Mexico's Drug War

"Calling Casino Attack In Mexico An ‘Act Of Terror:’ Rhetoric Or Rethinking?"

Here's a excerpt from my latest article for Homeland Security Today's Correspondents Watch:

"One of the worst mass killings in Mexico’s drug war history occurred on August 25 in the violence-plagued city of Monterrey. Around 3:00 PM, a dozen men in four cars pulled up in front of the Casino Royale casino lugging several gas cans with them. In less than three minutes, they doused the small casino with gasoline and set the building on fire, killing 52 people in the ensuing blaze. Some witnesses said the attackers - allegedly members of the brutal Los Zetas transnational criminal organization (TCO) - yelled at casino patrons to get out of the building. Sadly, though, most were unable to do so. Instead of heading for the casino’s exits, most patrons fled deeper into the casino and into bathrooms, where they died of smoke inhalation. Conflicting reports claimed the emergency exits were blocked. However, one report by CNN said several vetted witnesses heard grenades exploding in the casino and saw victims - including pregnant women - intentionally being gunned down by the attackers. One woman who escaped the fire told CNN one of the attackers told the patrons, “we’re going to kill all of you.” In the wake of the tragedy, Mexican President Felipe Calderón wasted no time publicly condemning the attack. But what especially perked the ears of many of the nation’s drug war observers - and likely not just a few members of the US government - was the wording he used. Calderón called the attack an “aberrant act of terror and barbarity.” His National Security spokesman, Alejandro Poiré, bluntly stated that “an act of terrorism has been committed.” But was the Casino Royale attack a true “act of terror”? If the Mexican government believes TCOs are committing acts of terrorism, what does that imply for its drug war strategy - and that of the US government?"

To read the full article at HSToday.us, please CLICK HERE!

"Tijuana’s top cop cites results amid claims of brutality."

Here is an excerpt from Sandra Dibble's article in the San Diego Union-Tribune:

To his many admirers, Tijuana’s public safety chief has been a key player in the city’s emergence from its darkest days of kidnappings, drug violence and widespread police corruption. Supporters say Julian Leyzaola’s efforts have helped create a renewed sense of public security, and they hope it will pave the way for a much-needed economic recovery by drawing new investment and encouraging many Americans who were driven away by fears of crime to return. Amid the choruses of praise, accusations have emerged from suspects who said Leyzaola tortured them to extract false confessions. Human rights groups have taken up their cause and are calling for the chief’s removal, saying such actions overshadow any accomplishments... Leyzaola’s hands-on style has won him supporters on both sides of the border, and U.S. agencies paid homage to his efforts last week at a ceremony in Tijuana... For many Tijuana residents, the drop in high-profile violence such as decapitations, hangings and public shootouts among rival gangs is cause for celebration, no matter what the reason. Recent months have seen the opening of new restaurants and the rebirth of a night life in the city... Crime statistics show a mixed picture, said Juan Manuel Hernandez, president of the Tijuana business group Coparmex. Car thefts, burglaries and kidnappings went down while homicides and robberies rose between 2008 and July of this year, according to a Coparmex study. A state government report that compares crime in the first eight months of 2009 with the same period this year shows an overall drop of 12 percent for common offenses in the city, but notes an increase in violent crime... Yet the fact that Tijuana’s rate of violence remains far lower than that of Mexican cities on the Texas border, such as Ciudad Juarez, may have more to do with the dynamics of drug groups than the efforts of law enforcement." Link to Full Article

Analysis: So this story brings us to an Abu Ghraib-style debate over appropriate law enforcement tactics in Mexico. It's true that for the past eight months or so, things have been remarkably quiet in Tijuana; or just so loud in Ciudad Juárez that Tijuana is being drowned out. Of course, that begs the question if the newfound calm is a result of law enforcement efforts or the shifting dynamics of DTOs, as David Shirk from the University of San Diego suggests. There's no reason it can't be a bit of both.

If you remember, Teodoro "El Teo" Garcia Simental was captured earlier this year (in January, I believe) and his right hand man, Raydel "El Muletas" López Uriarte, and brother Carlos were also arrested. I thought for sure that things were going to heat up after that, as the head of the AFO - Fernando Sanchez Arellano - made a play to get his territory back from the Sinaloa Federation's proxy group. Oddly enough, Tijuana has stayed mostly out of the news since those arrests, which is a good thing all around.

Or is it? Is Leyzaola being too heavy handed and extracting false confessions under duress? Or are criminals just trying to make him look bad? Either is possible, and it's hard to believe a drug trafficker who is likely going to jail for a while. And maybe that's part of the problem. If Leyzaola and his people are engaging in abusive tactics, they're probably banking on the fact no one is really going to believe the narco who's beat up and tortured his fair share of people.

Does that make it right? It depends on whom you ask. We get pretty bent out of shape here in the US when our troops or police officers get too heavy-handed with people, no matter how evil they are. In Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America, the attitude towards civil rights - and their suspension during times of domestic turmoil - is often different than it is here. Considering what the Mexican people have been through in the last decade, I'm going to presume that they would find Leyzaola's behavior - if those accusations are accurate - perfectly acceptable and appropriate. At least someone is getting things done in Tijuana, and roughing up some people may be the price that has to be paid for peace.

I'm sure there's some reader out there who's a member of the ACLU or something and screaming at the screen right now. Just remember, Mexico isn't the United States, and the mayor and residents of Tijuana have likely reached that point of "desperate times call for desperate measures." God knows how many thousands of people are having their civil rights violated every day by brutal thugs who don't give a crap if you don't feel safe enough to vote, go food shopping, or take your kids to school.

I do feel this is another great topic for debate. What do YOU think? Is it time for Mexican law enforcement to take things up a notch in order to get the narcos to pay attention? Is the violation of suspected drug traffickers' civil rights too steep a price to pay, no matter what the results?

A couple of thoughts on today's elections in Mexico...

As we celebrate our Independence Day in true American fashion, with barbecues, friends and family, and fireworks, it's easy to forget that there are other major world events going on in places where the Fourth of July isn't a big deal. Today, Mexico has its own big deal - elections across the country where people will be voting for a dozen governors and several dozen municipal officials. Sadly, DTO violence and intimidation has escalated in the weeks leading up to today, claiming the lives of one gubernatorial candidate and several other municipal politicians, not to mention the cadre of hopefuls who have received death threats.

