in US national parks and forests, but that's another blog post.

The next point: Who would said environmentalists, or just concerned citizens, complain to? Our federal and state governments, of course. No, technically they're not the ones causing the damage, unlike the border fence that they pay for. However, our government is charged with protecting our territory from damaging incursions by drug and human smugglers, and it's only our governments that are capable of providing more resources to the agencies that can stop those smugglers. Trust me, the BLM and Border Patrol don't want to spend their time picking up trash! They want to catch bad guys. Badly. But since in many cases, they don't have enough trained people to stop these folks at the border, they're left with erecting vehicle barriers that just redirect smugglers further inland to continue their illegal activities.

So don't go across the border and complain to a smuggler...that's no bueno. But if you care about the environment along the southwest border and beyond, or if you're simply ticked off that we can't stop these criminals and have to force them to "please go around," you can be vocal about it, and you can complain. I've been calling for more resources to be sent to the right places in order to better address border security problems, and your elected officials are always a good place to start if you want to do the same and don't have the luxury of a public "pulpit" like a blog. It's our soil, folks; let's not give it away because we didn't try hard enough to keep it.

"Suspected drug traffickers fire on U.S. Coast Guard off Nicaragua."

Here is an excerpt from Nick Valencia's article on CNN.com:

"A U.S. Coast Guard cutter was fired upon by suspected drug traffickers during a pursuit off the coast of Nicaragua, a Coast Guard spokesman told CNN. A U.S. Coast Guard cutter was fired upon by suspected drug traffickers during a pursuit off the coast of Nicaragua, a Coast Guard spokesman told CNN. The incident took place in the early morning of September 14, but information about the attack was not released until CNN inquired Friday about the incident... No shots hit the Coast Guard boat and there was no damage, O'Neil added. The shooting happened after a boarding team from the Cutter Escanaba (pictured) pursued a go-fast vessel suspected of smuggling drugs in international waters. The suspects managed to escape after entering Nicaraguan waters, said O'Neil. The Coast Guard is still reviewing the event, he said." Link to Full Article

Analysis: Is anyone else disturbed by the fact that drug smugglers are firing upon US Coast Guard personnel and vessels? I don't know how far away the two groups were from each other, but it's a good thing the shooter missed. I don't want to find out how a headline about a dead Coastie who was a victim of narco gunfire would play in the media, or with the general public.

Mind you, this isn't the first time that smugglers have fired on a US law enforcement agency. There have been numerous reports of gunshots exchanged between people on the Mexican side of the border and Border Patrol agents and police on the US side. This shouldn't be any different than those incidents, but somehow it feels more threatening. What would the national response have been if a Coastie had been shot, or worse, killed? In January 2008, a USBP agent was killed after being hit by a truck driven by smugglers. In July 2009, another agent was killed by  several gunshots to the head by an unidentified group of border crossers near a San Diego border fence. I don't remember there being a national outcry or major changes in policy after either of these incidents.

I guess I'm just curious what sort of incident it's going to take before people take notice of how brazen and aggressive smugglers have become, and the impact their activities are having on US homeland security personnel. I'm also curious if the Coast Guard was ever going to publicize this incident and use it as an example of the threats we're facing from drug smugglers. Maybe this happened all the time in the Caribbean when the Coasties were interdicting Colombian smugglers in go-fasts, and I'm making a big deal out of something that is (or was) relatively commonplace. After all, cops and Coasties and the military expect to be fired upon by the bad guys now and again. Still, my gut tells me that DTOs are moving away from the usual behavior of scuttle the vessel, dump the load, and just run as fast as you can to something considerably more dangerous. I hope I'm wrong.

"Mexico wary as California votes on legalizing marijuana."

Here is an excerpt from Nick Miroff and William Booth's article in The Washington Post:

To embattled authorities here, where heavily armed soldiers patrol the streets and more than 500 people have been killed this year, marijuana is a poisonous weed that enriches   death-dealing cartel bosses who earn huge profits smuggling the product north... But just over the border in California, cannabis is considered by law a healing herb. After the Obama administration announced that it would not prosecute the purveyors, about 100 medical marijuana dispensaries opened in San Diego alone in the past year... As the Obama administration presses Mexican President Felipe Calderon to stand firm in his costly, bloody military campaign against drug mafias, Mexican leaders are increasingly asking why their country should continue to attack cannabis traffickers and peasant pot farmers if the U.S. government is barely enforcing federal marijuana laws in the most populous state. This debate grows more urgent as California prepares to vote in November on Proposition 19, a game-changing ballot initiative to legalize the recreational consumption of marijuana. According to the polls, the vote is tight. Weary of spectacular violence and destabilizing corruption stoked by the prohibition against pot, some of Mexico's most prominent figures are wondering aloud what legalization would do on their side of the drug war." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I was hearing about the upcoming Prop 19 vote in California (where I worked as a contract intel analyst for four years), and started thinking about our federal government's selective enforcement of laws. I asked the following question to my personal Facebook friends, and it started an interesting discussion: If CA state laws regarding medical marijuana are superseded by federal law (the Controlled Substances Act says using or selling marijuana is illegal anywhere), and AZ [attempted] state laws regarding illegal immigration are also superseded by federal law (a circuit court deemed AZ SB 1070 unconstitutional), how can our federal government in good faith choose to "enforce" federal immigration law in Arizona but not federal anti-drug law in California?

Obviously the answer to this is politics...I'm not stupid or naïve (although I'm sure some readers may disagree). But I just don't understand how this can happen so blatantly, and no one in the mainstream media seems to be taking significant note of this hypocrisy.

Whether you believe me or not, this has nothing to do with my personal views on either subject. It has to do with the lack of a consistent government policy regarding enforcement of federal laws. You really should read this article about the selective nature of federal enforcement efforts in California; it's one of the best explanations I've seen yet. In a nutshell, President Obama announced during his 2008 campaign and on several occasions since that the US Department of Justice would not prosecute medical marijuana dispensaries unless they were in the business of making big profits or dealing to people who didn't need the marijuana for medicinal purposes. Yet, despite this shift in policy (outlined in a memo by Deputy AG David Ogden in October 2009), the DEA has been conducting raids on several California dispensaries in Los Angeles, San Diego, Bakersfield, and other cities since 2008. After one particular raid in Alameda last week, one DEA agent said, "Today's enforcement operation once again enlightens the public of the true nature and motive behind marijuana distribution centers — money."

Here's where I'm going to throw you for a loop. I'm all about legalizing marijuana in the US. not because I use it; I've never used any form of illegal drug, and I happily investigated airmen who tested positive for marijuana use for several years when I was a federal agent in the Air Force. I have no interest in using it, even though I have multiple sclerosis and could probably benefit from its use for medicinal purposes. I'm just seeing too many resources wasted on it when I think it can be compared to alcohol or tobacco use. The harder drugs like cocaine, meth, and heroin are what our law enforcement agencies should really be focusing on.

That being said, I don't care how big California's economy is or how many people live there; Prop 19 isn't going to solve any problems in Mexico. Even nationwide legalization of marijuana isn't going to end the violence, although I think it would make a sizable dent in cartel profits. I believe DTOs would just engage in legal sales of marijuana, and still make money from the sale of still-illegal drugs. Don't forget, they're making bank off kidnapping and extortion operations now, too.

So, back to my original point: Don't piss on me and tell me it's raining. If the federal government wants to sue Arizona for doing what it wants with its laws in violation of federal law, then it has to take similar action against California and the other 11 states with marijuana dispensaries also in violation of federal law. Again, I know it's politics, but our neighbor to the south is watching. Before we can move forward with any effective and lasting border security policy, we need to have some semblance of credibility first. This brand of hypocrisy isn't helping.

"Sinaloa drug cartel leaving Arizona?"

Thanks to Bill Richardson for sending me a link to this video clip! It's a news story from a local station in Arizona detailing the arrest of a dozen members of the Sinaloa Federation in Oklahoma. They were moving about 10 pounds of meth per day, and reportedly told authorities they were instructed by their DTO bosses to move north due to Arizona's new immigration law:

 

Analysis: Mr. Richardson - a journalist and former counterdrug officer - offers great insight in the video, which I briefly wanted to share. First, it is possible that some DTO members are leaving Arizona because they're concerned about increasing police scrutiny. However, if anyone thinks they're leaving for good, they're sorely mistaken. DTOs may not operate with as much impunity in the US as they do in Mexico, but they certainly won't be put off by a mere immigration law.

Please take a look at the video, and take to heart his comments; he knows what he's talking about, and I'm in complete agreement.

Some thoughts on border security and the illegal immigration nexus.

I have traditionally shied away from commenting on the immigration debate because it's such a polarized and emotional debate, and I try to keep my analysis as even-tempered and available to readers as possible. I don't like to alienate potential readers who want to learn more about events in Mexico by spouting my personal opinions about illegal immigration. And don't worry, I'm not going to start doing that now. It's just that with all the crazy events going on right now along the border - as well as in our nation's capital - I wanted to offer some thoughts about the confluence, as well as the divergence, of the concepts of immigration and border security.

Just the term "border security" means different things to different people. Some people believe a secure border implies NO ONE who isn't allowed into the US actually gets in. This means terrorists, illegal immigrants (from any country), and drug smugglers. Other people believe a secure border means that only people who are criminals or mean us harm are consistently caught and prevented from entering. I was reading an opinion piece in Reuters this morning, and the author explained how no border can truly be 100% secure, meaning no one gets in and out without the authorities noticing and approving. I have to agree with that. I mean, you can build an electrified fence that covers every square inch of the 2,000-mile US-Mexico border, but both good and bad people will find creative ways to get across. We've seen this in all major border lockdowns, like countries behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War, and even Cuba.

In light of recently growing tensions over border incidents, the AZ immigration law, and illegal immigration in general, we have to place the debate over border security in some kind of perspective. That means asking the question of ourselves AND the federal government, "What does it mean to have a secure border?" You have to know that we will NEVER keep ALL criminals and illegal immigrants from entering the US through our southwest border. Knowing that's the case, we have to prioritize because our law enforcement agencies have limited financial and logistical resources. In my opinion, we need to focus first on keeping people out who mean to do us harm or engage in dangerous/violent criminal activity on US soil. This includes terrorists, drug smugglers, human smugglers, DTO members, and gang members who work for DTOs.

Again, knowing our law enforcement agencies can't stop everyone, I'm willing to acknowledge that I have to be OK with the continuation of illegal immigration to some extent. I'm NOT okay with immigrants trashing our land, or trespassing on private property, or robbing/assaulting innocent Americans who get in their way. I do know that there are many illegal immigrants who come to the US from Mexico who don't engage in criminal behavior. I'm not saying it's any less of a violation of federal laws that they're here, but when it comes to the concept of border security, we have to look at who and what is making our border INsecure.

