Mexico's Drug War

"Mexico's drug Zeta hitmen advance on kingpin's turf."

Here is an excerpt from Robin Emmott's article on Reuters.com:

"Mexico's Gulf cartel and its brutal "Zetas" hit squad are taking on the country's most wanted drug lord on his own turf, escalating a fight for supremacy in a drug war that is worrying the United States. The Zetas, considered Mexico's most violent gang and feared for beheading victims, are pushing into the northwestern state of Durango in a new battle against arch-rival Joaquin "Shorty" Guzman, Mexico's top drug fugitive. At least 235 people have died in drug violence in the mountainous state this year in a fight over smuggling routes and marijuana and opium plantations that Guzman has long dominated... "Without a doubt, the Zetas are advancing in Durango and some towns are basically under their control," said Rafael Herrera, a political analyst and former editor of a regional newspaper... Lazcano is turning his attention in Durango to controlling rural outposts along smuggling corridors previously held by Guzman to win informants, hide and attack the military." Link to Full Article

Analysis: There is no doubt that the level of violence in Durango has increased in recent months, as documented by Ms. Emmott in another Reuters article. When violence increases in a relatively specific area in Mexico, that means that either two DTOs are fighting for control of a lucrative plaza (a drug smuggling corridor) like Nuevo Laredo or Cuidad Juarez, or a DTO is having some internal control issues, like the AFO in Tijuana. I also have no doubt that some sort of conflict is going on between the Sinaloa Federation and Los Zetas. My question is what Lazcano's priorities are with this strategy. The article mentions controlling outposts along smuggling routes, winning informants, finding places to hide and attack the military, etc. However, those are lofty goals if he expects to accomplish all of them.

Let's do a quick comparison of Los Zetas and the Sinaloa Federation, while making a few assumptions. Los Zetas used to be merely enforcers for the Gulf cartel, but after Osiel Cardenas Guillen was incarcerated and extradited to the US, they took over a good chunk of the Gulf cartel's operations. While I don't think anyone is ready to say that the two organizations are one and the same or use the names interchangeably, one can reasonably assume that any moves by Los Zetas has a direct impact on Gulf business, for better or for worse. There are two important differences between the Gulf and Sinaloa cartels. The Gulf cartel controls more plazas than the Federation. However, the Federation controls significantly more physical territory than the Gulf cartel. Controlling more routes is a competitive advantage because you can move more product across the border. However, controlling more territory has the advantages of providing more places to manufacture drugs, more places to hide, more officials to bribe in population centers, and more potential recruits.

I'm sure all of the Sinaloa advantages are tempting to Lazcano and his crew, but El Chapo is quite a force to contend with. He has his own enforcement teams, Los Pelones and Los Negros among them. No one really knows the exact Zetas numbers, but the latest estimates place them between 200-250 core members. However, Los Zetas have grown into a network and almost a brand name; that network of informants and other associates could number in the thousands. This would serve as a huge benefit to Lazcano in a conflict with El Chapo's people. Undoubtedly, El Chapo has a challenge on his hands. Not only does he have Lazcano to worry about on one side, but he's also backing Teodoro "El Teo" Garcia Simental in a battle for AFO's remaining territory in northern Baja California. As is typical for these kinds of turf wars, things are likely to get worse before they get better, and as the author implies, only time will tell who has the upper hand.

"Mexican mayors' arrests show nobody above drug war."

Here is an excerpt from Alexandra Olson's article in the Associated Press:

"Severed heads tossed in front of a car dealership. Bodies hurled off a bridge. Extortion threats against shop owners. It was no secret that this town popular with tourists for its monarch butterfly nesting grounds was in the grip of Mexico's drug trade. But even the most jaded were stunned when Zitacuaro's young, charismatic mayor was arrested this week in Mexico's biggest sweep ever against politicians with alleged cartel ties. The swift and secretive operation by federal forces netted 10 mayors and 18 other top officials in Michoacan state, escalating President Felipe Calderon's battle against cartels ahead of the July 5 national elections. The arrests sent a powerful message to Mexico's political class that no one — not even members of Calderon's own party — is safe from prosecution... The mayors are of different political stripes, including Calderon's conservative National Action Party, and the operation took place in the president's home state." Link to Full Article

Analysis: This is a bittersweet article that accomplishes a rare thing; reporting some good coming out of the Mexican drug war. I have a LOT of respect for President Calderon, and that should be obvious from many of my previous posts. This type of operation further reinforces my amazement at the lengths this man is willing to go to in order to attempt to wipe out corruption in Mexico - no small and probably an impossible task. Even though the individuals arrested were from different political parties - including Calderon's own party - accusations of plotting before the July 5th national elections are to be expected. Is Calderon immune from political scheming? I don't know; maybe, maybe not. If the officials were truly dirty - and I'm pretty confident they were - then they needed to be arrested anyway. If that benefits the President and the ruling party, I'm sure they're not going to complain. What does concern me is something I'm glad the author brought up - the challenges of successful prosecutions. I hope, for Calderon's sake, that the evidence against these individuals is ironclad. These are high-profile people, and it would be quite an embarrassment to the Calderon administration if they walked due to insufficient evidence or corruption within the judicial system (a real possibility). I imagine not all of them will serve time or receive serious punishment, but at least Calderon is sending a message that it ringing loud and clear.

"Doing Business in the Time of Mexican Drug Chaos."

Here is an excerpt from Joel Millman's article in The Wall Street Journal:

"U.S. Customs agents got a surprise on April 9, when they checked a trailer of an 18-wheel truck crossing into El Paso, Texas, from Mexico and found more than 9,000 pounds of marijuana hidden among auto parts bound for U.S. factories. A startling aspect of the bust: The pot was  packed into a shipment belonging to auto parts giant Delphi Corp... The bust highlights one of border control's endless conundrums: how to deter clever criminals from manipulating security systems for their own benefit. In an era of open trade, Customs officials encourage exporters to beef up internal security measures to earn the privilege of fast transit through border checkpoints. Thousands of manufacturers, shippers and cargo expediters have been certified under a number of U.S. government programs that designate compliance. The unintended result of that compliance: Those same exporters are increasingly likely to be targeted by smugglers, who look to piggyback their contraband on legal cargo that makes low-friction border crossings, according to law enforcement officials... So far this year, there have been at least 80 attacks on moving cargo in Mexico." Link to Full Article

Analysis: This is a really good article that explains in a decent amount of detail yet another major crime in which DTOs and their enforcers are engaging - truck hijackings. There are so many negative effects that the threat of these hijackings have on both American and Mexican businesses, and the situation is oddly reminiscent of the attacks on convoys in Iraq. Who would ever have thought that trucks carrying flat-screen televisions in Mexico would need to travel in a caravan with a GPS locator and a panic switch? Now, there are two different problems occurring here; one is the targeting of cargo trucks by DTOs and their affiliates for the cargo they're carrying. The other is the use by DTOs of cleared cargo trucks to move drugs into the US; in most cases, it appears both the drivers and the cargo owners are oblivious to the extra product being transported in those trucks. 