I have a few things I'd like to reflect on. First, I think it's a bad omen than Mexican DTOs are in the business of attempting to influence elections. It's bad enough that so many government officials are already in the pockets of the DTOs. But killing candidates and threatening to kill others is one more step towards a very slippery slope that leads to an erosion of the fundamental elements of democracy. News reports from both Mexico and the US are telling us that fewer people than ever are registering to vote and more people than ever are avoiding the polls because they're afraid of being attacked while waiting in line to cast their ballots. I can't help but think back to Iraq's first election after the removal of Saddam Hussein, when the Iraqi people were so proud to go on TV and show off their inked fingers, announcing to the world the privilege they just experienced. My family comes from a communist country, and we vote in every level of election because we know - either from personal experience or learning about it from older relatives - that many people in this world don't have that right. 

The Mexican people have had the right to vote for a long time, but many feel it's being taken away from them; not by the government, but by organized crime groups who are increasingly exhibiting the characteristics of insurgencies and terrorist groups around the world. The fact that election outcomes in Mexico can be - and likely will be - affected by threats and intimidation of both candidates and voters is a very disturbing development in both the drug war and Mexican history as a whole.

My next thoughts turn to the eventual outcome of said elections. Many observers feel that the PRI - the longstanding and long-corrupt political party that has dominated Mexico for so many decades - is poised to make a huge comeback today. They already made significant gains in the Mexican congress during elections last year. My concern over a return to PRI dominance in the legislature, if not the presidency, is a return to a political way of thinking that benefits the DTOs. During the PRI's hegemonic rule from 1929 through Vicente Fox's election in 2000, they had a nasty reputation for mostly being on the DTOs' payroll and looking the other way when it came to drug trafficking. This meant that life in Mexico was considerably more peaceful than it is now, but it also allowed DTOs to grow into the monsters that they've become.

And maybe the Mexican people want that. Maybe they're just so tired of the shootings and beheadings and grenade attacks that they're ready to accept a political solution that is morally compromised. Many Latin Americans in general don't care who's in charge as long as their lives are relatively stable, and maybe most Mexicans will put the PRI back in charge because they feel the PRI can provide that stability. But at what ultimate cost? This is all just speculation, of course. It could be as simple as the PAN and PRD candidates not coming across as able to get the job done, or past PAN and PRD officeholders just being completely incompetent. But to combine increased voter fear with reduced voter turnout and a likelihood of PRI election dominance...that's a bit too much for me to view as mere coincidence.

So today I'll be enjoying the Fourth of July holiday with my family and will be trying to stay away from my laptop and any news or Twitter updates about the elections in Mexico. There will be plenty of time tomorrow to get back into the grisly business of reading about the results, the turnout, the violence, and trying to make sense of it all.

"Some question US training of Mexican forces."

Here is an excerpt from Ramon Bracamontes' article in the El Paso Times:

"In the mid-1990s, the United States began training Mexico's soldiers in hopes of stopping the flow of drugs through Mexico and ending corruption. Some of those trained by U.S. forces   formed the Zetas, a criminal organization that works as assassins for one of the drug cartels fighting in Juárez, Mexican law enforcement officials said. Today, the United States is again trying to help Mexico with its drug-cartel problem, and part of the solution could include training Mexico's military and law enforcement officers... Given the history of the program, some question the effectiveness of that policy... Others agree, and as a prime example of training gone wrong, they point to the Zetas. The group was founded by Mexican army deserters, including officers trained by the United States at the military School of the Americas in Fort Benning, Ga. The Zetas, according to the Chihuahua attorney general's office, are thought to be behind some of the brutal killings in Juárez, which have surpassed 4,700 in two years... U.S. officials counter by saying that this time they would be doing more than just training soldiers. According to the latest proposals of phase two of the Merida Initiative, the United States would vet the Mexican soldiers who are to be trained. Previously, in the 1990s, the Mexican army chose those who came to the United States to train." Link to Full Article

Analysis: This article brings up an interesting point about the potential ramifications of Mexican soldiers and police undergoing training by US agencies. However, there are many distinctions between the situation with the GAFES soldiers who later became Zetas and the people who are going to be trained in the near future.

First, it's very important to understand that Mexican special forces (GAFES) soldiers who were trained at the School of the Americas (many of whom later became Zetas) were not being trained to fight DTOs inside Mexico. The Mexican army was given this mission by President Calderón when he came into office in 2006, so the training they received back then - and now being used against the Mexican military - did not have the same goals that present-day US training would have. Part of the problem the Mexican government is experiencing with all the allegations of human rights abuses by the military is that the army has not been well-trained to deal with narcos as adversaries. I'd like to think that any training provided by US agencies to Mexican soldiers would focus on tactics specific to counterdrug efforts - something most Mexican army soldiers are not familiar with. Another benefit, aside from increasing effectiveness in operations against DTOs, would hopefully be a reduction in human rights abuses.

Second, Mexican police will be receiving US assistance as well, not just the military. Yes, there is a greater likelihood that the cops will be dirty and use that training against Mexican authorities. However, Calderón is trying to nationalize and professionalize his police forces in an attempt to root out massive corruption, and this is a good way to start that process. Also, the Mexican people need to start having more faith in their police forces. Relations between the US and Mexico and the perception of US involvement in Mexican affairs have a sordid past, but US involvement in this particular aspect of the drug war might go a long way towards restoring that faith.

A third distinction you may have missed is that the US will have a hand in selecting who receives the training. Back in the School of the Americas days, the Mexican government chose who attended training. This will help ensure that trainees are vetted as thoroughly as possible, ostensibly to select the best and the brightest for what will likely be perceived as an elite group of trainees. 

Mexico has always been slow to ask for our help, mostly as a matter of national pride. But I think this is a good step that (a) doesn't compromise anyone's pride, (b) is a solid bi-national effort, and (c) will hopefully help accomplish some concrete goals. I look forward to seeing how things go when the first round of trainees graduates and is put on the street to test their newfound skills.

"Border program has vague goals, little oversight."

