Mexico's Drug War

"Mexico, U.S. can learn from Bogota."

Here is an excerpt from an editorial by Edward Schumacher-Matos in the North County Times:

"Mexicans once bridled at suggestions of learning anything from Colombia, but as the violence and power of drug cartels have grown in their country, they now are beating a path here. President Felipe Calderon, civil society groups, policy experts, police and others have been traveling to this Andean nation to learn how it beat back the cartels, sharply reduced murders and kidnappings and reasserted a sense of civic participation. Some, such as journalists, just seek tips on how to survive. There is much good to be learned from Colombia, but my own visit here reveals that it is not what many Americans hope it might be. John P. Walters, former head of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, is right when he recently wrote that Colombia is 'one of the greatest international policy success stories of the last decade.' But he is wrong in concluding that any of this means fewer illicit drugs and less crime in the United States." Link to Full Editorial

Analysis: I don't make comments on editorials very often, but sometimes quite a bit can be learned from them when written properly. There are a few inaccuracies in this one, however, that I need to point out, although the overall message is pretty good. It's not surprising that many, including people at the highest levels of both the Mexican and US governments, are looking to the Colombian experience for answers. However, I agree with the author that there are just enough differences between the two cases that the possibility of applying the Colombian strategy to Mexico might just not cut it.

It's true that, even if cocaine production in Colombia ever truly sees a significant decrease, entities in other Latin American countries like Peru and Bolivia are ready to step in to fill that market gap. Mexican DTOs have been making friends and influencing people in Peru for several years now, and the word on the street is that Shining Path, a once mostly defunct and now possibly a comeback terrorist organization in Peru, is getting in on the action with them. Now THAT is something to be concerned about. As for Colombian groups like the FARC and ELN, their numbers and strength have diminished, but they're still continuing to wage war against the Colombian military, government, and people in both a conventional fashion and terrorist manner. They're still producing the white powdery stuff, and there are hundreds of micro-cartels throughout Colombia that are waiting for the FARC to finally go away so THEY can fill the market vacuum. I strongly disagree with Schumacher-Matos' assertion that "the paramilitaries have been disarmed and the guerrillas have been pushed back into isolated jungle areas." The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), which served as the umbrella group for paramilitaries in Colombia, doesn't exist in the same fashion as before and several members have disarmed, but the large majority of them stay in the business under a different guise, forming other organized crime groups. They're still working as enforcers and protectors for the various Colombian cartels; they're just not as organized as they once were and don't have a singular name. As for the guerrillas, they've always had their strongholds in isolated jungle areas, so they were never pushed back there because they never left. And they're still carrying out attacks in or near populated areas and killing civilians.

Something that bothers me a little is Schumacher-Matos' offhand assertion that the answer lies not in Latin America, but in the rethinking of domestic policies, including the legalization of some or all drugs. I definitely won't get into that debate here because it's a long one, but he just leaves his statement at that, which is pretty weak, considering what a controversial subject legalization is and that he believes that's the better answer. If I thought I had the better answer to the Colombia and Mexico problem, I'd address it in more than a sentence or two. He ends the editorial with that sentiment, but I didn't feel that everything he talked about leading up to that was designed to support that argument.

Finally, I'm glad he inserted a statement by a Colombian woman explaining that in Colombia, people believe in the authorities and the police, whereas in Mexico they do not. If anything, this is part of an argument against legalization as the answer. Corruption in Mexico MUST be addressed and minimized (it will never be eliminated) to make a dent in the supply problem, and demand and enforcement must continue to be addressed - ever more effectively - in the US to make a dent in the demand problem.

"Gun flow south is a crisis for two nations."

Here is an excerpt from Josh Meyer's article in The Los Angeles Times:

"The United States lacks a coordinated strategy to stem the flow of weapons smuggled across its southern border, a failure that has fueled the rise of powerful criminal cartels and violence in Mexico, a government watchdog agency report has found. The report by the congressional Government Accountability Office, the first federal assessment of the issue, offered blistering conclusions that will probably influence the debate over the role of U.S.-made weaponry as violence threatens to spill across the Mexico border. According to a draft copy of the report, which will be released today, the growing number of weapons being smuggled into Mexico comprise more than 90% of the seized firearms that can be traced by authorities there. The document also cited recent U.S. intelligence indicating that most weapons were being smuggled in specifically for the syndicates -- and being used not only against the Mexican government but also to expand their drug trafficking operation in the United States." Link to Full Article

Analysis: As of 9:15 am Pacific time, the GAO report hadn't been posted on the agency's website, so I have to go off of what the LA Times article says about it. I'm not surprised at all the the GAO report really laid into the Obama administration and DHS component agencies. Mind you, this is a problem that goes back several years, so there is plenty of blame to go around for several administrations and agencies on both sides of the border.

