Mexico's Drug War

On a very short break...

I just wanted to let my readers know that I'm on a brief break from posting (if you haven't already noticed) due to the holidays, and due to the fact that I'm in the middle of a cross-country move. I should be back to posting my regular analysis of Mexico's drug war shortly after the New Year. Also, feel free to keep sending me emails, but my response time may be a little delayed.

Thanks for your understanding, and I hope your 2010 gets off to a great start!

"Slaying of hero's family brings chills to Mexico."

Here is an excerpt of Elisabeth Malkin's article from the New York Times, reprinted in the Houston Chronicle:

"It had been an elaborate farewell to one of Mexico's fallen heroes. Ensign Melquisedet Angulo, a special forces sailor killed last week during the government's most successful raid on a top drug   lord in years, received a stirring public tribute in which the secretary of the navy presented his mother with the flag that covered her son's casket. Then, the next day, only hours after the grieving family had finished burying him in his hometown, gunmen burst into the family's house and sprayed the rooms with gunfire, killing his mother and three other relatives, officials said Tuesday. It was a chilling epilogue to the navy-led operation that killed the drug lord, Arturo Beltran Leyva, and six of his gunmen. And it appeared to be intended as a clear warning to the military forces on the front line of President Felipe Calderon's war against Mexico's drug cartels: not only you, but your family is a target as well." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I think we all knew that reprisals were coming after Arturo Beltrán Leyva was killed, but I don't think anyone imagined something like this would happen. I thought nothing the DTOs could do would ever surprise me, but I'm floored with this one. Going after a soldier's family? As an acquaintance of mine put it today, not even the Mafia went after family members.

For some time now, I've been saying that the Mexican government - as well as our own government - needs to start treating DTOs as something more than just common criminals. I wrote an article in Henley Putnam University's Journal of Strategic Security some time ago about this very topic; you can read it here if you like. While you may not be able to call them terrorists in the purest sense (no ideology other than a profit motive), they're behaving like a hybrid of organized crime, terrorists, and insurgents. How can you effectively battle an Nth Generation organization like that when you're treating them - and fighting them - like gang members?

Some of my readers have taken issue with this view, saying I sometimes give DTOs too much credit. And it's true that many people believe DTO leaders and members are just greedy thugs who like to use they're enormous arsenal with impunity. That may be true in some cases, but ordinary street punks don't infiltrate the government and police as well as the BLO does, or organize prison escapes as elaborately as Los Zetas do, or mastermind the piecemeal destruction of rival organizations as well as the Sinaloa Federation leadership does.

So - not that any government is coming to me for advice - my take on this latest development is that both the Mexican and US governments need to wake up, stop putzing (not my preferred word, but I'm a lady and this is a public forum) around, and treat the DTOs like the opponent that they are.

"Top Mexican Drug Boss Killed in Navy Shootout."

Here is an excerpt from John Lyons and Jose de Cordoba's article in the Wall Street Journal:

"Mexican Navy special forces have killed one of the country's top drug kingpins in a shootout in the central city of Cuernavaca, notching an important victory in President Felipe Calderón's   three-year-old clampdown on narcotics trafficking. The death of Arturo Beltrán Leyva, who called himself "The Boss of Bosses" and was one of Mexico's three most wanted drug lords, came after a four-hour battle on Wednesday evening at an upscale condominium complex in Cuernavaca, a popular retirement destination for Americans and weekend getaway for residents of Mexico City. Four other suspected drug traffickers died, including one who killed himself rather than be arrested... The killing of Mr. Beltrán Leyva is also unlikely to slow down the actual business of drug trafficking in Mexico... The death, however, may alter the balance of power in the Mexican drugs business, with unpredictable consequences. Much of the bloodshed in recent years can be traced to a brutal turf war between Mr. Beltrán Leyva and his arch rival, the drug trafficker Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán, who is Mexico's most wanted man." Link to Full Article

Analysis: There's a looooong history between El Chapo and Arturo, and the WSJ article does a decent job of summing it up. I don't want to take up a lot of time and space in this blog post covering that, so if you want more background first, please check out the article in its entirety.

My main concern, as I think is the main concern for anyone who follows this sort of thing, is what happens next. More specifically, how is ABL's death - and likely the simultaneous death of his brother Héctor - going to affect the DTO dynamic in Mexico, and how is the level of bloodshed going to change?

Personally, I see three main scenarios that are possible, with some being more likely than others. The first one is that Héctor - if he's still alive, which it's looking less and less likely that he is - or one of the other top cartel bosses will fill the gap left by ABL quickly, and will fight to hang on to the BLO's territory and operations. From the conversations I've had today with former colleagues who follow the BLO, those remaining cartel bosses don't seem to stand out too much as men who could effectively lead the organization through what are sure to be very challenging times ahead. However, these men have been in charge of drug operations and deadly assassins for many years. Ultimately, their true capabilities won't be known until one of them (or several) step into the hot seat.

