Mexico's Drug War

"Firearms watchdog on short leash."

Here is an excerpt from Sari Horwitz and James Grimaldi's article in The Washington Post:

"The National Tracing Center is the only place in the nation authorized to trace gun sales. Here, researchers with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives make phone calls and pore over handwritten records from across the country to track down gun owners. In contrast with such state-of-the-art, 21st-century crime-fighting techniques as DNA matching and digital fingerprint analysis, gun tracing is an antiquated, laborious process done mostly by hand. The government is prohibited from putting gun ownership records into an easily accessible format, such as a searchable computer database. For decades, the National Rifle Association has lobbied successfully to block all attempts at such computerization, arguing against any national registry of firearm ownership. Concerns about government regulation of gun ownership have limited the resources available to the ATF, led to strict regulatory restrictions and left the agency without leadership... For the FBI, there are 19 lines of congressional direction. For the DEA, there are 10. For the ATF, there are 87 lines, including the requirement to keep the gun-tracing database hidden from the public... In 1972, when the ATF separated from the Internal Revenue Service and became its own bureau within the Treasury Department, it had about 2,500 agents. At the time, the FBI had 8,700, the DEA 1,500 and the U.S. Marshals 1,900. Thirty-eight years later, the FBI is up to 13,000, the DEA has more than tripled to 5,000, and there are 3,300 federal marshals. The ATF, now a part of the Justice Department, remains at 2,500... The ATF does not have enough personnel to fully inspect the firearms and explosives dealers under its charge. The bureau has about 600 inspectors to cover more than 115,000 firearms dealers - about 55,000 collectors and about 60,000 retail sellers... By law, the ATF can inspect dealers for compliance only once a year. But despite improvements, officials acknowledge that, on average, dealers are inspected only about once a decade... When inspectors document persistent or severe violations, they can issue warning letters or hold warning conferences with licensees. When problems are critical, they can move to take away the license. Dealers, however, can drag out the process for years and sell guns the entire time... One of the ATF's chief concerns is missing guns... Nationwide, dealers lose track of an enormous number of guns. Since 2005, 3,847 inspections have documented 113,642 guns that cannot be found... The process is complicated because dealers by law do not have to take inventory. In a 2003 provision authored by Rep. Todd Tiahrt (R-Kan.), Congress prohibited the ATF from requiring dealers to do inventories. As a result, ATF inspectors sometimes have to spend days or weeks poring through a dealer's paperwork and physically matching it to the guns on hand... New legislation, pending before Congress, would further limit the agency's ability to regulate dealers... The agency, for the first time, would have to show that a dealer knew the law and intentionally disregarded it; in other words, the ATF would have to establish the dealer's state of mind at the time of the violation. The NRA said the law is necessary because dealers often are harshly punished for trivial paperwork errors." Link to Full Article

Analysis: That was a really long excerpt, I know, but necessarily so. The article itself is five pages long, and I didn't even cover the difficulty the ATF has in poring through thousands of handwritten forms and documents it receives every year from gun sellers who go out of business. I strongly recommend that you read the entire article to get a better grasp of the immense challenges the ATF is dealing with when it comes to stopping the southbound flow of weapons into Mexico, on top of domestic illegal firearms transactions.

I've always said that the best solution (which won't fix the problem, but should make it better) to southbound weapons trafficking is to allocate a significant amount of additional resources to the ATF and not change laws (i.e. reinstate the assault weapons ban). You've read how insanely understaffed they are, and how archaic their tracing process is by necessity. The demands being placed on them to conduct inspections of gun sellers, review records, and run investigations of suspected traffickers are astronomical compared to what they can realistically accomplish with the resources they currently have. 

However, I was very wrong. We really need to change several laws, and I'm not talking about having a change of heart on the assault weapons ban. It's a strange position for me because I'm very pro-gun, being a former law enforcement agent and current gun owner. I also usually support most of the NRA's position on gun policy. But precisely because I'm a former agent, I can't fathom the idiocy of the current laws and regulations that tie the hands of the very agency dedicated to stopping weapons trafficking.

Think about it from a practical/rational perspective. We all have to register our vehicles with county government agencies, which means we have personal information in a government database. Our (very private and personal) medical records are now being kept in computerized databases. If we're homeowners, all details related to transactions with our homes are maintained in a government database. The government also has access to tons of personal information on our military members, many of whom are gun owners. Basically, if we drive a car, pay taxes, have a job, receive any sort of government benefit, or own a bank account or investments, our most personal information is stored in a computerized database which the government can access in some way.

The NRA and its staunchest supporters have major heartburn over the computerized registration of firearms. Seriously? OK, I can understand that we have SO many other things registered that gun owners don't want to deal with one more thing. I also understand that some gun owners are fiercely protective of their Second Amendment rights, and are fearful that gun registration will somehow eventually lead to the government either taxing their guns or taking them away, although I think those fears are a bit unwarranted.

But what happens when laws regarding gun registration impede on a US agency's ability to catch bad guys? On one hand, you have people screaming to stop the southbound flow of firearms from our gun shops into DTO hands, and demanding that the ATF do moremoremore. On the other hand, you have people lobbying Congress to create even more laws to prevent the ATF from doing almost anything, and I suspect that many of those people don't care where the weapons go or how they're used, as long as their rights to own one aren't impeded. The article briefly mentions the Tiahrt Amendment, but doesn't tell you about another one of its restrictions. The Amendment specifically prohibits most information sharing regarding trace data between the ATF and agencies with any sort of intelligence function. God forbid anyone might want to conduct some sort of interstate analysis on weapons trafficking to ascertain some sort of pattern to try and stop the bad guys. This happened to me when I was an analyst in California; I tried to write the first state fusion center-initiated joint analysis of southbound weapons trafficking with my colleagues at the fusion centers in Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. Unfortunately, the keystone of the project was ATF firearms trace data. The ATF supervisory agents I spoke with were so willing to help, and really wanted to see our product succeed. Unfortunately, their hands were legally tied, and they couldn't give us the information we desperately needed to cement our (in my opinion) groundbreaking joint product. It never saw the light of day.

So what say I? Let the ATF do their freakin' job! The restrictions that Congress is imposing on the ATF right now is like telling the FBI that all fingerprints need to be kept on paper, and you can only match up those of a suspect with those on file by using a magnifying glass. Or having a license plate number of a hit-and-run suspect and having to find the vehicle records by poring through thousands of Excel spreadsheets. I'm firmly of the mindset that if you're not doing anything wrong/illegal, then you have nothing to worry about by having your firearm transaction details in a computerized database. It's like having to undergo additional screening at the airport. Yeah, it sucks and it's inconvenient, but if you're not smuggling explosives or box cutters, you'll be on your way soon enough.

It's all about striking the right balance. I never thought an ultra-conservative group like the NRA could have anything in common with an ultra-liberal group like the ACLU, but they do. Both are groups with strong public voices who often impede the ability of law enforcement agencies to do their jobs. It is entirely possible for gun owners and legal buyers in the US to keep owning and legally buying guns, while at the same time, the ATF works with significantly more agents and analysts to prevent straw buyers from buying guns for transport to Mexico. But until Congress unties the hands - or at least loosens them up quite a bit - of the ATF, we're not going to see much slowing down of gun traffic flowing south.

"The case of the 20 missing Mexican tourists doesn't add up."

Here is an excerpt from Ken Ellingwood's article in the L.A. Times:

"It's one of the more puzzling episodes in a drug war heaped with unsolved cases: 20 Mexican men travel to Acapulco together and are kidnapped en masse as soon as they arrive. wo weeks later, there has been no trace of the men. Investigators have yet to announce any good leads, even though two others from the group were not taken. Against the backdrop of Mexico's extraordinary drug violence, it's tempting to write off the Sept. 30 disappearance as another grim skirmish between rival traffickers... But in the Acapulco case, the pieces don't add up neatly. Relatives back in the western state of Michoacan insist they were no drug henchmen, but ordinary guys: mechanics, students, deliverymen, an accountant, a physician. Loved ones said the friends and co-workers saved up for months for an annual, guys-only weekend in the seaside resort... Authorities have made comments casting doubt that the men were mere tourists, but have not specified a motive for the disappearances...  A state police commander first raised an eyebrow, saying it was unusual for a group of men to go on vacation without family members. And Zeferino Torreblanca Galindo, governor of the state of Guerrero, where Acapulco is located, was also quick to express skepticism. 'We assume it has to do with organized crime,' Torreblanca said a day after the news broke. 'I don't think anyone comes to deliberately carry out an attack on 20 tourists.' When the families complained that officials appeared to be blaming the victims, the authorities backed off, announcing that checks showed that none of the missing men had criminal records. When the men's vehicles were recovered, investigators found signs of a road trip — suitcases, beer, cookies — but no weapons or contraband. But last week, Mexico's tourism minister, Gloria Guevara, reignited tensions when she said the missing men 'didn't fit the usual profile' of a tourist. 'A tourist usually travels with family, has a hotel reservation, arrives directly at his hotel and fits certain profiles,' she told a congressional committee when a question about the case came up. Guevara stopped short of tying the men to criminal activities, but the implication seemed clear. Families of the men fired back, accusing Guevara of a 'lack of responsibility' and offering papers showing the group had reserved rooms for the three-day stay in a hotel they did not publicly identify." Link to Full Article

Analysis: To make this quick and dirty, know first off that the Mexican government can't afford to say that tourists - whether Mexican or foreign doesn't really matter - are being kidnapped in a high-profile resort area like Acapulco. I think those statements by government officials saying the men didn't fit a certain "tourist profile" are complete garbage. A tourist profile? Really? Can you honestly say that an American family consisting of a married couple and two or three kids heading to a major theme park for a week manages their vacation in the same way as four fraternity brothers from a big college heading to the Florida panhandle for Spring Break?

Speculation aside on these men's traveling habits, let's take a look at the facts. First, all the men had clean records. You can't go on the family's claims because they always say their family members aren't involved in drug dealing, but the records speak for themselves. Also, although nine of the victims were mechanics, the others had varied jobs in different places. This was also described as an annual trip, meaning it's not the first time these guys got into a few cars together and headed to Acapulco for a break. 

So what did happen to them? Was it another case of mistaken identity, as the current theory goes for the Hartley/Falcon Lake case? Los Zetas are currently fighting with La Familia Michoacana for control of Acapulco. Was this another case of amateur "Zetitas" carrying out an unsanctioned attack against a group of men they mistakenly thought posed a threat?

The worst-case scenario, of course, would be that the men were easy targets and kidnapped for ransom, or like the 72 migrants, offered the opportunity to work for Los Zetas in lieu of execution. All we know is that there have been no ransom demands, and there have been no heads or bodies showing up with notes attached. When DTOs want to send a message, they don't take too much time to put the bodies on public display, so it's likely the bodies of those 20 men have been summarily disposed of already. I don't believe they were picked off solely because they were tourists, but even if this was a DTO mistake, the Mexican government has to publicly push the assumption that the men were somehow dirty.

And this is where the real problem comes in. We're seeing more and more innocent bystanders being kidnapped for ransom, or shot and killed in cross-fire between narcos, or extorted at their places of business. The easiest (and most common) explanation for the death of a Mexican citizen by narco is that they were involved in the drug trade. That easy explanation can't be made in every case anymore, which means the Mexican government has to get up off its rear end and actually start investigating cases. I don't have the exact percentage handy, but the percentage of murder and kidnapping cases actually investigated with any level of professionalism and thoroughness is in the single digits. Even in the Hartley case, which was called off after two weeks, Mexican authorities acknowledged they spent way longer looking for his body than they would have for a Mexican citizen.

Will we ever know what happened to those men, or why it happened? Probably not. We can assume with some confidence that Los Zetas were likely involved (although La Familia is always a possibility, since the men were from Michoacán). Unfortunately, we can also assume that the Mexican government will continue to make it sound (whether intentional or not) that the 20 victims somehow had it coming to them. Whether they did or not, the authorities need to realize that thorough investigations for murder and kidnapping should be the rule and not the exception.

What really happened to the Hartleys on Falcon Lake?

Analysis: I know I normally start off my posts with excerpts from news stories, but there are too many small pieces of this story in separate articles. I'll try my best to encapsulate everything here. 

You probably already know the basic story, but in case you don't... David and Tiffany Hartley went for a ride on their jet skis last month on Falcon Lake, which straddles the Texas-Mexico border. There are some beautiful church ruins (#12 on the map) that are partially submerged on the Mexican side that they were trying to check out. While they were near that area, Tiffany says they were approached by men in three boats who started shooting. They began to flee towards the US side of the lake, but then David got shot and fell off his jet ski. Tiffany tried to pull him up onto her ski, but she says they started shooting at her. So, she had to leave him and beat feet to avoid getting shot herself.

Tiffany has provided a few different versions of the story, which has caused authorities on both sides of the border to be a little suspicious. David's body hasn't been found yet, and it will probably never be found. I've also read accounts that say David was shot from the front, which doesn't jive with him getting shot while heading away from the "pirates" towards the US side of the lake. The same account said the Hartleys had just returned from a luxury cruise and bought a house filled with new furniture shortly after attending a seminar for people having financial trouble.

The latest analysis by Stratfor says the shooting was a case of mistaken identity. David apparently had worked in Reynosa, and their car had Tamaulipas plates. This led Los Zetas to believe the Hartleys may be rival DTO Gulf cartel scouts. Stratfor also surmises that the killing was unauthorized, and the accidental work of young amateurs who have probably been killed by their cartel bosses already. The head Mexican investigator has already been killed, with his severed head delivered to Mexican authorities, and the search for David's body has been suspended indefinitely.

So what really happened? I have to tell you, this story doesn't pass the smell test for me. There's too much that doesn't make sense, and Tiffany has told too many different versions of what happened. I keep going back to the motive of the alleged shooters. Robbery (which is what pirates do)? No way...two jet skiers wouldn't exactly have a lot of cash on them, and I haven't read anywhere that the pirates took David's jet ski - or even tried to take Tiffany's. Retribution? I was told by a reporter friend of mine who got an off-the-record tip that the Hartleys may have been involved in some drug activity, but that hasn't been fleshed out enough. For fun? I still think it's too dangerous for cartels to start randomly shooting at innocent Americans just to do it because they know the response will likely be strong and swift. 

I think the Stratfor explanation makes sense. I know that many DTOs are hard up for shooters, so sometimes they have to hire younger punks with itchy trigger fingers. I just didn't expect that Los Zetas - probably the strongest DTO next to the Sinaloa Federation - would be so hard up that they'd have to go that route. Then again, they did just execute 72 South American migrants who refused to work for them. The more-then-slightly cynical explanation that "the wife did it" also makes sense, especially if the Hartley's were hard up for money and she was looking for a life insurance payout. However, we know Los Zetas were definitely involved in the incident - whatever really happened - and it's unlikely Tiffany had entered into some sort of arrangement with them. 

The Mexican authorities do not want to get back in this game for fear of losing more investigators, and they've already spent way more time looking for David than they would have looking for a Mexican citizen. I highly doubt David's body will ever be found - I agree with Stratfor that Los Zetas had to eliminate it - and we'll never have an account of events outside of Tiffany's side of the story. One can only hope that US citizens actually start heeding the advice given in State Department travel warnings and stay away from places like Falcon Lake known to be highly active drug smuggling areas.

What if Mexicans could arm themselves?

I know it's rare that I post pure commentary without a news story attached. But one of my readers posted a comment several days ago in response to another story, and what he said has been percolating in my brain for a little bit. I'd like to explore both sides of this idea, and then open it up to my readers for (hopefully) civil and thoughtful comments.

Some of you may already know that the majority of Mexican citizens cannot purchase firearms. Technically they're allowed to own them, because Mexico's constitution has wording very similar to our Second Amendment. However, there are only a handful of gun shops in the entire country, and the sheer volume of paperwork, checks, and personal recommendations required is huge. Even if you could obtain permission to buy a gun, the highest caliber pistol you could get is pretty low, with the higher calibers reserved strictly for law enforcement and the military.

These restrictions obviously haven't had much of an impact on gun violence in Mexico. DTOs obtain all the firepower they need from guns purchased in the US and smuggled south, and weapons and grenades "imported" from former eastern bloc countries, Central America, and Asia. DTOs also know they're operating in an environment of a population powerless to do anything, because even the police who are armed and sworn to protect them are in cahoots with the DTOs.

But what if the Mexican people were no longer powerless, and could legally arm themselves? Would this make a difference in the drug war?

Analysis: Let's take a look at the "pro" side first. I think there's a possibility that DTOs might change their strategy a bit if they knew the Mexican people - who have had it "up to here" with drug violence - all of a sudden had a means with which to defend themselves. Vigilante groups are starting to pop up in places as a result. More and more people refuse to go out at night or eat at certain restaurants because of the fear of becoming collateral damage in a gun fight between rival cartel members. Maybe the ability to carry a gun for self-defense would instill some confidence in some Mexicans to venture out again, and would give some narcos pause before kidnapping someone for ransom or entering an establishment and spraying it down with bullets.

Legal gun sales in Mexico would also likely have a positive impact on the southbound weapons trafficking problem. Of course, that just makes thing better for us, and doesn't completely solve the problem of certain weapons that Mexico probably wouldn't legally sell to its citizens. But probably much fewer handguns and standard rifles would be making their way across the border.

Looking for an example of Mexico's gun situation in the US is difficult, but can be found right in our nation's capital. Until very recently, it was illegal for residents in Washington, DC to own handguns. Ironically enough, some parts of DC are among the most violent in the country. The ban obviously didn't have much of an impact on criminal activity, and I'm curious to see how criminals there will start behaving now that they know the owner of the house they're thinking of burglarizing might be able to legally protect his home with a gun.