There are a few issues the article mentions that I want to point out, and I look forward to reading more about them in the draft GAO report when it's published. First, the GAO report continues to use the figure of 90% when it comes to weapons traced in Mexico; it actually says more than 90%. Again, we'll never know the actual number of weapons purchased here, and we can only rely on the weapons that ARE submitted by the Mexican government for tracing. Regardless of the actual percentage, we have a serious southbound weapons trafficking problem, and quibbling over the percentage just detracts from it. Second, the report mentions the lack of a national strategy, and lack of interagency cooperation and communication. I see and deal with this almost on a daily basis, and it's extremely frustrating for everyone involved. Keep in mind, it's not like this just became a problem; interagency battles and roadblocks have been going on since agencies were created. DHS and its component agencies have been a mess for years, so I'm curious to see what the Obama administration and Napolitano have in mind to accomplish what so many people before them failed to do - get federal agencies to play nice.

Third, the report talks about obstacles caused by legal issues. I'm particularly happy that this issue was brought up because most people don't know what those legal obstacles are. I posted about the Tiahrt Amendment and the problems it poses for information sharing, but that is only one of several laws that prevent effective cooperation. It's completely true that good analysis and reporting isn't happening because some agencies don't have the resources to do that, and other agencies can't legally do that. 

On top of our own issues, the Mexican government has more than enough to go around. Not only are we dealing with our own governmental and agency flaws; the Mexican government has to deal with an insane amount of corruption, sovereignty issues that have made it very resistant in the past to cooperation with the US, and an economy that's hurting way more than ours, which significantly limits their resources. We've seen some positive changes in all regards, and at least Calderon realizes that these problems will require an unprecedented level of cross-border communication and cooperation if they're ever going to approach being solved. 

Bottom line, this GAO report was needed by everyone - our government, federal and state agencies, the general public, and the Mexican government. There's nothing to put things in motion like a good, swift, public kick in the you-know-what, and that's what this GAO report is attempting to provide. Now, we wait and see what the response will be.

"Mexico candidate: Drug gangs contact all hopefuls."

Here is an excerpt from E. Eduardo Castillo's article in the Associated Press:

"A ruling party mayoral candidate in Mexico's richest city told his supporters that drug traffickers have contacted all leading political contenders in the country seeking their loyalty ahead of elections next month. Mauricio Fernandez's discussion with a group of supporters in a suburb of Monterrey — a leaked recording of which was broadcast throughout Mexico on Friday — is a remarkably frank description of how the brutal gangs try to control political leaders, which is a key concern of President Felipe Calderon in his fight against drug cartels. The candidate also acknowledged that the Beltran Levya cartel controls drug smuggling in his city of San Pedro Garza and suggested that as mayor he would avoid confronting the gang to maintain peace, comments that undermined Calderon's drive to show that the government and his National Action Party, or PAN, are tough on organized crime." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I'm currently doing some research on Al Capone's organization, Prohibition, and corruption in Chicago in the 1920s. I read this article, and was stunned at the similarities between the Monterrey now and Chicago back then. It pains me to see what an incredibly uphill battle Calderon is fighting. It's hard enough to eliminate corruption from police departments in towns and cities across the country, but things are made worse when the mayor of Mexico's wealthiest cities essentially says, "I'm not messing with that." Fernandez is definitely into self-preservation, as he knows many other Mexican mayors who have not "cooperated" with the predominant DTO in their city have been assassinated in short order. It's somewhat unfortunate for him that the conversation in which these feelings were expressed was recorded and made public, but he was frank in saying what almost every other public official in Mexico believes: you take the bribe or take the bullet - plata o plombo.

So how does Calderon deal with mayors like Fernandez and the coercion they have to live with? In some cases, Calderon has removed and arrested dirty mayors. However, this may only serve as a band-aid solution. Dirty mayors are replaced, and there's no guarantee the new mayor will be any better, and not likely he or she will be immune from or willing to defy any coercion attempts from DTOs. The best solution is to establish the rule of law, continue with the arrests, and do everything possible to portray to the public that (at least some) justice can be done. Calderon is a long way from reaching that point, but he has to start somewhere.