I know many of you - and maybe most of you - have very strong opinions about immigration, drugs, and guns, and your opinions are what make civil debates in my comments sections so lively and interesting. Many of you will probably disagree with me, and I'm totally OK with that. It's a free country after all! I just felt the need to explain that a secure border doesn't necessarily imply a complete border lockdown. It means that ALL Americans, whether they live in the SW border states or elsewhere, can feel safe and secure in their homes, and free from the dangers posed by terrorists and smugglers who attempt to enter our country surreptitiously. The illegal immigration debate often crosses paths with the border security debate, but I implore my readers to try to keep this in mind: When you can't keep everyone out, a secure border means you can effectively keep the BAD people out. We're not there yet, but our law enforcement agencies trying to do that can probably benefit from a government that realizes it needs to focus on what border security really means.

"Portion of US wildlife refuge closed due to violent border activity."

The sad part about this story is that it's not actually a story, and it's not even remotely news (in the sense that it's a recent occurrence). While exchanging emails with a reader this afternoon, he emailed me a document that sent me through the roof. It's a 2006 notice from the US Fish and Wildlife Service, advising the general public that a portion of the Buenos Aires National Wildlife Refuge in southern Arizona had been closed to the public because it had been "adversely affected by border-related activities." Furthermore, the Department stated it felt "continued public use of the area [was] not prudent." This closure was effective as of October 2006. Click HERE to read the entire notice, but here's the essential text:

The U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service has closed a portion of the Buenos Aires National Wildlife Refuge south of the Garcia Road to public use, under authority found in 8 RM 13.5 and 50 CFR 25.21(e) effective October 3, 2006. Garcia Road runs east/west parallel to the international boundary about one mile north of the line. This area is about 3500 acres in size. Our concern for public safety is paramount. The situation in this zone has reached a point where continued public use of the area is not prudent. The Buenos Aires National Wildlife Refuge has been adversely affected by border-related activities. The international border with Mexico has also become increasingly violent. Assaults on law enforcement officers and violence against migrants have escalated. Violence on the Refuge associated with smugglers and border bandits has been well documented. Many of these activities are concentrated at, or near, the border. The concentration of illegal activity, surveillance and law enforcement interdictions make these zones dangerous. Closure is in effect until further notice. 

The refuge sits almost in the center of Arizona's border with Mexico. Here's a map:

I'm frustrated that many politicians and federal government officials can breezily claim that border violence spillover isn't happening, and the US side of the border is as safe as it's ever been. Yet, we hear stories like the one I posted about earlier today from the Pinal County Sheriff, who says he has no control over portions of his own county. And I read and hear countless stories from ranchers on the US side of the border who constantly deal with armed Mexican thugs on their property who like to break into innocent people's homes and rob them at gunpoint. Then I read this - which our government has obviously known about for some time - and it sends me through the roof. Why hasn't this still-in-effect closure been widely reported in the news? More importantly, why has the security situation in one of our own wildlife refuges been allowed to get so out of hand that we've ceded control to drug and human smugglers, and just outright closed it to public access?

I know this is coming across as a soapbox rant, and I have to offer my apologies. I try to keep my analysis on subjects like this as level-headed as possible, but in light of the back-to-back-to-back confrontations between violent border crossers, smugglers, US law enforcement, and average Americans, I'm starting to lose patience with people who say spillover isn't a problem. Maybe not in their neighborhood, but I've got a truckload of people and towns who would beg to differ.

"Pinal County Sheriff: Mexican drug cartels now control parts of Arizona."

Here is an excerpt from MaryEllen Resendez's article on ABC15.com:

"Two men shot earlier this week could be the result of the ongoing battle between Mexican drug cartels now spilling over deep into Arizona, officials say. Pinal County investigators say  an area  known as the smuggling corridor now stretches from Mexico's border to metro Phoenix. The area , once an area for family hiking and off road vehicles has government signs warning residents of the drug and human smugglers. Night vision cameras have photographed military armed cartel members delivering drugs to vehicles along Highway 8. 'We are three counties deep. How is it that you see pictures like these, not American with semi and fully automatic rifles. How is that okay?' asked Pinal County Sheriff Paul Babeu. Babeu said he no longer has control over parts of his county. 'We are outgunned, we are out manned and we don't have the resources here locally to fight this,' he said at a Friday news conference... Babeu said he doesn't believe the drug cartel problems will not be solved when SB 1070 becomes a law, or with President Obama's promise of 1,200 troops spread out among four border states. 'It will fall short. What is truly needed in 3,000 soldiers for Arizona alone,' Babeu said." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I've written at length about the debate over border violence "spillover" - the confusion over what it really entails, and whether or not it's actually happening. The naysayers point to crime statistics, which in several major border cities show that the incidence of major crimes has gone down. El Paso is even considered the 2nd or 3rd safest city in the whole country. However, I don't believe you can use crime statistics alone to determine whether or not border violence spillover is occurring; there is just way too much anecdotal evidence to the contrary.

Sometimes people point to a few sheriffs in border counties and say they're just being paranoid. However, this county is not even along the border - it's three counties in and roughly 80 miles from Arizona's border with Mexico. Even more disturbing is this image I was sent this morning of a sign posted along mile marker 150 of Interstate 8 by the US Bureau of Land Management:

If you're a tourist or any other American driving along I-8 and see this sign, what are you going to think? Personally, you can tell me a hundred times that San Diego and El Paso and other cities along the border have declining crime rates, but if I see this sign, I'm going to book it out of there as fast as I can. Worse yet, this sign comes across (to me, anyway) as an acknowledgement by a federal government agency that this activity is occurring well within US territory with their knowledge, and US law enforcement doesn't have the resources to protect everyone from the threat posed by drug and human smugglers.

Here's a local news video relative to the story:

If this situation doesn't constitute border violence spillover, then I don't know what does. 

"Ciudad Juárez: Which Cartel is in Control?"

Here is an excerpt from my latest article on Homeland Security Today magazine's website:

"On Apr. 9, 2010, the Associated Press reported that Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzmán, the ruthless leader of the Sinaloa Federation narco-cartel, had finally taken control of the Ciudad Juárez drug trafficking corridor. For some followers of Mexico’s drug war, this came as surprising and entirely welcome news. However, it also sounded too good to be true... But the information in the Associated Press article indicates that much of the murder and mayhem may be coming to an end. After all, things in the parts of Mexico where one DTO dominates tend to be quiet and peaceful. Unfortunately, information from federal agencies, local law enforcement and private Mexican sources all contradict each other on the ground truth regarding the two cartels’ success in controlling Juárez." 

To read the full article on the Homeland Security Today website, please CLICK HERE. 

"AP Exclusive: Sinaloa cartel takes Ciudad Juarez."

Here is an excerpt from Alicia Caldwell and Mark Stevenson's Associated Press article, as published in The Houston Chronicle:

"After a two-year battle that has killed more than 5,000 people, Mexico's most powerful kingpin now controls the coveted trafficking routes through Ciudad Juarez. That conclusion by U.S. intelligence adds to evidence that Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman's Sinaloa cartel is winning Mexico's drug war. The assessment was made based on information from confidential informants with direct ties to Mexican drug gangs and other intelligence, said a U.S. federal agent who sometimes works undercover, insisting on anonymity because of his role in ongoing drug investigations. The agent told The Associated Press those sources have led U.S. authorities to believe that the Sinaloa cartel has edged out the rival Juarez gang for control over trafficking routes through Ciudad Juarez, ground zero in the drug war. Other officials corroborated pieces of the assessment. Andrea Simmons, an FBI spokeswoman in El Paso, confirmed that the majority of drug loads arriving from Juarez now belong to Guzman. And Mexican Federal Police Chief Facundo Rosas told the AP that while authorities are still working to confirm the U.S. assessment, 'These are valid theories.'" Link to Full Article

Analysis: I'm hesitant to get too excited about this news article because this would be the biggest thing to happen in the drug war (in my opinion) since the death of Amado Carrillo Fuentes. I sent emails out to my federal, state, and local law enforcement contacts to see if I could get some boots-on-the-ground confirmation that this is actually happening. I'll post any relevant updates after I get more info.

For now, suffice it to say that complete Sinaloa Federation control over the Juárez plaza is going to bring some peace and quiet to that city that its citizens haven't known for quite some time. Cuidad Juárez is arguably the busiest and the best drug smuggling corridor from Mexico into the US, which is why it's been the epicenter of the murder and mayhem along the border for so many years. If the battles between El Chapo's people and the VCFO's people are really winding down - at least for now, anyway - then that means that some sort of stability can be established there. And for the newbies, stability = peace. 

Fortunately or unfortunately, depending on how you look at it, it looks like the situation is advancing closer to the megacartel theory that writers like Sam Logan and John P. Sullivan have written about. One huge cartel dominating most trafficking activity means less violence and more peace and quiet for most of Mexico. But it then becomes the six- (or is it seven- ?) headed hydra that the Mexican government is REALLY ill-equipped to do away with. That is, of course assuming the Mexican government would even want to do away with such a megacartel that pours millions of narcodollars into a strapped economy.

More to come, folks...

"Old school meth: Mexican cartels go back to basics."

Here is an excerpt from David Koop's Associated Press article:

"Mexican cartels are increasingly going 'old school' to keep supplying America with methamphetamine despite an ingredient squeeze. Some gangs have responded to a Mexican   crackdown on their meth chemical of choice - pseudoephedrine - by reviving a production method so old, it was used by U.S. motorcycle gangs and bathtub chemists in the 1970s and '80s, recent seizures show. The re-emergence of the 'P2P method' demonstrates how frustrating it is to crack down on a synthetic drug that - unlike cocaine, heroin and marijuana - comes from recipes of chemical ingredients, known as 'precursors,' instead of a plant... Still, authorities contend going after precursors has produced results... And authorities say the [phenyl-2-propanone] P2P method is less desirable for the gangs because it reputedly produces a less-potent drug... While P2P itself is highly restricted and closely monitored by authorities, there are many ways to make it. Gangs found they could get their hands on phenylacetic acid, which can be made into P2P, which in turn can be made into meth." Link to Full Article

Analysis: This is another good example of how DTOs are adapting to and overcoming government efforts to restrict their activities, this time at the manufacturing level. I've seen plenty of stories about the crackdown on certain precursor chemicals, but then I started reading just as many stories about drug busts in Brazil, Paraguay, and elsewhere in South America of pseudoephedrine loads bound for Mexico. 