A second scenario is that Los Zetas may try to renew or strengthen their ties with the BLO in an attempt to merge the two organizations, or to orchestrate a friendly takeover. Both organizations have been battling El Chapo's Sinaloa Federation for some time, and this presents quite the strategic opportunity for the two cartels to work together again - especially if the BLO is feeling vulnerable and needs to shore up some support in order to keep control of its territory.

A third option is for El Chapo to try to reabsorb the BLO, and likely in a forceful manner. El Chapo has the resources at his disposal to effect such a swift and powerful takeover. The one thing that may work against him in such an attempt is the sheer size of the BLO's territory. They have influence in 17 of Mexico's 32 states and districts, and some will be easier to take over than others.

Here are some additional thoughts:

As the movie title says, there will be blood, no matter what option is taken or what events should transpire. It's only a matter of to what degree will the blood be shed. The BLO is notorious for exacting vicious revenge on the government and its rivals, and ABL's death at the hands of the Mexican navy will be no exception. There are some media reports out that El Chapo sold ABL's location out to the Navy. Whether or not that's true, the ABL will be looking to send some death in the Sinaloa Federation's direction.

The BLO has some of the best intelligence and infiltration capability in Mexico. How much of this capability survives depends on who was running those parts of the BLO. While acquisition of these capabilities would be a long-term goal for any rival - with the acquisition of territory being the high-priority short-term goal - it would be a significant prize.

So, as usual, more to come, and probably sooner rather than later. Power vacuums tend to be filled within a matter of days in Mexico, and this will not be an exception. Just prepare yourself for the reports of increased violence in areas where the BLO has traditionally held influence.

"Old school meth: Mexican cartels go back to basics."

Here is an excerpt from David Koop's Associated Press article:

"Mexican cartels are increasingly going 'old school' to keep supplying America with methamphetamine despite an ingredient squeeze. Some gangs have responded to a Mexican   crackdown on their meth chemical of choice - pseudoephedrine - by reviving a production method so old, it was used by U.S. motorcycle gangs and bathtub chemists in the 1970s and '80s, recent seizures show. The re-emergence of the 'P2P method' demonstrates how frustrating it is to crack down on a synthetic drug that - unlike cocaine, heroin and marijuana - comes from recipes of chemical ingredients, known as 'precursors,' instead of a plant... Still, authorities contend going after precursors has produced results... And authorities say the [phenyl-2-propanone] P2P method is less desirable for the gangs because it reputedly produces a less-potent drug... While P2P itself is highly restricted and closely monitored by authorities, there are many ways to make it. Gangs found they could get their hands on phenylacetic acid, which can be made into P2P, which in turn can be made into meth." Link to Full Article

Analysis: This is another good example of how DTOs are adapting to and overcoming government efforts to restrict their activities, this time at the manufacturing level. I've seen plenty of stories about the crackdown on certain precursor chemicals, but then I started reading just as many stories about drug busts in Brazil, Paraguay, and elsewhere in South America of pseudoephedrine loads bound for Mexico. 

I don't know a darn thing about phenylacetic acid, but it does appear that it's not that hard to come by, and it's relatively cheap. If you buy it legally (meaning you're a chemist or some sort of scientists who needs it), you can buy 100 grams of it for $16.95 online.

This quote from the story makes the outlook for this situation look pretty bleak: "Experts say a crackdown on phenylacetic acid would likely just push traffickers to other chemicals." Well, of course. That's what DTOs have been doing for decades. Even more disturbing is the fact that there are plenty of other "recipes" for meth, so DTOs and addicts alike have quite the cookbook to go through before authorities can hope to catch up.

"The Myth that No Place in Mexico is Safe."

Here is an excerpt from my latest article on MexiData.info:

"Thanks to the bloody drug battles being waged on a daily basis in so many Mexican cities and towns, the country has acquired a terrible reputation as a travel destination in the last few years. While some areas in Mexico definitely need to be avoided by tourists, there are several areas where this reputation is completely undeserved.

But before we get into the discussion of specific areas in Mexico and their relative safety, it’s important to understand why certain areas are so dangerous, and the factors that need to be taken into account when contemplating travel to Mexico."

To read the full article at MexiData.info, please CLICK HERE.

"The Irony of Mexico’s Problems along its Southern Border."

Here is an excerpt from my latest article on MexiData.info:

"It’s interesting how observers of Mexico’s drug war often assume that the country’s biggest problems are occurring along its northern border with the United States. What many people don’t realize is that Mexico has its own southern border problems with Guatemala (and Belize), and they’re not to be taken lightly. Guatemala has a long history of instability, poverty, and being a haven for criminal activity. Its border with Mexico is tiny compared to the 2,000-mile length of Mexico’s border with the U.S., but that hasn’t made it any less problematic for a country that already has its hands full with a drug war, a sliding economy, and massive emigration issues... If the illegal cross-border transfers of food, clothing, and bicycles were the only issues at hand along Mexico’s southern border that might not be so bad. But unfortunately, that’s the nicest part of the problem."