Finally, Mexico's economy is hurting even more than ours. Providing Mexicans with the opportunity to open hundreds of gun shops across the country, combined with the likely high number of people who'd be interested in buying guns for self-defense, might provide the Mexican economy with a much-needed injection of cash.

Now let's look at the "cons." The first and easiest argument to make is that gun violence in Mexico is bad enough as it is. Does anyone want to add to that by throwing armed citizens into the mix? Also, the majority of gun battles occur between narcos and cops, narcos and the military, or narcos and other narcos. All of them are armed already, so legalizing gun sales may not impact that.

Given the high level of corruption in Mexico at all levels, regulating gun sales and investigating violations would be challenging at best. The government would also need to implement a more robust registration system, and rewrite laws and regulations regarding requirements for gun ownership. This isn't complicate per se, but things move at a snail's pace already in Mexico's judicial and legislative system.

As I said earlier, vigilantism is already on the rise. Providing regular citizens with an easy path to gun ownership might push people who are currently on the fence towards joining or starting such a group willing to take the law into their own hands. This further subverts Mexican legal institutions, and could throw the country into even further chaos.

So what are your thoughts? Would removing most restrictions from private gun ownership in Mexico make a difference in the drug war?

"Mexico wary as California votes on legalizing marijuana."

Here is an excerpt from Nick Miroff and William Booth's article in The Washington Post:

To embattled authorities here, where heavily armed soldiers patrol the streets and more than 500 people have been killed this year, marijuana is a poisonous weed that enriches   death-dealing cartel bosses who earn huge profits smuggling the product north... But just over the border in California, cannabis is considered by law a healing herb. After the Obama administration announced that it would not prosecute the purveyors, about 100 medical marijuana dispensaries opened in San Diego alone in the past year... As the Obama administration presses Mexican President Felipe Calderon to stand firm in his costly, bloody military campaign against drug mafias, Mexican leaders are increasingly asking why their country should continue to attack cannabis traffickers and peasant pot farmers if the U.S. government is barely enforcing federal marijuana laws in the most populous state. This debate grows more urgent as California prepares to vote in November on Proposition 19, a game-changing ballot initiative to legalize the recreational consumption of marijuana. According to the polls, the vote is tight. Weary of spectacular violence and destabilizing corruption stoked by the prohibition against pot, some of Mexico's most prominent figures are wondering aloud what legalization would do on their side of the drug war." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I was hearing about the upcoming Prop 19 vote in California (where I worked as a contract intel analyst for four years), and started thinking about our federal government's selective enforcement of laws. I asked the following question to my personal Facebook friends, and it started an interesting discussion: If CA state laws regarding medical marijuana are superseded by federal law (the Controlled Substances Act says using or selling marijuana is illegal anywhere), and AZ [attempted] state laws regarding illegal immigration are also superseded by federal law (a circuit court deemed AZ SB 1070 unconstitutional), how can our federal government in good faith choose to "enforce" federal immigration law in Arizona but not federal anti-drug law in California?

Obviously the answer to this is politics...I'm not stupid or naïve (although I'm sure some readers may disagree). But I just don't understand how this can happen so blatantly, and no one in the mainstream media seems to be taking significant note of this hypocrisy.

Whether you believe me or not, this has nothing to do with my personal views on either subject. It has to do with the lack of a consistent government policy regarding enforcement of federal laws. You really should read this article about the selective nature of federal enforcement efforts in California; it's one of the best explanations I've seen yet. In a nutshell, President Obama announced during his 2008 campaign and on several occasions since that the US Department of Justice would not prosecute medical marijuana dispensaries unless they were in the business of making big profits or dealing to people who didn't need the marijuana for medicinal purposes. Yet, despite this shift in policy (outlined in a memo by Deputy AG David Ogden in October 2009), the DEA has been conducting raids on several California dispensaries in Los Angeles, San Diego, Bakersfield, and other cities since 2008. After one particular raid in Alameda last week, one DEA agent said, "Today's enforcement operation once again enlightens the public of the true nature and motive behind marijuana distribution centers — money."

Here's where I'm going to throw you for a loop. I'm all about legalizing marijuana in the US. not because I use it; I've never used any form of illegal drug, and I happily investigated airmen who tested positive for marijuana use for several years when I was a federal agent in the Air Force. I have no interest in using it, even though I have multiple sclerosis and could probably benefit from its use for medicinal purposes. I'm just seeing too many resources wasted on it when I think it can be compared to alcohol or tobacco use. The harder drugs like cocaine, meth, and heroin are what our law enforcement agencies should really be focusing on.

That being said, I don't care how big California's economy is or how many people live there; Prop 19 isn't going to solve any problems in Mexico. Even nationwide legalization of marijuana isn't going to end the violence, although I think it would make a sizable dent in cartel profits. I believe DTOs would just engage in legal sales of marijuana, and still make money from the sale of still-illegal drugs. Don't forget, they're making bank off kidnapping and extortion operations now, too.

So, back to my original point: Don't piss on me and tell me it's raining. If the federal government wants to sue Arizona for doing what it wants with its laws in violation of federal law, then it has to take similar action against California and the other 11 states with marijuana dispensaries also in violation of federal law. Again, I know it's politics, but our neighbor to the south is watching. Before we can move forward with any effective and lasting border security policy, we need to have some semblance of credibility first. This brand of hypocrisy isn't helping.

"Clinton Says Mexico Drug War Looks Like ‘Insurgency.’"

Here is an excerpt from Flavia Krause-Jackson and Jens Gould's article in Bloomberg BusinessWeek:

"U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said Mexican drug cartels are looking increasingly like 'insurgencies' as escalating violence resembles the war of terror waged against the Colombian   government two decades ago. 'It’s looking more and more like Colombia looked 20 years ago, where the narcotraffickers controlled certain parts of the country,' Clinton said today in Washington at the Council on Foreign Relations. In some cases, the trafficking 'is morphing into, making common cause, with what we would consider an insurgency,' Clinton said. While U.S. officials have expressed increasing concern about the scale of violence involving Mexican drug cartels, they have usually avoided suggestions that Mexico may be losing control over its territory." Link to Full Article

Analysis: FINALLY, someone in our government is catching on! The question is, will any changes be made because of it???

OK, let me back up a little bit. Historically speaking, both the US and Mexican governments have treated drug-related violence as an organized crime problem. We see every day how well that approach is working, and it's obvious to many that we're not just dealing with a bunch of hoodlums, thieves, drug dealers, and mafiosos. What I love (and I say this in a sarcastic fashion) is how Secretary Clinton says in her remarks that Mexican DTOs are now morphing into something resembling an insurgency. I beg to differ.

In January 2008, Ioan Grillo wrote an article for TIME magazine titled "Mexico's Narco-Insurgency." In it, he says, "Anti-drug officials believe the uptick in clashes between the police and gunmen of the cartels is a sign that Mexico's long-running drug violence has entered a new phase." Later in 2008, John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus wrote a paper titled "State of Siege: Mexico's Criminal Insurgency" for Small Wars Journal. In it, they say, "The criminal threat is not only a threat to public order but to the state. A top-ranking Mexican intelligence official has noted in interview that criminal gangs pose a national security threat to the integrity of the state." I co-wrote an article with my husband in November 2008 titled "Redefining Terrorism: Why Mexican Drug Trafficking is More than Just Organized Crime" for Henley Putnam University's Journal of Strategic Security. In it, we say:

"In early 2008, US counterterrorism sources reported the Gulf cartel real- ized it was incapable of head-to-head engagements with the Mexican mil- itary and federal police, but felt that engaging in insurgent-style tactics would give it an advantage. Mexican DTOs have actually used these tac- tics for some time, and have demonstrated a strong capability to conduct ambushes and hit-and-run attacks against convoys, highway checkpoints, and police and military installations. Over the last thirteen months, the army and federal police task forces have used both counter-insurgency warfare tactics and law enforcement techniques in counter-cartel opera- tions. At times, the counter-insurgency tactics have taken precedence over traditional police-type anti-crime measures."

So I guess this is a case of better late than never. But the real question is, does this acknowledgement by the US State Department mean that the US government is going to approach Mexico's drug war any differently than it has over the last two decades? My guess is, probably not. I have a feeling Secretary Clinton is going to be asked a LOT of questions about those remarks, some of which she's probably not prepared to answer. However, if there's even one speck of a chance that our government might be thinking about looking at the DTO problem as a criminal insurgency, then that's a step in the right direction.

"Entire US-Mexico border to be guarded by Predator drones."

Here is an excerpt from Taylor Barnes' article in the Christian Science Monitor:

"The entire 2,000-mile US-Mexico border will be monitored by drones starting Wednesday when a new Predator drone begins flying from Corpus Christi, Texas, Homeland Security Secretary Janet   Napolitano said. There are already three drones operating along portions of the border. Aside from the new drone launched today, money for two more was included in $600 million legislation President Barack Obama signed earlier this month... 'With the deployment of the Predator in Texas, we will now be able to cover the southwest border from the El Centro sector in California all the way to the Gulf of Mexico in Texas, providing critical aerial surveillance assistance to personnel on the ground,' Napolitano said during a conference call, according to Reuters... The Predator B drones that are being deployed have night-vision cameras and can stay in flight for 30 hours, detecting drug and human smuggling, Reuters added." Link to Full Article

Analysis: Before I start getting critical, I will say that I'm extremely happy that more drones are headed for the SW border, and that the Obama Administration is applying much-needed funding towards border security projects. I've been saying for a long time that more money needs to go to the right places in order to more efficiently and effectively secure the border against threats from drug traffickers and terrorists.

That being said, I believe any extra drones - as awesome as their capabilities are - will be completely useless without any augmentation of the forces on the ground. Remember, Predators aren't doing along the SW border what they do in Afghanistan. They're not launching missiles or preventing the loss of a human pilot to a surface-to-air missile. They're acting as additional - and highly sophisticated - eyes in the sky for law enforcement. However, without additional trained Border Patrol personnel who can effectively respond to incidents, it doesn't matter what the drones can see.

Remember, Border Patrol stations have limited personnel who patrol (in some cases) wide swaths of territory with sometimes unforgiving territory. Let's say a drone is on patrol and spots drug trafficking activity in a certain sector. However, all available BP agents in that sector have their hands tied responding to migrant activity elsewhere. See where I'm going?

Now, I'm hoping that the odds of that happening are low, because I would assume that drone activity would be coordinated to correspond with agent availability. Meaning, an operation would be planned out for BP agents to be ready and able to respond to areas where the drones are operating. This is the ideal situation, and indeed the Predators could be a huge help, especially at night with their infrared capability. 

Given how widely touted the Predator deployments are, I'm surprised I haven't seen more in the media regarding their effectiveness. I read plenty about drug seizures and migrant captures, and that's great. But how many of those are credited to drone assistance? Maybe a lot, maybe not too many. I'd like to know that they're not just flying around along the border because they look cool, and are actually justifying the funding being spent on them. 

"Border Wars" on NatGeo is worth checking out

I recently caught on to a series on the National Geographic channel called "Border Wars." It's a documentary that follows US Border Patrol agents around while they patrol the US-Mexico border, and also observes the work of US Customs and Border Protection agents at selected ports of entry. I'll be honest, I'm fascinated after watching a few episodes from last season, mostly with the clips of Customs agents working hard to find hidden compartments in vehicles that are holding an impressive amount of drugs and cash. Another thing that made an impression was the glimpse of the hostile conditions under which Border Patrol agents often work - especially while wearing long-sleeved dark green uniforms. Who came up with that bright idea? 

Anyway, if you've never been to the US-Mexico border and are curious how these folks do their jobs, the show (if you get NatGeo channel) is well worth checking it out. I believe the new season starts tonight (Wednesday) at 8:00pm EST: http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/series/border-wars

"Mexican Candidate for Governor Is Assassinated."

Here is an excerpt from Marc Lacey's article in the New York Times:

"A popular candidate for governor of Tamaulipas State who had made increased security his prime campaign pledge was killed along with at least four others Monday morning when gunmen opened fire on his motorcade as he headed to a campaign event, the authorities said. The   killing of the candidate, Rodolfo Torre Cantú, 46, drove election-related violence in Mexico to a peak unseen since 1994... Mr. Torre’s death followed the killing of a mayoral candidate and that of an activist during a get-out-the-vote effort. Explosives have been thrown at two separate campaign offices. Immediate suspicion in the Torre case fell on drug cartels since Tamaulipas, a northeastern state bordering Texas on the gulf coast, has been the site of fierce fighting in recent months between rival trafficking organizations, the Zetas and their former allies, the Gulf Cartel." Link to Full Article

Analysis: The important take-away from this story is not the person who was actually assassinated, but the fact that DTOs are using this as a tactic to benefit their business operations. Killings in Ciudad Juárez hit a record daily high last week, and some people are asking what's causing the uptick in violence. Upcoming gubernatorial and municipal elections aren't the whole story, but they're a big part of it. Violence in certain parts of Mexico is often cyclical or even seasonal, but DTOs do have a message to send at this particular time of the year.

And that message is two-fold: one for the candidates and one for the people. Organized crime in the US has always held a certain amount of influence over some politicians, but Mexican DTOs take it to an extreme. It's no secret that DTOs want certain people in office because they need an ally - whether forced or voluntary - who will allow their trafficking activities to continue in that state or municipality unfettered. Torre Cantú was probably not willing to play the DTOs' game, and he summarily paid the price for his intransigence. Either that, or because his opponent was and was less likely to win, assassinating Torre Cantú would clear the way for his opponent to be easily voted into office. Such political manipulation goes beyond the traditional definitions of organized crime, and governments on both sides of the border would be wise to regard it as such.

The second message - and perhaps the more dangerous and insidious one - is the message sent to the Mexican people. Rising drug violence, especially when it involves a lot of collateral damage, is highly discouraging to the electoral process. Not only do people stay away from the polls on election day, but they lose all faith in the candidates' ability to protect them or do anything to curb the violence where they live. It erodes the fundamental nature of democracy when a populace loses all faith in the system. Not that Americans are all that fond of our own politicians, and voter turnout during major elections usually hovers around 40-50 percent. But still, we don't fear for our lives when we go to the polls, and I think most Americans still believe their representatives have at least some concern for their constituents.

Keep this in mind when you see news stories of Mexican candidates for office being assassinated over the next week. It's not just a case of drug-related violence as usual. This is a basic erosion of democratic norms by powerful organized crime groups, and the ultimate effect on Mexico's government and society will be dire indeed.

Some thoughts on border security and the illegal immigration nexus.

I have traditionally shied away from commenting on the immigration debate because it's such a polarized and emotional debate, and I try to keep my analysis as even-tempered and available to readers as possible. I don't like to alienate potential readers who want to learn more about events in Mexico by spouting my personal opinions about illegal immigration. And don't worry, I'm not going to start doing that now. It's just that with all the crazy events going on right now along the border - as well as in our nation's capital - I wanted to offer some thoughts about the confluence, as well as the divergence, of the concepts of immigration and border security.

Just the term "border security" means different things to different people. Some people believe a secure border implies NO ONE who isn't allowed into the US actually gets in. This means terrorists, illegal immigrants (from any country), and drug smugglers. Other people believe a secure border means that only people who are criminals or mean us harm are consistently caught and prevented from entering. I was reading an opinion piece in Reuters this morning, and the author explained how no border can truly be 100% secure, meaning no one gets in and out without the authorities noticing and approving. I have to agree with that. I mean, you can build an electrified fence that covers every square inch of the 2,000-mile US-Mexico border, but both good and bad people will find creative ways to get across. We've seen this in all major border lockdowns, like countries behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War, and even Cuba.

In light of recently growing tensions over border incidents, the AZ immigration law, and illegal immigration in general, we have to place the debate over border security in some kind of perspective. That means asking the question of ourselves AND the federal government, "What does it mean to have a secure border?" You have to know that we will NEVER keep ALL criminals and illegal immigrants from entering the US through our southwest border. Knowing that's the case, we have to prioritize because our law enforcement agencies have limited financial and logistical resources. In my opinion, we need to focus first on keeping people out who mean to do us harm or engage in dangerous/violent criminal activity on US soil. This includes terrorists, drug smugglers, human smugglers, DTO members, and gang members who work for DTOs.

Again, knowing our law enforcement agencies can't stop everyone, I'm willing to acknowledge that I have to be OK with the continuation of illegal immigration to some extent. I'm NOT okay with immigrants trashing our land, or trespassing on private property, or robbing/assaulting innocent Americans who get in their way. I do know that there are many illegal immigrants who come to the US from Mexico who don't engage in criminal behavior. I'm not saying it's any less of a violation of federal laws that they're here, but when it comes to the concept of border security, we have to look at who and what is making our border INsecure.

I know many of you - and maybe most of you - have very strong opinions about immigration, drugs, and guns, and your opinions are what make civil debates in my comments sections so lively and interesting. Many of you will probably disagree with me, and I'm totally OK with that. It's a free country after all! I just felt the need to explain that a secure border doesn't necessarily imply a complete border lockdown. It means that ALL Americans, whether they live in the SW border states or elsewhere, can feel safe and secure in their homes, and free from the dangers posed by terrorists and smugglers who attempt to enter our country surreptitiously. The illegal immigration debate often crosses paths with the border security debate, but I implore my readers to try to keep this in mind: When you can't keep everyone out, a secure border means you can effectively keep the BAD people out. We're not there yet, but our law enforcement agencies trying to do that can probably benefit from a government that realizes it needs to focus on what border security really means.