I don't know a darn thing about phenylacetic acid, but it does appear that it's not that hard to come by, and it's relatively cheap. If you buy it legally (meaning you're a chemist or some sort of scientists who needs it), you can buy 100 grams of it for $16.95 online.

This quote from the story makes the outlook for this situation look pretty bleak: "Experts say a crackdown on phenylacetic acid would likely just push traffickers to other chemicals." Well, of course. That's what DTOs have been doing for decades. Even more disturbing is the fact that there are plenty of other "recipes" for meth, so DTOs and addicts alike have quite the cookbook to go through before authorities can hope to catch up.

"Program to help truckers attracts drug smugglers."

Here is an excerpt from Christopher Sherman's Associated Press article:

"A U.S. program that offers trusted trucking companies speedy passage across American borders has begun attracting just the sort of customers who place a premium on avoiding inspections:   Mexican drug smugglers. Most trucks enrolled in the program pause at the border for just 20 seconds before entering the United States. And nine out of 10 of them do so without anyone looking at their cargo. But among the small fraction of trucks that are inspected, authorities have found multiple loads of contraband, including eight tons of marijuana seized during one week in April. Some experts now question whether the program makes sense in an environment where drug traffickers are willing to do almost anything to smuggle their shipments into the U.S." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I wrote a post on the US-Mexico trucking program some time ago, trying to detail the deeply two-sided nature of this debate. It seems like that debate is still ongoing, and both sides still have very strong opinions about the program.

The group that sides against the program is comprised mostly of some law enforcement, safety-conscious US citizens, and unionized US truckers. The agencies that deal with cross-border trucks are mostly border agencies like CBP, as well as the DEA and highway patrol. I can't speak for CBP and the DEA, but I imagine they might feel that allowing vehicles with LOTS of space for contraband into the country with little scrutiny at the actual time of crossing poses a vulnerability. Highway patrol officers may come across these trucks well after they've entered the US, and while many are trained to spot safety violations and detect the presence of contraband, many are not. Some US citizens who are not well-versed on the program have an image in their heads of Mexican trucks on US highways and conclude that they must be rattling 18-wheelers that are ready to fall apart and kill a dozen motorists in the process. Finally, unionized US truckers are worried that the program will take jobs away from them.

The group in favor of the program includes Mexican trucking companies, US truckers who live and work in Mexico as part of the program, and businesses on both sides of the border who benefit from reduced shipping costs and transit times as a result of the program. I know an American trucker who works in Mexico, and he's pretty upset by the bad rap the program has gotten over the years. I asked him what he thought of this article, and he pointed out several things worth mentioning here. 

First, he said that 71 "compromised" loads out of roughly 7 million that cross the border every year is a tiny fraction. Of course, those 71 loads are the ones that were detected. We have no way of knowing how many loads of contraband successfully made it into the US in program-registered trucks. Second, he talked about the plata o plombo situation. I agree that program-affiliated companies make themselves vulnerable to smugglers by advertising their participation. I also agree with my associate in that truckers have little choice but to accept bribes if they value their lives. That's just the way things work in Mexico. Finally, he said it's a long and expensive process for trucking companies to get certified through the C-TPAT. They understand the risk, but feel it's worth the financial benefits they derive from being part of the program.

So, bottom line, this is just another form of the classic debate over security versus convenience, or in this case, commerce. I understand the merits of both arguments, and it's tough for me to say which side has the better one. Mexican trucks aren't the only ones crossing the border, and drugs make their way into the US inside all sorts of vehicles through dozens of ports of entry every day. But is it smart to allow trucks coming from Mexico on the fast track into the US with minimal - if any - physical scrutiny? If we can reduce the number of conveyances for drugs into the US, shouldn't we try? Sounds simple enough, but we have trains crossing the border (sometimes carrying drugs) and hundreds of Mexico-origin ships and boats that enter US waters without scrutiny every day. Are we going to try and limit that, too?

It's a tough call, and for now, we can only hope that our law enforcement agencies and the improved technology they're using can detect and deter the entry of contraband into the US by trucks originating in Mexico.

"Central American Disorder — a Threat to Mexico's Security."

Here is an excerpt from my latest MexiData.info article:

"The everyday realities of Mexico’s drug war are grisly and overwhelming. On a daily basis, both Mexican media outlets and U.S. news sources report the latest mass murders that have resulted from turf wars between Mexican cartels and internal organizational discord.

"Security in Mexico is perceived as mostly an internal problem. But Mexico is not an isolated country, and the ongoing turmoil in neighboring countries is having both a direct and indirect impact on Mexico’s security situation."

To read the complete article at MexiData.info, please CLICK HERE.

"How much is the U.S. to Blame for Mexico's Drug War?"

Here is an excerpt from my latest article on MexiData.info:

"There are two main issues for which the United States has recently taken at least partial responsibility in Mexico’s drug war—southbound weapons trafficking (the supply side), and drug trafficking (the demand side).

"In March 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, “We know very well that the drug traffickers are motivated by the demand for illegal drugs in the United States and that they are armed by the transport of weapons from the United States.” This acknowledgement was the beginning of a new level of cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico in fighting cartels.

But was it right for the U.S. to accept blame for these issues, and if so, will it lead to more U.S. involvement in solving other problems in Latin America for which it may be “responsible”?"

To read the rest of my article on MexiData.info, please CLICK HERE.

"DEA Announces Largest Single U.S. Strike Against Mexican Drug Cartels."

Here is the bulk of today's DEA press release, which can be read HERE in its entirety:

DEA Acting Administrator Michele M. Leonhart joined Attorney General Eric Holder and other federal officials today to announce the results of "Project Coronado", a 44-month multi-agency  law enforcement investigation which targeted the La Familia Michoacana drug cartel. FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III and ATF Acting Director Kenneth E. Melson also participated in the announcement.

Yesterday and today, 303 individuals in 19 states were arrested in a series of takedowns through coordination between federal, state and local law enforcement. More than 3,000 agents and officers operated across the United States to make the arrests during the two-day takedown. 62 kilograms of cocaine, 729 pounds of methamphetamine, 967 pounds of marijuana, 144 weapons, 109 vehicles, 2 clandestine drug labs were also seized in the past two days.

“Project Coronado, our massive assault on the La Familia Cartel, is part of our continued fight against all of the powerful Mexico-based drug cartels,” said DEA Acting Administrator Michele M. Leonhart. “This organization, the newest of Mexican cartels, is directly responsible for a vast majority of the methamphetamine pouring into our country across our Southwest Border, and has had a hand in fueling the cycle of violence that is wracking Mexico today.  DEA, along with our U.S. and Mexican partners, are committed to strategically attacking the international and domestic drug trade with every tool at our disposal, and defeating those that thrive on the suffering of others.”

The La Familia cartel is a violent drug trafficking cartel based in the state of Michoacan, in southwestern Mexico. According to court documents, La Familia controls drug manufacturing and distribution in and around Michoacan, including the importation of vast quantities of cocaine and methamphetamine from Mexico into the United States. La Familia is philosophically opposed to the sale of methamphetamine to Mexicans, and instead supports its export to the United States for consumption by Americans. La Familia is a heavily armed cartel that has utilized violence to support its narcotics trafficking business including murders, kidnappings and assaults. According to one indictment unsealed in New York, associates of La Familia based in the United States have allegedly acquired military-grade weapons, including assault weapons and ammunition, and have arranged for them to be smuggled back into Mexico for use by La Familia. Individuals indicted in the cases are charged with a variety of crimes, including: conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, cocaine and marijuana; distribution of methamphetamine, cocaine and marijuana; conspiracy to import narcotics into the United States; money laundering; and other violations of federal law. Numerous defendants face forfeiture allegations as well.

"This unprecedented, coordinated U.S. law enforcement action - the largest ever undertaken against a Mexican drug cartel - has dealt a significant blow to La Familia’s supply chain of illegal drugs, weapons, and cash flowing between Mexico and the United States,” said Attorney General Holder. “We will not allow these cartels to operate unfettered in our country, and with the increases in cooperation between U.S. and Mexican authorities in recent years, we are taking the fight to our adversaries. We will continue to stand strong with our partners in Mexico as we work to disrupt and dismantle cartel operations on both sides of the border.”

Arrests were made or charges were unsealed related to Project Coronado in the following districts: Central District of California, Southern District of California, District of Colorado, Northern District of Georgia, District of Massachusetts, District of Minnesota, Southern District of Mississippi, Eastern District of Missouri, Northern District of Oklahoma, Southern District of New York, Northern District of New York, Middle District of North Carolina, District of South Carolina, Middle District of Tennessee, Eastern District of Texas, Northern District of Texas, and the Western District of Washington. There were also arrests by state authorities in California, Nevada, North Carolina and Georgia.

Analysis: Two words - AWE. SOME. By all accounts and measures, this two-day raid was a really big deal. And not so much because of the "stuff" they rounded up. If you take a hard look at the amounts of drugs and weapons they seized, we're talking small potatoes for the number of agents, locations, and raids involved. 

It's the number of PEOPLE associated with La Familia that were arrested. THAT's the real treasure, in my opinion. Out of 303 people, there are probably quite a few who can be convinced to provide actionable intelligence to law enforcement authorities regarding some level of DTO operations on both sides of the border. That information could lead to dozens more arrests and seizures in the next several months, so hopefully, this is just the beginning.

Kudos and a big thank you to all agencies involved!

"Mexican Cartels are Taking over US Marijuana Production."

Here is an excerpt from my weekly article on MexiData.info:

"Life is getting a bit harder for Mexican drug lords these days. Not only do they have to worry about the Mexican military and U.S. law enforcement tripping up their drug trafficking efforts. Now they have some supply problems from a place they might not have expected – competition from U.S.-based marijuana producers. Several media outlets have published recent reports regarding U.S. marijuana farms, known as “grows.”  A Washington Post article from Oct. 7 said that thousands of mom-and-pop grows in the U.S. are threatening cartel profits, partly because of recent changes in state laws that allow the legal use of medical marijuana. So what’s a Mexican cartel to do? Well, if you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em."

To read the rest of my article on MexiData.info, please CLICK HERE.

"Are Mexican Cartels Expanding for Profit or Survival?"