"Suspect in murders headed Minuteman group."

Here is an excerpt from Daniel Newhauser and Dan Shearer's article in The Sahuarita Sun:

"Two of the three people arrested in connection with the May 30 murders of an Arivaca man and his daughter headed up a splinter Minuteman group, and were looking for drugs and money to fund their efforts to keep illegal immigrants and drug runners out of the country, sheriff’s officials said.Jason Eugene Bush, 34, was arrested Thursday in Kingman; Shawna Forde, 41, was arrested Friday south of Sierra Vista; and Albert Robert Gaxiola, 42, was arrested Friday afternoon in Tucson. All three have been charged with two counts of first-degree murder, one count of first-degree burglary and one count of aggravated assault in connection with the murders of Raul Flores and his 9-year-old daughter, Brisenia. Flores’ wife was shot during the incident but managed to shoot one of the intruders... Officials said Forde is associated with the Minutemen American Defense group and that Bush and Gaxiola, who is from Arivaca, are associates of Forde. The group is not associated with the national, 12,000-member Minutemen Civil Defense Corps... Within Minuteman group circles, Forde is controversial... Hal Washburn, vetting officer for Washington state chapter of the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps, said Forde was encouraged to leave the group over questions about honesty and her inability to follow orders, according to the story. San Diego Minutemen lists Forde among people they won’t work with, calling her 'unstable.'" Link to Full Article

Analysis: I was just getting ready to type that this story isn't normally the type of incident I provide commentary for, but the circumstance is so unusual and fascinating that I just couldn't resist. Forde is obviously a disturbed individuals with paranoias and extreme views regarding immigration and border security. It's incredibly sad that a man - regardless of his involvement in the drug trade - and his nine year-old daughter had to die because Forde felt justified in funding her operation by stealing drug money and killing drug dealers.

Regardless of how you feel about the official Minutemen organizations, I think it's important that they've made a quick and concerted effort to distinguish themselves from Forde's group. The MCDC does not condone murder or even violence (as far as I know), and I believe their funding comes primarily from donations. Forde's kind of vigilantism makes her and her group no better than the narco-thugs she claims to abhor. Reportedly, the plan was to kill all witnesses, and it's difficult to think that Forde and her two accomplices were sick enough to include a nine year-old in that plan; it can't be said if they knew a child would be in the home. When bullets are flying (the male victim's wife returned fire), anything can happen. But, regardless of how bad drug dealers and DTO members and enforcers are, nothing (in my opinion) justifies this kind of counter-drug vigilantism on US soil.

"Border czar warns cartels against targeting US forces."

Here is an excerpt from Andrew Beatty's article on Agence France Presse:

"US border czar Alan Bersin warned Mexico's brutal drug cartels Tuesday that threats to target law enforcement officials on both sides of the border would be met by a "significant response." Bersin said a recent call by one cartel kingpin to ramp up violence against US and Mexican law enforcement agents was potentially of 'grave significance' and was being 'taken seriously' by the administration. 'Should law enforcement, border patrol agents, customs officers or local and state law enforcement officers be targeted that would be considered a major departure from existing practice of the cartels, and a threat that called for a significant response,' he said... While drawing a line in the sand, Bersin did not specify what the US response might be, except to say efforts would be stepped up to apprehend those responsible." Link to Full Article

Analysis: While on one hand, I'm happy that Bersin is responding assertively and directly to threats against US law enforcement by Mexican DTOs, there are a couple of issues that concern me. I posted on these alleged threats back in early May, and I have since seen the "official" reports (which weren't much different than the media reports, incidentally). What I have NOT seen is any official confirmation that this meeting between Guzman and his people took place, and that this order to confront US law enforcement was actually given. Regardless of any confirmation, it looks like Bersin and DHS are accepting those threats as if they actually occurred, and responding in a manner they feel is appropriate. And this is my other concern.

Bersin is promising the DTOs a "significant response" when neither he nor DHS know what that means. The National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy was just published, but it talks more about methods of cooperation between agencies than it does about specific ways that each agency is going to attack problems with drug smuggling, weapons trafficking, and money transfer/laundering. Mind you, this is a strategy, not a tactical manual, so it's not really designed to talk specifics. Still, the US government has not put down on paper specific triggers or tripwires for mounting that "significant response" to a threat to US interests from Mexican DTOs. The problem now lies in Guzman's and other DTO leaders' perception of Bersin's assertion and any potential reaction. DTO leaders aren't stupid; they probably know that Bersin's statements don't currently have much substance to back them up. That being said, I don't think the DTOs are too interested in calling any bluffs. They are still very wary of encounters with US law enforcement, which are bad for business. Even if Guzman made those statements and threats during that meeting, it may have just been posturing to provide a morale boost (or threat of punishment) to his underlings. 