"Calderón asks for society’s help in the battle against drug trafficking."

Here is a translated excerpt from the Spanish-language article in Mexico's Correo:

"President Felipe Calderón predicts that there will be more deaths combating organized crime and he says the struggle is not only his but that of all Mexican citizens and that all of us should provide information to the government to confront criminal organizations. Last night in a 10 minute radio and television address to the nation, Calderón expressed concern over the growing number of executions but will maintain his strategy without backing off. 'I know there is worry among all Mexicans about the violent acts, there is hurt and indignation, particularly about the loss of innocent life, for this reason, we will not spare any forces or any resource in the battle against organized crime that continues to result in the loss of the lives of innocents,' said Calderón. He continued that there is a struggle against criminal groups that results in executions and confrontations with federal authorities. 'As I told you from the first day, this is a struggle that will cost time, resources, and disgracefully, human lives and unfortunately, the loss of brave policemen, soldiers and sailors who sacrificed their lives for the safety of all Mexicans,' he said." 

Analysis: If only it were so simple. See suspicious activity, report it to the police, and assume that they're going to respond or investigate right away. It may work that way in the US, but shame on Calderón for making this request of the Mexican people when he knows full well that most Mexicans wouldn't dream of putting their lives in danger by actually calling the cops.

I think most Americans are aware that corruption levels among Mexican law enforcement are incredibly high. I also think than many Americans don't realize just how profound that corruption is. It's not just a case of cops taking bribes to look the other way. Many police officers in Mexico are actively involved in drug trafficking, assassinations, and kidnapping operations. They provide all sorts of sensitive operational information to cartels in exchange for money, or just the privilege of remaining alive. This fact has pounded the morale of the Mexican people into a bloody pulp, and the sense of helplessness and insecurity among many is incomprehensible to many of us.

Some elections are coming up in certain parts of Mexico, and only 30 percent or so of the population is even registered to vote. Only 30 percent of those are expected to even show up to the polls because people are afraid to stand in line for too long in case the cartels are trying to put one candidate in office over another through the use of force.

I know Calderón needs the help of his people, and he's just shy of getting on his hands and knees and begging for it. But he has to know that the security conditions in his country just aren't predisposed to a populace that has any faith at all in government institutions or law enforcement. As insurmountable of a challenge as cleaning up the police ranks is - and will be for a long time - he shouldn't expect any help from his people until he can assure them some sort of security after providing it.

"Mexico anger high as US Border Patrol kills teen."

Here is an excerpt from Olivia Torres and Christopher Sherman's Associated Press article in Yahoo! News:

"Mexicans are seething over the second death of a countryman at the hands of U.S. Border Patrol agents in two weeks, an incident near downtown El Paso that is threatening to escalate tensions over migrant issues. U.S. authorities said Tuesday a border patrol agent was trying to   defend himself and colleagues when he fatally shot the 15-year-old as officers came under a barrage of big stones while trying to detain illegal immigrants on the U.S. side of the Rio Grande... Preliminary reports on the incident indicated that U.S. officers on bicycle patrol "were assaulted with rocks by an unknown number of people," Border Patrol Special Operations Supervisor Ramiro Cordero said Tuesday... The shooting happened beneath a railroad bridge linking the two nations... Arturo Sandoval, a spokesman for the Chihuahua state Attorney General's office, said a spent .40-caliber shell casing was found near the body — raising the question of whether the fatal shot was fired inside Mexico, although he did not explicitly make that allegation... U.S. official, meanwhile, said video shows the Border Patrol agent did not enter Mexico. [He] said the video also shows what seem to be four Mexican law enforcement officers driving to the edge of the dry but muddy bed of the Rio Grande, walking across to the U.S. side, picking up an undetermined object and returning to Mexico near the area where the boy's body was. According to the FBI, Border Patrol agents were responding to a group of suspected illegal immigrants being smuggled into the U.S. near the Paso Del Norte bridge, across from Ciudad Juarez around 6:30 p.m. Monday. One suspected illegal immigrant was detained on the levee on the U.S. side, the FBI said in a statement. Another Border Patrol agent arrived on the concrete bank where the now-dry, 33-foot (10-meter) wide Rio Grande is, and detained a second person. Other suspects ran back into Mexico and began throwing rocks, the FBI said. At least one rock came from behind the agent, who was kneeling beside a suspected illegal immigrant whom he had prone on the ground... The agent told the rock throwers to stop and back off, but they continued. The agent fired his weapon several times, hitting one who later died, said the FBI, which is leading the investigation because it involved an assault on a federal officer. The agent was not injured, Simmons said... T.J. Bonner, president of the union representing Border Patrol agents, said rock throwing aimed at Border Patrol agents is common and capable of causing serious injury." Link to Full Article

Analysis: This is definitely the southwest border controversy of the moment (as if the USBP tasering of a meth addict a few days ago wasn't enough for you), and that means there's much about the situation to discuss - and speculate about. The investigation is ongoing, which means that new details come out every day, and often those details in today's media reports contradict yesterday's details. Please keep this in mind as the story unfolds. I've selected the above AP story to quote from because it seems to be the most detailed account published yet.

First, no one is really sure on which side of the border this incident occurred. The Mexican government says the USBP agent who fired his weapon did so (illegally) on Mexican soil. The FBI, so far, is saying that the incident occurred on the US side of the Rio Grande, and other US officials are claiming they have a video depicting Mexican law enforcement officers crossing the river (illegally) to pick up some unidentified object on the US side and bring it back to the Mexican side by the victim's body. The clear implication here is that the object was the spent .40-caliber casing of one of the bullets fired by the USBP agent. I don't know what will come of that video; I do know that if it comes down to he-said-she-said pure witness testimony, you're going to have a slew of contradictory accounts regarding where the agent was and where the boy was.

Then, of course, there's the bigger issue of whether or not the shooting was warranted. Many people (and certainly the victim's family and Mexican government, in this case) would say that the use of a gun wasn't warranted to "mere" rock throwing. Well, you might be surprised at the circumstances under which it is, as this isn't the first time such an incident has occurred, and agents have been cleared of any wrongdoing. First of all, USBP use-of-force guidelines permit agents to use their handguns against rock throwers if they feel their or their colleagues' lives are being threatened. I've seen pictures of agents who have been hit by rocks, and in many cases, it's not pretty - particularly a recent incident where an agent lost an eye after being hit with a rock the size of a brick. We're not talking pebbles here, folks. Some of these "rocks" being used are huge, and could kill someone if hit hard enough in the head.

Now, it's bad enough to have to deal with rock throwers one-on-one. But some of the media accounts lead me to believe this agent may have been ganged-up on by several rock throwers at once. I don't know if that's the case, or what size the rocks are. I will tell you that if he was in a prone position holding someone down by himself, then all of a sudden starting getting hit by softball-sized rocks being thrown by three people, I wouldn't be surprised at all that he drew his gun and started firing. I know I'd be in fear for my life, as pepper spray and a taser gun - even a baton - wouldn't cut it in that situation. Just my personal opinion.

Actually, here's an example of a previous similar incident. In 2005, a USBP agent shot an 18 year-old who was throwing rocks at him near the San Diego-Tijuana border crossing. The boy died, and an extensive inquiry began regarding the agent's use of force during the incident. He was cleared of all wrongdoing, and the investigation showed there wasn't enough evidence to charge him with anything. In 2007, another agent shot and killed a 22 year-old Mexican national near the border after the tried to smash the agent's head with a large rock. After the agent was acquitted of wrongdoing, the victim's family filed a civil suit against the US government, and the Mexican government filed a protest similar to what it's doing now. Again, nothing came of the suit.

Bottom line, it's easy to condemn or support certain actions when you don't know all the facts. I'll be perfectly up front in saying I'm biased towards law enforcement since I used to be a military federal agent; that shouldn't come as a surprise to any of my regular readers. That's not to say that US agents don't ever make mistakes or have clouded judgment. However, many Americans don't understand what it's like to be working on the border every single day, often in the searing heat, and having to deal with drug smugglers (who are often armed) and belligerent illegal immigrants. Last year, there were over 1,000 violent incidents perpetrated against USBP agents. There was a two percent drop in the number of incidents from the previous year, but that's the first drop (however small) in several years. I'm just saying that before people start going ballistic about the big bad US agent with a gun firing indiscriminately against some hapless immigrant, they should think about the threats being faced every day by our agents along the border, and wait to find out more about what happened in this specific case before passing judgment.

"Tijuana club scene revs up as drug-war fears ease."

Here is an excerpt from Richard Marosi's article in the Los Angeles Times:

"Four months after the capture of the notorious crime boss Teodoro Garcia Simental, this border city is showing glimpses of its old, vibrant self. Like survivors of a Category 5 hurricane of crime, residents are emerging from their homes, wary but hopeful. While clashes in other key drug-  trafficking centers such as Juarez are reaching new heights of brutality, the uniquely savage violence that has plagued Tijuana during the government's three-year war on organized crime has declined dramatically since the January arrest. Drug-fueled crime has always cycled up and down, of course. But there are no signs that anyone of Garcia's ruthless ambition has stepped into the power void. Although homicides still occur at a steady pace, the beheadings, massacres and dissolution of victims in lye that were Garcia's terrorizing trademark have largely stopped... Government officials complain that the State Department's travel alerts are scaring off visitors. After Garcia's capture, local authorities hoped Washington would ease the warnings, but the U.S. Consulate in Tijuana issued another one, saying Garcia's arrest could trigger more violence." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I have to admit, this one has me stumped. Not because of the slowdown in violence, but because of the apparent cause. Back in January after El Teo's arrest, I was definitely concerned that violence in Tijuana would get even worse (if that was even possible) because of the power vacuum his arrest caused. I felt that El Chapo's people were more powerful than the AFO remnants left in the area, and hoped that Sinaloa faction would come in and quickly sweep away any opposition to solidify the position El Teo and his people had been carving out over the last two years.

So imagine my shock when I started getting emails from my sources in San Diego that things were suspiciously quiet in Tijuana. They knew I expected the opposite, and wanted to know if I had heard anything different. I asked them if they knew who was in charge down there now, and I was even more shocked by the answer - the AFO. 

It's not often I'm stumped by these developments between DTOs, and that's not because I know everything about the drug war - I'll be the first to tell you I still learn something about it every day. It's just that these conflicts go through fairly predictable cycles and movements, and analysts like me tend to have enough information about which DTOs are in a better position to take over a plaza. So at this point I can only make an educated guess regarding why the AFO came out on top in Tijuana, resulting in hopefully more than just fleeting calm.

It could be that El Chapo has his hands full with battles on several other fronts, and just doesn't want to deal with Tijuana right now. The Federation already runs at least two other plazas along the California-Mexico border, and he may be willing to let this one go for a bit to focus on other problems. An alliance was recently formed between the Federation, the Gulf cartel, and La Familia to attempt to nip the threat posed by Los Zetas in the bud, and that may be sapping some resources. Former Federation ally and component, the Beltrán Leyva remnants, are likely linking up with their former ally, Los Zetas, in an effort to remain relevant - and profitable - which ups the stakes in that battle.

Or, it could be that El Chapo feels he's making enough money from his other plazas and doesn't need any more out of Tijuana. Nah, I didn't think so either.

Maybe I'm not giving the AFO enough credit here. But it's really hard to be optimistic about their chances, considering that DTO is in the worst shape it's ever been after two years of protracted fighting with El Teo's people. They do know the lay of the land better than the Federation's people, and still have staunch allies in some places in northern Baja. That doesn't change the fact that they're still so fractured, and have outsourced kidnappings and killings to so many gangs and thugs whose loyalties are questionable at best.

I'm truly happy that some residents of Tijuana are feeling mildly optimistic about these developments, but it's the cynic in me that says this is too good to be true. If this "Pax Mexicana" continues for maybe another 6 months to a year, I'll feel better about it. But for the time being, I'll wait for the next cycle to start.

"Focus in Krentz killing on suspect in US."

Here is an excerpt from Brady McCombs' article in the Arizona Daily Star:

"The killing of a Southern Arizona rancher that sparked an outcry to secure the border was not random, and investigators are focusing on a suspect in the United States, the Arizona Daily Star has learned. High-ranking government officials with credible information...said Cochise County   Sheriff Larry Dever is investigating a person in the United States, not in Mexico, in connection with the shooting... Krentz was found gunned down on his ranch northeast of Douglas a day after his brother reported drug-smuggling activity to the Border Patrol that led to the seizure of 290 pounds of marijuana and the arrest of eight people on the ranch. The night of the killing, officers followed a single set of footprints to the U.S.-Mexico border. That sparked widespread speculation that Krentz was killed by an illegal immigrant or a drug smuggler from Mexico... Forty-eight hours after the killing, Dever told reporters that investigators believed the shooting was carried out by one person, but that they didn't know if it was a man or a woman, or the person's nationality. But Dever said they had reports that Krentz made reference to an "illegal alien" over a two-way radio he used to communicate with his brother while working that day on the southern part of their ranch... The Southeastern Arizona valley where Krentz was killed is a heavily trafficked people- and drug-smuggling corridor that has seen an increase in burglaries in recent years. Sheriff's investigators and most residents believe the crimes are being committed by drug smugglers heading back to Mexico." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I've received a LOT of questions by email on this incident in the last couple of weeks, and my response has typically been that it's hard to speculate too much because, to date, no one really knows what happened to Krentz. I also make it a point to not typically comment on illegal immigration stories because (a) it detracts from my focus on different border violence issues, and (b) it's just way too controversial and I'm a conflict-avoider.

So what makes this story different, that's making me want to write a blog post on it? Two things, specifically. First, I feel a very strong need to remind people that no one, including investigators and the press, know exactly what happened to Krentz. The only facts anyone has is that (a) Krentz is dead, and (b) Krentz was shot. Speculation ranges from the killer being an illegal immigrant (which many think led to the current controversial law in Arizona), to a contract assassin who specifically targeted Krentz, to a drug dealer who Krentz stumbled across while he was transporting a load. Before anyone gets screwed into the ceiling over this, wait to find out all the facts.

Second, this statement by Sheriff Devers really makes me mad, but not for the reasons you might think: "We cannot sit by while our citizens are terrorized, robbed and murdered by ruthless and desperate people who enter our country illegally."

To provide some much-needed perspective, I have to remind him and readers alike that we have been dealing with this behavior by violent gang members for years. And now he - and others - want to get mad about it? Members of brutal gangs like the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) have been in the US for decades, killing each other and innocent bystanders in drive-bys in large cities and small towns alike. A good chunk of MS-13 members are here in the US illegally, and have been (again) for decades. They get busted for criminal activity, go back to El Salvador (big point - they aren't Mexican), then come back illegally to commit more crimes. I just have a hard time wrapping my head around the fact that the media and politicians alike are making this story into such a huge and controversial deal when (a) we don't even know who killed this rancher, and (b) our citizens have been terrorized, robbed, and murdered by gang members who have been here illegally (in 33 US states, I might add) for decades.

I'm not naïve enough to ignore the fact that this story comes at a crucial time in the immigration debate, and people on both sides of the aisle will use this poor rancher's memory however they see fit to suit their agendas. Just remember that we have some serious gang violence issues across this entire country that are much more serious - and very much connected to the Mexican drug trade - that shouldn't be ignored or forgotten.

"Hillary Clinton Mexico visit: US and Mexico shift drug war approach."

Here is an excerpt from Sara Miller Llana's article in the Christian Science Monitor:

"US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, during a high-level meeting in Mexico Tuesday, spoke of a new strategy under the Merida Initiative, the $1.4 billion aid package to help Mexico and Central   America fight the scourge of organized crime, which includes a more targeted focus on community-building. Mrs. Clinton, who was in Mexico with, among others, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, and Adm. Michael G. Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, laid out plans that span beyond access to military hardware... The four-pronged strategy includes disrupting the criminal organizations, strengthening institutions, building a border that is safe but productive, and boosting communities so they can resist the power of drug traffickers... The announcement by Clinton comes as Mexico has already begun expanding its approach from the military strategy, which remains the key component, to an acknowledgment that social factors that drive violence, such as a lack of jobs, must be addressed, too." Link to Full Article

Analysis: A big deal has been made about this US delegation visit to Mexico, particularly because our SecDef was part of it. Any hint of a US military presence in Mexico is a big diplomatic no-no, but his assistance seems to have gone over well enough. Everyone involved covered a lot of different topics, and it's about time the light bulb went on to clue people in that the problems arising from the drug war are not caused by just drugs. The severity of violence and the extent of the drug trade exist because - Hello?!? - Mexico has other problems, too. It's nice that folks are finally acknowledging the role of sociological factors, but unfortunately, there's no short-term fix for that.

Speaking of fixes, it's great that our folks and their folks had this lovely kumbaya session, but what concrete solutions came out of it?

Well, the State Department has posted its new strategy, titled "United States-Mexico Partnership: Anti-Arms Trafficking and Anti-Money Laundering," on it's website HERE. Actually, I imagine it's only part of the new strategy because the document only covers those two issues - albeit two of the biggest issues. Some of the bullet points talk about meetings or initiatives already undertaken, and others talk about new programs being funded by the Mérida Initiative. That's all well and good, but here are the two major problems I have with this overview of the new strategy.

First, you can send the Mexican government all the firearms tracing and identification equipment in the world, but that won't change the fact that only a fraction of firearms seized in drug-related crimes in Mexico are ever traced. This is part of the big controversy over trying to nail down the exact percentage of how many guns in Mexico actually come from US sources. No one knows and no one will probably ever know because a LOT of seized guns are either untraceable for various reasons, or disappear into the hands of dirty cops or make their way into cartel hands before they can be traced. The new strategy says nothing about addressing the problem with the proper handling/securing of seized firearms and the corruption that results in so many firearms never being traced.