Here is an excerpt from my latest article on MexiData.info:

"The U.S. drug market is no longer satisfying the greed of Mexican drug lords and their cartels. Now they’re looking to Europe and the stronger purchasing power of the higher-value euro, and they’re using West Africa to get there... In January 2007, the Mexico City daily El Universal reported on the presence of Mexican cartels in Peru and their likely involvement with the terrorist group Shining Path... Last year, Strategic Forecasting (Stratfor) reported Guatemalan and Mexican government officials confirmed on April 15, 2008, that one of several Mexican nationals detained in Guatemala on April 9 was a high ranking Mexican drug cartel member near the top of Mexico City’s most wanted list... In the last month, General James Stravridis, current commander of the U.S European Command, and Michael Braun, former head of operations for the DEA, have warned separately in interviews and hearings on the expansion of Mexican cartels into Africa and the risk of extending their reach to Islamist groups... So what does this geographic shift in Mexican drug trafficking mean?"

To read the rest of my article on MexiData.info, please CLICK HERE.

"US seeks crackdown on drug smuggling aboard trains."

Here is an excerpt from Christopher Sherman's Associated Press article, published in The Brownsville Herald:

"When rail cars idle on side tracks in Mexico to be loaded with legitimate cargo and shipped to  the United States, drug smugglers scan for places to hide their own loot — and if no good  place is apparent, they make one. arijuana and cocaine can be concealed above rail car axles or behind false undercarriages made of plywood. Bolder smugglers sometimes weld a false wall into a car or sabotage trains to stop them and quickly stow their contraband on board before the train moves on. Cars are then tagged with graffiti or other markings so the dealer in the U.S. can spot his delivery... Thousands of pounds of drugs arrive in the U.S. by freight train every year. Now the federal government says it's time American rail companies cracked down on their Mexican business partners to keep the drugs from reaching the border... Because American rail companies have an ownership stake in the two largest Mexican railroads, U.S. law enforcement is pressuring rail companies to crack down on smuggling." Link to Full Article

Analysis: Those of you who have been following this blog for a while may remember I commented on this issue back in late March. It appears that not much has changed. Union Pacific still refuses to pay fines for drug found in its railcars, and the US government still thinks it should take full responsibility for the security of those railcars on both sides of the border. I can't say that my stance on the issue has changed much either.

To reiterate, I can understand both sides of the argument. Other transportation companies, like container ship owners and commercial airlines, have to pay fines if drugs are found on their ships or planes; rail companies and their trains should be held to the same standard, right? If only it were that easy. Inspecting planes and ships at their point of departure, and once again at the point of arrival in the US, is easier in many ways than inspecting a train. Once a ship or a plane leaves, it's either at sea or in the air without any stops before it reaches the US. Due to current agreements between the US and Mexico, trains do not stop at the border for inspection before reaching their US destination, but they do slow down and can stop in any of a number of places enroute to the US. Drug smugglers are usually very good at what they do, and can place a load in a railcar at the train's origin or somewhere along the route after the cars have been inspected. By then, it's too late for Ferromex or Union Pacific to do anything about it.

Experts say that part of the problem is corruption and negligence or fear among rail employees. This comes as no surprise, and it's an endemic problem that can't be solved overnight, either by Ferromex or Union Pacific. No matter how many security measures are enacted by Mexican authorities or how much pressure is placed on them by Union Pacific, there's no good way to get around an inside job.

"Is Gulf Cartel's alleged top boss ready to talk?"

Here is an excerpt from Dane Schiller and James Pinkerton's article in The Houston Chronicle:

"After hooded federal agents whisked the reputed head of the Gulf Cartel drug trafficking  syndicate from a Mexican prison to Houston to face justice nearly three years ago, he was branded by authorities as among the most notorious and feared gangsters in the world. But now, just weeks before Osiel Cardenas Guillen's blockbuster trial is set to begin, his lawyers and federal prosecutors are jousting behind closed courtroom doors and suddenly banned by the judge from discussing one of the most notorious cartel cases in the nation. Could U.S. prosecutors be brokering a deal with Cardenas in exchange for telling what he knows about Mexico's underworld, including who has been on his payroll?" Link to Full Article

Analysis: Based on information from my sources close to this story, as they say in the papers, there's a lot of shady stuff going on with Cardenas Guillen's upcoming trial and overall legal situation. He is arguably one of the biggest, if not the biggest, Mexican DTO fish the US has caught. It's no surprise the US government is interested in brokering a deal to extract information from the former head of the Gulf cartel. But the situation begs some questions: how current - and thus valuable - is the information he knows, how much is the US government willing to reduce his sentence if he cooperates, and how long could Cardenas Guillen possibly survive after getting out of prison?

It appears that the US government has an iron-clad case against Cardenas Guillen, despite his defense team's extraordinary efforts. The fact that they may be considering a plea deal indicates they feel the information he has regarding DTO operations in Mexico is still relevant and valuable. Cardenas Guillen was arrested in 2003, but pretty much ran the Gulf cartel from a Mexican prison until he was extradited to the US in 2007. In some cases, information that is two years old may still be accurate and useful, but in Mexico, things have changed a LOT since 2007.

But then again, there's the old saying that the more things change, the more they stay the same. Alliances and loyalties may have shifted several times between DTOs, but the basics of the drug trafficking business are essentially the same: get the loads across however you can, and with minimal law enforcement interference. Use bribery. Use weapons. Use threats and intimidation. Take control of the best routes. Keep control of the best routes. If your route gets burned, find another one, and get creative if you have to. Perhaps these are the kinds of details the US government hopes to obtain through a plea deal with Cardenas Guillen. Considering the position both the US and Mexican governments are in right now, even a little bit of good - I mean, REALLY good - intelligence could go a long way.

"Mexico, U.S. can learn from Bogota."

Here is an excerpt from an editorial by Edward Schumacher-Matos in the North County Times:

"Mexicans once bridled at suggestions of learning anything from Colombia, but as the violence and power of drug cartels have grown in their country, they now are beating a path here. President Felipe Calderon, civil society groups, policy experts, police and others have been traveling to this Andean nation to learn how it beat back the cartels, sharply reduced murders and kidnappings and reasserted a sense of civic participation. Some, such as journalists, just seek tips on how to survive. There is much good to be learned from Colombia, but my own visit here reveals that it is not what many Americans hope it might be. John P. Walters, former head of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, is right when he recently wrote that Colombia is 'one of the greatest international policy success stories of the last decade.' But he is wrong in concluding that any of this means fewer illicit drugs and less crime in the United States." Link to Full Editorial

Analysis: I don't make comments on editorials very often, but sometimes quite a bit can be learned from them when written properly. There are a few inaccuracies in this one, however, that I need to point out, although the overall message is pretty good. It's not surprising that many, including people at the highest levels of both the Mexican and US governments, are looking to the Colombian experience for answers. However, I agree with the author that there are just enough differences between the two cases that the possibility of applying the Colombian strategy to Mexico might just not cut it.

It's true that, even if cocaine production in Colombia ever truly sees a significant decrease, entities in other Latin American countries like Peru and Bolivia are ready to step in to fill that market gap. Mexican DTOs have been making friends and influencing people in Peru for several years now, and the word on the street is that Shining Path, a once mostly defunct and now possibly a comeback terrorist organization in Peru, is getting in on the action with them. Now THAT is something to be concerned about. As for Colombian groups like the FARC and ELN, their numbers and strength have diminished, but they're still continuing to wage war against the Colombian military, government, and people in both a conventional fashion and terrorist manner. They're still producing the white powdery stuff, and there are hundreds of micro-cartels throughout Colombia that are waiting for the FARC to finally go away so THEY can fill the market vacuum. I strongly disagree with Schumacher-Matos' assertion that "the paramilitaries have been disarmed and the guerrillas have been pushed back into isolated jungle areas." The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), which served as the umbrella group for paramilitaries in Colombia, doesn't exist in the same fashion as before and several members have disarmed, but the large majority of them stay in the business under a different guise, forming other organized crime groups. They're still working as enforcers and protectors for the various Colombian cartels; they're just not as organized as they once were and don't have a singular name. As for the guerrillas, they've always had their strongholds in isolated jungle areas, so they were never pushed back there because they never left. And they're still carrying out attacks in or near populated areas and killing civilians.

Something that bothers me a little is Schumacher-Matos' offhand assertion that the answer lies not in Latin America, but in the rethinking of domestic policies, including the legalization of some or all drugs. I definitely won't get into that debate here because it's a long one, but he just leaves his statement at that, which is pretty weak, considering what a controversial subject legalization is and that he believes that's the better answer. If I thought I had the better answer to the Colombia and Mexico problem, I'd address it in more than a sentence or two. He ends the editorial with that sentiment, but I didn't feel that everything he talked about leading up to that was designed to support that argument.

Finally, I'm glad he inserted a statement by a Colombian woman explaining that in Colombia, people believe in the authorities and the police, whereas in Mexico they do not. If anything, this is part of an argument against legalization as the answer. Corruption in Mexico MUST be addressed and minimized (it will never be eliminated) to make a dent in the supply problem, and demand and enforcement must continue to be addressed - ever more effectively - in the US to make a dent in the demand problem.

"Mexican drug cartels 'hide in plain sight' in U.S."

Here is an excerpt from Ben Conery's article in The Washington Times:

"Angel Haro-Perez, the Atlanta head of the Gulf Cartel, is typical of cartel members and associates working in the U.S.: They keep a low profile, avoid violence and work quietly to traffic tons of drugs — cocaine, heroin, marijuana and methamphetamine — into the U.S. while smuggling billions of dollars back across the border. And they do it while remaining virtually invisible to the community and general public... Just northeast of Atlanta, Gwinnett County,  where Mr. Haro-Perez was arrested, has become a ground zero of sorts for Mexican drug cartels, according to authorities. The county's population has more than doubled since 1990, and authorities say the Hispanic, particularly Mexican, population has exploded with a mixture of both legal and illegal immigrants. According to U.S. Census data, Hispanics made up less than 2.5 percent of Gwinnett County's population in 1990, a number that increased to 11 percent in 2000 and was up to 16 percent by 2007. 'We emphasize that the vast majority of those people have nothing to do with drug dealing, but what they do is they allow the Mexican cartels, almost all of whose operatives are Mexican, to hide in plain sight,' [U.S. Attorney David] Nahmias said. Fifteen years ago, he said, four young Hispanic men coming in and out of a house at all hours of the night might make neighbors suspicious. Now they could be painters or construction workers, and there could be 10 other households like theirs on a street." Link to Full Article

Analysis: Although this article focuses on Atlanta - and rightfully so, as it's a major drug distribution hub - the same concerns can be applied to dozens, if not hundreds, of metropolitan areas AND small towns across the US. Migration patterns can't be disputed, and it is creating environments in more and more places where DTO members and their associates - namely, Hispanic gang members - can blend in easily. The key to their success has been the avoidance of trappings which DTO members in Mexico usually enjoy: tricked-out and armored vehicles, jewelry, bodyguards, expensive clothes, etc. DTO members in the US appear to be all business and no play, and that mindset has benefitted them greatly.