Here is an excerpt from Brady McCombs and Stephen Ceasar's article in the Arizona Daily Star:

"A federal program touted as a model for using local law enforcement to help control our borders is handing out $165 million — but with little tracking of how the money is spent, no clear objective and no benchmarks for success, an Arizona Daily Star investigation has found. The Department of Homeland Security's "Operation Stonegarden" gives border law enforcement agencies money to pay officers to work overtime shifts aimed at enhancing border security. The money also lets agencies buy equipment such as four-wheel-drive trucks, radios and night-vision goggles. Star reporters examined more than 10,000 pages of documents and interviewed more than 50 people over the course of seven months as they analyzed how 10 Arizona agencies used the $7.3 million they have spent so far... The paper's investigation reveals a program so loosely managed that it's nearly impossible to determine its goals, much less measure whether those goals are being met." Link to Full Article

Analysis: This article is disturbing on so many levels, yet it doesn't come as a surprise. These kinds of problems were exactly what I was hearing about when I was working in California because some of that Stonegarden money was going to agencies in San Diego and Imperial counties. That's not to say that ALL the money is being misused and abused, but there's a general feeling that the money flow is a big show to give the appearance that the federal government is trying to work with the locals to make a dent in the border security problem. Guess what? It's not.

Here are a few more salient excerpts from the article:

"Homeland Security tracks how much each agency is reimbursed for overtime and equipment, but has no idea how that money is distributed among officers and doesn't keep a list of purchased items."

"With no definition of how officers should spend their overtime shifts, they do anything from patrolling known smuggling routes to targeting street gangs to controlling crowds at parades."

"The last three guidance packets include bullet-point goals, but none is written in a way that makes it possible to measure if the program is helping to control of the border."

This isn't to say that the project's funding isn't doing any good. It is. The problem is that no one can tell anyone else EXACTLY how much good it's doing because of that lack of benchmarks. I'll be the first one to say that the solution (or at least one of them) to controlling border violence is increased funding and manpower. Supporters of the Stonegarden program say it's providing just that, and it's money that's immediately available without having to go through miles of red tape.

I'm very concerned that a good chunk of Stonegarden money is being misused - that's your and my taxpayer money, by the way - and no one can prove that it is or isn't. Not to be overdramatic, but this is mildly reminiscent of the bank bailout. The federal government threw a LOT of money at the banks with very little oversight, and to this day, no one really knows how that money was spent. And that was just an economic issue; in this case, we're dealing with a possible misappropriation of significant sums of money intended for national security.

The intended goals of Operation Stonegarden are good ones; really, they are. But DHS needs to put its nose to the grindstone and crank out some firm guidelines, benchmarks, and accounting standards for OUR money.

This final excerpt sums up so well my opinion of the whole thing:

"Stonegarden serves its purpose politically as soon as the money is given out. You can say, 'Here is what we are doing for border security.' And departments are more than happy to get the money," said Raymond Michalowski, an Arizona regents professor in the department of criminology at Northern Arizona University. "You are assuming that merely spending the money is effective."

And you all know what happens when you assume.

"Official Immunity and Mexico's Fight against Corruption."

Here is an excerpt from my most recent article on MexiData.info:

"All Mexican elected officials, including the president, legislators, governors and mayors, enjoy the privilege of immunity from having criminal charges brought against them while in office. This is called fuero ("procedural immunity" in this case), although the term is also used for freedom of speech protections granted to members of Congress. However, if an elected official does commit a crime, there is a process in place by which the Mexican Congress can have this immunity removed, and it’s called desafuero. This process is usually quite slow, and can sometimes take years to resolve. Perhaps this is why it’s been so rare—until now." 

If you'd like to read the full article on MexiData.info, please CLICK HERE.

"U.S.-backed computer techs kicked out of Mexico for tracking illegal payoffs."

Here is an excerpt from my article on Examiner.com, based on information from KREM 2 News:

"An international group of computer experts was recently kicked out of Mexico for using a unique computer program to track drug cartel payoffs to police and government officials. The  program was immediately and hugely successful, resulting in the arrests of 92 Mexican municipal police officers. But apparently, no good deed goes unpunished. KREM 2 News reported that one day after those arrests occurred in late June, the team was rounded up, taken to an airport and kicked out of the country. They never got paid and all their hardware and special computer programs were left behind... According to KREM, this secret panel of computer experts was formed to help combat the problem, including Mark, because payoffs reached all the way into the Office of the Mexican Attorney General."

To read the rest of this article and watch the KREM video on this story (includes interview with "Mark"), CLICK HERE.

"Texas sheriff gets 5 years for helping drug cartel."

Here is an excerpt from Christopher Sherman's Associated Press article:

"A former Texas sheriff was sentenced to more than five years in federal prison Thursday for helping Mexican smugglers move drugs through his county on the U.S.-Mexico border in  exchange for thousands of dollars in bribes. U.S. District Judge Randy Crane sentenced former Starr County Sheriff Reymundo 'Rey' Guerra to 64 months in prison and four years of supervised release. The sentence was less than the eight to 10 years recommended under federal sentencing guidelines, but Guerra admitted his guilt early and cooperated with authorities, Crane said. FBI agents arrested Guerra at his office in October. Prosecutors termed Guerra a 'minor participant' in a drug trafficking conspiracy busted by operation 'Carlito's Weigh'... Prosecutors say Guerra made it easier for people tied to the Gulf Cartel to move drugs into the United States and, at least once, intervened in one of his own department's investigations to try to throw deputies off. He pleaded guilty in May to conspiring to distribute narcotics. Guerra apologized to his family, community and 'to the men and women who wear the badge. I'm sorry I let them down.'" Link to Full Article

Analysis: I can't stand to read articles like this because I always hate to be reminded that there are plenty of dirty federal, state, and local law enforcement officers out there. I posted on this issue in April, and my feelings about it haven't changed: corrupt border agents and cops need to be arrested, tried, and thrown in jail. I worked in law enforcement for over eight years, and I think "the code" among cops is a bunch of crap. Maybe I feel that way because I was a military/federal agent and my agency didn't have nearly as many internal issues like that as a large municipal department or federal agency. Regardless, I know there are a LOT of temptations out there for border agents and cops. But they're expected to be better people and rise above that. I know it can be a lot to ask, especially when many are out there risking their lives for our safety. However, just like the military, they're risking their lives voluntarily, and that doesn't entitle them to extra money or perks through bribes or other illegal activity.

Sam Logan, an author and journalist who REALLY knows what he's talking about regarding Mexico and Latin America, had some great comments on this story in his own blog:

"On the border, they can choose not to stop a car that they know is full of contraband. Border sheriffs, likewise, may choose not to focus their investigative force on specific subjects, or a specific hot spot in the county, because their criminal employers have asked him to simply look the other way. In the criminal world, there is likely no other job that is easier than looking the other way... Kudos for the FBI on taking this guy out. He is a disgrace to all men and women who wear a badge, and, unfortunately, stands as yet another example of how our law enforcement officials here in the US are not immune to the corruptive force of Mexican drug trafficking."