Next, the strategy for tackling money laundering never touches on the fundamental problem Mexico has with going after drug money: the inherent inadequacy of existing Mexican laws and the inability (or unwillingness) of the Mexican government to successfully prosecute those few that are eventually indicted for money laundering. I'm not saying it's bad that the US is providing training on investigative techniques and increasing information sharing. Those are both really good things that are needed in several areas. But what good is a top-notch investigation if weak or non-existent money-laundering laws don't allow for consistent and successful prosecutions? Obviously, this is an internal problem for the Mexican government, and the State Department can't include the changing of Mexican laws into its strategy. I just hope that encouragement in that regard is what they mean when talking about the vague notion of "capacity building."

My final thoughts are skeptical, as usual. It's nice to see and read about these high-profile meetings because it makes the general public feel like the Mexican and US governments are serious about tackling the problems arising out of the drug war. But these problems aren't new, and these sit-down sessions have occurred before. Is this a response to the murder of the three individuals who worked at the US Consulate in Cuidad Juárez? Maybe. If so, why was that the catalyst? US citizens have been killed in Mexico before because they were in the wrong place at the wrong time, and no such response occurred. Maybe it's because the FBI believes they were targeted by the Barrio Azteca gang for some reason. Still, Mexican drug trade-related activity, including murders and kidnappings, have been occurring on US soil for some time, and I'm disheartened that now is the time the State Department feels we need a new strategy. I'll be cynically waiting for some concrete measures to come out of yesterday's meeting.

"Is Tranquility or Turmoil Next for Tijuana?"

Here is an excerpt from my latest article in Homeland Security Today's "From the Field" section:

"The security situation in Mexico is in a constant state of flux, and nothing exemplifies that more than recent events in Tijuana and the surrounding area. President Felipe Calderón and his federal police forces got a much-needed morale boost on January 12 with the capture of the elusive Teodoro “El Teo” Garcia Simental. Garcia was the head of a drug operation that split off from the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO) in April 2008, and he was receiving support from the rival Sinaloa Federation.

"After Garcia’s capture, the general opinion among drug war observers was that not too much would change in violence levels or the movement of product across the border. This was due to the fact that Garcia ran a tight ship with a clear chain of command. True to form, boss. The biggest concern at the time was that López might escalate the level of violence to establish his position as the new boss—one worthy of assuming Garcia’s position.

"Fortunately, López never got that chance. In a huge raid on February 8, Mexican federal police arrested López, along with Manuel “El Chiquilin” Garcia Simental (Teodoro’s brother) and several Tijuana police officers. These three major arrests in the span of a month have effectively dismantled the AFO’s main rival and the Sinaloa Federation’s proxy in northern Baja California.

"So the question becomes, is this good news or bad news for Tijuana and the other drug corridors along the California-Mexico border?"

To read the full article at HSToday.us, please CLICK HERE.

"A Changing of the Guard in Mexico?"

Here is an excerpt from MY latest article in Homeland Security Today magazine online:

"2010 is off to a relatively good start for Mexican President Felipe Calderón’s war against drug trafficking organizations (DTOs).

"Shortly before the holidays on Dec. 16, Arturo Beltrán Leyva – the head of the Beltrán Leyva Organization (BLO) – was killed in a shootout with Mexican navy commandos. On Dec. 30, his brother, Carlos, was arrested after showing a fake ID during a traffic stop. Although Hector Beltrán Leyva remains at large and is ostensibly in charge of what remains of the BLO, the organization has been considerably weakened.

"The latest New Year’s victory came in the form of Eduardo Teodoro “El Teo” Garcia Simental’s arrest on Jan. 12 by Mexican federal police. Garcia used to be a lieutenant in the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO), the dominant DTO in northern Baja California. In April 2008, he split off from the AFO, and with rival DTO Sinaloa Federation’s backing, began a brutal turf war to wrest control of the Tijuana drug trafficking corridor from the AFO.

"The huge spike in drug-related violence in the Tijuana area in the last year and a half can be attributed to activities sanctioned and directed by Garcia, with the support of Federation leadership.

"So now that two Beltrán Leyva brothers and “El Teo” are out of the picture, what does that mean for drug war dynamics in Mexico?"

To read the rest of my article in Homeland Security Today's "From the Field" section in their online edition, please CLICK HERE.

Mexico's federal police arrest Teodoro "El Teo" Garcia Simental

Here is an excerpt from Sandra Dibble's article in the San Diego Union Tribune, titled "Mexico arrests leader of gang":

"His brutality was widely broadcast, as victims were found tortured, beheaded, dissolved in lye, hung from bridges, often with messages attached. Yet Eduardo Teodoro García Simental for   many months maintained a low profile and evaded capture. Yesterday, his luck ran out. The gang leader known as El Teo, who also was linked to numerous kidnappings and extortions in the Tijuana region, was captured in the quiet seaside city of La Paz, capital of Baja California Sur. What his arrest will mean to the violence that has gripped the Tijuana region has yet to play out.

"Authorities had been on García’s trail for five months, but the operation to detain him early yesterday was over quickly as Federal Police, soldiers and marines closed in on the two-story residence in an upscale neighborhood of the city about 900 miles south of Tijuana. Hours later, García was in Mexico City, in handcuffs as he was forced to pose for photographs with masked and heavily armed federal agents. A one-time member of the Arellano Félix drug cartel, García is being blamed for 300 murders, including the deaths of numerous police officers." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I was bombarded yesterday with emails of the news of El Teo's arrest, and I was thrilled to hear about it. I was also frustrated because I'm in the middle of a cross-country move, and didn't get a chance to post my analysis until just now. Regardless, this is a really big deal, and there are a lot of ramifications that come with it.

If you have been following events in Mexico's drug war even casually in the last year, you know that violence levels in Tijuana sharply spiked in the spring of 2008. That's because El Teo split off from the AFO in April, got the backing of the Sinaloa Federation, and started his own little war against what was left of the AFO in northern Baja. Life in and around Tijuana has been pretty brutal ever since, and it's mostly because of El Teo.

You'd think that now because he's behind bars, things will get better, and everyone in the Calderón administration will be jumping for joy for some time. Unfortunately, that probably won't be the case. Like any capo worth his salt, El Teo had a right-hand man, and his name is Raydel "El Muletas" López Uriarte. López is probably the guy who will take the reins in El Teo's stead. He'll have a lot of responsibility to deal with in very short order, and the easiest way for a new capo to prove he means business - especially to someone as brutal as the head of the Federation, Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzmán Loera - is to start killing people.

Bottom line, it's really a good thing that the federales picked up El Teo; it's good news for the people of Tijuana and the rest of northern Baja, and good for the morale of the Mexican army, federal police, and government. However, the bloodshed is far from over, and the Mexican authorities are going to need to figure out how López is going to proceed.

 

"Outsmarted by Sinaloa: Why the biggest drug gang has been least hit."

Here is an excerpt from this article in The Economist:

"IT MIGHT seem incongruous to see Felipe Calderón, who has bet his presidency on fighting organised crime, accused of sheltering Mexico’s top drug lord. Yet across the country banners hanging from highway overpasses suggest he is in cahoots with Joaquín "El Chapo" (“Shorty”) Guzmán—the leader of the Sinaloa “cartel” and, according to Forbes magazine, the world’s 701st richest man. “Mr Narco-President,” began one seen in Veracruz state in 2008. “If you want to end crime, stop protecting drug traffickers like "El Chapo."

"The banners are placed by rival drug mobs. But they hint at a paradox. The Sinaloa organisation (named after a north-western state) is responsible for around 45% of the drug trade in Mexico, reckons Edgardo Buscaglia, a lawyer and economist at ITAM, a Mexico City university. But using statistics from the security forces, he calculates that only 941 of the 53,174 people arrested for organised crime in the past six years were associated with Sinaloa. An official disputes those numbers, and notes that several close relatives of Ismael Zambada, the co-head of the Sinaloa mob, were arrested on drug charges last year.

"Nevertheless the government crackdown seems to have fallen mainly on other mafias... In the zero-sum game of the drug trade, one gang’s loss is another’s gain (which is why “drug cartel” is such a misnomer). The weakening of local traffickers in Tijuana and Ciudad Juárez has enabled Sinaloa to strengthen its presence along Mexico’s northern border." Link to Full Article

Analysis: The strategy that has been employed by the Calderón administration may seem strange to some, but it works well from several different angles - depending on what your goals are, and what you're willing to compromise to get there. The article cites Calderón as saying he is going after every DTO with equal ferocity, but we all know that what governments say and what governments do aren't always one and the same.

Let's take a look at the Mexican government's two biggest goals in the drug war, and how the strategy of isolating Sinaloa works with those goals. The first, and likely most important, goal is to reduce drug-related violence in Mexico. Today's violence is caused by turf wars between rival DTOs, and in some cases, intra-DTO fighting for power. The Sinaloa Federation is undoubtedly the most powerful DTO in Mexico; if Calderón can eliminate much of their competition, then a sort of equilibrium is attained, and violence is reduced.

The second goal is the arrest and prosecution of DTO leaders and members, and thus the reduction (notice I don't say "elimination," because that's virtually impossible) of drug trafficking in Mexico. The elimination of rivals like the Beltrán Leyva Organization and targeted operations against La Familia Michoacana and the Gulf Cartel have accomplished that to an extent, as the number of arrests of members in these organizations are unprecedented.

This concept isn't new. Back in 2006, a colleague of mine - journalist and author Sam Logan - wrote a piece called "The Reality of a Mexican Mega Cartel." In it, he explores the very real possibility of one of Mexico's DTOs becoming an enormous drug trafficking and business machine, either through their own elimination of rivals or with the unintentional assistance of the Mexican government. The existence of such a mega cartel would ostensibly reduce violence because of the lack of competition. However, it would likely grow to such proportions that the Mexican government would be unable to effectively dismantle it once competitors were completely eliminated.

So, the strategy of going after the smaller and easier-to-deal-with DTOs may be smarter in the short term, but at what cost? Will the Sinaloa Federation and El Chapo become so powerful in the next year or two that the Mexican government can no longer make sufficient arrests or seizures to remotely put a dent in their operations? It sure would be nice if violence were significantly reduced as a result of such a development, but totally not worth it if a DTO is running your country instead of your president.

"Mexican police arrest alleged drug lord Carlos Beltran Leyva."

Here is an excerpt from this article in The Guardian:

"Mexican police have captured an alleged drug lord two weeks after his more powerful brother was killed in a shootout with troops. Carlos Beltran Leyva was arrested in Culiacan, capital of the  Pacific coast state of Sinaloa, where he and several of his brothers allegedly started their gang. Two weeks ago his brother Arturo, reputed head of the Beltran Leyva cartel, was killed in the central city of Cuernavaca. He was the highest-ranking cartel suspect to be killed or captured since the president, Felipe Calderón, deployed tens of thousands of soldiers and police three years ago to fight drug gangs. Officials have previously described Carlos Beltran Leyva, 40, as a key member of the gang, but it was unclear whether he took over as chief after his brother died. A third brother, Alfredo, was arrested in January 2008. At least one other, Mario, remains at large and is listed as one of Mexico's 24 most wanted drug lords, with a $2m reward offered for his capture. Carlos was not included on the list, although the public safety department said there had been a warrant for his arrest since 2008. Officials from the US Drug Enforcement Administration, which helped to track down Arturo, said one of the brothers was likely to have filled the void. The agency's intelligence chief, Anthony Placido, said last month the US was receiving reports of plots to break Alfredo out of prison." Link to Full Article

Analysis: This is certainly a pleasant start to the new year for Mexican federal law enforcement and the Calderón administration, considering how badly things are going elsewhere in the drug war. The news report says that Carlos was a key leader, but no one was really sure where he fit in. I still think it's likely that Mario "Hector" Beltrán Leyva took the reins after Arturo was killed a couple of weeks ago, but with Carlos' capture, that's one less person vying for the top spot.

The Mexican daily La Jornada had an interesting comment that the competition for BLO leadership was now up to Mario, Édgar "La Barbie" Valdéz Villareal, and Heriberto "El Lazca" Lazcano. This is a significant comment because Villareal is the head of a team of highly trained hitmen for the Sinaloa Federation, and Lazcano is one of the heads of Los Zetas. Needless to say, these two are enemies under normal circumstances, so this wouldn't be an in-house ascension to power by any means.

On top of the battle sure to ensue - or actually continue - for control of the BLO remnants, there are still likely plenty of BLO elements who are going to continue in the tradition of reprisals for Carlos' capture. I'm sure many are concerned that those reprisals are going to take similar form to the killing of a Navy commando's family shortly after Arturo's death. Sorting out the bodies and the leadership changes is probably going to take up a lot of the Mexican government and military's time over the next few weeks.

"Top Mexican Drug Boss Killed in Navy Shootout."

Here is an excerpt from John Lyons and Jose de Cordoba's article in the Wall Street Journal:

"Mexican Navy special forces have killed one of the country's top drug kingpins in a shootout in the central city of Cuernavaca, notching an important victory in President Felipe Calderón's   three-year-old clampdown on narcotics trafficking. The death of Arturo Beltrán Leyva, who called himself "The Boss of Bosses" and was one of Mexico's three most wanted drug lords, came after a four-hour battle on Wednesday evening at an upscale condominium complex in Cuernavaca, a popular retirement destination for Americans and weekend getaway for residents of Mexico City. Four other suspected drug traffickers died, including one who killed himself rather than be arrested... The killing of Mr. Beltrán Leyva is also unlikely to slow down the actual business of drug trafficking in Mexico... The death, however, may alter the balance of power in the Mexican drugs business, with unpredictable consequences. Much of the bloodshed in recent years can be traced to a brutal turf war between Mr. Beltrán Leyva and his arch rival, the drug trafficker Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán, who is Mexico's most wanted man." Link to Full Article

Analysis: There's a looooong history between El Chapo and Arturo, and the WSJ article does a decent job of summing it up. I don't want to take up a lot of time and space in this blog post covering that, so if you want more background first, please check out the article in its entirety.

My main concern, as I think is the main concern for anyone who follows this sort of thing, is what happens next. More specifically, how is ABL's death - and likely the simultaneous death of his brother Héctor - going to affect the DTO dynamic in Mexico, and how is the level of bloodshed going to change?

Personally, I see three main scenarios that are possible, with some being more likely than others. The first one is that Héctor - if he's still alive, which it's looking less and less likely that he is - or one of the other top cartel bosses will fill the gap left by ABL quickly, and will fight to hang on to the BLO's territory and operations. From the conversations I've had today with former colleagues who follow the BLO, those remaining cartel bosses don't seem to stand out too much as men who could effectively lead the organization through what are sure to be very challenging times ahead. However, these men have been in charge of drug operations and deadly assassins for many years. Ultimately, their true capabilities won't be known until one of them (or several) step into the hot seat.

A second scenario is that Los Zetas may try to renew or strengthen their ties with the BLO in an attempt to merge the two organizations, or to orchestrate a friendly takeover. Both organizations have been battling El Chapo's Sinaloa Federation for some time, and this presents quite the strategic opportunity for the two cartels to work together again - especially if the BLO is feeling vulnerable and needs to shore up some support in order to keep control of its territory.

A third option is for El Chapo to try to reabsorb the BLO, and likely in a forceful manner. El Chapo has the resources at his disposal to effect such a swift and powerful takeover. The one thing that may work against him in such an attempt is the sheer size of the BLO's territory. They have influence in 17 of Mexico's 32 states and districts, and some will be easier to take over than others.

Here are some additional thoughts:

As the movie title says, there will be blood, no matter what option is taken or what events should transpire. It's only a matter of to what degree will the blood be shed. The BLO is notorious for exacting vicious revenge on the government and its rivals, and ABL's death at the hands of the Mexican navy will be no exception. There are some media reports out that El Chapo sold ABL's location out to the Navy. Whether or not that's true, the ABL will be looking to send some death in the Sinaloa Federation's direction.

The BLO has some of the best intelligence and infiltration capability in Mexico. How much of this capability survives depends on who was running those parts of the BLO. While acquisition of these capabilities would be a long-term goal for any rival - with the acquisition of territory being the high-priority short-term goal - it would be a significant prize.

So, as usual, more to come, and probably sooner rather than later. Power vacuums tend to be filled within a matter of days in Mexico, and this will not be an exception. Just prepare yourself for the reports of increased violence in areas where the BLO has traditionally held influence.

"Only sliver of aid for US-Mexico drug plan spent."

Here is an excerpt from Christopher Sherman's Associated Press article:

"Only $26 million of the $1.4 billion authorized to help Mexico and Central America fight organized crime has been spent due to bureaucracy, conditions placed on the funds by Congress  and preparations in recipient countries, according to a government report scheduled for release Thursday. While nearly all of the $1.4 billion pledged in October 2007 as part of the Merida Initiative has been appropriated by Congress, only about two percent was spent as of Sept. 30, according to a draft copy of a Government Accountability Office report obtained by The Associated Press... Mexico will get the bulk of the money and so far has received nearly all — $24.2 million — of what has been spent. It has yielded 26 armored vehicles, 30 machines to detect drugs and explosive materials and five x-ray vans, as well as software and several training programs. The report blamed red tape and the need to bolster the institutions that will be receiving the funds in Mexico, Central America, the Dominican Republic and Haiti. The U.S. too needed to increase staffing at its embassy in Mexico to handle the daily demands created by a seven-fold increase in U.S. law enforcement assistance." Link to Full Article

For a summary of the GAO report, CLICK HERE.