Despite their subtlety in business matters on US soil, Mexican DTOs have brought some of the violence of their work deeper into US territory than most people suspect. As the article mentions, DTO-related murders and kidnappings have occurred in places like Phoenix, Atlanta, and even small towns in Alabama. A raid on a gang in Omaha, Nebraska recently uncovered their plan to sell high-powered military-grade guns to Mexican DTOs. The article also mentions that violence levels associated with DTO activity in the US remains low, and DTO members seem to be content to just conduct their business quietly. That's all well and good, but I felt not enough focus was placed on the challenges being placed on state and local law enforcement by the presence of these distributors in their cities. There is some mention of wiretaps and surveillance being conducted, but not much more regarding to effort to detect these networks and dismantle them. If I were a reader living in a city with a sizeable Hispanic population (which I happen to be), I'd wonder what my Sheriff and local cops were doing to find out if this sort of thing was happening in my area, and how to prevent it from getting here (or getting worse).

"How Mexico's drug war washed up on Canada's West Coast" and "British Columbia or Colombia?"

Here is an excerpt from Linda Diebel's article in The Star:

"While the U.S. Attorney General's Office calls the Mexican drug cartels a "national security threat" and says 230 American cities have been infiltrated, the port city of Vancouver may be  Canada's first to feel the fallout from the crackdown on Mexico's drug lords. Already this year in the Vancouver area – nicknamed the gang capital of Canada – there have been 30 shootings (with 12 fatalities) directly linked to the gang shakeout in Mexico and tracked by the Washington-based Council on Hemispheric Affairs. Some 130 gangs operate in B.C., among them Red Scorpions, United Nations, MS-13, Bacon Brothers, Hells Angels and various independents – all with ties of varying degrees to lucrative Mexican cocaine, among other drugs from other places... In Vancouver, police are witnessing an escalation in the brutality of killings. Recently, in an apparently targeted hit, a gangster shot a young mother in her car as her 4-year-old sat in the back seat. Once, such actions were forbidden by established drug protocol. Now, collateral damage is routine in the slaughterhouse of gangland hits." Link to Full Article

Here is an excerpt from the second article, which appeared in The Economist:

"Canada remains one of the world’s safest countries but in recent years Vancouver, BC’s largest city, has gained notoriety for gun crime, especially among drug gangs. Since 1997 nearly 450 gangsters have been killed there. The surge in shootings is “directly related” to a crackdown on gangs in Mexico and the United States, says Pat Fogarty, a senior officer in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Recent arrests by the three countries’ police forces have disrupted a Mexican-run cocaine distribution chain, leaving Vancouver’s street dealers fighting to secure their supplies. “The price goes up and the guns come out,” says Mr Fogarty. Vancouver has become a distribution hub in a global drugs trade stretching to Asia and Europe. Local gangs ship out cannabis, amphetamines and ecstasy made in BC, importing cocaine, heroin and guns for the Canadian market. Around 135 gangs are thought to be fighting over a business worth an estimated C$7 billion ($6.2 billion) a year." Link to Full Article

Analysis: Normally I comment on one news article at a time, but these two are intrinsically related. The stories are also reported in both a metropolitan newspaper and a global periodical, which draws more attention to the story. I was interested in this topic because you don't read much about our northern neighbor when it comes to drug wars, and especially not in the context of Mexican DTOs and gang warfare. I've been following Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13, on and off for the past few years and I knew they had a presence in British Columbia (and Canada in general). I wanted to get the Canadian perspective because, compared to gang violence and DTO activity in certain US cities, the problems in Vancouver didn't seem serious enough at first to merit such grim headlines. I even spent a week in Vancouver a couple of years ago, and although I was told about and witnessed first-hand the drug culture in some areas of the city, it struck me overall as a nice place that I'd want to visit again. So, to get that Canadian perspective, I contacted Dr. James Creechan, a sociology professor with a criminology specialty/interest. He's taught at the University of Alberta for most of his career, and occasionally teaches at the University of Toronto, Queen's University, and the University of Guelph, with adjunct privileges at the Autonomous University of Sinaloa-Culiacan. He currently is teaching a class on the violence and drug war in Mexico, so I thought he'd be the perfect person to provide some context on this issue. What follows is my paraphrasing of his comments. 

Canadian cities— especially major metropolitan areas of Vancouver, Toronto & Montreal— have never had gang related problems similar to those in most US cities... There are no equivalent programs like the NCJS gang surveys etc. Canadian homicide levels are also low — approximately 540 total homicides in all of Canada last year. Only some of those (less than 30%) of those are linked to gangs. But, Canadians aren’t accustomed to reading that gang hits are taking place, and a few extra-ordinary incidents (by Canadian standards) over the past few years have garnered national attention. In [British Columbia], a drug related gangland hit inside of a condo raised concerns last year, especially when one of the victims was in the wrong place at the wrong time (doing maintenance). In Toronto, there have been several drive-by shootings and gang hits captured on video-tape. The most notorious case involved a shooting on Boxing Day (Dec. 26) where two gangs shot it out in downtown Toronto and a young high school girl was killed. Things have gotten worse by a degree that is intolerable to Canadians and this has led to demands for government action before things get even worse... It’s a slippery slope once drug gangs, and a culture of drug gangs establish a foothold. Another factor to consider is the lack of hard news about drug wars. Until recently, there was little coverage of narco wars in Mexico. The sensationalism in The Star can be attributed to the fact that similar incidents have not been widely reported to a significant degree... It’s also clear that information is dated and overstated in sections. 

The Canadian character is hard to nail down with certainty, but one important “subterranean value” is that Canadians generally believe that “We are not American” and “We do not want to become more like Americans."  This view, “we’re not you,” means that Canadians do have concretely different views about crime and violence. Guns are not widely available [there]. There is a Canadian gun registry (...even if it is a political hot potato). Basically, Canadians read about a growing gang problem and believe that it’s an indicator that Canada might eventually have the same kind of problems that Canadians believe exist in Los Angeles, Miami etc. unless [they] act hard and fast.

"Mexico's drug Zeta hitmen advance on kingpin's turf."

Here is an excerpt from Robin Emmott's article on Reuters.com:

"Mexico's Gulf cartel and its brutal "Zetas" hit squad are taking on the country's most wanted drug lord on his own turf, escalating a fight for supremacy in a drug war that is worrying the United States. The Zetas, considered Mexico's most violent gang and feared for beheading victims, are pushing into the northwestern state of Durango in a new battle against arch-rival Joaquin "Shorty" Guzman, Mexico's top drug fugitive. At least 235 people have died in drug violence in the mountainous state this year in a fight over smuggling routes and marijuana and opium plantations that Guzman has long dominated... "Without a doubt, the Zetas are advancing in Durango and some towns are basically under their control," said Rafael Herrera, a political analyst and former editor of a regional newspaper... Lazcano is turning his attention in Durango to controlling rural outposts along smuggling corridors previously held by Guzman to win informants, hide and attack the military." Link to Full Article

Analysis: There is no doubt that the level of violence in Durango has increased in recent months, as documented by Ms. Emmott in another Reuters article. When violence increases in a relatively specific area in Mexico, that means that either two DTOs are fighting for control of a lucrative plaza (a drug smuggling corridor) like Nuevo Laredo or Cuidad Juarez, or a DTO is having some internal control issues, like the AFO in Tijuana. I also have no doubt that some sort of conflict is going on between the Sinaloa Federation and Los Zetas. My question is what Lazcano's priorities are with this strategy. The article mentions controlling outposts along smuggling routes, winning informants, finding places to hide and attack the military, etc. However, those are lofty goals if he expects to accomplish all of them.

Let's do a quick comparison of Los Zetas and the Sinaloa Federation, while making a few assumptions. Los Zetas used to be merely enforcers for the Gulf cartel, but after Osiel Cardenas Guillen was incarcerated and extradited to the US, they took over a good chunk of the Gulf cartel's operations. While I don't think anyone is ready to say that the two organizations are one and the same or use the names interchangeably, one can reasonably assume that any moves by Los Zetas has a direct impact on Gulf business, for better or for worse. There are two important differences between the Gulf and Sinaloa cartels. The Gulf cartel controls more plazas than the Federation. However, the Federation controls significantly more physical territory than the Gulf cartel. Controlling more routes is a competitive advantage because you can move more product across the border. However, controlling more territory has the advantages of providing more places to manufacture drugs, more places to hide, more officials to bribe in population centers, and more potential recruits.

I'm sure all of the Sinaloa advantages are tempting to Lazcano and his crew, but El Chapo is quite a force to contend with. He has his own enforcement teams, Los Pelones and Los Negros among them. No one really knows the exact Zetas numbers, but the latest estimates place them between 200-250 core members. However, Los Zetas have grown into a network and almost a brand name; that network of informants and other associates could number in the thousands. This would serve as a huge benefit to Lazcano in a conflict with El Chapo's people. Undoubtedly, El Chapo has a challenge on his hands. Not only does he have Lazcano to worry about on one side, but he's also backing Teodoro "El Teo" Garcia Simental in a battle for AFO's remaining territory in northern Baja California. As is typical for these kinds of turf wars, things are likely to get worse before they get better, and as the author implies, only time will tell who has the upper hand.

"Doing Business in the Time of Mexican Drug Chaos."

Here is an excerpt from Joel Millman's article in The Wall Street Journal:

"U.S. Customs agents got a surprise on April 9, when they checked a trailer of an 18-wheel truck crossing into El Paso, Texas, from Mexico and found more than 9,000 pounds of marijuana hidden among auto parts bound for U.S. factories. A startling aspect of the bust: The pot was  packed into a shipment belonging to auto parts giant Delphi Corp... The bust highlights one of border control's endless conundrums: how to deter clever criminals from manipulating security systems for their own benefit. In an era of open trade, Customs officials encourage exporters to beef up internal security measures to earn the privilege of fast transit through border checkpoints. Thousands of manufacturers, shippers and cargo expediters have been certified under a number of U.S. government programs that designate compliance. The unintended result of that compliance: Those same exporters are increasingly likely to be targeted by smugglers, who look to piggyback their contraband on legal cargo that makes low-friction border crossings, according to law enforcement officials... So far this year, there have been at least 80 attacks on moving cargo in Mexico." Link to Full Article

Analysis: This is a really good article that explains in a decent amount of detail yet another major crime in which DTOs and their enforcers are engaging - truck hijackings. There are so many negative effects that the threat of these hijackings have on both American and Mexican businesses, and the situation is oddly reminiscent of the attacks on convoys in Iraq. Who would ever have thought that trucks carrying flat-screen televisions in Mexico would need to travel in a caravan with a GPS locator and a panic switch? Now, there are two different problems occurring here; one is the targeting of cargo trucks by DTOs and their affiliates for the cargo they're carrying. The other is the use by DTOs of cleared cargo trucks to move drugs into the US; in most cases, it appears both the drivers and the cargo owners are oblivious to the extra product being transported in those trucks. 