To read the rest of this article at MexiData.info, please CLICK HERE.

"Only sliver of aid for US-Mexico drug plan spent."

Here is an excerpt from Christopher Sherman's Associated Press article:

"Only $26 million of the $1.4 billion authorized to help Mexico and Central America fight organized crime has been spent due to bureaucracy, conditions placed on the funds by Congress  and preparations in recipient countries, according to a government report scheduled for release Thursday. While nearly all of the $1.4 billion pledged in October 2007 as part of the Merida Initiative has been appropriated by Congress, only about two percent was spent as of Sept. 30, according to a draft copy of a Government Accountability Office report obtained by The Associated Press... Mexico will get the bulk of the money and so far has received nearly all — $24.2 million — of what has been spent. It has yielded 26 armored vehicles, 30 machines to detect drugs and explosive materials and five x-ray vans, as well as software and several training programs. The report blamed red tape and the need to bolster the institutions that will be receiving the funds in Mexico, Central America, the Dominican Republic and Haiti. The U.S. too needed to increase staffing at its embassy in Mexico to handle the daily demands created by a seven-fold increase in U.S. law enforcement assistance." Link to Full Article

For a summary of the GAO report, CLICK HERE.

To read the full GAO report, CLICK HERE.

Analysis: I'm going to focus on the three reasons listed by the GAO why the Merida Initiative money is taking forever to get to Mexico: "(1) statutory conditions on the funds, (2) challenges in fulfilling administrative procedures, and (3) the need to enhance institutional capacity on the part of both recipient countries and the United States to implement the assistance." 

Reason 1 - This refers to human rights abuses by the Mexican army. While I understand the intention of this condition, I think it's pretty hypocritical. We just lifted all restrictions on remittances going to Cuba, haven't seen a single benefit in return, and we don't even need to start discussing the extent of human rights abuses going on in Cuba. Then there's the billion dollars in trade we have with China, and they don't exactly have the best human rights track record, either. The US government should also have thought of this condition at the beginning of the Initiative's drafting, not after most everything was put into motion. This is NOT to say the abuses being committed by some army soldiers are OK, and yes, the Mexican government needs to step up efforts to make sure those violations are being prosecuted. I just think the US government needs to think carefully about the kinds of strings it starts attaching to Merida money this late in the game.

Reason 2 - This is the bureaucratic way of saying our government machine is slow as molasses, and there's enough red tape in this process to circle the globe 75 times. According to the GAO report, it takes three to six months to negotiate and sign a contract that will send a new helicopter to a country, and another year to build one to spec. Seriously? Look, I know helicopters aren't cheap, and it's not like negotiating for just a few hours at a car dealership. But 3-6 months for just finalizing the contract? You know things are bad when Sec Clinton says to Congress that she doesn't understand what's so hard about getting the money flowing.

What's even more fun about funds distribution is that Merida money comes from three different agency pots. And guess what? Each agency has a completely different way of managing that money; separate spreadsheets, separate tracking methods, and different budgeting terms. The US State Department currently has no consolidated database for all this information, so tracking the money from one place is near impossible.

Reason 3 - There aren't enough people at both ends of the money pipe to handle the flow. Really? Did our government not realize the personnel needed on our end to manage the money flow when the Initiative was first drafted two years ago? As for the need to recipient institutions to get their act together, I can understand that. Remember, it's not just Mexico receiving Initiative money; there are several other countries involved whose government institutions are in varying states of organization - and honesty.

The State Department's Response - At the end of the report, the GAO offered the following regarding the State Dept's reponse: "In commenting on our report, State emphasized that while Mérida expenditures may be below expectations, they have spent considerable time laying the groundwork with their Mexican and Central American partners to ensure effective coordination and future disbursement of assistance. State also commented that using expenditures as a performance measure for U.S.-funded programs in general does not take into account the nuances and delays in the procurement and billing cycles, and therefore does not fully capture program activity."

The GAO has said it's going to do follow-up with the State Department's management of Merida money, and it looks like it's going to issue another report in mid-2010. Hopefully all the players can get their act together by then, or the next-biggest thing to Plan Colombia in the Western Hemisphere is going to end up as just window dressing in an attempt to tackle the challenges of Mexico's drug war.

"Al Capone and Today's Cartels."

I'm very excited to announce that I have officially been published in a magazine! My article, titled "Al Capone and Today's Cartels," came out this morning in Homeland Security Today (HSToday) magazine. In it, I compare the situation in 1920s Prohibition-era Chicago to that of modern-day Mexico. I also examine the strategies our government used against corruption and organized crime in Mexico to attempt to suss out potential new strategies for the Mexican government in its war against the cartels.

To read the article in HSToday, please CLICK HERE.