To read the full GAO report, CLICK HERE.

Analysis: I'm going to focus on the three reasons listed by the GAO why the Merida Initiative money is taking forever to get to Mexico: "(1) statutory conditions on the funds, (2) challenges in fulfilling administrative procedures, and (3) the need to enhance institutional capacity on the part of both recipient countries and the United States to implement the assistance." 

Reason 1 - This refers to human rights abuses by the Mexican army. While I understand the intention of this condition, I think it's pretty hypocritical. We just lifted all restrictions on remittances going to Cuba, haven't seen a single benefit in return, and we don't even need to start discussing the extent of human rights abuses going on in Cuba. Then there's the billion dollars in trade we have with China, and they don't exactly have the best human rights track record, either. The US government should also have thought of this condition at the beginning of the Initiative's drafting, not after most everything was put into motion. This is NOT to say the abuses being committed by some army soldiers are OK, and yes, the Mexican government needs to step up efforts to make sure those violations are being prosecuted. I just think the US government needs to think carefully about the kinds of strings it starts attaching to Merida money this late in the game.

Reason 2 - This is the bureaucratic way of saying our government machine is slow as molasses, and there's enough red tape in this process to circle the globe 75 times. According to the GAO report, it takes three to six months to negotiate and sign a contract that will send a new helicopter to a country, and another year to build one to spec. Seriously? Look, I know helicopters aren't cheap, and it's not like negotiating for just a few hours at a car dealership. But 3-6 months for just finalizing the contract? You know things are bad when Sec Clinton says to Congress that she doesn't understand what's so hard about getting the money flowing.

What's even more fun about funds distribution is that Merida money comes from three different agency pots. And guess what? Each agency has a completely different way of managing that money; separate spreadsheets, separate tracking methods, and different budgeting terms. The US State Department currently has no consolidated database for all this information, so tracking the money from one place is near impossible.

Reason 3 - There aren't enough people at both ends of the money pipe to handle the flow. Really? Did our government not realize the personnel needed on our end to manage the money flow when the Initiative was first drafted two years ago? As for the need to recipient institutions to get their act together, I can understand that. Remember, it's not just Mexico receiving Initiative money; there are several other countries involved whose government institutions are in varying states of organization - and honesty.

The State Department's Response - At the end of the report, the GAO offered the following regarding the State Dept's reponse: "In commenting on our report, State emphasized that while Mérida expenditures may be below expectations, they have spent considerable time laying the groundwork with their Mexican and Central American partners to ensure effective coordination and future disbursement of assistance. State also commented that using expenditures as a performance measure for U.S.-funded programs in general does not take into account the nuances and delays in the procurement and billing cycles, and therefore does not fully capture program activity."

The GAO has said it's going to do follow-up with the State Department's management of Merida money, and it looks like it's going to issue another report in mid-2010. Hopefully all the players can get their act together by then, or the next-biggest thing to Plan Colombia in the Western Hemisphere is going to end up as just window dressing in an attempt to tackle the challenges of Mexico's drug war.

"Al Capone and Today's Cartels."

I'm very excited to announce that I have officially been published in a magazine! My article, titled "Al Capone and Today's Cartels," came out this morning in Homeland Security Today (HSToday) magazine. In it, I compare the situation in 1920s Prohibition-era Chicago to that of modern-day Mexico. I also examine the strategies our government used against corruption and organized crime in Mexico to attempt to suss out potential new strategies for the Mexican government in its war against the cartels.

To read the article in HSToday, please CLICK HERE.

I'll be talking about Mexico on the Roger Hedgecock show Tuesday night!

I'm thrilled to say I was contacted by the producers of the Roger Hedgecock talk radio show yesterday, and was asked to speak for roughly ten minutes tomorrow evening on a recent piece I wrote for MexiData.info! I'll be addressing instability in several countries in Central America - notably Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador - and how that instability is affecting Mexico's security situation.

If you'd like to read the article on MexiData.info, please CLICK HERE.

The Roger Hedgecock show is syndicated, so you may be able to catch it locally - especially if you're in the San Diego area. However, you can listen online through the show's website HERE, and click on "Listen Live!" in the upper right portion of the page. You can also listen on XM satellite radio channel 158. The producers told me they'll be calling me at 4:36 PST/7:36pm EST.

Wish me luck!

"Program to help truckers attracts drug smugglers."

Here is an excerpt from Christopher Sherman's Associated Press article:

"A U.S. program that offers trusted trucking companies speedy passage across American borders has begun attracting just the sort of customers who place a premium on avoiding inspections:   Mexican drug smugglers. Most trucks enrolled in the program pause at the border for just 20 seconds before entering the United States. And nine out of 10 of them do so without anyone looking at their cargo. But among the small fraction of trucks that are inspected, authorities have found multiple loads of contraband, including eight tons of marijuana seized during one week in April. Some experts now question whether the program makes sense in an environment where drug traffickers are willing to do almost anything to smuggle their shipments into the U.S." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I wrote a post on the US-Mexico trucking program some time ago, trying to detail the deeply two-sided nature of this debate. It seems like that debate is still ongoing, and both sides still have very strong opinions about the program.

The group that sides against the program is comprised mostly of some law enforcement, safety-conscious US citizens, and unionized US truckers. The agencies that deal with cross-border trucks are mostly border agencies like CBP, as well as the DEA and highway patrol. I can't speak for CBP and the DEA, but I imagine they might feel that allowing vehicles with LOTS of space for contraband into the country with little scrutiny at the actual time of crossing poses a vulnerability. Highway patrol officers may come across these trucks well after they've entered the US, and while many are trained to spot safety violations and detect the presence of contraband, many are not. Some US citizens who are not well-versed on the program have an image in their heads of Mexican trucks on US highways and conclude that they must be rattling 18-wheelers that are ready to fall apart and kill a dozen motorists in the process. Finally, unionized US truckers are worried that the program will take jobs away from them.

The group in favor of the program includes Mexican trucking companies, US truckers who live and work in Mexico as part of the program, and businesses on both sides of the border who benefit from reduced shipping costs and transit times as a result of the program. I know an American trucker who works in Mexico, and he's pretty upset by the bad rap the program has gotten over the years. I asked him what he thought of this article, and he pointed out several things worth mentioning here. 

First, he said that 71 "compromised" loads out of roughly 7 million that cross the border every year is a tiny fraction. Of course, those 71 loads are the ones that were detected. We have no way of knowing how many loads of contraband successfully made it into the US in program-registered trucks. Second, he talked about the plata o plombo situation. I agree that program-affiliated companies make themselves vulnerable to smugglers by advertising their participation. I also agree with my associate in that truckers have little choice but to accept bribes if they value their lives. That's just the way things work in Mexico. Finally, he said it's a long and expensive process for trucking companies to get certified through the C-TPAT. They understand the risk, but feel it's worth the financial benefits they derive from being part of the program.

So, bottom line, this is just another form of the classic debate over security versus convenience, or in this case, commerce. I understand the merits of both arguments, and it's tough for me to say which side has the better one. Mexican trucks aren't the only ones crossing the border, and drugs make their way into the US inside all sorts of vehicles through dozens of ports of entry every day. But is it smart to allow trucks coming from Mexico on the fast track into the US with minimal - if any - physical scrutiny? If we can reduce the number of conveyances for drugs into the US, shouldn't we try? Sounds simple enough, but we have trains crossing the border (sometimes carrying drugs) and hundreds of Mexico-origin ships and boats that enter US waters without scrutiny every day. Are we going to try and limit that, too?

It's a tough call, and for now, we can only hope that our law enforcement agencies and the improved technology they're using can detect and deter the entry of contraband into the US by trucks originating in Mexico.

"Central American Disorder — a Threat to Mexico's Security."

Here is an excerpt from my latest MexiData.info article:

"The everyday realities of Mexico’s drug war are grisly and overwhelming. On a daily basis, both Mexican media outlets and U.S. news sources report the latest mass murders that have resulted from turf wars between Mexican cartels and internal organizational discord.

"Security in Mexico is perceived as mostly an internal problem. But Mexico is not an isolated country, and the ongoing turmoil in neighboring countries is having both a direct and indirect impact on Mexico’s security situation."

To read the complete article at MexiData.info, please CLICK HERE.

"Border program has vague goals, little oversight."

Here is an excerpt from Brady McCombs and Stephen Ceasar's article in the Arizona Daily Star:

"A federal program touted as a model for using local law enforcement to help control our borders is handing out $165 million — but with little tracking of how the money is spent, no clear objective and no benchmarks for success, an Arizona Daily Star investigation has found. The Department of Homeland Security's "Operation Stonegarden" gives border law enforcement agencies money to pay officers to work overtime shifts aimed at enhancing border security. The money also lets agencies buy equipment such as four-wheel-drive trucks, radios and night-vision goggles. Star reporters examined more than 10,000 pages of documents and interviewed more than 50 people over the course of seven months as they analyzed how 10 Arizona agencies used the $7.3 million they have spent so far... The paper's investigation reveals a program so loosely managed that it's nearly impossible to determine its goals, much less measure whether those goals are being met." Link to Full Article

Analysis: This article is disturbing on so many levels, yet it doesn't come as a surprise. These kinds of problems were exactly what I was hearing about when I was working in California because some of that Stonegarden money was going to agencies in San Diego and Imperial counties. That's not to say that ALL the money is being misused and abused, but there's a general feeling that the money flow is a big show to give the appearance that the federal government is trying to work with the locals to make a dent in the border security problem. Guess what? It's not.

Here are a few more salient excerpts from the article:

"Homeland Security tracks how much each agency is reimbursed for overtime and equipment, but has no idea how that money is distributed among officers and doesn't keep a list of purchased items."

"With no definition of how officers should spend their overtime shifts, they do anything from patrolling known smuggling routes to targeting street gangs to controlling crowds at parades."

"The last three guidance packets include bullet-point goals, but none is written in a way that makes it possible to measure if the program is helping to control of the border."

This isn't to say that the project's funding isn't doing any good. It is. The problem is that no one can tell anyone else EXACTLY how much good it's doing because of that lack of benchmarks. I'll be the first one to say that the solution (or at least one of them) to controlling border violence is increased funding and manpower. Supporters of the Stonegarden program say it's providing just that, and it's money that's immediately available without having to go through miles of red tape.

I'm very concerned that a good chunk of Stonegarden money is being misused - that's your and my taxpayer money, by the way - and no one can prove that it is or isn't. Not to be overdramatic, but this is mildly reminiscent of the bank bailout. The federal government threw a LOT of money at the banks with very little oversight, and to this day, no one really knows how that money was spent. And that was just an economic issue; in this case, we're dealing with a possible misappropriation of significant sums of money intended for national security.

The intended goals of Operation Stonegarden are good ones; really, they are. But DHS needs to put its nose to the grindstone and crank out some firm guidelines, benchmarks, and accounting standards for OUR money.

This final excerpt sums up so well my opinion of the whole thing:

"Stonegarden serves its purpose politically as soon as the money is given out. You can say, 'Here is what we are doing for border security.' And departments are more than happy to get the money," said Raymond Michalowski, an Arizona regents professor in the department of criminology at Northern Arizona University. "You are assuming that merely spending the money is effective."

And you all know what happens when you assume.

"Bush aide urges weapons ban to slow Mexican drug war."

Here is an excerpt from Jerry Seper's article in the Washington Times:

"The former head of U.S. Customs and Border Protection called Monday for the U.S. to reinstitute the ban on assault weapons and take other measures to rein in the war between Mexico and its drug cartels, saying the violence has the potential to bring down legitimate rule in that country. Former CBP Commissioner Robert C. Bonner also called for the United States to more aggressively investigate U.S. gun sellers and tighten security along its side of the border, describing the situation as 'critical' to the safety of people in both countries, whether they live near the border or not... He said some studies have shown that many of the weapons obtained by Mexican drug traffickers come from the U.S., and much of their funding comes from U.S. drug sales. He called for U.S. authorities to begin more aggressive investigations of U.S. gun sellers and to reinstitute the ban on assault weapons... At least three other efforts to pass new legislation banning the weapons have not been successful. In February, Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. said the ban should be reinstated, but Mr. Obama has since said he would not push its reinstatement even though it 'made sense.'" Link to Full Article

Analysis: I usually don't like to re-hash old blog posts and analyses, but in this case, I don't think the issue of the potential reinstatement of an assault weapons ban can be explained too much. It seems to me that many people are under the impression that DTO enforcers only use assault weapons when they kill people, and that is NOT the case. Yes, they do like some types of assault weapons that they legally buy in the US through straw purchasers, but I'm still convinced that reinstating the ban won't make that much of a dent in the southbound weapons flow problem, or in the levels of violence in Mexico. Here's my analysis from April 2009, in response to an article called "Obama gets gun shy.":

"I'm not a firearms expert, so take my analysis knowing that. However, I was able to do some common sense research, and I came to the conclusion that renewing the assault weapons ban would probably not accomplish much by way of stemming the flow of weapons from the US into Mexico.

"The verbiage in the 1994 legislation identifies 19 firearms that qualify as assault weapons under the ban. The legislation also details the features that certain weapons have that also qualify them as assault weapons, but for brevity's sake, I'll stick to the 19 named firearms. They include the Uzi; Steyr AUG; Galil; FN/FAL, FN/FAR, and FNC; North China Industries 56, 84, 86, 320, AKM, and AKS; Polytechnologies AK-47, AK-47/S, AKS; Mitchell Arms AK; SWD M-10, M-11, M-11/9, and M-12; Colt AR-15; Intratec TEC-9, TEC-DC9, and TEC-22; Beretta AR-70; and the Street Sweeper/Striker 12 (including USAS 12). The majority of these firearms are 5.56 caliber, although assault rifle calibers can range from 5.45mm to 7.62mm. 

"So what kinds of firearms are going to Mexico? The ATF has analyzed firearms recovered in Mexico from 2005-2008 and has identified the following weapons most commonly used by Mexican DTOs: 9mm pistols; .38-caliber revolvers; 5.7mm pistols; .223-caliber rifles; 7.62mm rifles; and .50 caliber rifles. Specifically, certain DTOs are fond of the Fabrique Nationale (FN) FiveSeven pistol and the FN-P90, as well as the Barrett .50-caliber sniper rifle. 

"As most anyone can tell, most of the weapons on the original 1994 ban list are not the ones going to Mexico. Yes, the AK-47 (pictured) and the AR-15 are very popular with the DTOs. However, as I've previously posted, you don't need a whole AK-47 from the manufacturer to get an AK-47, as parts kits for assault weapons are legally available in the US. According to the Impact Guns Online Superstore website, "[parts] kits are what's left from real AK-47, or AK-47 rifles that were cut in half to destroy them as weapons. Those parts are legal to import since they are not a gun. They are a great inexpensive source of spare parts for your AK, since many AK-47 parts are interchangeable between models. These kits are also made back into legal rifles in the US with American made receivers and semi automatic trigger parts. This is a fun project for those who can do it, but it takes lots of tools and knowledge of metalworking to do a good job. Many of the AK-47 rifles you'll see at a [US] Gun Shop or Gun Show will have been made from these parts kits." The kits and parts for other assault weapons, such as the AR-15, can be legally purchased on numerous websites that are US-based. 

"So, bottom line, between non-assault weapons, legal parts kits, and the straw purchase method, renewing the assault weapons ban - or enacting other types of gun control laws - would serve more as window dressing than an actual deterrent to the southbound flow of guns."

Another thing that is VERY important to remember is that DTOs are relying more heavily on military-grade weapons, like grenade launchers, hand grenades, and sniper rifles. These types of weapons not only wouldn't fall within an assault weapons ban, but they're not even purchased by DTO reps in the US. Long story short, a weapons ban would likely be yet another ineffective attempt by the Obama Administration to look like it's doing something - anything - to help the Mexico situation.

"Feds: Gun, cash seizures up at Mexican border."

Here is an excerpt from Elliot Spagat's Associated Press article:

"U.S. authorities on Tuesday reported a spike in seizures of guns and cash along the Mexican border since they began assigning more agents to stem the flow of southbound  contraband. Nearly 600 illegal weapons were seized along the border by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials from March through September, an increase of more than 50 percent from the same period of 2008. The agencies seized more than $40 million in cash along the border from mid-March through September, nearly double the amount in the year-ago period. The seizures represent a tiny fraction of business done by Mexican and Colombian drug lords. According to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, those drug lords generate $18 billion to $39 billion in wholesale drug proceeds in the United States each year. Cash proceeds are smuggled across the border to Mexico. But U.S. officials said the figures demonstrate that heightened enforcement is paying off." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I'm always a fan of reading good news, and this seems to fit the bill. A 50 percent increase in weapons seizures is a sizable increase, and so is the amount of cash seized. The increased enforcement activities are long overdue, and I'm happy to see that US agencies working along the border are getting some concrete results.

I'm also happy to see a dose of reality with the statement that the seizures represent only a drop in the bucket. I'll try to put the 600 guns seized over a six-month period in perspective. Last year, over 20,000 guns were seized from criminals in Mexico. That's just the number seized, not the number actually out there and being used by DTOs. God knows how many more were "seized" by dirty cops and rerouted without being reported. One Mexican official said two years ago that over 2,000 guns come into Mexico from the US every day. I don't know how accurate that number is (it's likely exaggerated..after all who's counting?), but even if you make the relatively conservative and speculative guess that 100 guns are coming in every day, US authorities only seized six days' worth of guns in a six-month period.