Although the article addresses both issues, it really focuses on the former. There's not much more I can add to what the author has already explained, except to say how disturbing it is that this is the operating environment that both major corporations and trucking companies have to deal with in Mexico. The panic switches and GPS locators are a nice touch, but they can't prevent all hijackings, especially with the speed and precision with which groups like Los Zetas execute them. Fortunately, it sounds like it's just the cargo that's being targeted and not the drivers, so the odds of a driver living through a Mexican hijacking incident is pretty good, although it will definitely leave a few marks. It's also bad for both businesses and consumers, who will eventually pay for the cost of additional transport security.

As for the planted drug situation, there's not much information in the article explaining how those drugs make their way onto cleared trucks in the first place, or what companies are doing to prevent this from happening. In the Sharp Electronics case, it looks like they wouldn't have been able to do much, since the contraband was in boxes that came from a Mexican supplier. Fortunately the drugs were detected early on, but how? How many other companies have had this problem? If the narcos are surreptitiously planting this stuff on cleared trucks, does that automatically vindicate the cargo or truck owner since they didn't know what was happening, or should they be responsible for screening their shipments before they arrive in the US? I wish the author had expanded this aspect of the story a little bit because there's a similar controversy brewing in the rail sector. The US government has brought a suit against Union Pacific because drugs were discovered in their rail cars after they arrived in the US. The US government claims that Union Pacific should inspect their trains in Mexico before they enter the US, and that the company should be held accountable for any drugs that are discovered in their trains (Union Pacific disagrees, of course). I wonder what would have happened to Sharp Electronics if those drugs had been discovered in the US instead of prior to leaving the plant. 

Either way, it looks like the trucking industry has plenty to deal with. We can only hope that between CBP inspections at ports of entry, new technology being incorporated into those inspections, and self-inspections by companies operating in Mexico, it will become increasingly difficult to sneak drug shipments onto cleared commercial vehicles. We can also hope that truckers don't start installing heat-seeking missiles on their trucks or attaching .50-caliber rifles to their cabs for protection, or else the cost of your next TV will probably be out of your budget. 

"The Sicario: A Juárez hit man speaks."

Here is an excerpt from Charles Bowden's article in Harper's Magazine:

"I am ready for the story of all the dead men who last saw his face. As I drank coffee and tried to frame questions in my mind, a crime reporter in Juárez was cut down beside his eight-year-old daughter as they sat in his car letting it warm up. This morning as I drove down here, a Toyota passed me with a bumper sticker that read, with a heart symbol, i love love. This morning I tried to remember how I got to this rendezvous. I was in a distant city and a man told me of the killer and how he had hidden him. He said at first he feared him, but he was so useful. He would clean everything and cook all the time and get on his hands and knees and polish his shoes. I took him on as a favor, he explained. I said, 'I want him. I want to put him on paper.' And so I came. The man I wait for insists, 'You don’t know me. No one can forgive me for what I did.' He has pride in his hard work. The good killers make a very tight pattern through the driver’s door. They do not spray rounds everywhere in the vehicle, no, they make a tight pattern right through the door and into the driver’s chest. The reporter who died received just such a pattern, ten rounds from a 9mm and not a single bullet came near his eight-year-old daughter. I wait. I admire craftsmanship... I have spent years getting to this moment. The killers, well, I have been around them before. Once I partied with two hundred armed killers in a Mexican hotel for five days. But they were not interested in talking about their murders. He is." Link to Extended Excerpt on Anderson Cooper 360

Analysis: THIS is what an interview with an assassin should look like. It is a gripping ten-page account of the interview between the author - a veteran and award-winning journalist - and the subject, a world-weary and repentant sicario who has been staying out of the business for the last two years. The article is gripping, intense, and incredibly vivid in its detail and emotion. It's unfortunate that you can only read an excerpt of it online, but it's completely worth the drive to your local bookstore to pick up a copy of May 2009 edition of Harper's in order to read it (and thanks to James Creechan and Lindsay Beyerstein for recommending this!).

There are a few things about the article that I want to point out, which will hopefully encourage those of you with a profound interest in this topic to go out and buy the mag. First, the writing is really good. Yes, it's very dramatic and reads like a novel in some places. But isn't that what keeps you interested? Bowden, unlike some writers, doesn't use that tactic to detract from shaky "facts" or a mediocre story. The subject and the interview are very grave, which merits a degree of drama, in my opinion. I think it adds context and perspective, especially for those who don't follow border violence issues and don't realize just how bad things are in some places in Mexico.

Several important aspects of the drug smuggling business are revealed here, and it's not in a question-and-answer format that makes you wonder whether or not the answers were planted or the subject was set up to answer in a certain way. For example, the subject explains at great length that he never really knew who he was working for. He got orders, carried them out, and got paid in cash, booze, drugs, and women. He had rules to follow, and as long as he followed them, he stayed alive.

He explains that towards the end of his "career," after things started getting really bad in 2006, he was kidnapped twice. He talked about how his captors and torturers were amateurs in their methods - something I've noticed going on in the Tijuana area for about a year or so. This is part of what's contributing to the more grisly slayings and collateral damage - the fact that some newer hitmen are inexperienced, not as likely to follow the rules, and bloodthirsty. There's a part of the article where the subject talks about the difference between men that kill as a job and men that kill because they like killing. He felt that the men who enjoyed killing for its own sake were sick and needed to be killed themselves because they were a liability...an interesting viewpoint.

One of the more disturbing parts is his discussion of the corruption among Mexican law enforcement and the collusion between police and the DTOs. I knew corruption was widespread in many, if not most, areas of Mexico, but I had no idea it was this pervasive. The mere thought of Mexican cops taking part in kidnappings and torture - regardless of whether or not the victims are dirty themselves and owe money to a drug lord - is tough to swallow. However, it makes the problem of corruption so real, and helps the reader see what in incredible obstacle corruption poses to the Calderon administration.

So if you haven't figured it out yet, I think this is an incredibly good read, and well worth the time, effort, and $6.95 to get it at the news stand. It's an insight into a world who some think they know, yet we've only begun to scratch the surface; we may never get to the day-to-day truth that lies deep beneath for so many in Mexico.

"Tubac checkpoint still a flashpoint."

Here is an excerpt from Jaime Richardson's article in The Sahuarita Sun:

"The Border Patrol checkpoint north of Tubac is killing tourism, putting residents in harm’s way and costing million of dollars in home sales, according to local business owners. But it’s also responsible for the seizure of tons of illegal drugs, hundreds of arrests and an increased sense of security in the area, Border Patrol officials say. The value of the temporary checkpoint at the northbound Agua Linda Road exit has been debated for years, but it was stepped up with last week’s announcement that expansion will begin in June... Carol Cullen, executive director of the Tubac Chamber of Commerce, is concerned that smugglers looking to get around the checkpoint are driven up the Santa Cruz River, Anza Trail or along railroad tracks and gas lines, pushing them closer to homes and people... The Border Patrol is awaiting results of a Government Accountability Office report on the effectiveness of permanent checkpoints, which is expected as early as June... The permanent checkpoint would be much larger, with about 10 buildings on 25 acres, with six to eight paved lanes and a covered inspection area... Mike Scioli, a spokesman for the Tucson Sector of the Border Patrol, understands the opposition but points out that many residents are thankful for the “second layer of defense” against smugglers and other criminals." Link to Full Article

Analysis: Before I make any comments on the information in this article, I'd like to provide some geographical context first. Tubac is a REALLY small town, with a population hovering at just over 1,000 people. It serves as a draw for tourists because of its galleries, shops, and boutiques. Tubac is located approximately 22 miles north of Nogales and the Arizona-Mexico border and 48 miles south of Tucson. The town sits right off of Interstate 19, and is surrounded by generally flat, desert terrain. The USBP checkpoint in question is approximately five miles north of Tubac. There are a few interstate exits between Tubac and the Agua Linda exit; however, one has to go through the checkpoint if headed to Alamo, Tucson, or any other major population center north of Tubac.

So, there are basically two sides to this argument: the argument by the business owners and residents of Tubac that feel the checkpoint is a detriment to business and safety, and the argument by US authorities that the checkpoint is effective and its expansion will be a benefit. Each side has its merits, but the argument (as always) brings us to the sliding scale of security, with ease and convenience at one end of the scale and super-tight security at the other end. The point where most are happy lies somewhere in between, but that point moves on almost a daily basis sometimes.

I can understand that Tubac is probably losing some money due to the real or perceived inconvenience of the checkpoint. However, I'm a little skeptical about some of the claims quoted in the article. $5 million in lost home sales? Brasher Realty sells some modest homes, but also some pricey custom homes, land, and commercial property. Was it dozens of buyers that were interested in modest homes who changed their minds, or was it two wealthy buyers who signed contracts for a dozen acres and 5,000 sq ft custom homes? Hard to tell from the article. Also, is it constantly a 20-minute wait to pass through the checkpoint? I would imagine that after the expansion is completed, that wait time would be greatly reduced because of the increased number of lanes and additional systems with which to run checks.

I have to admit, I'm pretty floored with the seizure statistics: 40,000 pounds of marijuana seized at the Agua Linda Road checkpoint in the 2007-08 fiscal year; 200 pounds of cocaine; 500 arrests of Mexican and US citizens. From October 2008 through March 2009, agents at the checkpoint seized 19,000 pounds of marijuana and made more than 300 arrests; that's impressive by any standard, and one can't argue that the checkpoint isn't making a difference. But is it really giving the impression that crime is up in the area? Enhanced or increased law enforcement presence can do that, yes. But it can also give people a greater sense of security because they know cops are around. It's also possible that the Tubac view of crime is a little skewed; there's obviously plenty of criminal activity going on in the area if USBP is making that many arrests and seizing that much dope at that checkpoint. However, the impact of those incidents is probably not being directly felt in town five miles away in the form of gang violence, DTO-initiated murders or kidnappings, or drug dealing. 