"Mexico’s Drug Traffickers Continue Trade in Prison."

Here is an excerpt from Marc Lacey's article in The New York Times:

"The surveillance cameras captured it all: guards looking on nonchalantly as 53 inmates — many of them associated with one of Mexico’s most notorious drug cartels — let themselves out of  their cells and sped off in waiting vehicles. The video shows that prison guards only pulled out their weapons after the inmates were well on their way. The brazen escape in May in the northern state of Zacatecas — carried out in minutes without a single shot fired — is just one of many glaring examples of how Mexico’s crowded and cruel prison system represents a critical weak link in the drug war. Mexico’s prisons, as described by inmates and insiders and viewed during several visits, are places where drug traffickers find a new base of operations for their criminal empires, recruit underlings, and bribe their way out for the right price. The system is so flawed, in fact, that the Mexican government is extraditing record numbers of drug traffickers to the United States, where they find it much harder to intimidate witnesses, run their drug operations or escape." Link to Full Article

Analysis: Most people think that drug traffickers aren't afraid of anything - the law, the government...even death. Not true. They are afraid of one thing, and one thing only - extradition to the United States. Why? The above article says it all. In Mexican prisons, drug traffickers - especially the big ones, like Osiel Cardenas Guillen - live like kings. Not only can they continue to run their operations, but they eat the best food, have hotel room-like amenities, and can even have prostitutes brought in for their pleasure. 

And Cardenas Guillen is a really good example. He was arrested and put in a Mexican prison in 2003, but he continued to run the Gulf cartel in the luxury of his cell until his extradition to the US in 2007. He's now awaiting a trial that might not happen if he agrees to provide the US government with valuable intelligence on Mexican DTO personnel and activities. Even so, he's being treated like any other high-value prisoner in the US - maximum security, boring clothes, boring food, and a boring cell. Oh yeah, and that's perhaps for life, with little chance of his cronies breaking him out or corrupt prison guards letting him out.

Mexico has typically been averse to extraditing criminals to the US for trial, but after several high-profile prison breaks in recent years, the Mexican government is finally realizing that maybe it has a prison security problem. The US government is providing Mexico with $4 million to help revamp its prison system. Maybe that's a lot of money in Mexico, but $4 million won't get you much in the US. Then again, with the Mexican economy being in dire straits (like almost every other economy in the hemisphere), every red cent helps.

"Mexico candidate: Drug gangs contact all hopefuls."

Here is an excerpt from E. Eduardo Castillo's article in the Associated Press:

"A ruling party mayoral candidate in Mexico's richest city told his supporters that drug traffickers have contacted all leading political contenders in the country seeking their loyalty ahead of elections next month. Mauricio Fernandez's discussion with a group of supporters in a suburb of Monterrey — a leaked recording of which was broadcast throughout Mexico on Friday — is a remarkably frank description of how the brutal gangs try to control political leaders, which is a key concern of President Felipe Calderon in his fight against drug cartels. The candidate also acknowledged that the Beltran Levya cartel controls drug smuggling in his city of San Pedro Garza and suggested that as mayor he would avoid confronting the gang to maintain peace, comments that undermined Calderon's drive to show that the government and his National Action Party, or PAN, are tough on organized crime." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I'm currently doing some research on Al Capone's organization, Prohibition, and corruption in Chicago in the 1920s. I read this article, and was stunned at the similarities between the Monterrey now and Chicago back then. It pains me to see what an incredibly uphill battle Calderon is fighting. It's hard enough to eliminate corruption from police departments in towns and cities across the country, but things are made worse when the mayor of Mexico's wealthiest cities essentially says, "I'm not messing with that." Fernandez is definitely into self-preservation, as he knows many other Mexican mayors who have not "cooperated" with the predominant DTO in their city have been assassinated in short order. It's somewhat unfortunate for him that the conversation in which these feelings were expressed was recorded and made public, but he was frank in saying what almost every other public official in Mexico believes: you take the bribe or take the bullet - plata o plombo.

So how does Calderon deal with mayors like Fernandez and the coercion they have to live with? In some cases, Calderon has removed and arrested dirty mayors. However, this may only serve as a band-aid solution. Dirty mayors are replaced, and there's no guarantee the new mayor will be any better, and not likely he or she will be immune from or willing to defy any coercion attempts from DTOs. The best solution is to establish the rule of law, continue with the arrests, and do everything possible to portray to the public that (at least some) justice can be done. Calderon is a long way from reaching that point, but he has to start somewhere.

"Mexican mayors' arrests show nobody above drug war."

Here is an excerpt from Alexandra Olson's article in the Associated Press:

"Severed heads tossed in front of a car dealership. Bodies hurled off a bridge. Extortion threats against shop owners. It was no secret that this town popular with tourists for its monarch butterfly nesting grounds was in the grip of Mexico's drug trade. But even the most jaded were stunned when Zitacuaro's young, charismatic mayor was arrested this week in Mexico's biggest sweep ever against politicians with alleged cartel ties. The swift and secretive operation by federal forces netted 10 mayors and 18 other top officials in Michoacan state, escalating President Felipe Calderon's battle against cartels ahead of the July 5 national elections. The arrests sent a powerful message to Mexico's political class that no one — not even members of Calderon's own party — is safe from prosecution... The mayors are of different political stripes, including Calderon's conservative National Action Party, and the operation took place in the president's home state." Link to Full Article

Analysis: This is a bittersweet article that accomplishes a rare thing; reporting some good coming out of the Mexican drug war. I have a LOT of respect for President Calderon, and that should be obvious from many of my previous posts. This type of operation further reinforces my amazement at the lengths this man is willing to go to in order to attempt to wipe out corruption in Mexico - no small and probably an impossible task. Even though the individuals arrested were from different political parties - including Calderon's own party - accusations of plotting before the July 5th national elections are to be expected. Is Calderon immune from political scheming? I don't know; maybe, maybe not. If the officials were truly dirty - and I'm pretty confident they were - then they needed to be arrested anyway. If that benefits the President and the ruling party, I'm sure they're not going to complain. What does concern me is something I'm glad the author brought up - the challenges of successful prosecutions. I hope, for Calderon's sake, that the evidence against these individuals is ironclad. These are high-profile people, and it would be quite an embarrassment to the Calderon administration if they walked due to insufficient evidence or corruption within the judicial system (a real possibility). I imagine not all of them will serve time or receive serious punishment, but at least Calderon is sending a message that it ringing loud and clear.