Although the article addresses both issues, it really focuses on the former. There's not much more I can add to what the author has already explained, except to say how disturbing it is that this is the operating environment that both major corporations and trucking companies have to deal with in Mexico. The panic switches and GPS locators are a nice touch, but they can't prevent all hijackings, especially with the speed and precision with which groups like Los Zetas execute them. Fortunately, it sounds like it's just the cargo that's being targeted and not the drivers, so the odds of a driver living through a Mexican hijacking incident is pretty good, although it will definitely leave a few marks. It's also bad for both businesses and consumers, who will eventually pay for the cost of additional transport security.

As for the planted drug situation, there's not much information in the article explaining how those drugs make their way onto cleared trucks in the first place, or what companies are doing to prevent this from happening. In the Sharp Electronics case, it looks like they wouldn't have been able to do much, since the contraband was in boxes that came from a Mexican supplier. Fortunately the drugs were detected early on, but how? How many other companies have had this problem? If the narcos are surreptitiously planting this stuff on cleared trucks, does that automatically vindicate the cargo or truck owner since they didn't know what was happening, or should they be responsible for screening their shipments before they arrive in the US? I wish the author had expanded this aspect of the story a little bit because there's a similar controversy brewing in the rail sector. The US government has brought a suit against Union Pacific because drugs were discovered in their rail cars after they arrived in the US. The US government claims that Union Pacific should inspect their trains in Mexico before they enter the US, and that the company should be held accountable for any drugs that are discovered in their trains (Union Pacific disagrees, of course). I wonder what would have happened to Sharp Electronics if those drugs had been discovered in the US instead of prior to leaving the plant. 

Either way, it looks like the trucking industry has plenty to deal with. We can only hope that between CBP inspections at ports of entry, new technology being incorporated into those inspections, and self-inspections by companies operating in Mexico, it will become increasingly difficult to sneak drug shipments onto cleared commercial vehicles. We can also hope that truckers don't start installing heat-seeking missiles on their trucks or attaching .50-caliber rifles to their cabs for protection, or else the cost of your next TV will probably be out of your budget. 

"Border Inspections Impeding Traffic."

Here is an excerpt from Mike Allen's article in The San Diego Business Journal:

"Backups at the San Ysidro border crossing are a given, but a recent increase in spot inspections of southbound cars crossing into Mexico could have a devastating impact on business, two San Diego business organizations fear. In a letter sent to newly appointed border czar Alan Bersin, the San Diego Regional Chamber of Commerce and the South County Economic Development Council said that while security must be the highest priority of customs officials, “the need to ensure that commerce continues to flow is also extremely important. Outbound checks could have devastating impacts if these operations are done without regard for consequences to the business community and towns adjacent to the border,” the letter said... The increased checks result from enhanced efforts by the United States and Mexico to stop the flow of illegal drugs, guns, cash, stolen cars and fugitives into Mexico... There are times when traffic does back up for extended periods, but customs officers mitigate (the delays) as best as [they] can. Complicating the issue is a proposed vehicle checking program by Mexico announced last month. The program involves using a scale to determine whether a vehicle warrants further inspection. The process, which also involves photographing and checking license plate numbers, would increase the crossing times from 2 seconds to 7 seconds, according to a chamber official." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I'm sure you've heard the expression (or something similar) that when everything is a priority, nothing is. This letter states that security should be the highest priority, but the flow of commerce is also extremely important. So, which should take priority? It depends on whom you ask. I have a mixed opinion about this letter to Bersin; some of it I find whiny and exaggerated, yet many of the suggestions the Chamber makes sound reasonable. In particular, I'm curious about the complaint that the new inspection system would increase the "scan" time from two seconds to seven seconds. Of course, any small delay can initiate the domino effect and start backing up traffic, but every day, all day, on a continuous basis? I'm sure there will be traffic backups at certain times of day, but I don't know if the new inspection plan would cause the backups that the letter says are likely. 

As for the Chamber's suggestions, here they are: divert checked vehicles to secondary lanes; monitor delays and suspend operations when pre-determined impacts become clear; be more proactive in transmitting information about expected border wait times; and use new state Department of Transportation electronic signs to let drivers know about the wait times. These all sound reasonable, and this sort of traffic management system exists in plenty of metropolitan areas that have highway signs posting wait times. As for diverting checked vehicles, I don't know how easy or difficult that would be, especially if a suspicious vehicle is in the center lane of an eight-lane checkpoint. I also wonder how many of these measures are already ongoing, and if the Chamber and Council inquired about the traffic mitigation measures already in place or being planned before they wrote their letter. I'm trying not to be skeptical, but sometimes people write letters of complaint before doing their homework.

I'm also not completely ignorant of or insensitive to the needs of businesses and people who cross the border daily for business reasons. I'm just trying to put things into perspective regarding any new limitations that might be imposed by southbound inspections. I imagine that any Americans who drive into Mexico every day for work are already used to the sometimes hours-long wait to get back into the US at the end of the day, and just don't want to add an extra half hour or hour to their round-trip commute. Have there been similar letters of complaint to CBP in the past about the long wait to get INTO the US from Mexico regarding the negative impact on businesses? I'm sure there have been, but business has been pretty brisk, the recent economic downturn notwithstanding. I'm just not seeing how a possible delay in southbound traffic would make things so much worse for US businesses along the border when the (probably much longer) northbound delay has been around for so long.

Bottom line, you can't have it both ways. If you want to stop money and guns from going south, you have to check vehicles. I'm not here to argue whether the decision to do that is right or wrong or whose responsibility those checks should be. The delays worry some people, no matter who's doing the checking. But the flow of guns and money, while it probably can't be stopped, needs to be slowed. This is part of the answer right now, and I'm sure we're all curious to see if and how well it works. If the Mexican government had decided to start inbound checks at the border instead of CBP starting outbound checks, I'm curious to whom the Chamber and Council's letter would have been addressed.

"Bold prison break? Just another day in Mexico's drug war."