Bottom line, I realize it's important for people like Bersin to make their position known and known clearly when dealing with threats by Mexican DTOs. However, I also believe these statements need to be made with caution, and the knowledge that a DTO's response to these types of statements can be unpredictable - and deadly.

"Mexican drug cartels 'hide in plain sight' in U.S."

Here is an excerpt from Ben Conery's article in The Washington Times:

"Angel Haro-Perez, the Atlanta head of the Gulf Cartel, is typical of cartel members and associates working in the U.S.: They keep a low profile, avoid violence and work quietly to traffic tons of drugs — cocaine, heroin, marijuana and methamphetamine — into the U.S. while smuggling billions of dollars back across the border. And they do it while remaining virtually invisible to the community and general public... Just northeast of Atlanta, Gwinnett County,  where Mr. Haro-Perez was arrested, has become a ground zero of sorts for Mexican drug cartels, according to authorities. The county's population has more than doubled since 1990, and authorities say the Hispanic, particularly Mexican, population has exploded with a mixture of both legal and illegal immigrants. According to U.S. Census data, Hispanics made up less than 2.5 percent of Gwinnett County's population in 1990, a number that increased to 11 percent in 2000 and was up to 16 percent by 2007. 'We emphasize that the vast majority of those people have nothing to do with drug dealing, but what they do is they allow the Mexican cartels, almost all of whose operatives are Mexican, to hide in plain sight,' [U.S. Attorney David] Nahmias said. Fifteen years ago, he said, four young Hispanic men coming in and out of a house at all hours of the night might make neighbors suspicious. Now they could be painters or construction workers, and there could be 10 other households like theirs on a street." Link to Full Article

Analysis: Although this article focuses on Atlanta - and rightfully so, as it's a major drug distribution hub - the same concerns can be applied to dozens, if not hundreds, of metropolitan areas AND small towns across the US. Migration patterns can't be disputed, and it is creating environments in more and more places where DTO members and their associates - namely, Hispanic gang members - can blend in easily. The key to their success has been the avoidance of trappings which DTO members in Mexico usually enjoy: tricked-out and armored vehicles, jewelry, bodyguards, expensive clothes, etc. DTO members in the US appear to be all business and no play, and that mindset has benefitted them greatly.

Despite their subtlety in business matters on US soil, Mexican DTOs have brought some of the violence of their work deeper into US territory than most people suspect. As the article mentions, DTO-related murders and kidnappings have occurred in places like Phoenix, Atlanta, and even small towns in Alabama. A raid on a gang in Omaha, Nebraska recently uncovered their plan to sell high-powered military-grade guns to Mexican DTOs. The article also mentions that violence levels associated with DTO activity in the US remains low, and DTO members seem to be content to just conduct their business quietly. That's all well and good, but I felt not enough focus was placed on the challenges being placed on state and local law enforcement by the presence of these distributors in their cities. There is some mention of wiretaps and surveillance being conducted, but not much more regarding to effort to detect these networks and dismantle them. If I were a reader living in a city with a sizeable Hispanic population (which I happen to be), I'd wonder what my Sheriff and local cops were doing to find out if this sort of thing was happening in my area, and how to prevent it from getting here (or getting worse).

"Gun dealers rarely charged in trafficking plots," and "Obama's other surge."

Here is an excerpt from the first article by Dane Schiller in The Houston Chronicle:

"One guy was an unemployed machinist who lived with his parents, but spent $24,800 in a year at Houston gun stores, snapping up military-style weapons for a Mexican drug cartel. His accused gun-running associate dropped $42,700 in a year, as did another who spent $27,700 in two months. Each often shopped at the same stores, according to court records. Ten alleged buyers were indicted and arrested last week, part of an investigation of as many as 23 people who spent $366,400 during a 15-month period that ended in 2007. Two of them, including the machinist, have pleaded guilty. But the dealers who sold the guns, are not accused of wrongdoing. The law says they did nothing wrong, even if they wondered, for example, why a customer in one pop would pay cash for five civilian variants of the M-16 assault rifle used by the military. 'Technically, they don’t have to do anything unless they suspect something is wrong,' Franceska Perot, a spokeswoman for the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ Houston division said. 'Unless they knew where the guns were going, it is not a crime on the part of the dealer.' Less than 1 percent of dealers nationwide are ever charged with a crime, according to the ATF. Most gun dealers are law abiding, authorities said. Proving they knowingly engaged in a criminal plot is especially tough." Link to Full Article