Look, in the southbound inspection business, you have to start somewhere. And it's not like US authorities are just starting, either. It's just that they now have a new mandate and (hopefully) more resources to do the southbound inspection job. Hopefully next year we'll see a similar or larger increase in seizures as the process gets further refined.

"Fewer border agents in south."

Here is an excerpt from Jonathon Shacat's article in The Sierra Vista Herald:

"The number of U.S. Border Patrol agents that are deployed on the U.S.-Mexico border will be cut soon, while the amount along the U.S.-Canada border will be expanded, a federal official said. On Thursday, Lloyd Easterling, acting media director for U.S. Customs and Border Protection, said the planned changes will be implemented in fiscal year 2010, which begins next Thursday. 'We have been adding agents for several years and now have about 20,000,' he told the Herald/Review on Thursday. 'Importantly, we also have added tactical infrastructure plus new and improved technology which act as force multipliers and allow us to expand our coverage area. Smart deployment of these resources allows us to properly evaluate and move resources where we need them to continue securing our borders incrementally so that we can get the job done the right way.' During the current fiscal year, 17,399 agents have been deployed on the nation’s southern border, but that will be decreased by 384, for a total of 17,015, Easterling confirmed." Link to Full Article

Analysis: This news story is absolutely baffling. Back in March, I posted on the US government's plan to send 360 federal security agents to the border and into Mexico, saying 360 agents wasn't enough. I conceded a little bit when the number of agents being sent to the SW border jumped to somewhere around 600, but later I learned many of them were USBP interns fresh out of school. This means they can't do much on their own, and aren't a significant source of immediate manpower help for the USBP. The border governors have been screaming left and right for the deployment of National Guard troops, and after being denied so many times, TX Governor Rick Perry finally decided to send in the Texas Rangers. No, not the baseball team.

So now the US government is changing its mind. Whaaaa??? That line about increased technology acting as a force multiplier is only partly true. Some USBP stations have access to scopes so they can see their territory better, but that doesn't automatically mean they have the manpower or resources to RESPOND every time they see a problem. What good is knowing you have a problem if you can't do anything about it because you don't have enough PEOPLE?

Just last week, I posted on an article that talks about Napolitano halting border projects because of controversy over stimulus fund spending on quiet northern border crossings. I'll be the first one to say that our northern border is nowhere NEAR as "fortified" as our SW border. However, that doesn't mean that resources should be taken away from one and sent to the other, especially just a few months after hundreds of additional agents were slated to be sent to the SW border. I'm tempted to scream "POLITICS!" because I just don't understand this non-sensical and absolutely ridiculous move.

"Obama names Customs and Border Protection commissioner."

Here is an excerpt from Sebastian Rotella's article in the Los Angeles Times:

"President Obama has nominated the administration's point man on Southwest border strategy 

to be the new commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the nation's largest law enforcement agency, the White House announced Tuesday. Alan Bersin, a veteran of federal border enforcement and a former San Diego schools superintendent, has served since April as assistant secretary for international affairs at the Homeland Security Department. Bersin, 62, is the department's special representative for border affairs, working with Mexican leaders and U.S. border-area agencies on challenges such as drugs and immigration... Bersin will continue to advise Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano on issues related to Mexico and the border, although he will relinquish the title of special representative, officials said." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I don't really have too much commentary about this story, except to wonder who will replace Bersin as the SW border "czar." I don't know that there will be a huge rush to do so, since the story says Bersin will continue to advise Napolitano on SW border issues. I know folks who have heard Bersin speak at various events and California, and although his speeches have been non-specific, he did come across as a hard-charger. I haven't had a chance to speak to any of my contacts at CBP or USBP about the nomination. If there are any CBP or USBP readers who would like to anonymously comment on the appointment, shoot me an email at [email protected] and I'll pass on your thoughts.

"Perry: Ranger teams to go to Texas-Mexico border."

Here is an excerpt from Michael Graczyk's Associated Press article:

"Special teams of Texas Rangers will be deployed to the Texas-Mexico border to deal with increasing violence because the federal government has failed to address growing problems  there, Gov. Rick Perry said Thursday. "It is an expansive effort with the Rangers playing a more high-profile role than they've ever played before," Perry said of the Department of Public Safety's elite investigative unit. The forces, dubbed "Ranger recon" teams, are the latest effort "to fill the gap that's been left by the federal government's ongoing failure to adequately secure our international border with Mexico," he said... They'll be deployed to high-traffic, high-crime areas along the border," he said. "They'll give us boots on the ground, put people in these hot spots no matter what or where they may exist." Perry said the effort also would focus on remote areas where farmers and ranchers have complained of being overrun by smugglers and gangs from Mexico in numbers that also overwhelm local law enforcement and border patrol officers." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I'll be the first to admit that I'm a fan of Rick Perry's, but I also have to ask exactly what his ultimate goal is here. Yes, of course he wants to do whatever possible to secure his state's border with Mexico, and he's also pretty ticked off at the federal government for not granting his request to send 1,000 National Guard troops to Texas for that purpose. But (a) will he be able to make a dent in border security problems with the Rangers, (b) is this just his way of giving the finger to the Obama Administration, and (c) is this a ploy to garner favor among constituents before next year's gubernatorial election?

Well, it's probably a little of each. I'm not entirely familiar with Texas state politics, although I did spend five months in 2005 working for a small, west Texas county. There was more drama in west Texas politics than in any soap opera I've ever seen, and I can imagine that it's at an even bigger scale at the state level. And, of course, everything's bigger in Texas.

As for the practical logistics of sending Rangers to the border, Perry's statements didn't make very clear exactly how they would be used. Rangers are different than National Guard troops in that they can actually make arrests and enforce civilian law, which is useful for his purposes. National Guard troops more often than not act as force multipliers for the US Border Patrol, serving as additional eyes so that agents are freed up to respond to situations. I'm waiting to see if the Border Patrol issues a statement regarding the Rangers' deployment. Specifically, I want to know if Perry's actions have been coordinated with the Border Patrol, or if he's just acting on his own to send more law enforcement agents to border hot spots. If this is a unilateral action by Perry, then that will make for some serious Texas drama with the feds, in my opinion.

As for political motivations, I imagine they're likely in this case. I think it's definitely a situation of, "if you want something done right, do it yourself." I believe three out of the four southwest border governors have requested National Guard troops (CA, AZ, and TX), and the Obama Administration is hemming and hawing over how they'll be paid for, what they'll be used for, etc. It's not like this is the first time it's been done, so they can figure out pretty easily how they can best be used. The money part is what's iffy for the feds, but if Perry can find a way to pay for the Rangers and stick it to the federal government at the same time, I imagine he'd do it - especially a few months before he's up for re-election.

I'll be keeping an eye on this one, for two reasons: I want to see if the Rangers are effective, and if they are, what actions the other border states might take to duplicate those of Governor Perry.

"Mexico changes justice, farm, oil Cabinet posts."

Here is an excerpt from Olga R. Rodriguez's Associated Press article:

"Mexican President Felipe Calderon announced Monday the resignation of Attorney General Eduardo Medina-Mora, his point-man in the offensive against drug cartels, but gave no indication  that the current strategy of full confrontation with the gangs would change. At a ceremony announcing Cabinet changes, including the resignations of the agricultural secretary and head of the state-owned oil company, Medina-Mora predicted history would judge the tough approach with drug gangs as correct... Cabinet changes at midterm are not unusual in Mexico. Calderon, whose term runs from 2006 to 2012, gave no explanation for the officials leaving, although there had been rumors for some time that Medina-Mora would be giving up his post... Jose Luis Pineyro, a drug expert at Mexico's National Autonomous University, said the change could indicate some change in the government's tactics in the drug fight, which have sparked bloody reprisal attacks by cartels... Calderon also announced the resignations of Agriculture Secretary Alberto Cardenas and the director of the oil monopoly, Petroleos Mexicanos, Jesus Reyes Heroles. All three officials had been in the Cabinet since the start of Calderon's term." Link to Full Article

Analysis: Regardless of how common mid-term Cabinet changes are in Mexico, some of these changes are raising eyebrows. Mora's resignation might signal a change in strategy, motivated either by Calderon himself or recent elections that saw a decrease in Calderon's political party's influence. Some felt Mora was an average performer, so maybe Calderon was looking for someone more aggressive. He's nominating lawyer Arturo Chavez to replace Mora; I don't know yet what his creds are, and what he might bring to the table that Mora was unable to.

Jose Luis Pineyro, a drug expert at Mexico's National Autonomous University, is quoted in the AP article, and he has something to say that I find VERY interesting:

"As long as there is a lack of attention to attacking the financial nerve center and property of organized crime, you're not going to make progress."

The first article I wrote for Examiner.com discussed the lack of attention the Mexican government has paid to money laundering operations in Mexico, and how that negligence was hurting the government's efforts against the DTOs. I think it's fantastic that Pineyro has brought this up publicly, but now we have to see if the change-up in the Cabinet does anything to address the money issue. To read more about this, CLICK HERE.

The PEMEX change isn't too surprising. I recently wrote an article for MexiData.info that addresses the $700 million annual loss PEMEX is experiencing due to oil theft. Part of that is due to lack of physical security along the massive pipeline infrastructure, but another (and perhaps bigger) part is due to the insane level of corruption within PEMEX. Calderon has made no secret of his distaste for corruption, so this change was somewhat expected.

As for the other changes, time will tell if they will make any difference in the drug war. The PAN lost a lot of representation in Congress to the PRI, so maybe this is Calderon's way of appeasing the PRI - or at least meeting them halfway. There's no guarantee the new appointees will be more effective (or cleaner) than the old ones, but there's only one way to find out. Wait.

"Border governors ask U.S. to divert money to their fight against organized crime."

Here is an excerpt from Alfredo Corchado's article in The Dallas Morning News:

"Governors from northern Mexico are asking the U.S. government to help provide training and equipment for their beleaguered and often corrupt state and municipal authorities, a move that  could intensify the U.S. role in Mexico's uphill battle against organized crime. During the 27th annual border governors' meeting, which concluded Friday in Monterrey, the governors of Tamaulipas, Nuevo León, Chihuahua and Coahuila – the four states bordering Texas – pressed the U.S. delegations to support the diversion of funds from the Mérida Initiative to state and local governments... The effort by the Mexican governors represents a significant turnaround by state authorities, some of whom once suggested that the Mérida Initiative posed a threat to Mexican sovereignty. The change of heart underscores the increasing worry among local and state authorities over whether the federal government will be able to sustain a longer and bloodier campaign than anticipated... While some current and former U.S. officials embrace the idea of assisting state and local authorities, they warn that the vetting process must be rigorous. Law enforcement authorities are notorious for collaborating with organized crime." Link to Full Article

Analysis: To say this is interesting is an understatement, and it's not just the request. I attended the BGC last year in Hollywood, and it was a pretty glitzy - and very safe - affair, with most of the meetings and events occurring within Universal Studios. There were TV and movie stars at some of the social events, and I can almost guarantee you that none of the Mexican OR US governors would have allowed a "scheduling conflict" to prevent them from attending. Plus, the BGC is a big deal. Several important cross-border issues are discussed, and often many resolutions are drawn up and signed. The governors get along pretty well, and I think they're all genuinely interested in addressing and fixing security, economic, and environmental issues at the state and local level whenever possible.

This year's BGC took place in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state - a city widely touted as the safest in Mexico. Yet, three out of the four US border governors didn't attend. California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger said he had to stay home and monitor the wildfire situation. Texas Governor Rick Perry cited a "scheduling conflict." Arizona Governor Jan Brewer canceled her trip at the last minute, deciding to monitor budget talks at home. Did those governors' issues really take priority over the BGC, or were they worried about personal security during their travels to and stay in Mexico? I would be, but I imagine it's a diplomatic no-no for these governors to say so publicly.

But back to the issue at hand: redirecting money to the states. I have to admit, I chuckled a bit when I read this. Tony Garza, the former US Ambassador to Mexico, summed up my concerns pretty well:

"If we're talking about vetting, training and follow-on programs designed to assure integrity within the forces, then you might want to consider doing something," said Tony Garza, former U.S. ambassador to Mexico. "But, look, if you're talking about putting hardware in the hands of poorly trained and vetted officers, then I think that's a non-starter."

I'm sure there's enough concern already about holding the Mexican government accountable for its share of Merida money. But ensuring that any funds diverted to God knows how many states and municipalities for border security purposes might be impossible, given the extent of corruption at that level. Mind you, the Mexican government is working to replace many of its customs officers and provide quality training to new police officers, but this sort of shift doesn't happen overnight. I think Garza is right, and the US government is better off just considering this request for the time being, and taking a skeptical approach.

"U.S.-backed computer techs kicked out of Mexico for tracking illegal payoffs."

Here is an excerpt from my article on Examiner.com, based on information from KREM 2 News:

"An international group of computer experts was recently kicked out of Mexico for using a unique computer program to track drug cartel payoffs to police and government officials. The  program was immediately and hugely successful, resulting in the arrests of 92 Mexican municipal police officers. But apparently, no good deed goes unpunished. KREM 2 News reported that one day after those arrests occurred in late June, the team was rounded up, taken to an airport and kicked out of the country. They never got paid and all their hardware and special computer programs were left behind... According to KREM, this secret panel of computer experts was formed to help combat the problem, including Mark, because payoffs reached all the way into the Office of the Mexican Attorney General."

To read the rest of this article and watch the KREM video on this story (includes interview with "Mark"), CLICK HERE.

Details on some great links to Mexico security issues in my blogroll

If you've seen other blogs similar to mine - on any issue, really - they're likely to have what's called a Blogroll, or a list of other blogs and websites the author enjoys or finds useful. I'm no different, in that I have to look at plenty of sources of information in order to come to the (hopefully educated) conclusions that I post on my own blog. I'm pretty picky about what I post in my blogroll these days, and I wanted to give you a brief description on each site in case you can use any of them for your own research.

The first blog is Southern Pulse Networked Intelligence, which was created by Samuel Logan. Sam is an author and journalist who has traveled and lived throughout Latin America. He has written probably hundreds of articles and papers on all sorts of security-related topics, and most recently published a book on Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13. Anyway, Southern Pulse is pretty neat, and different because it only posts a short blurb, or "pulse," on a news topic related to security, politics, business, or economics in Latin America. Given the current security situation in Mexico, the posts relating to it are very frequent. It's up to you to do more digging on each story, but the blog is designed to give you a fast overview of current events.

Next is Sam's personal blog, Security in Latin America. Again, he covers topics for all of Latin America, but posts on Mexico are frequent.

Next is MexiData.info, which provides longer, more in-depth articles about Mexican security, politics, and economics. It's designed to provide useful, actionable information and open-source intelligence to businesses, governments, and concerned citizens. I was recently asked to be a contributor, and I post summaries of my weekly articles here in my blog with links to MexiData. I'm impressed with the credentials of my fellow contributors, and the information on this site is solid, well-written, and useful.

Next is Bloggings by Boz, a blog by James Bosworth. James is a freelance writer/analyst/consultant living in Washington, DC. Prior to going independent, he worked for an international strategic communications consulting company and a DC think tank. He writes on a wide variety of issues, but frequently posts about Mexico. James' analysis is always spot-on; he really knows what he's talking about, and he and Sam are acquainted.

Next is Security Corner, by Mario Gonzalez-Roman. The site specializes in the subjects of public security and crime prevention, and with good reason. Mario worked in the U.S. Embassy in Mexico for 28 years, and is now retired from the U.S. Civil Service. He was awarded four honorary recognitions by the Department of State and his responsibility included serving as liaison between the Secret Service and the Presidential staff during the visits of U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of State to Mexico. Mario has also been kidnapped and tortured, and kindly helps the families of kidnap victims to get through their ordeal. The site contains Mexico-related news and a wide variety of information on travel and security issues.

Next is the site for the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars' Mexico Institute. The site provides comprehensive and timely news, analysis and studies on Mexico. It covers a wide range of crucial issues, including migration, security, the economy, development, energy, and elections. It's also updated frequently, which is a must for me when looking for current stories on which to post an analysis.

Finally is Dr. James Creechan's Narco Mexico blog. Dr. Creechan is a sociology professor in Toronto, and has taught (and still teaches as a visiting professor) at universities in Canada, the United States, and Mexico. He specializes in criminology, and is currently teaching a class on Mexico's drug war. He posts news stories every day on his blog from the Mexican dailies, many with his analysis attached. Most of the posts are in Spanish, but he does post some English-language stories. This is a great site for checking daily news out of Mexico from the more reputable news sources.

I'm constantly looking for new blogs and sites that offer timely, intelligent, and useful information on Mexico's drug war and general Latin America security issues. Check back every so often to see if I've added any to my blogroll. Also, if you know of a really great site, either in English or Spanish, don't hesitate to email me and let me know about it. Thanks, and enjoy!

"Mexico's EPR 'Guerrillas': A Nuisance or a Threat in 2010?"

Here is an excerpt from my latest article on MexiData.info:

"In this time of unprecedented violence and criminal activity throughout Mexico, the last thing President Felipe Calderón’s government needs is a guerrilla group resurgence. But is the chaos in some parts of Mexico tempting those who seek to end the democratic state?

The Popular Revolutionary Army, or EPR for Ejército Popular Revolucionario, is a Marxist-Leninist  guerrilla group in Mexico that advocates a socialist revolution. The group announced its existence on June 28, 1996, at the one-year anniversary memorial of the Aguas Blancas Massacre, in Aguas Blancas, Guerrero.  During this announcement, the group read from its manifesto in which they described their origins: “We come from the sadness of widows and orphans, from the absence created by our disappeared loved ones." Then they called for the overthrow of the "unjust and illegitimate" Mexican government...