"Bold prison break? Just another day in Mexico's drug war."

Here is an excerpt from Sara Miller Llana's article in The Christian Science Monitor:

"A convoy of cars carrying more than two dozen suspected drug cartel members disguised as Mexican police officers arrives at the Zacatécas state prison before dawn. Their helicopter hovers overhead. Minutes later, the men help more than 50 inmates – many of them suspected drug traffickers – flee the prison. A countrywide manhunt ensues. No, this is not a script for a B movie. It's just another day in Mexico's high-stakes war on drug trafficking – Saturday, in fact. The story grabbed headlines worldwide. But for Mexicans – who have now grown accustomed to fugitives on the lam and traffickers taunting the state with death threats and even banners hung in public spaces to recruit new members – it was business as usual... Many of those who fled from the Cieneguillas prison in Zacatecas over the weekend are believed to be members of the Gulf cartel, one of the major organizations fighting the Mexican state and their rivals to preserve corridors to the illegal drug market in the US... Prison breaks are nothing new in Mexico. In 2001, Mexico's most wanted drug lord, Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, escaped from a high-security prison – reportedly in the back of a laundry truck. And there have been at least three breaks in Zacatecas in recent years. Such attempts began in the late 90s..with the emergence of the Zetas, who are the security enforcers for the Gulf Cartel." Link to Full Article

Analysis: A few people have asked my opinion on this prison break, and at first I wasn't really sure how to comment on it until I saw this article. There are just a few things I want to mention, which the article highlights quite nicely. First, the expertise of Los Zetas. Prison breaks and hostage rescues are two things older members of Los Zetas (i.e. former GAFES soldiers who were trained at Fort Benning) were actually trained on during their Mexican army days. I'm sure many of them have passed on these skills to newer recruits, and this prison break is a good example of that training. Second, yes, of course there was inside help - how could you have a prison break without one shot fired if a good number of prison personnel aren't in on the plan? And finally, although this prison break received a lot of press, it's not exactly the first time something like this has happened, and certainly not a first for Zacatecas. As I've said before, the only thing that DTO members and leaders fear is extradition to the US. Why? Because if they get thrown into a Mexican prison, they either live like kings for just a few years, or get busted out in an operation like this one. If they go to prison in the US, they're staying put for a LONG time. So, not only is it hard enough for the Mexican government to put these thugs in jail; apparently, it's a real problem to keep them there.

"DEA: Bribes taint late Mexican drug czar."

Here is an excerpt from Dane Schiller's article in The Houston Chronicle:

"A highly trusted former deputy attorney general, who later became Mexico’s drug czar and was embraced by Washington until his death, is accused in a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration report of taking bribes from one of Mexico’s oldest narcotics trafficking

 cartels. Jose Luis Santiago Vasconcelos, killed in November in a mysterious plane crash over Mexico City, is among three senior federal law-enforcement officials named in an April 21-page DEA briefing on organized crime and drug trafficking south of the border. Vasconcelos was never charged with a crime. The other two are being prosecuted by Mexico. The report, prepared as a primer on drug cartels, does not say when, or how much money was allegedly taken by Vasconcelos... When contacted Wednesday, DEA spokesman Garrison Courtney, said the agency could neither refute nor offer a source for the highly charged allegation, which appears in the report as fact. The information was included without being fully vetted for release, Courtney said. Tony Garza, the former U.S. ambassador to Mexico who knew Vasconcelos personally, said he was respected and trusted, but not above suspicion... Three retired DEA agents, who held senior posts and knew Vasconcelos, said it’s hard to believe he was corrupt and noted it doesn’t take long to be smeared in Mexico." Link to Full Article

Analysis: There are two main things I'd like to point out in this story. First is the obvious oversight by DEA in their DTO primer presented to a mostly non-expert audience. I've read the report, and it's a very basic overview of the problem in Mexico, with sections on each of the major DTOs - not unlike the ones I've posted on this blog. Unfortunately, it appears whoever put those sections together - particularly the section on Arturo Beltran Leyva - did a quick cut-and-paste job without checking several sources, and without citing the information. Although it may sound like it, I'm not knocking the DEA; they know their stuff, and I'm going to give them the benefit of the doubt by assuming the person or people who put this briefing packet together were not experts on the BLO and had no idea of the magnitude of the allegation being made about Vasconcelos. It was almost sheer luck that someone who knew Vasconcelos personally and knew of the esteem in which he was held by the US government noticed the glaring error in the report. Unfortunately, when the DEA was questioned about this, they were unable to cite the source for the information, and couldn't even speculate as to whether the information came from law enforcement data, wiretaps, or even open sources. As embarrassing as it is, the DEA is not the only agency to have this problem. I've seen numerous government assessments, reports, and documents that are not properly cited, with only a general statement saying the information was culled from various official/government and open sources. Good, solid citations not only help the readers of such reports assess the credibility of those sources - and thus the report - but also serve as a CYA for the agency that created the report. 

My second point is the ease with which anyone in Mexico can be painted with the corruption brush. It's easy to understand why this happens, as corruption has been tolerated - and has even been socially acceptable in many places - throughout Mexico for hundreds of years. Reading about a senior Mexican government official taking bribes from the BLO in an official DEA report wouldn't surprise most people, with the exception of those few Americans who are very familiar with Vasconcelos personally and his reputation. President Calderon has made it his personal mission to wipe out corruption in Mexico. Unfortunately, the impossible is made even more so because not only does he have to eliminate corruption itself, but the perception or suspicion of corruption. That suspicion taints relationships between government officials, law enforcement agencies, and the general public. Wiping out corruption in Mexico may take forever, but eliminating that suspicion and mistrust may take forever and a day.

"The Sicario: A Juárez hit man speaks."