Here is an excerpt from the second article by Todd Bensman on GlobalPost.com:

"As open warfare between rival drug cartels filled the streets of Nuevo Laredo with bodies, Armando and Diana Villarreal, owners of Mando’s, prospered from a sharp sudden spike in demand for AK-47 semiautomatic assault rifles... Federal agents, though, eventually traced more than 50 AK-47s recovered after battles in Nuevo Laredo to Mando’s. In October 2006, Villarreal died of cancer just before federal prosecutors could make an example of him as perhaps the first federally licensed firearms dealer to be indicted for crossing the legal line into weapons trafficking, U.S. Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives officials confirm. There have been no publicly known successful gun-smuggling prosecutions of licenced retail gun dealers since... America's gun retailers will continue to enjoy some measure of insulation because of scant legal requirements on sales, as well as a high burden of proof that a retailer actually knows ahead of time where the guns are headed." Link to Full Article

Analysis: Both of these articles accomplish more or less the same thing, and that's to point out three major issues when it comes to southbound weapons trafficking: the straw-purchase system the Mexican DTOs have going is a pretty darn good system - for them, anyway; proving complicity by a US gun dealer in weapons trafficking is very difficult; the large majority of US gun dealers are honest, cooperative, and concerned about the potential for their guns to be used in crimes south of the border.

So how much responsibility (or blame) should be placed on US gun dealers to prevent the sale of guns to straw buyers? How many AK-47s sold to the same individual(s) should be considered suspicious? Where should the line be drawn between making a profit and losing business over possibly baseless suspicions? Gun sellers are not cops or investigators. However, taking the initiative these days to be more alert to suspicious buying behavior is probably in the best interest of gun sellers; not because it's become any easier to implicate them in criminal activity, but because it's always possible they may have less guns they can legally sell if the southbound weapons flow doesn't slow down soon.

I firmly believe the focus of law enforcement efforts with regards to this issue needs to be on the straw buyers, and to maintain that cooperation with gun dealers. Both the articles state and my ATF contacts confirm that the number of gun dealers knowingly and actively involved in illegal sales to Mexican DTO associates is extremely small. In the law enforcement world, when you have limited resources and personnel, you go with the numbers - tackle your larger problems first, and deal with the smaller ones later. The larger problem in this case is dirty buyers, not dirty sellers. 

"Arrests 'Major' Blow To Trans-National Gangs."

Here is an excerpt from this article on KETV.com:

"Authorities said they arrested 36 gang members and seized 69 weapons in Omaha and Lincoln Tuesday in a sweeping investigation that officials said dismantled the metro area's role in a  trans-national gang. The weapons included 14 assault rifles and a Barrett .50-caliber sniper rifle that were sold to a government informant who told the gang members he planned to ship them to Mexico where they'd be used to arm Mexican drug cartels. Law enforcement officials said it was the biggest gun bust in Omaha history and a major blow to the Serenos street gang." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I'm going to keep this post short and sweet because there's only one thing I want to point out. The .50-caliber sniper rifle mentioned in the story was seized in NEBRASKA and sold by a GANG MEMBER to an informant. It was not purchased in Central America or China or Romania or some former Soviet-bloc country. I grow increasingly frustrated with journalists and so-called analysts that believe military-grade hardware and most other firearms used by DTOs don't actually come from the US, as the US government claims. While I acknowledge that we'll never know the true percentage, this is a great example of how the weapons trafficking problem is NOT exclusive to the southwest border states, and involves even midwest gang members. Huge kudos to Omaha law enforcement for this bust, and I hope we see many more across the country.

"Al Qaeda eyes bio attack from Mexico."