Honestly, I feel bad that anyone has to lose money during these times, especially in such a small town that relies heavily on tourist dollars. However, you can't complain about border security not being tight enough, then complain again when USBP is doing their job in a place you don't like. Yes, tough enforcement often comes with a price, and it's unfortunate that many people in Tubac feel they're paying it. But this "not in my backyard" mentality is better applied to relocating Gitmo detainees than it is to the USBP doing a fine job of seizing drugs and arresting criminals like we've been begging them to do.

"Schemes to cross border getting bolder."

Here is an excerpt from Moises Mendoza's article in The Houston Chronicle:

"U.S. Border Patrol agent John Lopez has seen it all: Men hiding in tiny holes in the ground, in car trunks and behind seat backs. He’s even captured an illegal immigrant hiding in a suitcase... Each year, agents see many brazen attempts to sneak people and drugs into the U.S. But as border enforcement has stepped up in the past two years, smugglers’ schemes appear to be getting more creative and bolder than ever... Smugglers could be turning to craftier tactics because it’s harder than ever to sneak people across the border. Or, as some Border Patrol officials believe, this is nothing strange at all — smugglers are innovating all the time. Between January and March of this year, the Border Patrol captured 164,733 illegal immigrants, compared to about 227,000 over the same period last year. It’s not clear whether the decrease is due to increased enforcement or an ailing economy with few jobs to draw immigrants." Link to Full Article

Analysis: This article makes two main points, both of which are well-presented and important to make note of. First is the point that smugglers have always been creative, and new and crazy ways of bringing people or drugs across the border doesn't necessarily have to be in immediate response to enforcement efforts, the loss of a plaza, etc. Successful drug smugglers know that a portion of their product will be lost to seizures, stolen loads, or lost/dropped loads. They factor this in as a percentage and thus the cost of doing business. Smugglers also know they can reduce their loss percentage by spreading their product around to different smuggling avenues, some of which will inevitably be more successful than others. Some of these methods include the use of backpackers, all-terrain vehicles, ultralights, border tunnels, go-fast boats, and drug submarines. Moving people is a bit of a different story, and allows for a little less creativity simply because people need to breathe, eat, drink water, and relieve themselves, limiting the amount of time and space a person can be cramped into an object or compartment. Ultimately, the creativity just makes good business sense, in addition to helping smugglers thwart the authorities.

The second point is that it's hard to pinpoint exactly why less people are being arrested and detained for attempting to cross the border illegally. I don't think you can point to a single factor. Yes, I believe the ailing US economy has something to do with it. However, the Mexican economy is also ailing - some would say more so than the US - and job prospects for illegals in the US are probably still better in most respects than they are in Mexico. I also think improved enforcement has something to do with it. While CBP and USBP still don't have as many people as they need to maintain control of every square inch of the US-Mexico border - which in some places is extremely rugged and inaccessible during bad weather - the technology available to them has improved significantly. But you can't rely completely on gadgets. Previous deployments of National Guard troops to the border have provided hundreds of extra eyes, which free up USBP agents to conduct apprehensions. Sensors, scopes, helicopters, improved roads, and just plain additional bodies are helping with the enforcement effort.

Bottom line, the creativity will continue, both in the drug and human smuggling arenas, and due to both business/economic reasons and enforcement efforts. Based on the stories in this article and personal anecdotes I've heard from CBP officers, I can't wait to see how crazy these smugglers can get.

IN FOCUS: The Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act

On December 3, 1999, President Clinton signed into law the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (the “Kingpin Act”). The Kingpin Act blocks all property and interests in property, subject to US jurisdiction, owned or controlled by significant foreign narcotics traffickers as identified by the President. In addition, the Kingpin Act blocks the property and interests in property, subject to US jurisdiction, of foreign persons designated by the Secretary of Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General, the CIA Director, the FBI Director, the DEA Administrator, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State, who are found to be: (1) materially assisting in, or providing financial or technological support for or to, or providing goods or services in support of, the international narcotics trafficking activities of a person designated pursuant to the Kingpin Act; (2) owned, controlled, or directed by, or acting for or on behalf of, a person designated pursuant to the Kingpin Act; or (3) playing a significant role in international narcotics trafficking. 

Significant foreign narcotics traffickers and foreign persons designated by the Secretary of the Treasury are referred to collectively as Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers. Foreign persons designated under the Kingpin Act are referred to as "[SDNTK]s" on the Office of Foreign Assets Control's listing of "Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons" to differentiate them from the Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers named under Executive Order 12978. US persons are prohibited from engaging in any transaction or dealing in property or interests in property of [SDNTK]s and from engaging in any transaction that evades or avoids the prohibitions of the Kingpin Act. These prohibitions affect trade transactions as well as accounts, securities, and other assets.

Since the inception of the Kingpin Act, dozens of top Mexican DTO members have been added to the SDNTK list, including the Arellano Felix brothers, Osiel Cardenas Guillen, Ismael Zambada Garcia, Joaquin Guzman Loera, and Vicente Carrillo Fuentes. In June 2004, the AFO and VCFO were added to the list as organizations. In June 2007, the Gulf cartel was added, and in May 2008, the BLO was added. Most recently, in April 2009, La Familia Michoacana, Los Zetas, and the Sinaloa Federation were added to the SDNTK list as organizations.

"Mexican drug lord orders deadly force."

Here is an excerpt from Josh Meyer's article in The Baltimore Sun:

"The reputed head of Mexico's Sinaloa drug cartel has instructed his army of associates to use deadly force if necessary to protect their increasingly contested trafficking operations, even against U.S. law enforcement, according to authorities here and in Washington. The threatened offensive by Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, Mexico's most-wanted man, was described by U.S. officials as being highly unusual, given that his associates have avoided violent confrontations with American law enforcement officers, and have kept their blood feuds with fellow traffickers largely south of the border. Guzman is believed to have delivered the message personally in early March, during a three-day gathering of his associates in Sonoita, a small Mexican town just a few miles south of the Arizona border, according to U.S. intelligence bulletins sent to several state and federal law enforcement officials. The Sonoita meeting is one of many indications that Mexico's most-wanted man is becoming more brazen even in the face of a massive Mexican government crackdown on his activities and deadly turf rivalries with other traffickers." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I'm really concerned about this, as it's plausible enough to be true. I haven't seen the bulletin in question yet, and even if I had, I might not be able to comment on it anyway as it's probably marked as Law Enforcement Sensitive. So, going solely on the information in this newspaper article, I agree with the author's assessment that Guzman's brazenness is unexpected, yet not out of the realm of possibility with everything that the Mexican government has been doing to crack down on his operations. Still, DTOs have shied away from directly confronting US law enforcement because it's not good business sense to engage US authorities unless absolutely necessary.

I'm curious if the bulletin has more details regarding the rules of engagement, or ROEs, for US authorities. Did Guzman differentiate between engaging locals and feds? Did he order his people to fire only if fired upon? Did he offer instructions for disposing of any US law enforcement bodies after a deadly shootout, or were his orders only to shoot and run? These questions may sound inconsequential, but considering that DHS is drawing up a new (and I imagine lengthy) border response plan, the response to any intentional deadly-force engagement by DTOs with US local or federal law enforcement is likely to be bigger and more intense than it would have been, say, two or three months ago. All this being said, the order may just have been an attempt by Guzman to instill some courage (or at least bravado) in his drug runners, who may have been more prone to dump pricey shipments at the first sign of US authorities. Drug runners are mostly still wary of US law enforcement, but I think this information is plausible, and US law enforcement along the border is wise to be even more cautious than usual.

"America tried a war like this before."

Here is an excerpt from Mike Gray's article in The Detroit News:

"After decades of trying to stem the influx of illegal narcotics into the United States, it's clear that the drug war, like Prohibition, has led us into a gruesome blind alley. Drugs are cheaper than ever before and you can buy them anywhere. As Mexico's cash-starved government struggles to keep up the good fight, the drug barons rake in more than enough to buy political protection and military power while still maintaining profit margins beyond imagining. And what's driving this desperate struggle may be the ubiquitous weed: Southwestern lawmen say that marijuana accounts for two-thirds of the cartels' income. At last, the spectacular violence in Mexico has captured everybody's attention, and in an eerie replay of the end of alcohol prohibition, we may at last be witnessing the final act in the war on drugs." Link to Full Article

Analysis: What follows in the rest of the article is an interesting argument for the legalization of marijuana. Without getting into the whole moral or legal debate, I think the article presents a great angle comparing the organized crime problem in the US during Prohibition to the current organized crime problem in Mexico. The argument has its strengths and weaknesses, but overall, it's well-written and provides a great argument. Of course, there are always a couple of things I like to point out in an article like this.

Gray mentions that drugs are cheaper today than ever before and available anywhere. Well, that's partly true. The price of cocaine has been going down over the last several years, but is now on the rise again due to enforcement efforts. Low-grade marijuana is cheap, but the price of high-grade Mexican marijuana and Canadian marijuana from British Columbia (known as "BC bud") is high and going up. Mexico is also exporting black-tar heroin, which is increasingly popular and not always cheap. However, methamphetamine is right on the heels of marijuana as far as Mexican drug exports go, and that is relatively cheap and very easy to make.

I've read the arguments before regarding the income that would be generated by legalizing marijuana. I wonder how much of that would be offset by the need for treatment program, rehab facilities, etc. I also wonder if the use of meth, designer drugs like ecstasy, or other relatively cheap and readily available drugs would increase. Who knows? Maybe the use of harder drugs might go down because marijuana is all of a sudden really cheap and legally available anywhere. I don't know enough about patterns of illegal drug use or the psychology of drug use to speculate intelligently about the societal effects the legalization of marijuana would have. I have a feeling that many would argue we shouldn't legalize a substance like marijuana in an attempt to reduce violence in another country. But then, others would argue that too much effort by law enforcement is being wasted and too much jail space is being used for people being picked up for possessing a couple of joints. 

I agree with Gray that this won't solve the drug problem. He thinks it might save us from something worse, but it's really hard to say. Mexican DTOs have made inroads to European markets and have established relationships in Central and South America; in some cases, with unsavory characters like the terrorist group Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru. Try to think of this situation in business terms. If you sell flowers to the US because the US is your primary market and pays you a lot of money for your flowers, it's bad for your business if the US changes its attitude about flowers. Let's say the US decides it's better to grow its own flowers because it can do so for much cheaper than buying them from you. Now you have two choices: sell your flowers to someone else who's willing to pay top dollars for your flowers, or start selling something else to the US. If the bottom drops out of the illegal marijuana market, who's to say that the DTOs won't sell it to Europe, Canada, South America, or elsewhere? And who's to say they won't start pushing cocaine, methamphetamine, and black-tar heroin even harder?