Here is an excerpt from Charles Bowden's article in Harper's Magazine:

"I am ready for the story of all the dead men who last saw his face. As I drank coffee and tried to frame questions in my mind, a crime reporter in Juárez was cut down beside his eight-year-old daughter as they sat in his car letting it warm up. This morning as I drove down here, a Toyota passed me with a bumper sticker that read, with a heart symbol, i love love. This morning I tried to remember how I got to this rendezvous. I was in a distant city and a man told me of the killer and how he had hidden him. He said at first he feared him, but he was so useful. He would clean everything and cook all the time and get on his hands and knees and polish his shoes. I took him on as a favor, he explained. I said, 'I want him. I want to put him on paper.' And so I came. The man I wait for insists, 'You don’t know me. No one can forgive me for what I did.' He has pride in his hard work. The good killers make a very tight pattern through the driver’s door. They do not spray rounds everywhere in the vehicle, no, they make a tight pattern right through the door and into the driver’s chest. The reporter who died received just such a pattern, ten rounds from a 9mm and not a single bullet came near his eight-year-old daughter. I wait. I admire craftsmanship... I have spent years getting to this moment. The killers, well, I have been around them before. Once I partied with two hundred armed killers in a Mexican hotel for five days. But they were not interested in talking about their murders. He is." Link to Extended Excerpt on Anderson Cooper 360

Analysis: THIS is what an interview with an assassin should look like. It is a gripping ten-page account of the interview between the author - a veteran and award-winning journalist - and the subject, a world-weary and repentant sicario who has been staying out of the business for the last two years. The article is gripping, intense, and incredibly vivid in its detail and emotion. It's unfortunate that you can only read an excerpt of it online, but it's completely worth the drive to your local bookstore to pick up a copy of May 2009 edition of Harper's in order to read it (and thanks to James Creechan and Lindsay Beyerstein for recommending this!).

There are a few things about the article that I want to point out, which will hopefully encourage those of you with a profound interest in this topic to go out and buy the mag. First, the writing is really good. Yes, it's very dramatic and reads like a novel in some places. But isn't that what keeps you interested? Bowden, unlike some writers, doesn't use that tactic to detract from shaky "facts" or a mediocre story. The subject and the interview are very grave, which merits a degree of drama, in my opinion. I think it adds context and perspective, especially for those who don't follow border violence issues and don't realize just how bad things are in some places in Mexico.

Several important aspects of the drug smuggling business are revealed here, and it's not in a question-and-answer format that makes you wonder whether or not the answers were planted or the subject was set up to answer in a certain way. For example, the subject explains at great length that he never really knew who he was working for. He got orders, carried them out, and got paid in cash, booze, drugs, and women. He had rules to follow, and as long as he followed them, he stayed alive.

He explains that towards the end of his "career," after things started getting really bad in 2006, he was kidnapped twice. He talked about how his captors and torturers were amateurs in their methods - something I've noticed going on in the Tijuana area for about a year or so. This is part of what's contributing to the more grisly slayings and collateral damage - the fact that some newer hitmen are inexperienced, not as likely to follow the rules, and bloodthirsty. There's a part of the article where the subject talks about the difference between men that kill as a job and men that kill because they like killing. He felt that the men who enjoyed killing for its own sake were sick and needed to be killed themselves because they were a liability...an interesting viewpoint.

One of the more disturbing parts is his discussion of the corruption among Mexican law enforcement and the collusion between police and the DTOs. I knew corruption was widespread in many, if not most, areas of Mexico, but I had no idea it was this pervasive. The mere thought of Mexican cops taking part in kidnappings and torture - regardless of whether or not the victims are dirty themselves and owe money to a drug lord - is tough to swallow. However, it makes the problem of corruption so real, and helps the reader see what in incredible obstacle corruption poses to the Calderon administration.

So if you haven't figured it out yet, I think this is an incredibly good read, and well worth the time, effort, and $6.95 to get it at the news stand. It's an insight into a world who some think they know, yet we've only begun to scratch the surface; we may never get to the day-to-day truth that lies deep beneath for so many in Mexico.

"Mexican mayor: Army will fight cartels permanently."

Here is an excerpt from Maria Sanminiatelli's article in the Associated Press:

"The mayor of one of Mexico's most troubled border towns said Tuesday he expects to keep army troops in place to fight drug violence even after a revamped police department resumes its duties. About 5,000 troops moved into Ciudad Juarez in March and took over police operations in the violence-scarred town across the border from El Paso, Texas. It is part of a larger move by the government of President Felipe Calderon to send 45,000 troops to patrol territories long ruled by narcotraffickers. Mayor Jose Reyes Ferriz said in an interview with The Associated Press that he expects about 2,000 army troops to remain in Juarez permanently 'so that the army can maintain a presence against organized crime'... 'At the end of the year we will have a robust police department with at least 3,000 officers,' Reyes Ferriz said. He said the city needs a total of 4,000 officers, noting that organized crime preys on towns along the U.S.-Mexico border... The mayor said crime is down 90 percent since the army arrived in March. But, tensions flared early on as army troops showed clear distrust for the police force — especially after three police cars were discovered filled with drugs, Reyes Ferriz said." Link to Full Article

Analysis: Unfortunately, this story has "no good can come of this" written all over it. Just the very thought of a permanent military occupation in a Mexican city - regardless of its recent violent history - must send shudders down many spines. I'm very concerned that although the Mayor seems to have a plan in place for cleaning up his police force and making it more robust, he still feels the need to maintain a permanent garrison of 2,000 army troops to keep them honest. He obviously lacks confidence in his own plan and internal security measures. This move also sends a bad message to the people of Cuidad Juarez - we've "cleaned up" our cops, but we're keeping the army here "just in case." From what I recall, the amount of complaints regarding alleged human rights abuses by the army has been particularly high in Cuidad Juarez - probably because the city currently has the largest army presence. If many of those allegations are founded, then a continuing military presence will draw the ire of the city's population. Finally, I'm not surprised to read of the tension and distrust between the army and the police. That situation would likely get worse under a permanent army presence. 

The implications of the Mayor's intended actions remind us that Calderon's army deployments to battle DTOs have been effective, but are not sustainable in the long-term. It's like putting the proverbial finger in the dike when the water starts spewing out; you may be able to plug that leak for a little while, but eventually the water will start spewing out somewhere else. And that has been the case with Mexican army deployments. They're effective in reducing crime in short order wherever they're sent, but they can't stay forever (although the Juarez Mayor might argue with that point), and the DTOs know this. So, they lay low for a few months until the army leaves, then they pick up operations where they left off. It's unfortunate that this is currently Calderon's only option, and its lack of sustainability is the primary concern for Mexico in the long-term.

"Arrests of border agents on the rise."