Here is an excerpt from Sara Carter's article in The Washington Times:

"U.S. counterterrorism officials have authenticated a video by an al Qaeda recruiter threatening to smuggle a biological weapon into the United States via tunnels under the Mexico border, the latest sign of the terrorist group's determination to stage another mass-casualty attack on the U.S. homeland. The video aired earlier this year as a recruitment tool makes clear that al Qaeda is looking to exploit weaknesses in U.S. border security and also is willing to ally itself with white militia groups or other anti-government entities interested in carrying out an attack inside the United States, according to counterterrorism officials interviewed by The Washington Times. The officials, who spoke only on the condition they not be named because of the sensitive nature of their work, stressed that there is no credible information that al Qaeda has acquired the capabilities to carry out a mass biological attack although its members have clearly sought the expertise. The video first aired by the Arabic news network Al Jazeera in February and later posted to several Web sites shows Kuwaiti dissident Abdullah al-Nafisi telling a room full of supporters in Bahrain that al Qaeda is casing the U.S. border with Mexico to assess how to send terrorists and weapons into the U.S." Link to Full Article

Analysis: It's no secret that I'm not a fan of Sara Carter's writing in The Times, as I thoroughly ripped apart an article she wrote on Hizballah entering the US from Mexico. This article continues her streak of sensationalism and blowing things out of proportion without providing any context or perspective. 

First, let's take a look at the "recruiter" in the video she refers to, Abdullah al-Nafisi. He's a well-known Kuwaiti college professor, and apparently enjoys ranting against the US and promoting al-Qa'ida. His "speeches" are often shown in pro-AQ media, but there's no evidence he's a bona fide AQ member, let alone an "official" recruiter; he's most likely just a blowhard professor. Second, let's examine the weaknesses in the plan to move anything that isn't DTO-owned product into the US through a border tunnel. Moving terrorists, bombs, or anything of the sort is VERY bad for DTO business. Also, the DTOs that build and own these tunnels are VERY territorial and protective of these tunnels. NOTHING goes into them or comes out of them without their knowledge and approval. For al-Qa'ida or any other terrorist group to move operatives or biological weapons or nuclear material using a tunnel, they'd be hard-pressed to do so without alerting the DTO owners and incurring some serious penalties. Finally, although our northern border is not nearly as scrutinized in the media as our southwest border, it's infinitely easier to bring anything into the US from the north. If I were a terrorist with two brain cells to run together, I wouldn't risk detection in Mexico to cross an increasingly fortified border when I can just take a boat ride down a river and sail right up to a major metropolitan area in the northeast US.

Bottom line, this "exclusive" (which was actually reported through other outlets in February) is yet another attempt by the author to make headlines. Unfortunately, there are a lot of managers and decision-makers in the homeland security business that read this stuff and get bent out of shape right away. If you happen to be someone who bears the brunt of those "I need to know what this means now!" demands, just point those folks in the direction of this blog *wink*.

IN FOCUS: La Familia Michoacana

The publicity surrounding this up-and-coming Mexican DTO has been increasing in the last year, and it appears that La Familia is making plays to put the organization on the forefront of organized crime groups in Mexico. Even the US government has recently acknowledged the group’s power and influence, placing it on the Kingpin Designation Act list in April 2009. While La Familia has several things in common with the major Mexican DTOs, there are a few things that set it apart, making it a unique organization as organized crime groups go.

First, let’s take a look at their beginnings, which are pretty recent. George Grayson of the Foreign Policy Research Institute wrote a really nice backgrounder on La Familia, some of which I’m paraphrasing here. La Familia came about in 2004 with the goal of eradicating the trafficking of crystal methamphetamine, or “ice,” and other narcotics, kidnapping, extortion, murder-for-hire, highway assaults, and robberies. This is all according to one of La Familia’s founders, Nazario “The Craziest One” Moreno Gonzalez. They may have come about to thwart the trafficking efforts of the Milenio cartel, associated with Sinaloa’s Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman. La Familia may also have appeared to prevent Los Zetas from entering what they considered their territory.

Handwritten, poorly-spelled, enigmatic missives showed up in 2006 next to decapitated heads in Uruapan as part of an intense Familia propaganda campaign designed to intimidate both foes, terrorize the local population, and inhibit action by the government. Like Los Zetas, La Familia disseminates news of its deeds nationally by conventional media as well as by internet videos and carefully placed banners. On the heels of the Uruapan atrocity, La Familia took out a half-page advertisement in newspapers claiming to be crime-fighters. El Sol of Morelia and La Voz de Michoacan both ran the group’s manifesto. Such expressions of civic virtue aside, 18 of 32 police officers in the Tepalcatepec area resigned after receiving death threats from La Familia, while local newspapers exercise self-censorship concerning the sinister band.