Or, who's to say that it won't dramatically reduce crime rates in the US, reduce violence levels in Mexico, and free up a significant amount of time for DEA, CBP/USBP, and other law enforcement agencies that can begin to focus exclusively on the hard stuff? I firmly believe you can do a million studies, create a million computer models, and consult with a million experts on the subject, but no one will be able to say with complete accuracy the effects of marijuana legalization until it's actually put into practice. Whether or not that policy will be enacted during this Administration - or my lifetime - is just as good a mystery.

"Grisly slayings brings Mexican drug war to US."

Here is an excerpt from Pauline Arrillaga's Associated Press article:

"Shelby County Sheriff Chris Curry found out firsthand what federal drug enforcement agents have long understood. The drug war, with the savagery it brings, knows no bounds. It had landed in his back yard, in the foothills of the Appalachians, in Alabama's wealthiest county, around the corner from The Home Depot... Five men dead in an apartment in a county that might see five homicides in an entire year... Some of the men showed signs of torture: Burns seared into their earlobes revealed where modified jumper cables had been clamped as an improvised electrocution device. Adhesive from duct tape used to bind the victims still clung to wrists and faces, from mouths to noses... It didn't take long for Curry and federal agents to piece together clues: A murder scene, clean save for the crimson-turned-brown stains now spotting the carpet. Just a couple of mattresses tossed on the floor. It was a typical stash house... Now the cartels have brought the fight to us: In 230 U.S. cities, the Mexican organizations maintain distribution hubs or supply drugs to local distributors, according to the Justice Department's National Drug Intelligence Center... What's new is where that violence is erupting, where distribution cells and hubs and sub-hubs have surfaced. How an apartment in Alabama became the site of a drug hit in many ways tells the story of the narco-trade in America in 2009, and of the challenges we face in combatting a blight that has spread to big cities and small all across the land."  Link to Full Article

Analysis: This is a really great article, and it approaches the border violence "spillover" phenomenon from a non oft-explored angle - border violence that's happening far away from the border. It's public knowledge that Mexican DTOs have been operating in hundreds of American towns and cities, and the media has been publicizing that a little more as of late. However, you don't hear many news stories of drug-related murders in small towns in the southeast or midwest US. I imagine the local news carry those items more than the national audience will never know, and as the article says, the locals in those towns are very concerned and starting to become afraid of the spread of narco-violence away from the southwest border.

I like that the author explained how easy it is for DTO associated in the US to blend into the population because of the growing Hispanic population in more rural areas. One thing she doesn't mention is the DTOs' affiliation with US based gangs and the violence in US cities that arises from that relationship. Unfortunately, this is where some definitions of DTO-related violence gets gray and hazy. US-based gangs distribute the drugs that are smuggled into the US by DTOs. Often, US-based gangs are contracted by the DTOs to carry out executions inside the US. When a gang member murders someone in Texas on behalf of a DTO, should we classify that as DTO-related violence? Gang violence? Or just a "simple" murder? Defining spillover, which was already complicated and considerably nebulous, is even more difficult when you take geography and gang activity into consideration.

I'm a huge fan of George Friedman's and Strategic Forecasting in general, so I was happy to see he was quoted in this article - it lends a lot of credence. And yes, what's going on in Mexico is more of a mess than a war sometimes. Endemic corruption is an institutional problem, not something that can be ameliorated with better policing - especially when police are the problem. As long as the demand for drugs in the US is fueling DTO business in Mexico, and as long as corruption and fear of DTO retribution fuels DTO business in Mexico, the war AND the mess will continue on both sides of the border and beyond.

"Drug traffickers move underwater."

Here is an excerpt from John Otis' article on GlobalPost.com:

"Today, smugglers are moving tons of drugs towards the United States in so-called “semi-submersibles,” homemade vessels that travel just below the ocean’s surface and cover distances of up to 2,000 miles. Because they leave tiny wakes, the crude subs are extremely difficult to detect visually or by radar. Even when they are spotted, crew members quickly sink the vessels to get rid of the evidence and avoid being prosecuted for drug trafficking. uthorities seized 14 semi-submersibles last year, and another six have been captured this year, according to Colombian Navy Capt. Mario Rodriguez. Most of the vessels move between Colombia and drop-off points in Mexico and Central America... [Smugglers] used to prefer go-fast boats, high-speed fiberglass watercraft that can carry 2 tons of drugs and travel up to 80 miles per hour in calm seas. But those crafts leave huge wakes and anti-drug agents, using helicopters and their own racing boats, have become far more adept at spotting them. So, the traffickers have moved underwater by making modifications to the go-fast boat design." Link to Full Article

Analysis: Drug subs are a great example of both DTO creativity and, in some cases, desperation. Some are high-end professionally constructed vessels that cost upwards of $1  million to build. In 2000, a half-built sub was found in a Colombian warehouse, and Russian documents found at the site led investigators to believe the Russian mafia or Russian technicians were involved in the sub's construction. Some others are more ramshackle affairs that look like someone wrapped PVC pipes and cardboard together with duct tape and put it to sea with a Fred Flintstone-like propulsion system. Either way, these subs are designed to go long distances without stopping. The US Coast Guard estimates some of these vessels can travel from South America to the US coast without stopping to refuel or resupply.

So, if drug subs are so stealthy and easy to dispose of if detected, then why haven't we seen more of them? Open source reports indicate these vessels have been seized going back to at least 2000, but from what I can tell, the annual seizures are usually in the single digits or maybe the teens. There may be a couple of reasons. First, there may be hundreds of them out there, but they're not being detected because (a) they're so stealthy, (b) the Mexican navy's technology is not sophisticated enough to find them, or (c) a combination of both. Or, maybe it's not cost effective to build hundreds of these things to send product north along the Mexican coast. Each sub can carry tons of product, which is equivalent to several truckloads, car loads, or backpacker loads of product carried across land or through a border tunnel. Similar to border tunnels, I think the drug subs are another way for DTOs to diversify their smuggling conveyances. And remember, the subs are moving product from Colombia to Mexico, not across the maritime border (at least, not typically) into US waters. It's still easier and less costly, I believe, to get the product into Mexico by sea, then move it into the US by land.

Bottom line, I don't know if we can consider this a trend yet. Drug subs have been around for a few years, but the number of seizures and detections haven't increased by a sufficient margin to say whether or not this is the next big thing for them. DTOs have even explored the use of ultralights for bringing product across the border, so who knows what conveyance may be on the horizon for them.

"Hezbollah uses Mexican drug routes into U.S."

Here is an excerpt from Sara A. Carter's exclusive article in The Washington Times:

"Hezbollah is using the same southern narcotics routes that Mexican drug kingpins do to smuggle drugs and people into the United States, reaping money to finance its operations and threatening U.S. national security, current and former U.S. law enforcement, defense and counterterrorism officials say. The Iran-backed Lebanese group has long been involved in narcotics and human trafficking in South America's tri-border region of Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil. Increasingly, however, it is relying on Mexican narcotics syndicates that control access to transit routes into the U.S. Hezbollah relies on 'the same criminal weapons smugglers, document traffickers and transportation experts as the drug cartels,' said Michael Braun, who just retired as assistant administrator and chief of operations at the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). 'They work together,' said Mr. Braun. 'They rely on the same shadow facilitators. One way or another, they are all connected. They'll leverage those relationships to their benefit, to smuggle contraband and humans into the U.S.; in fact, they already are [smuggling].' His comments were confirmed by six U.S. officials, including law enforcement, defense and counterterrorism specialists. They spoke on the condition that they not be named because of the sensitivity of the topic." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I'm concerned about the impression this article gives the average reader, as the information - in the way it's presented - is misleading in many ways. After reading it through once, it seems like the author is trying to imply that Mexican DTOs are knowingly and actively colluding with Hizballah to move drugs and people across the border into the US. This doesn't make much sense, and I'll explain why.

First, there are a limited number of routes through which ANY organization can move contraband - whether narcotic, human, or otherwise - across the border. It's logical that several organizations would attempt to use these routes for different purposes. I italicized the word "attempt" because it's well-known that DTOs have VERY tight control over these routes.  The bloodshed going on every day along the border is a result of turf battles between DTOs over these routes. Alien smuggling organizations, or ASOs, are also well-established in specific places along the border, and many of them specialize in moving special interest aliens - individuals from countries associated with terrorism in some way - from Mexico into the US. DTOs and ASOs are VERY particular about what their routes are used for, and by whom they're used. DTOs have retaliated in grisly fashion against some individuals who have attempted to use their border tunnels or drug routes to move people. Per the US Dept of Justice, when ASOs use DTO drug routes to move people, they do it with the express knowledge and permission of the controlling DTO, and that the authorized use comes at a price. Knowing all this, one has to ask: Why would a business enterprise like a DTO who wishes to avoid the full wrath of the US Government willingly get involved with a terrorist organization like Hizballah?

Let's examine the human smuggling aspect. Yes, it's likely that members of Hizballah have entered the US illegally from Mexico (although open sources on this topic are sketchy). However, they're generally not the ones running the show, as most ASOs - especially those bringing in SIAs - are Mexican-run. Does this mean that Hizballah is using the same human smuggling routes as DTOs and ASOs? Technically yes, but it's in the semantics. Hizballah is likely just paying their fees to the smugglers to get them across the same as other SIAs. This does not mean that they're actively colluding with DTOs in an organization-to-organization or "managerial" capacity.

The drug smuggling aspect is even more incongruous in the context presented in this article. Hizballah is involved in the drug trade, but only as a relatively small part of its operations in the Americas - almost as a side gig. They earn most of the money they send back to the homeland through counterfeit goods, both in Latin America and various communities in the US. Hizballah's presence in the tri-border area and other parts of the Americas is considerable, but I haven't seen much data supporting any assertion that Hizballah has a sizeable presence in Mexico. For argument's sake, let's say they did have enough people in-country to get involved in the Mexico-to-US drug trade. Why on earth would a DTO allow Hizballah to operate in their territory? DTOs' main goals include maximizing profits and minimizing Mexican (and US) government interference in their operations. Despite increases in some US cities near the border, we have not seen the same levels of violence on the US side as the Mexican side, and there's a very good reason for that. DTOs are willing to risk a small amount of attention from US law enforcement for their actions. They are NOT willing to risk a full federal and military response, which is surely what would transpire should hard evidence emerge that a DTO was actively colluding with a terrorist organization.

All this being said, Mr. Braun's comments are plausible, meaning it's entirely possible that Hizballah and DTOs are using the same networks or the same facilitators to accomplish their goals in Latin America. This does NOT automatically mean that DTOs and Hizballah are knowingly working together, and it's likely not in the DTOs' best interests to establish such a relationship in the future.