Here is an excerpt from Sara Miller Llana's article in The Christian Science Monitor:

"A convoy of cars carrying more than two dozen suspected drug cartel members disguised as Mexican police officers arrives at the Zacatécas state prison before dawn. Their helicopter hovers overhead. Minutes later, the men help more than 50 inmates – many of them suspected drug traffickers – flee the prison. A countrywide manhunt ensues. No, this is not a script for a B movie. It's just another day in Mexico's high-stakes war on drug trafficking – Saturday, in fact. The story grabbed headlines worldwide. But for Mexicans – who have now grown accustomed to fugitives on the lam and traffickers taunting the state with death threats and even banners hung in public spaces to recruit new members – it was business as usual... Many of those who fled from the Cieneguillas prison in Zacatecas over the weekend are believed to be members of the Gulf cartel, one of the major organizations fighting the Mexican state and their rivals to preserve corridors to the illegal drug market in the US... Prison breaks are nothing new in Mexico. In 2001, Mexico's most wanted drug lord, Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, escaped from a high-security prison – reportedly in the back of a laundry truck. And there have been at least three breaks in Zacatecas in recent years. Such attempts began in the late 90s..with the emergence of the Zetas, who are the security enforcers for the Gulf Cartel." Link to Full Article

Analysis: A few people have asked my opinion on this prison break, and at first I wasn't really sure how to comment on it until I saw this article. There are just a few things I want to mention, which the article highlights quite nicely. First, the expertise of Los Zetas. Prison breaks and hostage rescues are two things older members of Los Zetas (i.e. former GAFES soldiers who were trained at Fort Benning) were actually trained on during their Mexican army days. I'm sure many of them have passed on these skills to newer recruits, and this prison break is a good example of that training. Second, yes, of course there was inside help - how could you have a prison break without one shot fired if a good number of prison personnel aren't in on the plan? And finally, although this prison break received a lot of press, it's not exactly the first time something like this has happened, and certainly not a first for Zacatecas. As I've said before, the only thing that DTO members and leaders fear is extradition to the US. Why? Because if they get thrown into a Mexican prison, they either live like kings for just a few years, or get busted out in an operation like this one. If they go to prison in the US, they're staying put for a LONG time. So, not only is it hard enough for the Mexican government to put these thugs in jail; apparently, it's a real problem to keep them there.

"New reason for Mexican immigration to US: Drug violence."

Here is an excerpt from Julie Wolf's* article in McClatchy Newspapers (DC):

"Mexican immigration to the United States has been almost entirely an economic issue for the past few decades. Politicians have fine-tuned their positions around what to do about illegal immigrants who supposedly take jobs from Americans. Now, however, as violence on the border continues to increase, a new kind of immigrant to the United States is appearing: people seeking asylum to escape the drug-fueled brutality in Mexico... Already, there have been two celebrated cases of asylum-seekers: a journalist who fled the northern state of Chihuahua after drug cartels threatened him, and the mayor of Ciudad Juarez, a major border city opposite El Paso, Texas, who pulled out when drug traffickers threatened his family. Though both succeeded in getting into the U.S., their tactic is still relatively untested in U.S. courts... Ana Maria Salazar, a U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense during the Clinton administration who's now a political commentator in Mexico City, said...'Many people fearing for their lives in border towns are moving to big cities within Mexico," said Salazar, who has Mexican and American citizenship. 'As descriptions of the violence continue to become public, there will definitely be talk about the refugee status' in the U.S., although she adds that the violence would have to be 'very high.'" Link to Full Article

*Wolf is a student at Penn State University. This story was reported from Mexico City for a class in international journalism.

Analysis: Lately, more has been written and speculated regarding the touchy subject of Mexicans who are fleeing drug violence claiming asylum or refugee status in the US. I'm glad there are two high-profile examples in the article, and that the author mentions the tactic is relatively untested in US courts - that's very true. I'm also wholly unaware of how many asylum requests have been made by Mexican nationals fleeing drug violence in border cities or elsewhere in Mexico, and what portion of those requests have been granted. I could find out through official channels, but I probably wouldn't be able to share the information with you on this blog. So, let's stick to the stuff I can talk about and use to inform you.

The US Refugee Program and guidelines for requesting asylum might seem clear-cut when you look at the US State Department guidelines, but the interpretation of "persecution" is usually completely subjective. From the Iowa Bureau of Refugee Services: "Refugees, according to the United States Department of State, are persons of special humanitarian concern who can establish persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion... Each year, the President of the United States, after consulting with Congress and appropriate agencies, determines the designated nationalities and processing priorities for refugee processing for the upcoming year. The President also sets annual ceilings on the total number of refugees who may enter the U.S. from each region of the world." From the US Customs and Immigration Service: "[An] Asylum Officer or Immigration Judge will determine if you are eligible [for asylum] by evaluating whether you meet the definition of a refugee... The determination of whether you meet the definition of a refugee will be based on information you provide on your application and during an interview with an Asylum Officer or at a hearing before an Immigration Judge."

So the question becomes, do Mexican nationals fleeing drug violence fear persecution based on their race, religion, nationality, membership in a social group, or political opinion? Before I answer that with my own opinion, I'd like to present an example of two large immigrant groups in South Florida who have been at odds over US asylum policy for decades: the Cubans and the Haitians. Both Cuban and Haitian immigrants make dangerous journeys through often treacherous waters in vessels that would blow your mind with their deplorable conditions. Since 1994, Cuban immigrants have been subject to the US government's wet-foot dry-foot policy. Essentially, this means that if they make it to dry land on US territory, their political asylum claims will pretty much be automatically granted under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966. Although Haiti's government is complete crap, their economy has been in the toilet since the Haitian Revolution burned the country to the ground, and murders and kidnappings are a daily occurrence, Haitians usually have to emigrate like everyone else and are not automatically granted asylum for economic or security reasons. The difference between Cuba and Haiti? Cuba is still a communist country, and Haiti is not. Like it or hate it, that's the realit when it comes to current immigration law.