In 2010, Mexico will celebrate both the 200th anniversary of its call for Independence, and the centennial of the start of the Mexican Revolution. These are two huge events that could be used as an excuse for smaller, largely ignored rebel groups like the EPR to make their voices heard by the government."

To read more about the EPR, possible assistance they might be receiving from DTOs, and the future threat they might pose in Mexico, CLICK HERE.

"Office of Mexican Newspaper Comes under Assault Rifle Attack."

Here is an excerpt from this article on the International Press Institute's website:

"Unidentified gunmen opened fire at around 1am local time on Wednesday at the editorial offices of the Coahuila-based daily Siglo de Torreón, according to the newspaper. There were no  reports of any injuries. Witnesses describe two assailants on motorcycles opening fire on the building’s façade, according to local news reports. The assault shattered the building’s glass exterior, and damaged walls, desks and furniture inside.Bullet casings from AK-47 and AR-15 assault rifles were found at the scene... Sources at the newspaper told IPI that they had not yet identified a possible motive behind the attack, and had received no warning prior to, or messages after, the incident... Mexico is the Western Hemisphere’s deadliest country for reporters, with at least four journalists murdered so far in 2009 for reasons believed to be related to their work, according to IPI’s Death Watch count." Link to Full Article

Analysis: This attack was interesting in that an entire news office was sprayed with bullets. Usually, individual reporters are threatened, kidnapped or murdered, although that's not always the case. The Washington Post reported that in late 2006 and 2007, grenades were thrown into newspaper offices in Cancun, Hermosillo and Nuevo Laredo, and gunmen attacked a radio station and newspaper in Oaxaca.

Mexico is second only to Iraq in the list of most dangerous countries to operate in as a journalist. Once a reporter starts writing truthful articles that make a DTO look bad, or reveals details about DTO personnel or operations, he or she immediately becomes a target. Despite the threats and despite the gruesome evidence that DTOs are willing to make good on their threats, there are several brave (some would call them foolhardy) reporters that are willing to tell it like it is. It can be REALLY hard to get good, reliable information on Mexican DTOs, both within Mexico and in the US. We rely heavily on good, solid reporting from newspapers like El Universal, La Jornada, Proceso, and many other good Spanish-language dailies to give us the Mexican perspective on the drug war. Without the brave souls who are willing to put their lives on the line to write and disseminate quality open source information on the drug war, many of us in the US that follow it would be clueless. 

"17 charged in string of brutal kidnappings and slayings in San Diego suburbs."

Here is an excerpt from Richard Marosi's article in the Los Angeles Times:

"Authorities announced charges Thursday against a Mexican gang that took Tijuana-style violence to the upscale suburbs of San Diego County, kidnapping, torturing and killing well-to-do residents, even after some families paid large ransoms. The gang, a rogue cell of the Tijuana-based Arellano Felix drug cartel, moved across the border in 2002 and posed as U.S. law enforcement, donning FBI and police uniforms and caps while snatching victims outside homes and public places, said San Diego County prosecutors. Nine victims were killed from 2004 to 2007, and the bodies of two of them were dissolved in chemicals at a rented house in San Diego. Gang members were also charged with trying to murder a Chula Vista police officer in September 2005, peppering his car with high-caliber bullets before fleeing in a car. The gang targeted people it suspected of having links to organized crime, although some victims had no known ties, authorities said." Link to Full Article

Analysis: When I was working as an analyst for the State of California, one of the most frustrating things for me, as well as colleagues in other border states, was the fact that no standardized definition exists for the term "spillover" or the concept of "border violence spillover." Whether or not it is occurring depends on whom you ask. In February 2009, Texas state Homeland Security Director Steve McCraw said, "Yes, absolutely it has occurred; there's no question about it," McCraw said after a hearing before the House Committee on Border and International Affairs." However, the unanimous opinion of 10 Southern Arizona law-enforcement officials interviewed by the Arizona Daily Star in April 2009 was that spillover was NOT happening. "Spillover crime would be bad for business," Douglas, Arizona Police Chief Alberto Melis said. "And they're businessmen."

But what guidance are these people using to form their very visible and influential public opinions regarding spillover? I ask this question because, reading the reasons 17 people were charged in San Diego for that string of kidnappings and killings, it's obvious to me (but apparently not to everyone) that border violence spillover is happening in San Diego, and probably plenty of other cities on the US side of the border. You might ask what guidance I'M using to form my opinion. One part of it is the fact that violent criminal activity directly related to Mexico's drug trade occurred and is occurring in the United States. A second part of it is that many of the perpetrators of these types of crimes move freely between both countries and target illegals, legal residents, and US citizens alike. True, most victims are not "innocent" in the sense that they are usually involved or connected to organized crime in some way. This fact does little to calm the fears of neighbors in the US cities and towns where these crimes are happening. The third part is the bold willingness to impersonate US law enforcement officers and use high-powered weapons in our cities to carry out the orders of foreign organized crime groups. If the actions of those 17 individuals don't qualify as border violence spillover, I don't know what ever will. 

"Mexico’s Drug Traffickers Continue Trade in Prison."

Here is an excerpt from Marc Lacey's article in The New York Times:

"The surveillance cameras captured it all: guards looking on nonchalantly as 53 inmates — many of them associated with one of Mexico’s most notorious drug cartels — let themselves out of  their cells and sped off in waiting vehicles. The video shows that prison guards only pulled out their weapons after the inmates were well on their way. The brazen escape in May in the northern state of Zacatecas — carried out in minutes without a single shot fired — is just one of many glaring examples of how Mexico’s crowded and cruel prison system represents a critical weak link in the drug war. Mexico’s prisons, as described by inmates and insiders and viewed during several visits, are places where drug traffickers find a new base of operations for their criminal empires, recruit underlings, and bribe their way out for the right price. The system is so flawed, in fact, that the Mexican government is extraditing record numbers of drug traffickers to the United States, where they find it much harder to intimidate witnesses, run their drug operations or escape." Link to Full Article

Analysis: Most people think that drug traffickers aren't afraid of anything - the law, the government...even death. Not true. They are afraid of one thing, and one thing only - extradition to the United States. Why? The above article says it all. In Mexican prisons, drug traffickers - especially the big ones, like Osiel Cardenas Guillen - live like kings. Not only can they continue to run their operations, but they eat the best food, have hotel room-like amenities, and can even have prostitutes brought in for their pleasure. 

And Cardenas Guillen is a really good example. He was arrested and put in a Mexican prison in 2003, but he continued to run the Gulf cartel in the luxury of his cell until his extradition to the US in 2007. He's now awaiting a trial that might not happen if he agrees to provide the US government with valuable intelligence on Mexican DTO personnel and activities. Even so, he's being treated like any other high-value prisoner in the US - maximum security, boring clothes, boring food, and a boring cell. Oh yeah, and that's perhaps for life, with little chance of his cronies breaking him out or corrupt prison guards letting him out.

Mexico has typically been averse to extraditing criminals to the US for trial, but after several high-profile prison breaks in recent years, the Mexican government is finally realizing that maybe it has a prison security problem. The US government is providing Mexico with $4 million to help revamp its prison system. Maybe that's a lot of money in Mexico, but $4 million won't get you much in the US. Then again, with the Mexican economy being in dire straits (like almost every other economy in the hemisphere), every red cent helps.

"Los Linces, Mexican Drug War Contemporaries of Los Zetas."

Greetings! I'm excited to let you all know I've been invited to contribute weekly articles to MexiData.info, a great resource for important happenings in Mexico. You can read all about them HERE. Meanwhile, here is an excerpt from my first article on their site:

"Drug-related violence throughout Mexico is vicious, rampant, and almost always attributed to drug trafficking organizations, or DTOs. However, that attribution is very generic. To many, DTOs are just a faceless machine of drugs, death, and destruction. To others, they are disciplined and well-structured organizations designed to make maximum profit through bribery, intimidation, and enforcement. Upper-level management, as it were, of Mexican DTOs aren’t the ones who get their hands dirty during day-to-day operations and in defense of their transport routes. This is the job of the enforcement groups... While some enforcement group activities are well publicized—and thus well-known throughout Mexico and the U.S., the VCFO’s enforcer group under La Linea has been very hard to pin down. It is called Los Linces, and very little concrete information is available about its members. On July 21, 2009, General Raúl David Guillén Altuza, chief of staff of the 5th Military Zone headquartered in Chihuahua, confirmed their existence. He also said some of their members are former Mexican military members, but not all."

If you'd like to read the rest of the article and learn more about Los Linces, CLICK HERE. And don't worry, I'll still continue to post my analysis on Mexico's Drug War here on my blog. MexiData.info is just a good way for me to diversify, and keep fighting the good fight!

"Is Gulf Cartel's alleged top boss ready to talk?"

Here is an excerpt from Dane Schiller and James Pinkerton's article in The Houston Chronicle:

"After hooded federal agents whisked the reputed head of the Gulf Cartel drug trafficking  syndicate from a Mexican prison to Houston to face justice nearly three years ago, he was branded by authorities as among the most notorious and feared gangsters in the world. But now, just weeks before Osiel Cardenas Guillen's blockbuster trial is set to begin, his lawyers and federal prosecutors are jousting behind closed courtroom doors and suddenly banned by the judge from discussing one of the most notorious cartel cases in the nation. Could U.S. prosecutors be brokering a deal with Cardenas in exchange for telling what he knows about Mexico's underworld, including who has been on his payroll?" Link to Full Article

Analysis: Based on information from my sources close to this story, as they say in the papers, there's a lot of shady stuff going on with Cardenas Guillen's upcoming trial and overall legal situation. He is arguably one of the biggest, if not the biggest, Mexican DTO fish the US has caught. It's no surprise the US government is interested in brokering a deal to extract information from the former head of the Gulf cartel. But the situation begs some questions: how current - and thus valuable - is the information he knows, how much is the US government willing to reduce his sentence if he cooperates, and how long could Cardenas Guillen possibly survive after getting out of prison?

It appears that the US government has an iron-clad case against Cardenas Guillen, despite his defense team's extraordinary efforts. The fact that they may be considering a plea deal indicates they feel the information he has regarding DTO operations in Mexico is still relevant and valuable. Cardenas Guillen was arrested in 2003, but pretty much ran the Gulf cartel from a Mexican prison until he was extradited to the US in 2007. In some cases, information that is two years old may still be accurate and useful, but in Mexico, things have changed a LOT since 2007.

But then again, there's the old saying that the more things change, the more they stay the same. Alliances and loyalties may have shifted several times between DTOs, but the basics of the drug trafficking business are essentially the same: get the loads across however you can, and with minimal law enforcement interference. Use bribery. Use weapons. Use threats and intimidation. Take control of the best routes. Keep control of the best routes. If your route gets burned, find another one, and get creative if you have to. Perhaps these are the kinds of details the US government hopes to obtain through a plea deal with Cardenas Guillen. Considering the position both the US and Mexican governments are in right now, even a little bit of good - I mean, REALLY good - intelligence could go a long way.

"Senator holds up U.S. anti-drug aid to Mexico."

Here is an excerpt from Susan Cornell's article in Reuters:

"Mexico has not yet met human rights requirements laid down in U.S. law for the release of millions of dollars in U.S. anti-narcotics aid... Senator Patrick Leahy (pictured) said in a statement that it  would be premature for the U.S. government to issue a report affirming Mexico is respecting human rights in its war against drug traffickers. Leahy is chairman of a subcommittee that oversees foreign aid spending. His stance could delay the release of millions of dollars in U.S. anti-narcotics aid under a program called the Merida Initiative... "The law withholds 15 percent of the Merida funds until the Secretary of State reports to Congress that the Mexican government is meeting four requirements, including prosecuting military and police officers who violate human rights," Leahy said in a statement. "Those requirements have not been met, so it is premature to send the report to Congress. We had good faith discussions with Mexican and U.S. officials in reaching these requirements in the law, and I hope we can continue in that spirit," he said. The State Department had intended to send a favorable report on Mexico's human rights record ahead of President Barack Obama's visit to Guadalajara for a summit of North American leaders this weekend... More than $100 million in U.S. aid to Mexico is at stake under the Merida Initiative, a three-year, $1.4 billion counter-narcotics package launched in 2007 under former President George W. Bush... The aid, aimed at helping Mexico crush the drug trade that has most of its market in the United States, is for uses such as training Mexico's police and buying helicopters and other equipment." Link to Full Article

Analysis: There are a couple of issues going on here that I want to comment on - the withholding of financial aid due to certain conditions not being met, and the condition itself of human rights violations. The first is certainly not new or unexpected, and completely fair when the US is doling out so much money for a neighboring country's drug war. The second is subjective, political, and often hypocritical, which is going to further saddle the Merida Initiative with controversy and red tape.

US foreign aid with strings attached isn't new, and has resulted in many disgruntled governments in mostly the third world. The Inter Press Service, or IPS, reported the following in 2004: "[Njoki Njoroge] Njehu [director of the 50 Years is Enough campaign] cited the example of Eritrea, which discovered it would be cheaper to build its network of railways with local expertise and resources rather than be forced to spend aid money on foreign consultants, experts, architects and engineers imposed on the country as a condition of development assistance. Strings attached to US aid for similar projects, she added, include the obligation to buy products such as Caterpillar and John Deere tractors... Njehu also pointed out that money being doled out to Africa to fight HIV/AIDS is also a form of tied aid. She said Washington is insisting that the continent’s governments purchase anti-AIDS drugs from the United States instead of buying cheaper generic products from South Africa, India or Brazil. As a result, she said, US brand name drugs are costing up to 15,000 dollars a year compared with 350 dollars annually for generics." Furthermore, in their 2000 report looking back at the previous year, Reality of Aid 2000 reported in their US section that “71.6% of its bilateral aid commitments were tied to the purchase of goods and services from the US.” That is, where the US did give aid, it was most often tied to foreign policy objectives that would help the US.

It's not entirely surprising that the US would tie a human rights condition to Merida Initiative money, but the specifics are interesting for the political and diplomatic nuances alone. The US has maintained an embargo against Cuba for 47 years, partly due to human rights abuses by the Cuban government against the Cuban people. Yet, the US government has granted China "most favored nation" status as a trading partner, despite rampant human rights abuses committed by the Chinese government.

Here's an interesting summary of a report by Indiana University political science professors in the Journal of Peace Research: "Respect for human rights is one of several factors influencing US aid allocation decisions. Whereas previous research identifies human rights practices as being of secondary importance, it typically does not explore whether there is a more complicated relationship between human rights practices and US aid allocation. The authors argue that the impact of human rights varies at different levels of democracy and economic development. Employing data on 151 countries from 1977 to 2004, this study also investigates whether there has been an increase in the impact of human rights practices since the end of the Cold War. The results of the analysis show that during the Cold War, economic development was the prevailing factor in decisions about whether to allocate US aid. In the post-Cold War era, human rights practices are one among several significant variables, albeit exerting a generally negative impact. These results indicate that shifts in the international environment have, in fact, altered the determinants of US foreign aid. The authors further demonstrate that after the Cold War, countries with low economic development and transitioning regimes are subject to diminished levels of accountability for their human rights practices, while aid allocations to autocratic regimes follow the logic of promoting relatively higher human rights standards."

So what does this mean for Merida Initiative money attached to human rights conditions? Simply put, it's complicated. The Mexican army has been accused of human rights abuses before, but I believe there has never been a successful prosecution for it. The Mexican army is the least corrupt of any government institutions currently doing battle against the cartels, and the US government knows that. The US government also knows it has engaged both economically and politically with countries guilty of abuses considerably worse than those the Mexican army is accused of. I believe US politicians feel the need to express concern (or make a show of it, anyway) over these abuses because that's what they're supposed to do. Yet, they're under a lot of pressure to provide assistance to Mexico in light of southbound weapons trafficking and border violence spillover concerns. As they have in the past, Mexican army abuses will continue, they will eventually be overlooked, and the Merida Initiative money spigot will open up again.

"Alleged Mexican Cartel Leaders, Associates Targeted in Newest Effort to Combat Drug Trafficking Organizations."

Here is an excerpt from the US Drug Enforcement Agency's July 20 press release:

"Today the Departments of Justice, State and Treasury announced coordinated actions against the Gulf Cartel/Los Zetas drug trafficking organization, now known as the 'Company,' in the latest in a series of efforts by the U.S. government to neutralize and dismantle this violent cartel. Antonio Ezequiel Cardenas-Guillen, Jorge Eduardo Costilla-Sanchez, Heriberto Lazcano-Lazcano and Miguel Trevino-Morales, high-level Mexican leaders of the Company and 15 of their top lieutenants, have been charged in U.S. federal courts with drug trafficking-related crimes. Also today, the State Department announced rewards of up to $50 million, collectively, for information leading to the capture of 10 of these defendants, including the four leaders who were also specially designated as Narcotics Kingpins today by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). 'These indictments allege a stunning and sophisticated operation by the Company to move illegal drugs into our communities and cash back to Mexico,' said Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer. 'We have learned that the most effective way to disrupt and dismantle criminal organizations is to prosecute their leaders and seize their funding. Today’s coordinated actions by the Departments of Justice, State and Treasury will serve not only to bring these individuals to justice, but also to significantly slow the flow of cash that is so vital to cartel operations. These actions are also the result of our strong partnership with Mexican Attorney General Medina Mora, Secretary of Public Security Garcia Luna and other Mexican officials. We stand shoulder-to-shoulder with our brave Mexican colleagues in the fight against these destructive cartels.'" Link to Full Press Release

Analysis: These legal actions by the U.S. government are positive steps for a couple of reasons. First, the defendants are now eligible for extradition if apprehended. The only thing any Latin American drug lord fears is extradition to the U.S. because (a) the odds of escape are very slim compared to a Mexican prison, (b) the sentence is bound to be very long, and (c) he won’t be living like a king in prison. Second, the prospect of a high reward might serve as motivation to a disillusioned DTO member to provide useful information to a U.S. agency. Good informants are hard to come by in Mexico because their strong sense of self-preservation tends to keep them quiet. However, the right reward might change that thought process.