In all, authorities attributed 17 decapitations to La Familia in 2006 alone. Between the murder of Rodriguez Valencia that August and December 31, 2008, La Familia killed scores, if not hundreds, of people. What may have begun as a small group of armed men on the prowl to protect their children from meth has turned into a major criminal outfit that is just as well-armed and organized as any top-tier drug smuggling organization in Mexico. The Attorney General’s Office claims that elements of organization not only sell narcotics in many of the municipalities of their home state, but also seek to dominate the distribution route to the US border that snakes through territory traditionally in the hands of the Sinaloa cartel. To this end, they have established safe houses as refuges for their traffickers at strategic points along the route northward. While originating in Michoacan, La Familia has extended its activities to Mexico State, where it controls or has conducted operations in numerous municipalities.

According to the Southern Pulse Intelligence Network, Moreno Gonzales revealed that La Familia had some 4,000 members working in various parts of Michoacan. Everyone received a salary of between $1,500 and $2,000 a month, and all were born in Michoacan. La Familia reportedly pays millions in bribe money every month, and offers protection to various business owners in Michoacan, the state of Mexico, and the Federal District. The protection, however, mostly translates to extortion, where some business owners are taxed every week, others once a month. In August 2008, the Mexican Attorney General’s office made an announcement, revealing that La Familia intended to control the drug smuggling market in Michoacan and open a route all the way north, passing though the traditionally held lands of the Sinaloa Federation, where many claim Joaquin Guzman has been weakened by the Mexican government’s constant focus on dismantling his organization and his ongoing battles with Los Zetas and other rival groups.

In May 2009, The Los Angeles Times reported that La Familia is undermining the electoral system and day-to-day governance of Michoacan, pushing an agenda that goes beyond the usual money-only interests of drug cartels. In late May, it became clear how deeply embedded La Familia is in the political machine. Federal authorities detained 10 mayors and 20 other local officials as part of a drug investigation, saying the group has contaminated city halls across the state. Unlike some drug syndicates, La Familia goes beyond the production and transport of marijuana, cocaine and methamphetamine and seeks political and social standing. It has created a cult-like mystique and developed pseudo-evangelical recruitment techniques that experts and law enforcement authorities say are unique in Mexico. No party has been spared its influence or interference, politicians of all stripes said in a series of interviews conducted before the arrests of the mayors. Generally, though, traffickers' political influence in Michoacan has less to do with winning office and more with controlling officeholders, to create a buffer of protection that allows their business to proceed unimpeded, said a security advisor to Calderon. La Familia reportedly recruits at drug rehab centers and indoctrinates followers with an ideology akin to religious fundamentalism, complete with group prayer sessions. Some armed guards wear uniforms with the Familia logo, witnesses say. Failure by a recruit to live by the rules is said to be punishable by death.

This cult-like behavior and extensive interference in politics portrays La Familia as a hybrid organization; a cross between organized crime syndicate, terrorist organization, and insurgency.  Grayson mentions that La Familia has a lot in common with the former United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), a disarmed umbrella group of paramilitary organizations that was designated a foreign terrorist organization by the US government in 2001. I believe that almost all Mexican DTOs can be compared to the AUC, and I did so in an article my husband and I co-wrote for Henley Putnam University’s Journal of Strategic Security. La Familia comes eve closer to the AUC because the AUC did try to dabble in politics, albeit in a different way. The AUC tried to gain some status as a legitimate political party in Colombia (it failed), whereas La Familia just wants to influence politics. With its current methods, La Familia may be more successful in the political scene than the AUC ever was. Regardless, it will be interesting to see the result of the inevitable future clashes between elements of La Familia and its rivals, as well as how the Calderon administration and the Mexican army modify their strategies to counter the group’s growth.

"How Mexico's drug war washed up on Canada's West Coast" and "British Columbia or Colombia?"