Based on this historical example, the prospects for granting asylum to Mexican nationals fleeing drug violence don't look good right now. You can easily throw out the race, religion, and nationality categories of persecution. You can probably throw out political opinion as well, as DTOs and their enforcers don't really care who Mexicans vote for. I think where things get into the gray area is the "membership in a particular social group." High-profile politicians, law enforcement commanders, etc. might fit into the social group of elites who are threatened - directly or just by virtue of their positions - by DTOs. That's probably how the journalist (a group of people who are routinely threatened and sometimes murdered for stories they publish) and the mayor were granted asylum. As for the average Mexican Joe (or Jose, if you will), trying to find that all-encompassing category would be difficult, especially if you have a checkered past or criminal record (all asylum seekers must submit to a background check). Just being a Mexican citizen who is afraid of being killed by narcos won't cut it, especially when historical evidence shows that truly innocent civilians aren't typically in danger of being murdered or kidnapped in Mexico - unless they're DEA informants, of course. Unless President Obama - in consult with Congress - changes the rules, Mexican nationals are going to have to follow the exisiting rules the same as Haitians and everyone else trying to get to the US.

"Gun show legislation is a diversion from addressing the real problem of illicit drugs."

Here is an excerpt from J. R. Labbe's column in The Star-Telegram:

"There's a practical reason the proposed law requiring private gun owners to conduct background checks on potential buyers at a gun show is unworkable. Only federally licensed firearm dealers have access to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System, or NICS. An individual gun owner, who's paid a rental fee to set up a table at a gun show to sell from a personal collection, can't place that call, which is probably why Democratic Sens. Frank Lautenberg, Dianne Feinstein and Jack Reed think that it's a peachy idea to make it part of federal law. Lautenberg, of New Jersey, recently filed a bill that would "close the gun show loophole" by making a nonlicensed person who wants to sell a gun "use an FFL (Federal Firearms License) at the gun show to complete the transaction." Question: Who's going to force the FFL holder, who's invested a lot of time and money to meet the requirements for getting that license, to take time away from his or her business to run a check for the guy at the next booth? Even if one agrees to do it, there will no doubt be a hefty fee for the service. Say goodbye to private collectors at gun shows." Link to Full Column

Analysis: Well, yes and no. This is a very passionately written opinion column that makes some good points, but there are some items that are not completely correct and need to be clarified.

First, let's talk about the Federal Firearms License, or FFL. You have to apply for one by filling out an ATF Form 7 and following the ATF guidelines for applicants. You CANNOT apply for an FFL for the sole purpose of selling guns at a gun show. The FFL is issued for one location only - the location where you would ostensibly run your firearms business. The FFL will allow you to sell guns at gun shows in the same state for which your FFL was issued, but the key is that you have to have that permanent business location. Also, the license isn't as expensive or time-consuming to acquire as the author might have you believe. The license costs $200, is good for three years, and costs $90 to renew. Yes, you can still sell your weapons to people (in some states) at your home, in a parking lot, or wherever without an FFL. Yes, if a law like this passes, most private sellers will be inconvenienced by not being able to sell their guns at gun shows when they can still legally sell them elsewhere, and there is an element of silliness to that.

Now, legislative and political issues aside, let's talk about something the author doesn't mention, although it probably would have fit right in with her argument. The majority of guns that are purchased in the US by straw buyers are bought LEGALLY, from both licensed and non-licensed gun sellers. The straw buyers have clean backgrounds, fill out all the requisite forms, claim (falsely) that the guns are for personal use, then leave and pass the guns on to whoever is going to transport them south into Mexico. Passing legislation to close the "gun show loophole" and remove non-licensed sellers from gun shows isn't, in my humble opinion, going to make a dent in the weapons trafficking problem because DTO-bound guns can still be bought through existing venues. 

As I've mentioned many times before in this blog, geographical proximity is constantly working against authorities trying to deal with this problem on both sides of the border. The straw buyer methodology is a great one for the DTOs, and unless you outlaw the sale of guns in the US altogether (which will never and should never happen), it's going to keep working. Passing new laws isn't going to help when you're having trouble enforcing existing laws. The focus needs to be on better enforcement, detection, and prevention of straw purchases with the cooperation of the licensed and non-licensed gun-selling community.

UPDATE: Playa Bagdad device was NOT a missile

Rather, it was an MK 25 marine marker. According to The Ordinance Shop:

"The MK 25...marine location markers are launched from aircraft or surface craft. They are launched from aircraft to provide day or night reference points for marking the course of enemy submarines in antisubmarine warfare operations. They are suitable for any type of sea-surface reference-point marking that calls for both smoke and flame for a period of 10 to 20 minutes... The Mk 25 marker consists of a cylindrical outer tube about 18.5 inches long and 2.9 inches in diameter. A valve assembly is fitted into the projecting chimney at the marker's nose end. The smoke and flame are emitted from this opening. At the opposite end is a heavier aluminum base assembly to which the outer tube is crimped. The heavy base end causes the marker to float in the water with the chimney out of the water and the base in the water."

Here's a photo of what the hotel employee actually found:

Here is an image of what the Mexican authorities claimed they found to El Universal:

Now, I suppose that after enough tequila, you might mistake the marine marker for the very front end of the missile portion of an SA-7. Still, this is yet another example of the Mexican authorities greatly exaggerating claims of high-powered weapons they've seized, or in this case, stumbled upon. If you remember, I posted a couple of weeks ago on a .50-caliber Browning "anti-aircraft" weapon that the Mexican authorities seized from a BLO stash. It wasn't even a real Browning, but a replica manufactured in Oregon. Why do the Mexican authorities invent these claims? Probably a couple of reasons; to make themselves and their efforts look better than they are, or to make the DTOs look more well-equipped and dangerous than they are so they can receive more counter-drug funding. I'm just speculating, but in this kind of war, one-upmanship means quite a bit to the parties involved.

"Mexican authorities seize Soviet-era missile in Playa Bagdad."

Here is an excerpt from this article on ValleyCentral.com:

"Mexican authorities are investigating the discovery of a Soviet-era anti-aircraft missile south of where the Rio Grande empties into the Gulf Of Mexico. The El Universal newspaper reported that a hotel employee from the beach resort community of Playa Bagdad made the discovery on Thursday night. The newspaper reported that the discovery prompted the mobilization of the Mexican navy, soldiers and police. Authorities seized the missile and searched the area for other explosives but did not find any. El Universal reported that the type of missile seized is fired from a shoulder launcher and has a range of a little over two miles. The newspaper reported that the seized weapon  is a first-generation Soviet military heat-seeking missile." Link to Full Article

Analysis: It's still too early for me to be able to do more than speculate on the origins of this missile, but I'll do just that. The Spanish El Universal article has a few more specifics on the missile capabilities, and I wish the Mexican authorities would have just come out and said the make and model. From what very little I can gather (and again, the better info is in El Universal, if you read Spanish), there's a chance the missile might be an old Soviet SA-7:

"In 1972 the Soviet Union introduced what is known as the SA-7.  It is what is now known as a'1st generation' MANPAD (man portable air defense).  It is a shoulder launched passive IR  seeking missile.  It is passive meaning that it emits nothing that can be detected (such as a laser or radar signal).  It’s basic operation is based on the seeker head.  The head is an uncooled seeker that can detect heat signatures in the medium Infra-Red bands of the electromagnetic spectrum.  This basically corresponds with the energy emitted from the exhaust of an engine." (source: http://en.allexperts.com)

As for what an SA-7 was doing on a Mexican beach (if, in fact, that's what it was), that's anyone's guess. Maybe it fell off a gun-running boat and washed ashore. Maybe an arms shipment was brought to shore there for a DTO and that one got left behind. Maybe it made the trip from Cuba to Mexico because it was unhappy with the Castro brothers and communist rule. Bottom line, there are currently no images available of the missile, and only two news stories that I can find on the incident...not exactly independent confirmation from multiple credible sources. If more information becomes available, I'll post an update.

"DEA: Bribes taint late Mexican drug czar."

Here is an excerpt from Dane Schiller's article in The Houston Chronicle:

"A highly trusted former deputy attorney general, who later became Mexico’s drug czar and was embraced by Washington until his death, is accused in a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration report of taking bribes from one of Mexico’s oldest narcotics trafficking

 cartels. Jose Luis Santiago Vasconcelos, killed in November in a mysterious plane crash over Mexico City, is among three senior federal law-enforcement officials named in an April 21-page DEA briefing on organized crime and drug trafficking south of the border. Vasconcelos was never charged with a crime. The other two are being prosecuted by Mexico. The report, prepared as a primer on drug cartels, does not say when, or how much money was allegedly taken by Vasconcelos... When contacted Wednesday, DEA spokesman Garrison Courtney, said the agency could neither refute nor offer a source for the highly charged allegation, which appears in the report as fact. The information was included without being fully vetted for release, Courtney said. Tony Garza, the former U.S. ambassador to Mexico who knew Vasconcelos personally, said he was respected and trusted, but not above suspicion... Three retired DEA agents, who held senior posts and knew Vasconcelos, said it’s hard to believe he was corrupt and noted it doesn’t take long to be smeared in Mexico." Link to Full Article

Analysis: There are two main things I'd like to point out in this story. First is the obvious oversight by DEA in their DTO primer presented to a mostly non-expert audience. I've read the report, and it's a very basic overview of the problem in Mexico, with sections on each of the major DTOs - not unlike the ones I've posted on this blog. Unfortunately, it appears whoever put those sections together - particularly the section on Arturo Beltran Leyva - did a quick cut-and-paste job without checking several sources, and without citing the information. Although it may sound like it, I'm not knocking the DEA; they know their stuff, and I'm going to give them the benefit of the doubt by assuming the person or people who put this briefing packet together were not experts on the BLO and had no idea of the magnitude of the allegation being made about Vasconcelos. It was almost sheer luck that someone who knew Vasconcelos personally and knew of the esteem in which he was held by the US government noticed the glaring error in the report. Unfortunately, when the DEA was questioned about this, they were unable to cite the source for the information, and couldn't even speculate as to whether the information came from law enforcement data, wiretaps, or even open sources. As embarrassing as it is, the DEA is not the only agency to have this problem. I've seen numerous government assessments, reports, and documents that are not properly cited, with only a general statement saying the information was culled from various official/government and open sources. Good, solid citations not only help the readers of such reports assess the credibility of those sources - and thus the report - but also serve as a CYA for the agency that created the report. 

My second point is the ease with which anyone in Mexico can be painted with the corruption brush. It's easy to understand why this happens, as corruption has been tolerated - and has even been socially acceptable in many places - throughout Mexico for hundreds of years. Reading about a senior Mexican government official taking bribes from the BLO in an official DEA report wouldn't surprise most people, with the exception of those few Americans who are very familiar with Vasconcelos personally and his reputation. President Calderon has made it his personal mission to wipe out corruption in Mexico. Unfortunately, the impossible is made even more so because not only does he have to eliminate corruption itself, but the perception or suspicion of corruption. That suspicion taints relationships between government officials, law enforcement agencies, and the general public. Wiping out corruption in Mexico may take forever, but eliminating that suspicion and mistrust may take forever and a day.

"The Sicario: A Juárez hit man speaks."

Here is an excerpt from Charles Bowden's article in Harper's Magazine:

"I am ready for the story of all the dead men who last saw his face. As I drank coffee and tried to frame questions in my mind, a crime reporter in Juárez was cut down beside his eight-year-old daughter as they sat in his car letting it warm up. This morning as I drove down here, a Toyota passed me with a bumper sticker that read, with a heart symbol, i love love. This morning I tried to remember how I got to this rendezvous. I was in a distant city and a man told me of the killer and how he had hidden him. He said at first he feared him, but he was so useful. He would clean everything and cook all the time and get on his hands and knees and polish his shoes. I took him on as a favor, he explained. I said, 'I want him. I want to put him on paper.' And so I came. The man I wait for insists, 'You don’t know me. No one can forgive me for what I did.' He has pride in his hard work. The good killers make a very tight pattern through the driver’s door. They do not spray rounds everywhere in the vehicle, no, they make a tight pattern right through the door and into the driver’s chest. The reporter who died received just such a pattern, ten rounds from a 9mm and not a single bullet came near his eight-year-old daughter. I wait. I admire craftsmanship... I have spent years getting to this moment. The killers, well, I have been around them before. Once I partied with two hundred armed killers in a Mexican hotel for five days. But they were not interested in talking about their murders. He is." Link to Extended Excerpt on Anderson Cooper 360

Analysis: THIS is what an interview with an assassin should look like. It is a gripping ten-page account of the interview between the author - a veteran and award-winning journalist - and the subject, a world-weary and repentant sicario who has been staying out of the business for the last two years. The article is gripping, intense, and incredibly vivid in its detail and emotion. It's unfortunate that you can only read an excerpt of it online, but it's completely worth the drive to your local bookstore to pick up a copy of May 2009 edition of Harper's in order to read it (and thanks to James Creechan and Lindsay Beyerstein for recommending this!).

There are a few things about the article that I want to point out, which will hopefully encourage those of you with a profound interest in this topic to go out and buy the mag. First, the writing is really good. Yes, it's very dramatic and reads like a novel in some places. But isn't that what keeps you interested? Bowden, unlike some writers, doesn't use that tactic to detract from shaky "facts" or a mediocre story. The subject and the interview are very grave, which merits a degree of drama, in my opinion. I think it adds context and perspective, especially for those who don't follow border violence issues and don't realize just how bad things are in some places in Mexico.