As for how effective the indictments will be, it’s hard to say. The U.S. government has had some success with this approach, namely with Osiel Cardenas Guillen, the Gulf cartel’s former leader (who is sitting in an American prison) and members of the Arellano Felix Organization. However, the US government still has to rely on the Mexican government, the Mexican army, and a highly corrupt police force to help apprehend these individuals. Regardless, the indictments and reward are an assertive move and a step in the right direction towards mitigating the cash flow and influence of a major Mexican DTO.

"Senators Demand Rethinking of Strategy Against Crime."

Here is a translated excerpt from Victor Ballinas and Alonso Urrutia's article in the Mexican daily La Jornada:

"According to the Senate coordinators of the PRI, the PAN, and the PRD, the current wave of violence affecting Mexico makes it necessary to rethink the government's strategy in the fight against organized crime, and to hold a meeting of the National Security Council to discuss a new strategy. PRI Senate coordinator Manlio Fabio Beltrones called for an urgent review of the government's strategy, but added that the Army would have to remain on the streets until Mexico had a reliable police force to replace the military troops. PAN Senate coordinator called for a 'permanent' review of the strategy against organized crime, in response to an ever-changing situation, but he stressed that this 'does not entail a failure, but an updating of the focus in the determined fight launched by President Felipe Calderon.' Madero also defended the Army's continued deployment against organized crime. PRD Senate coordinator Carlos Navarrete declared that it was not possible to fight well-organized gangs 'without an adequately planned and properly executed policy, based on well-defined intelligence work.' Referring to a recent wave of attacks against the security forces in Michoacan, Guanajuato, and Guerrero, Navarrete declared that 'until now, the Army would chase and the others would run away; today for the first time we are seeing an organized, synchronized counterattack, and this represents an escalation of the violence and the conflict.'" Link to Full Spanish-language Article

Analysis: This multi-party discussion between Mexican senators is a great example of how something that sounds great on paper or in theory doesn't always work in reality. I will be the first one to say that Calderon's strategy of deploying the military in lieu of corrupt police to deal with DTOs is bold and necessary, yet completely unsustainable in the long-term. I agree with the senators that Mexico needs to come up with a long-term solution (I think their use of the term "permanent" is impractical). However, Calderon - and the senators - have very limited options to achieve these goals.

I'm glad Beltrones acknowledges that the military has to stay on the street until a reliable police force can be used, but exactly how reliable is reliable in Mexico? The Mexican people have little faith in the police force's ability to protect them and effectively go after DTOs, officers are routinely being arrested for being in collusion with DTOs, and officers are failing lie detector tests when questioned about their association with DTOs. There's no way Calderon can clean up the police to (for example only; not because they're perfect) US law enforcement standards in the time he has left in office. So the question becomes, how clean does the Mexican government expect their police force to be before they withdraw troops from places like Cuidad Juarez?

Navarrete said that a good policy is based on well-defined intelligence work. Unfortunately, good intelligence on DTOs is usually hard to come by. Recruiting an insider who isn't afraid enough of getting killed to talk to the DEA or Mexican federales is really hard. Sending in an undercover agent who can avoid having to kill someone else or getting killed him or herself is even harder. The Mexican government has been extremely reluctant to work jointly with US agencies, and intelligence sharing between the two countries is made even more difficult by the fact that US agencies don't know who in Mexico they can trust with sensitive information.

Although the PRI gained a lot of seats in the recent election, they still don't have an absolute majority without the help of other parties. Still, they may see their political gains as a mandate by the Mexican people to change the course of the drug war that has wreaked so much violence since Calderon came into office. It's always possible that there's a better way to do battle with the DTOs, and good luck to the Mexican Congress in finding it; I just hope that in the process, they don't give up the gains Calderon has worked so hard to achieve.

[To view my Examiner.com article on this topic, CLICK HERE.]

"Is Phoenix really the 'kidnapping capital'?"

Here is an excerpt from E.J. Montini's article in The Arizona Republic:

"Phoenix police Sgt. Tommy Thompson took a telephone call not long ago from a Florida couple who were driving their motorhome through Arizona and wanted to know if they should avoid Phoenix. The folks from the Sunshine State had heard on TV that Phoenix was the "kidnapping capital" of the nation and the second-worst city for kidnapping in the entire world. They wondered if they should bypass Arizona since they couldn't afford a big ransom. That was in February. The TV folks had learned that the Phoenix Police Department had a special unit to deal with what has become a near constant stream of ransom kidnappings linked to drug-smuggling and human-smuggling gangs out of Mexico. The department let a news crew monitor their operation. In the subsequent ABC report, Phoenix is described as 'the kidnapping capital of America, with more incidents than any other city in the world outside of Mexico City.' The label stuck.... Phoenix is upfront about the roughly 370 kidnappings each year linked to criminal smuggling gangs. Other cities may not keep track of the problem in the same way or may simply avoid speaking about it publicly." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I love this article because it's a great example of (a) how the media plays a big part in shaping our perception of the drug war, and (b) how difficult it is to grasp the problem because NO ONE knows the exact number of anything involved in this war. It's impossible to know exactly how many people are being kidnapped on the US side of the border, anywhere in Mexico, and anywhere in the world, for that matter. Why? Because the victims' families are terrified; they're being threatened with harm to their loved ones (or worse) if they go to the police. Estimates vary from country to country on what percentage of kidnappings actually gets reported to the authorities, but most that I've seen hover around 10% in developing countries. The percentage is probably higher in the US because the public is generally trusting of law enforcement. However, the majority of cross-border kidnapping victims in the US are either dirty themselves, or an immediate family member of someone involved in the drug business. This greatly reduces the chances of the kidnapping being reported to US authorities.

As happy as I am that Phoenix is being so up front about their kidnapping problem (click here for a great story in Newsweek on that), I'm curious as to why they've chosen to go that route. I agree with the author that it's bad for tourism, and I'd hate to be the person at the Phoenix PD who has to answer questions from people regarding the safety of the city. Perhaps they feel that by just putting it out there, it sends a message to kidnappers that Phoenix is ready and willing to take them on. Maybe it also (wittingly or not) sends a political message to DC and the rest of the country that screams, "helloooooo, we have a problem down here!" Regardless, I'm glad the Phoenix PD is taking the bull by the horns, and as long as you're Joe Tourist and the family, I think checking out the sights there will be just fine.

"Calderon's ruling party slips in Mexico."

Here is an excerpt from Ken Ellingwood's article in The Los Angeles Times:

"With a sagging economy and bloody drug war as a backdrop, voters across Mexico dealt a blow Sunday to the conservative party of President Felipe Calderon as they elected members of Congress, a handful of governors and hundreds of state and local officials. Calderon's National Action Party, or PAN, conceded defeat in the 500-seat lower house of Congress, the Chamber of Deputies, after exit polls and early returns showed the once-ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI, with a solid lead. The PAN, with 206 seats in the outgoing chamber, lacked a majority. Sunday's results would leave the PRI -- which currently holds 106 seats -- short of a majority too... The vote capped a campaign in which no single issue dominated. The PAN played up Calderon's 2 1/2-year crackdown on drug traffickers while largely skirting Mexico's economic downturn... The election results could make it more difficult for Calderon and the PAN to pass legislation on tax reform as well as laws envisioned as part of his offensive against organized crime. The PAN holds a plurality in the Senate, the upper house. Losing the lower chamber will make it harder for Calderon to move aggressively to fix the sagging economy and slumping oil industry, even though his approval ratings are high. His term ends in 2012." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I'm a little surprised and disappointed in these election results, and more than a bit concerned about what they might mean for Mexico's drug war. Calderon still has very strong public support and high approval ratings, but the results may indicate that many are growing weary of the violence and feel a change in leadership might fix that. It's largely acknowledged that the PRI mostly looked the other way where Mexican DTO activity was concerned. It's also widely accepted that the current levels of violence in Mexico are mostly due to the aggressive actions Calderon has taken against the DTOs. While these actions are necessary and long overdue, the mantra of "things have to get worse before they'll get better" apparently isn't sitting well with some voters.

So the results will mean a couple of things. Yes, it will be more difficult for Calderon and the PAN to pass legislation intended to crack down harder on DTOs - perhaps. If the PRI wants to win the presidential election in 2012, they can't afford to be seen as soft on the cartels. Second, we'll have to see how susceptible these new office-holders are to corruption and DTO influence. History shows the PRI is quite familiar with these issues, and it will be interesting to see how DTO leadership - especially in Michoacan State - reacts to the election results. 

"Mexico, U.S. can learn from Bogota."

Here is an excerpt from an editorial by Edward Schumacher-Matos in the North County Times:

"Mexicans once bridled at suggestions of learning anything from Colombia, but as the violence and power of drug cartels have grown in their country, they now are beating a path here. President Felipe Calderon, civil society groups, policy experts, police and others have been traveling to this Andean nation to learn how it beat back the cartels, sharply reduced murders and kidnappings and reasserted a sense of civic participation. Some, such as journalists, just seek tips on how to survive. There is much good to be learned from Colombia, but my own visit here reveals that it is not what many Americans hope it might be. John P. Walters, former head of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, is right when he recently wrote that Colombia is 'one of the greatest international policy success stories of the last decade.' But he is wrong in concluding that any of this means fewer illicit drugs and less crime in the United States." Link to Full Editorial

Analysis: I don't make comments on editorials very often, but sometimes quite a bit can be learned from them when written properly. There are a few inaccuracies in this one, however, that I need to point out, although the overall message is pretty good. It's not surprising that many, including people at the highest levels of both the Mexican and US governments, are looking to the Colombian experience for answers. However, I agree with the author that there are just enough differences between the two cases that the possibility of applying the Colombian strategy to Mexico might just not cut it.

It's true that, even if cocaine production in Colombia ever truly sees a significant decrease, entities in other Latin American countries like Peru and Bolivia are ready to step in to fill that market gap. Mexican DTOs have been making friends and influencing people in Peru for several years now, and the word on the street is that Shining Path, a once mostly defunct and now possibly a comeback terrorist organization in Peru, is getting in on the action with them. Now THAT is something to be concerned about. As for Colombian groups like the FARC and ELN, their numbers and strength have diminished, but they're still continuing to wage war against the Colombian military, government, and people in both a conventional fashion and terrorist manner. They're still producing the white powdery stuff, and there are hundreds of micro-cartels throughout Colombia that are waiting for the FARC to finally go away so THEY can fill the market vacuum. I strongly disagree with Schumacher-Matos' assertion that "the paramilitaries have been disarmed and the guerrillas have been pushed back into isolated jungle areas." The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), which served as the umbrella group for paramilitaries in Colombia, doesn't exist in the same fashion as before and several members have disarmed, but the large majority of them stay in the business under a different guise, forming other organized crime groups. They're still working as enforcers and protectors for the various Colombian cartels; they're just not as organized as they once were and don't have a singular name. As for the guerrillas, they've always had their strongholds in isolated jungle areas, so they were never pushed back there because they never left. And they're still carrying out attacks in or near populated areas and killing civilians.

Something that bothers me a little is Schumacher-Matos' offhand assertion that the answer lies not in Latin America, but in the rethinking of domestic policies, including the legalization of some or all drugs. I definitely won't get into that debate here because it's a long one, but he just leaves his statement at that, which is pretty weak, considering what a controversial subject legalization is and that he believes that's the better answer. If I thought I had the better answer to the Colombia and Mexico problem, I'd address it in more than a sentence or two. He ends the editorial with that sentiment, but I didn't feel that everything he talked about leading up to that was designed to support that argument.

Finally, I'm glad he inserted a statement by a Colombian woman explaining that in Colombia, people believe in the authorities and the police, whereas in Mexico they do not. If anything, this is part of an argument against legalization as the answer. Corruption in Mexico MUST be addressed and minimized (it will never be eliminated) to make a dent in the supply problem, and demand and enforcement must continue to be addressed - ever more effectively - in the US to make a dent in the demand problem.

"Gun flow south is a crisis for two nations."

Here is an excerpt from Josh Meyer's article in The Los Angeles Times:

"The United States lacks a coordinated strategy to stem the flow of weapons smuggled across its southern border, a failure that has fueled the rise of powerful criminal cartels and violence in Mexico, a government watchdog agency report has found. The report by the congressional Government Accountability Office, the first federal assessment of the issue, offered blistering conclusions that will probably influence the debate over the role of U.S.-made weaponry as violence threatens to spill across the Mexico border. According to a draft copy of the report, which will be released today, the growing number of weapons being smuggled into Mexico comprise more than 90% of the seized firearms that can be traced by authorities there. The document also cited recent U.S. intelligence indicating that most weapons were being smuggled in specifically for the syndicates -- and being used not only against the Mexican government but also to expand their drug trafficking operation in the United States." Link to Full Article

Analysis: As of 9:15 am Pacific time, the GAO report hadn't been posted on the agency's website, so I have to go off of what the LA Times article says about it. I'm not surprised at all the the GAO report really laid into the Obama administration and DHS component agencies. Mind you, this is a problem that goes back several years, so there is plenty of blame to go around for several administrations and agencies on both sides of the border.

There are a few issues the article mentions that I want to point out, and I look forward to reading more about them in the draft GAO report when it's published. First, the GAO report continues to use the figure of 90% when it comes to weapons traced in Mexico; it actually says more than 90%. Again, we'll never know the actual number of weapons purchased here, and we can only rely on the weapons that ARE submitted by the Mexican government for tracing. Regardless of the actual percentage, we have a serious southbound weapons trafficking problem, and quibbling over the percentage just detracts from it. Second, the report mentions the lack of a national strategy, and lack of interagency cooperation and communication. I see and deal with this almost on a daily basis, and it's extremely frustrating for everyone involved. Keep in mind, it's not like this just became a problem; interagency battles and roadblocks have been going on since agencies were created. DHS and its component agencies have been a mess for years, so I'm curious to see what the Obama administration and Napolitano have in mind to accomplish what so many people before them failed to do - get federal agencies to play nice.

Third, the report talks about obstacles caused by legal issues. I'm particularly happy that this issue was brought up because most people don't know what those legal obstacles are. I posted about the Tiahrt Amendment and the problems it poses for information sharing, but that is only one of several laws that prevent effective cooperation. It's completely true that good analysis and reporting isn't happening because some agencies don't have the resources to do that, and other agencies can't legally do that. 

On top of our own issues, the Mexican government has more than enough to go around. Not only are we dealing with our own governmental and agency flaws; the Mexican government has to deal with an insane amount of corruption, sovereignty issues that have made it very resistant in the past to cooperation with the US, and an economy that's hurting way more than ours, which significantly limits their resources. We've seen some positive changes in all regards, and at least Calderon realizes that these problems will require an unprecedented level of cross-border communication and cooperation if they're ever going to approach being solved. 

Bottom line, this GAO report was needed by everyone - our government, federal and state agencies, the general public, and the Mexican government. There's nothing to put things in motion like a good, swift, public kick in the you-know-what, and that's what this GAO report is attempting to provide. Now, we wait and see what the response will be.

"Mexico candidate: Drug gangs contact all hopefuls."

Here is an excerpt from E. Eduardo Castillo's article in the Associated Press:

"A ruling party mayoral candidate in Mexico's richest city told his supporters that drug traffickers have contacted all leading political contenders in the country seeking their loyalty ahead of elections next month. Mauricio Fernandez's discussion with a group of supporters in a suburb of Monterrey — a leaked recording of which was broadcast throughout Mexico on Friday — is a remarkably frank description of how the brutal gangs try to control political leaders, which is a key concern of President Felipe Calderon in his fight against drug cartels. The candidate also acknowledged that the Beltran Levya cartel controls drug smuggling in his city of San Pedro Garza and suggested that as mayor he would avoid confronting the gang to maintain peace, comments that undermined Calderon's drive to show that the government and his National Action Party, or PAN, are tough on organized crime." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I'm currently doing some research on Al Capone's organization, Prohibition, and corruption in Chicago in the 1920s. I read this article, and was stunned at the similarities between the Monterrey now and Chicago back then. It pains me to see what an incredibly uphill battle Calderon is fighting. It's hard enough to eliminate corruption from police departments in towns and cities across the country, but things are made worse when the mayor of Mexico's wealthiest cities essentially says, "I'm not messing with that." Fernandez is definitely into self-preservation, as he knows many other Mexican mayors who have not "cooperated" with the predominant DTO in their city have been assassinated in short order. It's somewhat unfortunate for him that the conversation in which these feelings were expressed was recorded and made public, but he was frank in saying what almost every other public official in Mexico believes: you take the bribe or take the bullet - plata o plombo.

So how does Calderon deal with mayors like Fernandez and the coercion they have to live with? In some cases, Calderon has removed and arrested dirty mayors. However, this may only serve as a band-aid solution. Dirty mayors are replaced, and there's no guarantee the new mayor will be any better, and not likely he or she will be immune from or willing to defy any coercion attempts from DTOs. The best solution is to establish the rule of law, continue with the arrests, and do everything possible to portray to the public that (at least some) justice can be done. Calderon is a long way from reaching that point, but he has to start somewhere.