Here is an excerpt from Linda Diebel's article in The Star:

"While the U.S. Attorney General's Office calls the Mexican drug cartels a "national security threat" and says 230 American cities have been infiltrated, the port city of Vancouver may be  Canada's first to feel the fallout from the crackdown on Mexico's drug lords. Already this year in the Vancouver area – nicknamed the gang capital of Canada – there have been 30 shootings (with 12 fatalities) directly linked to the gang shakeout in Mexico and tracked by the Washington-based Council on Hemispheric Affairs. Some 130 gangs operate in B.C., among them Red Scorpions, United Nations, MS-13, Bacon Brothers, Hells Angels and various independents – all with ties of varying degrees to lucrative Mexican cocaine, among other drugs from other places... In Vancouver, police are witnessing an escalation in the brutality of killings. Recently, in an apparently targeted hit, a gangster shot a young mother in her car as her 4-year-old sat in the back seat. Once, such actions were forbidden by established drug protocol. Now, collateral damage is routine in the slaughterhouse of gangland hits." Link to Full Article

Here is an excerpt from the second article, which appeared in The Economist:

"Canada remains one of the world’s safest countries but in recent years Vancouver, BC’s largest city, has gained notoriety for gun crime, especially among drug gangs. Since 1997 nearly 450 gangsters have been killed there. The surge in shootings is “directly related” to a crackdown on gangs in Mexico and the United States, says Pat Fogarty, a senior officer in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Recent arrests by the three countries’ police forces have disrupted a Mexican-run cocaine distribution chain, leaving Vancouver’s street dealers fighting to secure their supplies. “The price goes up and the guns come out,” says Mr Fogarty. Vancouver has become a distribution hub in a global drugs trade stretching to Asia and Europe. Local gangs ship out cannabis, amphetamines and ecstasy made in BC, importing cocaine, heroin and guns for the Canadian market. Around 135 gangs are thought to be fighting over a business worth an estimated C$7 billion ($6.2 billion) a year." Link to Full Article

Analysis: Normally I comment on one news article at a time, but these two are intrinsically related. The stories are also reported in both a metropolitan newspaper and a global periodical, which draws more attention to the story. I was interested in this topic because you don't read much about our northern neighbor when it comes to drug wars, and especially not in the context of Mexican DTOs and gang warfare. I've been following Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13, on and off for the past few years and I knew they had a presence in British Columbia (and Canada in general). I wanted to get the Canadian perspective because, compared to gang violence and DTO activity in certain US cities, the problems in Vancouver didn't seem serious enough at first to merit such grim headlines. I even spent a week in Vancouver a couple of years ago, and although I was told about and witnessed first-hand the drug culture in some areas of the city, it struck me overall as a nice place that I'd want to visit again. So, to get that Canadian perspective, I contacted Dr. James Creechan, a sociology professor with a criminology specialty/interest. He's taught at the University of Alberta for most of his career, and occasionally teaches at the University of Toronto, Queen's University, and the University of Guelph, with adjunct privileges at the Autonomous University of Sinaloa-Culiacan. He currently is teaching a class on the violence and drug war in Mexico, so I thought he'd be the perfect person to provide some context on this issue. What follows is my paraphrasing of his comments. 

Canadian cities— especially major metropolitan areas of Vancouver, Toronto & Montreal— have never had gang related problems similar to those in most US cities... There are no equivalent programs like the NCJS gang surveys etc. Canadian homicide levels are also low — approximately 540 total homicides in all of Canada last year. Only some of those (less than 30%) of those are linked to gangs. But, Canadians aren’t accustomed to reading that gang hits are taking place, and a few extra-ordinary incidents (by Canadian standards) over the past few years have garnered national attention. In [British Columbia], a drug related gangland hit inside of a condo raised concerns last year, especially when one of the victims was in the wrong place at the wrong time (doing maintenance). In Toronto, there have been several drive-by shootings and gang hits captured on video-tape. The most notorious case involved a shooting on Boxing Day (Dec. 26) where two gangs shot it out in downtown Toronto and a young high school girl was killed. Things have gotten worse by a degree that is intolerable to Canadians and this has led to demands for government action before things get even worse... It’s a slippery slope once drug gangs, and a culture of drug gangs establish a foothold. Another factor to consider is the lack of hard news about drug wars. Until recently, there was little coverage of narco wars in Mexico. The sensationalism in The Star can be attributed to the fact that similar incidents have not been widely reported to a significant degree... It’s also clear that information is dated and overstated in sections. 

The Canadian character is hard to nail down with certainty, but one important “subterranean value” is that Canadians generally believe that “We are not American” and “We do not want to become more like Americans."  This view, “we’re not you,” means that Canadians do have concretely different views about crime and violence. Guns are not widely available [there]. There is a Canadian gun registry (...even if it is a political hot potato). Basically, Canadians read about a growing gang problem and believe that it’s an indicator that Canada might eventually have the same kind of problems that Canadians believe exist in Los Angeles, Miami etc. unless [they] act hard and fast.