Here is an excerpt from Rick Jervis's article in the USA Today:

"A rising number of U.S. border enforcement officers are being arrested on corruption charges as Mexican drug cartels look to bribes as a way to get around tougher enforcement, border officials say. nvestigators arrested 21 U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers on corruption charges in the fiscal year that ended last September, up from eight in the previous 12 months, according to CBP. This year, 14 have been arrested. Since 2004, 84 officers have been arrested and 62 were convicted, says James Tomsheck, assistant commissioner for internal affairs at CBP, which is part of the Department of Homeland Security. That number represents a small fraction of the more than 52,000 people employed by the agency, which enforces U.S. law along the 2,000-mile border with Mexico... Another troubling trend: Mexican syndicates are trying to plant their own people in the agency. Investigators have arrested at least four agents since 2007 who they believe were sent by drug cartels to infiltrate the CBP, Tomsheck says." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I am always saddened and disappointed to read stories like this, as it's incredibly difficult to acknowledge that some of your own people - as few in number as they are - are dirty. But the reason I wanted to highlight this story is not to make our federal agencies look bad. It's to point out that no country and no agency is immune to the lure of easy money. Some US agents and cops that work along the border have financial problems like everyone else, and in some cases worse - gambling debts, four kids that need to go to college, a home going into foreclosure, etc. Those are NOT excuses for accepting a bribe or compromising our nation's security. But some do it, and it's a sad testament to the power that Mexican DTO money has over people. I'm sure it's hard for these agencies to publicize those arrests and convictions, but it serves two very positive and powerful purposes. First, it serves as an example to other agents - if you break the rules, we'll try to catch you and we will punish you. Second, it sends a message to the American people that this type of behavior is unacceptable, and it will not be swept under the rug to save face. I can't speculate on what percentage of dirty agents are actually caught. I imagine that the majority of cases are reported by fellow agents, which has to be so hard to do, as it's an age-old rule among cops that you never bust a fellow cop. I really admire those that, as difficult as it is, want to do the right thing and are willing to suffer the consequences for it.

"Record number of guns in Mexico traced to the US."

Here is an excerpt from Todd Bensman's article on GlobalPost.com:

"In 2008, a year during which more than 7,000 Mexicans were killed in drug violence, a record number of weapons confiscated in Mexico were traced to U.S. retailers, according to the latest available government data obtained by GlobalPost. The number of traced firearms that originated in the U.S. — 12,073 — is by far the most ever recorded in one year since the U.S. Bureau of Tobacco, Alcohol, Firearms and Explosives began tracing Mexico's seized guns in 2005. The tracing numbers, which the ATF plans to officially release in a report next month, are significant in that they provide the only statistical indication of the extent to which American guns might be arming Mexico's cartels. In recent weeks, ATF tracing statistics have become increasingly politicized within the U.S. as gun control advocates cite them as grounds for new legislation... Fueling the domestic debate is the fact that no one can really say how many guns in total Mexico has seized, making it impossible to place the number of U.S.-traced weapons in the larger context of Mexican weapons seizures. Mexican authorities have provided widely varying numbers of total guns confiscated." Link to Full Article

Analysis: This is a really great article that needs to be read in its entirety, simply because it explains so well the challenge of trying to determine the exact number - or even close - of weapons in Mexico that came from US sources. It's not sensational, it's not politicized, and it does a great job of showing the herculean task the ATF has undertaken in trying to wrap their heads around the southbound weapons trafficking problem.

To sum up, Bensman explains the possibilities of why so many firearms are never submitted to the ATF for tracing: lack of ATF access to Mexican government gun vaults, theft by Mexican military officials who put them on the black market, and lack of training on identifying firearm markings, just to name a few. The ATF clearly states that the Mexican DTOs don't need to go to other countries or sources for most of the guns they want because the US is still the easiest and cheapest source. And no, the majority of firearms being used by DTOs are NOT military grade. Yes, they have .50-caliber Barrett rifles, LAW rockets, RPGs and grenades. No, you can't buy these at a gun shop or gun show. But those are NOT their preferred weapons, not the ones most commonly used, and not the ones most commonly seized.

As I've mentioned in many previous posts on this topic, we will never know the exact number of firearms flowing from the US into Mexico, but rest assured they're flowing, and flowing quite freely at the moment. Don't believe some sensationalist articles saying it's only a small percentage of Mexican DTO guns that come from the US and the 90% figure is just some ploy by the anti-gun people to reinstate the assault weapons ban. That's garbage. While it may not be exactly 90%, it's a heck of a lot more than 17%; thanks to this article, I'm hoping more people will understand why.

"Former U.S. officers to train Mexican police in cartel fight."

Here is an excerpt from Kevin Johnson's article in the USA Today:

"The U.S. and Mexico are drawing up plans to dispatch up to 300 former U.S. law enforcement officials to Mexico later this year to train thousands of Mexican police investigators in their

 escalating fight against drug cartels, federal officials said. Mexican government officials would select about 9,000 Mexican police for training at undisclosed locations in Mexico, one U.S. diplomatic and one federal law enforcement official said. The goal would be to quell rampant corruption and violence, much of it fueled by warring drug organizations. The plan would create a law enforcement academy where Mexican investigators could be trained in narcotics and weapons trafficking, money laundering, fingerprint examination and other disciplines key to their battle against the cartels and other criminal groups. The State Department would oversee the U.S. side of the program. Among the remaining issues that need State's approval: how the costs will be shared by the two governments, the full scope of the curriculum and how soon training could begin." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I'm ambivalent about this effort, simply because there are so many things that could go wrong and things that could be taken advantage of. Remember, Los Zetas used to be Mexican army special forces soldiers who were trained in the good ol' US-of-A at Fort Benning, Georgia. They took advantage of all that specialized training when they deserted, and are now making mincemeat of their enemies. Mind you, the type of training those former commandos received is different than the type of training the selected Mexican police officers will receive. Still, the echo of Los Zetas' background reverberates in my mind when I hear former FBI agents will be training Mexican cops.

Because I like to end on a positive note, I'll say that I'm trying to be optimistic about this initiative. I'm curious how they plan to vet the 9,000 Mexican police officers that are being selected for this program, but since I know Calderon is serious about purging corruption from the ranks, he may personally have a hand in the rules for that process. A good PR campaign for this initiative could also go a long way towards restoring some level of confidence in the public in cities and towns where these newly-trained police would be working. Yes, violence could get worse as these FBI-trained Mexican cops assert their authority, but I think we all know it will get worse before it gets better. I like that the State Department is involved and managing the US end of this program - that keeps a handle on the sensitive diplomatic issues regarding US assistance to Mexico. Also, the FBI's involvement is very prestigious for the officers selected; this serves as motivation for other Mexican cops to aspire to this sort of training, and to maybe keep their noses clean for future opportunities.