Several important aspects of the drug smuggling business are revealed here, and it's not in a question-and-answer format that makes you wonder whether or not the answers were planted or the subject was set up to answer in a certain way. For example, the subject explains at great length that he never really knew who he was working for. He got orders, carried them out, and got paid in cash, booze, drugs, and women. He had rules to follow, and as long as he followed them, he stayed alive.

He explains that towards the end of his "career," after things started getting really bad in 2006, he was kidnapped twice. He talked about how his captors and torturers were amateurs in their methods - something I've noticed going on in the Tijuana area for about a year or so. This is part of what's contributing to the more grisly slayings and collateral damage - the fact that some newer hitmen are inexperienced, not as likely to follow the rules, and bloodthirsty. There's a part of the article where the subject talks about the difference between men that kill as a job and men that kill because they like killing. He felt that the men who enjoyed killing for its own sake were sick and needed to be killed themselves because they were a liability...an interesting viewpoint.

One of the more disturbing parts is his discussion of the corruption among Mexican law enforcement and the collusion between police and the DTOs. I knew corruption was widespread in many, if not most, areas of Mexico, but I had no idea it was this pervasive. The mere thought of Mexican cops taking part in kidnappings and torture - regardless of whether or not the victims are dirty themselves and owe money to a drug lord - is tough to swallow. However, it makes the problem of corruption so real, and helps the reader see what in incredible obstacle corruption poses to the Calderon administration.

So if you haven't figured it out yet, I think this is an incredibly good read, and well worth the time, effort, and $6.95 to get it at the news stand. It's an insight into a world who some think they know, yet we've only begun to scratch the surface; we may never get to the day-to-day truth that lies deep beneath for so many in Mexico.

"Tubac checkpoint still a flashpoint."

Here is an excerpt from Jaime Richardson's article in The Sahuarita Sun:

"The Border Patrol checkpoint north of Tubac is killing tourism, putting residents in harm’s way and costing million of dollars in home sales, according to local business owners. But it’s also responsible for the seizure of tons of illegal drugs, hundreds of arrests and an increased sense of security in the area, Border Patrol officials say. The value of the temporary checkpoint at the northbound Agua Linda Road exit has been debated for years, but it was stepped up with last week’s announcement that expansion will begin in June... Carol Cullen, executive director of the Tubac Chamber of Commerce, is concerned that smugglers looking to get around the checkpoint are driven up the Santa Cruz River, Anza Trail or along railroad tracks and gas lines, pushing them closer to homes and people... The Border Patrol is awaiting results of a Government Accountability Office report on the effectiveness of permanent checkpoints, which is expected as early as June... The permanent checkpoint would be much larger, with about 10 buildings on 25 acres, with six to eight paved lanes and a covered inspection area... Mike Scioli, a spokesman for the Tucson Sector of the Border Patrol, understands the opposition but points out that many residents are thankful for the “second layer of defense” against smugglers and other criminals." Link to Full Article

Analysis: Before I make any comments on the information in this article, I'd like to provide some geographical context first. Tubac is a REALLY small town, with a population hovering at just over 1,000 people. It serves as a draw for tourists because of its galleries, shops, and boutiques. Tubac is located approximately 22 miles north of Nogales and the Arizona-Mexico border and 48 miles south of Tucson. The town sits right off of Interstate 19, and is surrounded by generally flat, desert terrain. The USBP checkpoint in question is approximately five miles north of Tubac. There are a few interstate exits between Tubac and the Agua Linda exit; however, one has to go through the checkpoint if headed to Alamo, Tucson, or any other major population center north of Tubac.

So, there are basically two sides to this argument: the argument by the business owners and residents of Tubac that feel the checkpoint is a detriment to business and safety, and the argument by US authorities that the checkpoint is effective and its expansion will be a benefit. Each side has its merits, but the argument (as always) brings us to the sliding scale of security, with ease and convenience at one end of the scale and super-tight security at the other end. The point where most are happy lies somewhere in between, but that point moves on almost a daily basis sometimes.

I can understand that Tubac is probably losing some money due to the real or perceived inconvenience of the checkpoint. However, I'm a little skeptical about some of the claims quoted in the article. $5 million in lost home sales? Brasher Realty sells some modest homes, but also some pricey custom homes, land, and commercial property. Was it dozens of buyers that were interested in modest homes who changed their minds, or was it two wealthy buyers who signed contracts for a dozen acres and 5,000 sq ft custom homes? Hard to tell from the article. Also, is it constantly a 20-minute wait to pass through the checkpoint? I would imagine that after the expansion is completed, that wait time would be greatly reduced because of the increased number of lanes and additional systems with which to run checks.

I have to admit, I'm pretty floored with the seizure statistics: 40,000 pounds of marijuana seized at the Agua Linda Road checkpoint in the 2007-08 fiscal year; 200 pounds of cocaine; 500 arrests of Mexican and US citizens. From October 2008 through March 2009, agents at the checkpoint seized 19,000 pounds of marijuana and made more than 300 arrests; that's impressive by any standard, and one can't argue that the checkpoint isn't making a difference. But is it really giving the impression that crime is up in the area? Enhanced or increased law enforcement presence can do that, yes. But it can also give people a greater sense of security because they know cops are around. It's also possible that the Tubac view of crime is a little skewed; there's obviously plenty of criminal activity going on in the area if USBP is making that many arrests and seizing that much dope at that checkpoint. However, the impact of those incidents is probably not being directly felt in town five miles away in the form of gang violence, DTO-initiated murders or kidnappings, or drug dealing. 

Honestly, I feel bad that anyone has to lose money during these times, especially in such a small town that relies heavily on tourist dollars. However, you can't complain about border security not being tight enough, then complain again when USBP is doing their job in a place you don't like. Yes, tough enforcement often comes with a price, and it's unfortunate that many people in Tubac feel they're paying it. But this "not in my backyard" mentality is better applied to relocating Gitmo detainees than it is to the USBP doing a fine job of seizing drugs and arresting criminals like we've been begging them to do.

"Interview with a hitman."