"Arizona judge dismisses charges in gunrunning case."

Here is an excerpt from Tim Gaynor's article on Reuters.com:

"An Arizona judge threw out criminal charges on Wednesday against a gun dealer accused of knowingly selling weapons to smugglers shopping for Mexican drug cartels, after he ruled the prosecutor's evidence was flawed. Maricopa County Superior Court Judge Robert Gottsfield issued a directed verdict of not guilty in the trial of George Iknadosian [pictured left], 47, the owner of X-Caliber guns in Phoenix. Prosecutors alleged Iknadosian sold hundreds of AK-47 assault rifles and other guns to third-party buyers for the cartels in Mexico, where 6,000 people were killed in drug violence last year. The case was the most significant to date brought by U.S. prosecutors seeking to curb the illegal flow of arms south of the border. Gottsfield dismissed the case on the grounds that the prosecutors had not proven the third-party buyers, or "straw purchasers," had misrepresented their identities when buying the guns." Link to Full Article

Analysis: As infuriating as he verdict must have been for investigators and prosecutors, the sad fact is that the system DTOs and strawmen use for purchasing guns and smuggling them into Mexico is a good one - for them, of course. One real problem that is probably going to emerge from this (actually, it's been a point of contention for a while when discussing the southbound flow of weapons) is the debate over gun laws. Some feel that gun bans and tighter gun laws would ameliorate the weapons trafficking issue. Others would rather see Mexico burn to the ground before they'd give up their guns or the right to purchase and own them. 

The problem is NOT gun laws. The problem is the shortage of manpower in law enforcement agencies dedicated to investigating crimes involving guns. The strawmen that buy guns destined for Mexico, in many cases, purchase the guns legally. This means they (or the identity they portray) have a clean background, no criminal history, and are a resident of the state where they purchase the gun. This profile is identical to those of thousands of honest citizens who purchase guns every day for hunting or home protection or other legal uses. The difference is that strawmen KNOW the guns are being sent to Mexico and they lie about it. This is a criminal offense, and so is selling a gun to an individual when the seller KNOWS the guns are intended for that purpose. Proving in a court of law that a gun dealer KNEW for a fact that he or she was selling guns to a straw purchaser, as evidenced by this case, is difficult at best.

So, if the gun purchases themselves are often legal, how do you mitigate the problem? Short of banning the sale of ALL guns - which will never happen - investigation and prosecution after the purchase occurs appears to be the only feasible answer. However, that answer has its own challenges. Law enforcement on the US side or the border needs more funding and more manpower to start making a dent in the investigative process. Mexican law enforcement is dealing with serious corruption issues that prevent an accurate portrayal of the problem, mostly because the corruption affects what weapons are seized and traced in Mexico. Current proposals for US legislation aimed at stemming the southbound flow of weapons indicates the US Government understands how serious the problem is and the assistance that law enforcement agencies along the border require. Hopefully assistance in the form of funding and manpower will manifest itself sooner rather than later.

IN FOCUS: Corruption in Mexico

It is difficult to examine many of the problems currently going on in Mexico without the word "corruption" being thrown around. It is assumed that most government officials, judges, and police officers are on the take, either from each other, the public, or drug cartels. How has corruption become such an ingrained part of Mexican society, and why is it so difficult - if not impossible - to stamp out?

I found a great article on Prof. Claudio Lomnitz's study of the history of corruption in Mexico in the University of Chicago Chronicle. According to Lomnitz, corruption in Mexico goes back to colonial times, when officials appointed by the Spanish crown were expected to extract money from local sources to support themselves. Those appointments didn't last long, and they were usually "bought." The church had its own issues with corruption at the time, having its own source of income and exchanging offices for money. After independence, the system continued because bureaucrats needed some way to make up for the shortfalls in their incomes from small tax revenues. Lomnitz says, "In most cases there just wasn't enough money to pay for the services people needed, so corruption developed as a means of raising revenue, although it has always been more than a way of financing government operations."

In modern Mexico, this system attempts to ensure that services are rendered to certain people. As in colonial times, it also attempts to make up the shortfall in salaries. I have personally heard Mexican government officials say that corruption is almost a necessity in Mexico to maintain order and stability. It is seen as a way of life. As long as most people feel they are getting their share - even if it is through corrupt means - then it keeps the masses happy.

Another angle of corruption in Mexico is the dreaded plata o plombo - "silver or lead," meant as take the bribe or take the bullet. This is a form of corruption encouraged by fear, as opposed to social acceptance or economic survival. Many police officers in Mexico are corrupt because they or their families are physically threatened by DTO members. Public executions of over 450 police officers and soldiers in Mexico last year are proof that the DTOs are more than willing to make good on their threats.

So how does the Calderon administration, which is so committed to cleansing Mexico of this endemic corruption, accomplish this goal? The sad fact is, it can't. Calderon is up against roughly 500 years of history ingrained into his people. He also has two other major things working against him: the economy and an organized crime crisis. If the average Mexican citizen could make a fair living by living fairly, then corruption wouldn't be seen as necessary. While corruption exists in the United States (and every country, for that matter), it exists to a much smaller extent because public servants - for the most part - earn a fair salary with which they can make a living. The Mexican economy is the 12th largest in the world, but the country has an extremely high rate of underemployment, and most people do not earn what Americans would call fair salaries for their work. Unless economic conditions in Mexico improve, the economic challenge to eliminating corruption will remain. The organized crime threat from DTOs is so pervasive, few public or law enforcement officials in Mexico can escape it. When accepting a bribe is a matter of life or death, rather than being honorable or corrupt, the choice is easy for many. Mexican society may not see this as a form of corruption as Americans do, since it is a manner of survival that American cops don't have to deal with. Regardless, the unreliability of Mexican law enforcement is the largest obstacle Calderon must face. Short of removing the large majority of Mexican law enforcement from their posts, which is impractical and probably impossible, Calderon will have to continue to rely on the more reliable, very loyal, and considerably less corrupt Mexican Army as the only stop-gap measure at his disposal.