Here is an excerpt from Todd Bensman's article on GlobalPost.com:

"Through Department of Homeland Security contacts, Texas journalist Todd Bensman arranged in November 2008 to interview a former Mexican special forces soldier who went AWOL and joined the Gulf Cartel's notoriously brutal The Zetas enforcement gang. The Zetas are responsible for thousands of murders and for operating houses of torture all along the Mexican side of the Texas border. The cartel foot soldier had left the organization several years prior to the interview, and had become a cooperating witness for the U.S. government in the upcoming trial of extradited Gulf Cartel leader Osiel Cardenas Guillen in Houston. The former gunman was produced for Bensman to interview on strict condition that his name and other revealing details not be publicly disclosed, for his protection. Bensman questioned the Zeta about how his gang procured American weapons." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I'm always up for reading an interview with a former member of Los Zetas or Los Pelones, or any other sicario that used to work for a DTO in Mexico. They don't give interviews to the press very often, and when they do, you have to be careful about what you believe. It's difficult to get good informants to really penetrate the DTO hierarchies, especially into their higher levels, so when information like this is made available to the general public, we want to gobble it up. There are two things to keep an eye on, both with this interview and other rare interviews with former DTO hitmen: the veracity of the information they provide, and the biases or intentions of the interviewer.

First, let's examine the information provided by the subject. He left Los Zetas many years prior to the interview, so there's a pretty good chance that his information regarding cartel operations has changed significantly. In the past year, Los Zetas have left the service of the Gulf Cartel, worked shortly for the BLO, then pretty much struck out on their own. That means there's a chance they're procuring different weapons or from different places. However, there's also a good chance that they had a good thing going with certain guns and certain US suppliers, and not much has changed - we just don't know. The subject identified his organization's weapons of choice as M-16s, AR-15s, and H&K models; that matches up to information the ATF has publicized. However, there seems to be some public dissent (based on blog commentary) regarding how easy (or difficult) it is to convert certain weapons from semi-auto to full auto. Personally, I think an argument can be made for either side, as I've seen convincing information telling me it's easy to convert some weapons and next to impossible to convert others without serious time, equipment, and expertise.

The information the subject provides regarding the movement of guns from the US into Mexico also matches up with what we know from US border agencies. However, I'm a little skeptical about the statements he makes regarding the acquisition of Barret sniper rifles, grenades, and rocket launchers. Those are NOT easily purchased by just anyone in the US, as they are military grade weapons, and are usually obtained elsewhere in Mexico or from other Latin American countries. I am, however, more likely to believe his claims that there wasn't much need to cover up or erase serial numbers or other markings on weapons because either the Mexican police were inept investigators or being paid/threatened to protect the DTOs.

As for the journalist/interviewer, he definitely had an angle, and that was to focus on the southbound weapons trafficking issue. I can't blame him, as that's the hot topic du jour in the media these days. It seemed to me he was trying to make the point that yes, the majority of weapons used by DTOs come from the US. That's fine with me, as that has always been my stance on the issue, and it's fascinating to see that information come "first hand" from a former DTO enforcer. I put that in quotations because there will always be critics of what the subject is saying, or the parts of the interview the journalist or editor selected for publication. I know there is limited time and space for inclusion of parts of that interview, and I would love to know if there was more to it than that. Personally, I would have rounded out the questions a little more, asking more about tactics, training, organization, involvement in human smuggling, kidnapping, etc. Even taken with a large grain of salt, the interview is thought-provoking; hopefully a journalist can soon snag an interview with someone less removed from the action.

"Schemes to cross border getting bolder."

Here is an excerpt from Moises Mendoza's article in The Houston Chronicle:

"U.S. Border Patrol agent John Lopez has seen it all: Men hiding in tiny holes in the ground, in car trunks and behind seat backs. He’s even captured an illegal immigrant hiding in a suitcase... Each year, agents see many brazen attempts to sneak people and drugs into the U.S. But as border enforcement has stepped up in the past two years, smugglers’ schemes appear to be getting more creative and bolder than ever... Smugglers could be turning to craftier tactics because it’s harder than ever to sneak people across the border. Or, as some Border Patrol officials believe, this is nothing strange at all — smugglers are innovating all the time. Between January and March of this year, the Border Patrol captured 164,733 illegal immigrants, compared to about 227,000 over the same period last year. It’s not clear whether the decrease is due to increased enforcement or an ailing economy with few jobs to draw immigrants." Link to Full Article

Analysis: This article makes two main points, both of which are well-presented and important to make note of. First is the point that smugglers have always been creative, and new and crazy ways of bringing people or drugs across the border doesn't necessarily have to be in immediate response to enforcement efforts, the loss of a plaza, etc. Successful drug smugglers know that a portion of their product will be lost to seizures, stolen loads, or lost/dropped loads. They factor this in as a percentage and thus the cost of doing business. Smugglers also know they can reduce their loss percentage by spreading their product around to different smuggling avenues, some of which will inevitably be more successful than others. Some of these methods include the use of backpackers, all-terrain vehicles, ultralights, border tunnels, go-fast boats, and drug submarines. Moving people is a bit of a different story, and allows for a little less creativity simply because people need to breathe, eat, drink water, and relieve themselves, limiting the amount of time and space a person can be cramped into an object or compartment. Ultimately, the creativity just makes good business sense, in addition to helping smugglers thwart the authorities.

The second point is that it's hard to pinpoint exactly why less people are being arrested and detained for attempting to cross the border illegally. I don't think you can point to a single factor. Yes, I believe the ailing US economy has something to do with it. However, the Mexican economy is also ailing - some would say more so than the US - and job prospects for illegals in the US are probably still better in most respects than they are in Mexico. I also think improved enforcement has something to do with it. While CBP and USBP still don't have as many people as they need to maintain control of every square inch of the US-Mexico border - which in some places is extremely rugged and inaccessible during bad weather - the technology available to them has improved significantly. But you can't rely completely on gadgets. Previous deployments of National Guard troops to the border have provided hundreds of extra eyes, which free up USBP agents to conduct apprehensions. Sensors, scopes, helicopters, improved roads, and just plain additional bodies are helping with the enforcement effort.

Bottom line, the creativity will continue, both in the drug and human smuggling arenas, and due to both business/economic reasons and enforcement efforts. Based on the stories in this article and personal anecdotes I've heard from CBP officers, I can't wait to see how crazy these smugglers can get.

IN FOCUS: The Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act

On December 3, 1999, President Clinton signed into law the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (the “Kingpin Act”). The Kingpin Act blocks all property and interests in property, subject to US jurisdiction, owned or controlled by significant foreign narcotics traffickers as identified by the President. In addition, the Kingpin Act blocks the property and interests in property, subject to US jurisdiction, of foreign persons designated by the Secretary of Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General, the CIA Director, the FBI Director, the DEA Administrator, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State, who are found to be: (1) materially assisting in, or providing financial or technological support for or to, or providing goods or services in support of, the international narcotics trafficking activities of a person designated pursuant to the Kingpin Act; (2) owned, controlled, or directed by, or acting for or on behalf of, a person designated pursuant to the Kingpin Act; or (3) playing a significant role in international narcotics trafficking. 

Significant foreign narcotics traffickers and foreign persons designated by the Secretary of the Treasury are referred to collectively as Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers. Foreign persons designated under the Kingpin Act are referred to as "[SDNTK]s" on the Office of Foreign Assets Control's listing of "Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons" to differentiate them from the Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers named under Executive Order 12978. US persons are prohibited from engaging in any transaction or dealing in property or interests in property of [SDNTK]s and from engaging in any transaction that evades or avoids the prohibitions of the Kingpin Act. These prohibitions affect trade transactions as well as accounts, securities, and other assets.

Since the inception of the Kingpin Act, dozens of top Mexican DTO members have been added to the SDNTK list, including the Arellano Felix brothers, Osiel Cardenas Guillen, Ismael Zambada Garcia, Joaquin Guzman Loera, and Vicente Carrillo Fuentes. In June 2004, the AFO and VCFO were added to the list as organizations. In June 2007, the Gulf cartel was added, and in May 2008, the BLO was added. Most recently, in April 2009, La Familia Michoacana, Los Zetas, and the Sinaloa Federation were added to the SDNTK list as organizations.

"Mexican mayor: Army will fight cartels permanently."

Here is an excerpt from Maria Sanminiatelli's article in the Associated Press:

"The mayor of one of Mexico's most troubled border towns said Tuesday he expects to keep army troops in place to fight drug violence even after a revamped police department resumes its duties. About 5,000 troops moved into Ciudad Juarez in March and took over police operations in the violence-scarred town across the border from El Paso, Texas. It is part of a larger move by the government of President Felipe Calderon to send 45,000 troops to patrol territories long ruled by narcotraffickers. Mayor Jose Reyes Ferriz said in an interview with The Associated Press that he expects about 2,000 army troops to remain in Juarez permanently 'so that the army can maintain a presence against organized crime'... 'At the end of the year we will have a robust police department with at least 3,000 officers,' Reyes Ferriz said. He said the city needs a total of 4,000 officers, noting that organized crime preys on towns along the U.S.-Mexico border... The mayor said crime is down 90 percent since the army arrived in March. But, tensions flared early on as army troops showed clear distrust for the police force — especially after three police cars were discovered filled with drugs, Reyes Ferriz said." Link to Full Article

Analysis: Unfortunately, this story has "no good can come of this" written all over it. Just the very thought of a permanent military occupation in a Mexican city - regardless of its recent violent history - must send shudders down many spines. I'm very concerned that although the Mayor seems to have a plan in place for cleaning up his police force and making it more robust, he still feels the need to maintain a permanent garrison of 2,000 army troops to keep them honest. He obviously lacks confidence in his own plan and internal security measures. This move also sends a bad message to the people of Cuidad Juarez - we've "cleaned up" our cops, but we're keeping the army here "just in case." From what I recall, the amount of complaints regarding alleged human rights abuses by the army has been particularly high in Cuidad Juarez - probably because the city currently has the largest army presence. If many of those allegations are founded, then a continuing military presence will draw the ire of the city's population. Finally, I'm not surprised to read of the tension and distrust between the army and the police. That situation would likely get worse under a permanent army presence. 

The implications of the Mayor's intended actions remind us that Calderon's army deployments to battle DTOs have been effective, but are not sustainable in the long-term. It's like putting the proverbial finger in the dike when the water starts spewing out; you may be able to plug that leak for a little while, but eventually the water will start spewing out somewhere else. And that has been the case with Mexican army deployments. They're effective in reducing crime in short order wherever they're sent, but they can't stay forever (although the Juarez Mayor might argue with that point), and the DTOs know this. So, they lay low for a few months until the army leaves, then they pick up operations where they left off. It's unfortunate that this is currently Calderon's only option, and its lack of sustainability is the primary concern for Mexico in the long-term.

"Mexican drug lord orders deadly force."

Here is an excerpt from Josh Meyer's article in The Baltimore Sun:

"The reputed head of Mexico's Sinaloa drug cartel has instructed his army of associates to use deadly force if necessary to protect their increasingly contested trafficking operations, even against U.S. law enforcement, according to authorities here and in Washington. The threatened offensive by Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, Mexico's most-wanted man, was described by U.S. officials as being highly unusual, given that his associates have avoided violent confrontations with American law enforcement officers, and have kept their blood feuds with fellow traffickers largely south of the border. Guzman is believed to have delivered the message personally in early March, during a three-day gathering of his associates in Sonoita, a small Mexican town just a few miles south of the Arizona border, according to U.S. intelligence bulletins sent to several state and federal law enforcement officials. The Sonoita meeting is one of many indications that Mexico's most-wanted man is becoming more brazen even in the face of a massive Mexican government crackdown on his activities and deadly turf rivalries with other traffickers." Link to Full Article

Analysis: I'm really concerned about this, as it's plausible enough to be true. I haven't seen the bulletin in question yet, and even if I had, I might not be able to comment on it anyway as it's probably marked as Law Enforcement Sensitive. So, going solely on the information in this newspaper article, I agree with the author's assessment that Guzman's brazenness is unexpected, yet not out of the realm of possibility with everything that the Mexican government has been doing to crack down on his operations. Still, DTOs have shied away from directly confronting US law enforcement because it's not good business sense to engage US authorities unless absolutely necessary.

I'm curious if the bulletin has more details regarding the rules of engagement, or ROEs, for US authorities. Did Guzman differentiate between engaging locals and feds? Did he order his people to fire only if fired upon? Did he offer instructions for disposing of any US law enforcement bodies after a deadly shootout, or were his orders only to shoot and run? These questions may sound inconsequential, but considering that DHS is drawing up a new (and I imagine lengthy) border response plan, the response to any intentional deadly-force engagement by DTOs with US local or federal law enforcement is likely to be bigger and more intense than it would have been, say, two or three months ago. All this being said, the order may just have been an attempt by Guzman to instill some courage (or at least bravado) in his drug runners, who may have been more prone to dump pricey shipments at the first sign of US authorities. Drug runners are mostly still wary of US law enforcement, but I think this information is plausible, and US law enforcement along the border is wise to be even more cautious than usual.